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Abstract 
 
Investigation of the European Union’s foreign policy towards Hamas acquires its significance 
as a topic from the undemocratic way in which the (supposedly) democratic EU pursues its 
strategy since, according to its own rhetoric, this should have been normatively undertaken. 
In examining inconsistencies and paradoxes in the EU discourse towards Hamas, and the  
determinants underlying such contradictions, the study scrutinizes questions of ‘how’ and 
‘why’, focusing mainly on identities and self-interests as lenses borrowed from 
constructivism and neorealism, as well as the influence of external actors on the way the EU 
functions towards Hamas.  
Behind such inconsistency stands a cultural-historical heritage, part of the mind-set of the 
European decision-makers. The contradictory status of the association between the two actors 
is formed by the main interactively-constructed and conflictual socio-political components 
arising from the reality of the EU as a stability-seeking and security-driven actor in Palestine, 
and the self-definition of Hamas as a freedom-fighter striving for the liberation of its lands. 
Being defenders of the culturally-drawn meanings given by the EU to Palestine as a 
‘promised land’ for the Jews within a two-state solution, and those given to it by Hamas as an 
‘Islamic Waqf’ is another field of identities’ clash between the two actors. The Israeli factor, 
regarded in practice as a fixed, constant and purely Western and European interest in the 
Middle East, along with the dominant influence of the US on its EU partner, are emphasized 
as main determinants of EU policy towards Hamas.  
On the macro and micro levels, the determinants of the EU decision making process, and the 
way the EU functions when its perceived interests are threatened must be understood when 
any decision on relations with the EU is taken, particularly by the Palestinian resistance 
factions. At the same time, the EU should also examine its own inconsistencies in dealing 
with Hamas as a ‘terrorist’ organization and boycotting its democratically-elected 
government, in order to avoid repeating the ‘trial and error’ approach with the new powers 
rising in the ‘Arab spring’ countries, and to adapt itself to change in Palestine accordingly. 
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Chapter One: Methodology and Literature Review 
 
This chapter consists of two sections; the first of which outlines the introduction, objectives, 
research questions, significance and methodology of the study, while the second is based on 
reviewing a sizeable collection of secondary sources relevant to the subject under 
investigation.  
Introduction 
It is clearly understood that the EU is one of the main players in today’s politics, not only in 
the Middle East, but also around the world. Although the notion of a united Europe emerged 
only 60 or so years ago, the main countries involved in shaping the political and economic 
trends of such an entity have been in touch with the ME region for hundreds of years.
1
 Even 
after the end of colonialism the relationship between these countries and the Middle East has 
continued, since, due to the interests of European states in the Middle East,
2
 the political and 
economic ties between these countries and their previous colonized states are in various ways 
still alive and active. Since the EU, following on from the EEC and the EC, began in 1993, it 
has played a significant role in the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, 
showing particular support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces, and other 
infrastructural works on the ground.
3
  However, despite the EU’s desire to play a substantial 
part in the political side of the peace process, the US has maintained a monopoly in this 
process
4
 and has not allowed the EU or any other powers to play a role of this kind.
5
     
 
                                                          
1
  Louise Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East (New York: OUP, 2005). p. 20-35 
2
  Ibid. p. 82-85 
3
  Natalie Tocci, 'What Went Wrong? The Impact of Western Policies Towards Hamas & Hizbollah', in Richard 
Youngs and Michael Emerson (eds.), Political Islam and European Foreign Policy: Perspectives from Muslim 
Democrats of the Mediterranean (Foreign and Security Policy, CEPS Paperbacks, 5/ 2007; Brussels, 2007).    
p. 14 
4
 Alain Dieckhoff, 'The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ', Inroads Journal, /16 (2004), 52-
62.  p. 54 
5
 Amine Hutaite, 'Euro-Israeli Military and Security Relations and Agreements and Their Impacts on the 
European Foreign Policy [Translated]', The Europeans Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian Issue (Beirut: 
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2010). p. 16; also  Costanza Musu, European Union Policy 
Towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process the Quicksands of Politics, eds Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent, and 
William Paterson Obe (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics; New York and UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010). p. 35 
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It is noticeable that the EU’s foreign policy toward Israel has not substantially changed since 
the 1950s. Europe is in fact still Israel’s second main supporter and protector after the US.6 
Nevertheless, despite the support given to Israel by the EU, its role as a full actor in the peace 
process remains unrecognized by the Israeli side. Thus, although the EU has tried to play a 
prominent role in this process, for several reasons that are explored below, Israel has not 
placed its entire trust in the EU.
7
     
On the other hand, the Islamists in Palestine, represented by the Hamas movement have been 
definitely contributing to the Palestinian political scene before the Oslo Agreements in 1993, 
while currently have more political power than ever before.
8
 The increasingly powerful 
presence of the movement poses a challenge for all parties involved in the Palestinian issue.  
Meanwhile, Hamas has succeeded in building a base of popular support among Palestinians 
and abroad, and has shown itself to be remarkably adept at putting many obstacles in the path 
of a peace process that does not correspond to its perspective on the rights of the Palestinian 
people. Commonly described as a ‘radical faction’ Hamas has ensured by both political and 
violent means over time, that it is so strongly-rooted and effective as a movement that no 
peace will be achieved without its imprint.
9
 Despite the severe wars which Hamas has faced 
since being elected in 2006, it is still one of the most powerful players in the regional 
equation. 
The overwhelming victory of Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary and municipal elections was a 
sudden shock for all concerned with the Palestinian issue. Hamas duly formed the Palestinian 
government; however, other secular parties who had participated in the elections refused to 
join the Hamas-led government preferring to stand in opposition. Shortly after, the 
relationship between Hamas and its rival movement Fatah (which had been the main leader of 
the Palestinians over the previous decades), reached a nadir as civil war broke out in the Gaza 
Strip between members of the two factions.
10
 At the same time, the Middle East Quartet, 
consisting of the EU, US, UN and Russia, not only gave its support to Fatah against Hamas in 
this quarrel, but also imposed a tough siege on the Hamas government in an attempt to force 
                                                          
6
    David Cronin, Europe’s Alliance with Israel Aiding the Occupation (London: Pluto Press, 2011). p. 34-55  
7
    Geoffrey Kemp, 'Europe’s Middle East Challenges', The Washington Quarterly, 27/1 (2004), 164 - 70. 
8
   It has been seen through the overwhelming electoral victory of Hamas in 2006 (74 Parliament seats for  
Hamas while its rival Fatah achieved just 46 seats).  
9
    Sven Biscop, 'The ENP, Security and Democracy in the Context of the European Security Strategy', (Global 
Europe Papers, 2008/3: University of Nottingham, 2008). p. 6 
10
   Rouba Al-Fattal, 'The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory', (Working Documents, 328; 
Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010). 
12 
 
it to accept the Quartet’s political conditions11 which were described by Hamas leaders as 
unfair and impossible. These conditions were expressed in the Quartet’s statements and 
reinforced on many occasions by the EU institutions; “The Quartet recalled its statement of 
January 30 and its call for the new Palestinian government to commit to the principles of 
nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, 
including the Roadmap.”12  
As discussed in the literature review in the second section of this chapter, many observers 
internationally are convinced that the EU’s behaviour in this matter has been unreasonable, 
and that it conflicts with the EU’s own democratic beliefs and values13 while many others 
have criticized Hamas for its inflexible stance in refusing to accept what should have been 
accepted of the international conditions that were put to it.
14
 Therefore, this study investigates 
in depth the background to the EU’s foreign policy towards Hamas between 2000 and 2010, 
the decade in which most of developments between the two actors took place, with some 
references to periods after or before this decade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
  MEQ, 'Quartet Statement', (London, S031/06:  30 January 2006). Daniel Möckli, 'The Rise of Islamists in the 
near East: The EU, the US, and Hamas', CSS Analyses in Security Policy (2:18; Zurich: Center for Security 
Studies (CSS), July 2007), 1-3. Ibid. Also  'After Mecca: Engaging Hamas  ', (Middle East Report N°62, 
2007). 
12
  Quartet Committee, 'Statement of the Quartet ', S099/06 (London: Quartet Committee, 30 March 2006).      
13
  For more details see: Al-Fattal, 'The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory'. Also, Tocci, 'What 
Went Wrong? The Impact of Western Policies Towards Hamas & Hizbollah'. See also, Carolin Goerzig, 
'Transforming the Quartet Principles; Hamas and the Peace Process', (Occasional Papers, 85; Brussels: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010). Also, Michelle Pace, 'When Liminals Interact EU-
Hamas Relations', Rethinking the Middle East? Values, Interests, and Security Concerns in Western Policies 
toward Iraq and the Wider Region, 1918-2010 (London: British Academy, 2010a). Ibid.And, Timo Behr, 
'Dealing with Political Islam: Foreign Policy-Making between the Union and the Member States', Fifth Pan-
European Conference on EU Politics (Portugal ECPR, 2010).  
14
   For further details, see the various schools of thought related to the EU policy towards Hamas, presented in 
the literature review below. See also: Behr, 'Dealing with Political Islam: Foreign Policy-Making between 
the Union and the Member States'., and Kemp, 'Europe’s Middle East Challenges',  ( also two works by 
Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas Vs. Fatah; the Struggle for Palestine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Jonathan Schanzer, 'Misguided Engagement', in Timo Behr (ed.), Hard choices: The EU's Options in a 
Changing Middle East (28: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2011). 
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Section One:  Methodology 
 
This section explains the research design that is used throughout the study. The research 
design is meant to be “the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial 
research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions.”15 Hence the data collection and 
analytical methods used, as well as other procedural steps pertaining to the questions 
themselves and their significance, the outline, and above all the theoretical approaches 
embarked upon, are all included in such a design, and are highlighted accordingly.    
Objectives of the study  
The EU’s policies are highly relevant to the Palestinians and their leadership, which means 
therefore that they must struggle to persuade the EU to take a more effective role in isolating 
the Israeli occupation. This study is dedicated to shedding some light on the EU’s policies in 
Palestine and, in particular, towards Hamas, or more precisely, to analysing perceptions
16
 of 
the EU’s policy towards Hamas during the period from 2000 to 2010, by ascertaining and 
examining the determinants and logic of that policy towards such an important movement in 
the ME. By scrutinizing the role of identities and self-interests in addition to other external-
internal factors that drive the EU’s discourse towards Hamas, the researcher aims to explore 
inconsistencies
17
 and paradoxes
18
 in this discourse. The objective is to establish whether the 
EU has jeopardized its reputation as a supposedly normative civilian power with a set of core 
values, and if inconsistencies resulted from this have supported its image as a normative actor 
or as a realistically-driven entity and why. Finally, the researcher is motivated to explore the 
possibilities for achieving a breakthrough in the existing relationship between the two parties, 
Hamas and the EU, and to formulate this relationship in a coexistent manner. Indeed, the 
suggestions and recommendations in the concluding chapter of this thesis might be regarded 
as a cognitive basis upon which such relationship might be constructed and secured.   
                                                          
15
  Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3 edn.: SAGE Publications, 2003).p. 20 
16
 The notion of “perception” means in this context, the way in which the EU views the ‘other’ in particular 
area, and a theoretical lens through which the EU positions could be identified in this area.      
17
  Inconsistency, adopted in this context, is a concept which means: the gap resulted from the socio-political 
acts and behaviours of decision-makers where the implemented policies are not compatible with the declared 
objectives, or where different contradictory policies are adopted in similar circumstances.  
   
18
  A definition of  ‘paradox’ that is adopted in this context means: ‘a statement or proposition which, despite 
sound (or apparently sound) reasoning from acceptable premises, leads to a conclusion that seems logically 
unacceptable or self-contradictory’. See http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/paradox 
14 
 
Research Questions 
This study attempts to answer one main question and other following sub-questions:   
 Why has the EU treated Hamas as a terrorist organization, and boycotted its 
democratically elected body since 2006?  
 
This gives rise to the following sub-questions: 
i. Does the EU contravene its core normative values and objectives (democracy 
promotion, Human Rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms)
19
 by 
categorizing Hamas as a terrorist organization
20
 and boycotting the Hamas-led 
democratic government thereafter? 
ii. What are the genuine determinants of the EU’s foreign policy towards Hamas?  
a) To what extent have the identities of both the EU and Hamas, their 
perceptions about the Arab-Israeli conflict, the specificity of Israel 
in Europe, and the EU’s dependence on the US, in addition to the 
Hamas behaviours, constituted main factors of the EUDM process 
towards Hamas?  
b) To what extent is the EUFP towards Hamas, based on the principle 
of self–interest, realistically driven? 
iii. How has the impact of the EUFP on Hamas been perceived? Has it proved the 
success or failure of the EU’s policy, and how? 
 
Significance of the Study 
After the outbreak of the Arab Spring
21
 at the end of 2010, this study took on an additional 
significance, with developments in the Middle East imposing many new challenges in 
international relations between the East and the West and pointing to a new Middle East with 
specific characteristics under formation. Up to the present, these characteristics show, 
surprisingly, that Islamic organizations have been dominant on the changing political scene in 
                                                          
19
 EU, 'Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union', (Vol: 53: O.J.C 83, 2010c). p. 19  For more details: Karen E. Smith, European Union 
Foreign Policy in a Changing World (2 edn.; Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). p. 6 
20
  See European Council, 'Notices from European Union Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies', (Brussels: 
Official Journal of the European Union, 31.5.2011). 
21
  Arab Spring; is a nickname given by the media to the continuing Arab revolution that has been seeking 
democracy since December 2010.  As is known, this revolution started in Tunisia, was followed by Egypt 
and subsequently spread to other countries in the Middle East.    
15 
 
this changing ME.
22
 Hamas has had weighty relationships with these resurgent Islamic 
movements in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and has equally important relations with 
Islamists in other countries that are expected to have their own elections and democracy in 
the future. Given that sooner or later these relations could significantly affect international 
relations in the ME, understanding the EU’s policy towards Hamas has increasingly provided 
substantial evidence of how the relationship between the EU and the rest of Islamists in the 
Middle East is perceived. Thus, solving this problematic area of research will enable both 
sides to have a cognitive basis upon which to construct better relations. Significantly, the geo-
strategic proximity of the ME with its new actors, and the EU countries which are 
accustomed to being cautious towards Islamists, make it necessary to develop a solid 
foundation upon which a stable neighbourhood might be situated, lest political explosions 
should occur which might negatively affect the entire region. Consequently, this area of 
research should be investigated to build up an epistemological basis of mutual understanding 
that would enable the two players to direct their capacities in a constructive way rather than a 
conflictive manner. 
To establish a base to build on, this study examines the EUFP towards Hamas from the year 
2000 up to 2010. It clarifies in depth the nature and reasons for the EU’s policy, factors that 
influence it, and the position of Hamas towards the EU agenda. It is expected that this will 
lead to an accurate diagnosis of the nature and logic of this policy, and how it fits with the 
agendas of other international actors worldwide. This research might also prove to be 
beneficial in overcoming the deadlock that has developed between the two parties. 
This work is also intended to influence policy-makers. Generally speaking, scholars involved 
in qualitative research are mostly concerned “with having their work taken seriously by their 
colleagues and by other policy actors.”23 Therefore, the researcher’s intention is to reach out 
for the truth and to present it in a persuasive manner that may affect policy-makers on both 
sides: that is the EU and Hamas. The study will also help by creating some useful background 
knowledge of the strategies and techniques used by the EU in making its policy towards one 
of the most effective, but controversial, movements in the ME. In light of this knowledge, 
                                                          
22
  See the results of the recent parliamentary elections (2011/12) in Tunisia and Egypt. Islamic groups achieved 
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policy-makers either in Hamas or in the EU may be able to review the way they approach 
each other, and Palestinians, particularly Hamas, might be more motivated to adopt a more 
imaginative policy towards the EU. Ultimately, this effort could aid other scholars in their 
efforts to achieve more in-depth studies, especially of the relationship between the West and 
Islamic Radical Movements (IRM) in the ME.  
Why the EU?  
When looking at influential external actors and designators of the present and future ME, 
observers might talk about a small number of economic and political super-powers; some of 
which are in direct contact with the ME, while others have proportional influence but 
intervene only indirectly. At the same time, some of them leave an economic imprint while 
others have heavy political and economic sway on the region. For example, even though 
China and Russia have had considerable say in international relations, especially in UN 
Security Council resolutions, they are still far from being able to exert any strong influence in 
the direction of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
24
 Russia lost significant parts of its clout after the 
end of the Cold War in 1989, while China has not yet proposed itself as an effective actor 
politically (rather than economically) in the region. 
However, due to their political and economic weight the main players in the Middle East are 
the US and the EU. In fact, while the US has been operating in the region since WWII, the 
EU, through its member states, has had a far longer historical relationship, which continues to 
affect the ME to this day: “the EU’s ‘presence’ is felt more or less everywhere in the world, 
albeit more in some sectors and regions than in others.”25 Certainly, when considering the 
positions of these two powers towards regional political issues in the ME, such as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, it would seem that the EU is more flexible and accommodating in its 
attitudes than the US. To put it more simply, due to several internal-external factors the US 
appears closed off with regard to the demands and legitimate rights of the Palestinians, while 
the EU typically tries to present itself more flexible and understanding.  
Inevitably, and owing to the geo-strategic proximity between Europe and the ME, there is a 
search for actors which can guarantee stability and prosperous future relationships rather than 
tense hegemonic associations. Significantly, given the necessity of prioritizing fields of 
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of Interregionalism', European Foreign Affairs Review /10 (2005), 535-52. p. 535 
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research in accordance with their importance in specific areas, securing this region and 
stabilizing European-Middle Eastern links requires an appropriate understanding of all its 
central components. This matter definitely implies scrutinizing those who seem ethically 
open and amenable, like the EU, rather than those who are likely to be politically irrelevant 
for the time being, like Russia and China,
26
 or who look as if they are politically blocked and 
immovable towards Palestine, like the US.     
Research Methods  
The researcher utilizes the qualitative research method, which enables in-depth rather than 
general or large-scale analysis. However, it “properly seeks answers to questions by 
examining various social settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings.”27  
Specifically, this study seeks to understand and interpret the behaviour of the EU in the 
context of Palestine. Therefore, it is essential to make use of qualitative research, or what 
Liamputtong and Ezzy describe as a flexible, fluid and interpretative research method, which 
typically focuses on meaning and interpretation. Thus, according to the same scholars, rather 
than documenting the world from the standpoint of the researcher it records realities derived 
from perspectives of people studied. Hence, this method aims to investigate specific vital 
experiences concluded from particular people in the social life and meanings given to these 
experiences. Furthermore, qualitative methods shed light on how people make sense of their 
experiences in ways that other methods cannot do.
28
 The ultimate aim of using this method is 
“to produce rounded understandings on the basis of rich, contextual and detailed data”,29 
which enables the researcher to formulate his findings accordingly. In this way, the EUFP 
towards Hamas will be analyzed in terms of the views of those who involved with either of 
the two parties in order to provide a more precise understanding of the nature of the EU’s 
policy.   
Data Collection   
Technically, this study is based on triangulation techniques in data collection
30
 and a variety 
of primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews is used efficiently throughout the 
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study. However, emphasis is placed on using as broad a variety of resources as possible, 
including formal statements, official announcements, press releases, and excerpts from 
speeches. This data was mostly gathered from various websites representing the EU as well 
as those representing Hamas. In addition, newspaper articles, websites, and other media 
outlets contributed noticeably towards this investigation, while personal interviews with a 
range of high-ranking politicians from the EU institutions, Hamas leaders and EU-ME 
experts is of benefit to the study’s search for accurate knowledge about the EU’s stance 
towards Hamas. This level of diversity is intended to provide a balanced, objective and 
comprehensive evaluation of the topic under investigation. Given the nature of the research 
and its focus on the EUFP, more emphasis is placed on the EU documents than others, to 
enable the researcher to build an accurate contribution. Thus, by activating variety of data 
collection in the researcher’s attempts to answer the study questions, the essence of 
triangulation will be achieved, and hence the reliability and validity of the conclusions will be 
significantly strengthened.   
Qualitative Interviewing 
As noted above, interviews were a major source of information for this study, alongside 
relevant official EU documents. As Jennifer Mason asserts, “interviews are one of the most 
commonly recognized forms of qualitative research.”31 Hence, investigating certain 
perspectives of people to be thoroughly understood, and linking specific phenomena or 
events to particular meanings could be first and foremost achieved by interviewing them; a 
matter that “provides a useful means of access”, as well as a very effective method of data 
collection.
32
 As interviews can be fully standardized or un-standardized, semi-standardized 
interviews seemed to be the most responsive kind for use in answering the questions of this 
thesis. However, as Mason claims, the interview concept itself typically refers to semi-
structured, loosely structured, or in-depth forms of interviewing with the assumption that any 
data gathered in this way results from patterns of interaction between the interviewees and 
their interviewer.
33
  
Thus, the ‘research’ conducted for this study is a ‘systematic enquiry’ which makes use of 
this method as a form of conversation in which the researcher represents one side while the 
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interviewees represent the other.
34
 Additionally, whereas interviews were the main instrument 
of this study for promoting engagement between EU and Hamas officials, in-depth or semi-
structured interviews were typically intended to examine the complexity and variable nature 
of meanings and interpretations that could not be highlighted by using other instruments.
35
 As 
Arksey and Knight have stated, these types of interview are designed to obtain information 
about people’s views, opinions, ideas and experiences.36 In particular, they help people to 
make explicit things that have hitherto been implicit, i.e., to articulate their tacit perceptions, 
feelings and understandings.
37
 
In another sense, using semi-structured interviews allows the interviewer to follow up his 
targets through questions directed at exploring implicit beliefs and meanings. Significantly, 
there are various sorts of questions that can be included in an interview; essential questions, 
extra questions, throw-away questions, and probing questions. Essential questions are meant 
to focus on the core of the study, while extra questions are similar to the essential ones but 
are worded differently. Another kind termed as throw-away questions is related to those 
“incidental or unnecessary questions for gathering the important information being examined 
in the study”, whereas probing question enable the interviewer to elaborate on answers 
received about specific questions.
38
 These questions were chosen according to their relevance 
to the topic under investigation, while directing the question types would be dealt with 
carefully and consciously.  Thus, the use made of such a method in this study is fully 
justifiable, and because the interpretations revealed of the EU’s foreign policy towards 
Hamas were not sufficiently persuasive: therefore, as discussed above, these in-depth modes 
of enquiry were needed and, at the same time, treated as a particular kind of dialogue which 
was employed to provide a better understanding of the question under investigation. 
The researcher’s interviewing journey started with gaining an ethical approval issued by the 
Ethics Committee in the College of Social Sciences and International Studies (SSIS). This 
essential approval authorizes the researcher to proceed in his fieldwork and to introduce him 
to the interviewees’ community as well as to reassure his targets about the academic 
objectives of the study. Both the interviewees and the researcher have to sign a consent form 
which contains, in addition to the researcher’s personal information, a brief summary about 
                                                          
34
   Arksey and Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists. p. 2 
35
   Liamputtong and Ezzy, Qualitative Research Methods. p. 56 
36
   Arksey and Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists. p. 96 
37
   Ibid. p. 32 
38
   Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. p. 75-6 
20 
 
the research. It also covers any preferences of an interviewee as to whether he or she would 
prefer to be recorded and quoted or to be anonymous and off the record. Whoever wanted to 
be named and recorded was given this right and vice versa. In fact, due to the topic’s nature, 
tackling Hamas, Israel, terrorism and resistance, some of the interviewees did not hide their 
desire to be kept anonymous, and so they were quoted as such with only referring to their 
institutional backgrounds.  
A sample of about 30 candidates for interviews was carefully chosen according to their area 
of concern. In addition an alternative list of ten other nominees was available in case of 
negative responses. As the main thrust of this thesis is on EU foreign policy towards Hamas, 
the main focus of the interviews was on EU officials from the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the Commission’s foreign affairs arm, the European Parliament delegation 
for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council and the delegation for relations with 
Israel as well as the EU Council. Therefore, a list of interviewees from these institutions was 
prepared and the candidates approached by the researcher, but it was clear from the beginning 
that while some of the requests received a positive response, other potential interviewees did 
not reply at all or, after a long wait, (in one case two months) answered negatively. Hence, 
large numbers of these interviews, which took place in Brussels, Turkey and the UK (face to 
face) or Gaza (by email or by phone) could not have completely succeeded without 
arrangements managed by third parties.   
In the case of the Brussels interviews, it would have been quite difficult to arrange meetings 
with high-ranking personalities in the EU and to gather the required data about such a topic of 
inquiry without the direct assistance provided by one of the Brussels-based NGOs, the 
Council for European Palestinian Relations (CEPR). Generously, the NGO’s channels of 
communications were used to fix appointments conducted with the targeted weighty EU 
figures mostly between May and July 2012. Eventually, 25 highly significant interviewees, as 
listed in the bibliography, were successfully approached. Prominent figures, such as Marc 
Otte, the former EU envoy to the MEPP during the period in which the Hamas-led 
democratically elected government was boycotted in 2006 took part a matter that enriched 
and widened the researcher’s knowledge and understanding of the EU context in which the 
latter functioned with Hamas. It was astonishing that most of those contacted from the EP 
delegation for relations with Israel refused to be interviewed after being informed about the 
topic in question; in fact, this reflected the cautiousness that they had about such 
controversial and sensitive subjects. Whereas the researcher was also interested in 
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interviewing policy-makers from the EU Council, he always failed in this and was referred to 
the Commission and the EP. However, this has not substantially affected data collection 
especially because those who were in touch with the Palestinians and involved with them 
over years had already been interviewed. In this regard, a significant amount of supporting 
documents was additionally gathered to foster the analysis of their discourse.  
At the same time, the main figures of the Hamas Foreign Affairs Department were also 
interviewed including Usama Hamdan, the Hamas International Relations Commissioner, 
consultants to Ismael Haneyyah, the Hamas Prime Minster in Gaza, in addition to other 
experts. Their responses to the EU officials’ criticism and opinions were highly important for 
drawing the picture from all sides. After meeting Usama Hamdan, the person in charge of the 
dialogue with Europeans, the author was keen to meet Alastair Crooke, the former security 
advisor to Javier Solana, especially as he was the official in charge of the EU-Hamas 
dialogue between 2000 and 2003. Unfortunately, due to his extensive workload, as his office 
informed me, he was unable to meet but he deeply apologized. Whereas meeting him could 
have been greatly enlightening, the inability to meet Crooke did not substantially affect this 
thesis as, in fact, he wrote articles about that period and was interviewed by newspapers on 
the same issues all of which was duly utilized.  
Generally speaking, the aim of approaching EU officials was to hear directly from EU 
decision-makers about their interpretations and explanations of EU policy towards Hamas 
and the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the period under investigation. Hearing from 
those figures in decision-making circles plus those observers and analysts who were involved 
in this analysis has added significant input to this thesis which has been profoundly built on, 
inter alia, interviewees’ insights. However, observing them answering specific questions and 
abstaining from responding to others or bypassing them reflects interestingly the extent to 
which they are prepared to discuss particular areas at the expense of others and why. As 
focussing on the inconsistencies and paradoxes of the EU policy towards Hamas and in an 
attempt to discover the reasons behind such contradictions, the semi-standardized interview 
used was divided into four areas of discussion which constitute the main axes of this research. 
These areas were decided after scrutinizing the vast scale of EU documents and observing  
EU behaviour towards the Palestinian cause over years as well as searching through other 
scholars’ contributions.  
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The first area examined the normative EU discourse and the way this was applied to 
Palestinian democracy in the year 2006, when Hamas came to power. The second area was 
dedicated to discover meanings given by the interviewees to the EU terrorism-violence 
debate as it appeared in EU declarations, statements and behaviour directed to either Hamas 
or Israel. In this respect, the interviewees’ perceptions of the right to the Palestinian 
resistance to the Israeli occupation compared to their perceptions of the Israeli right to self-
defence, were profoundly examined. The third concentrated on perceptions held by 
Europeans about the Israeli state and the common denominator between both actors, in 
addition to the role played by this denominator in steering EU foreign policy towards Hamas. 
The fourth area focussed on EU-US relations and the influence that the latter has had on the 
former in terms of the EU-Hamas relationship.  
Significantly, the interviewees had been asked to freely answer the open-ended questions of 
the interview and to express their convictions unreservedly as much as they could. All were 
informed that the researcher would use the interviews only for academic purposes, and every 
effort would be exerted to guarantee the highest level of confidentiality. They were reassured 
that gathering the data would be treated with full privacy according to the criteria of research 
ethics. Physically, the collected data was stored on either audio files (MP3) or in written 
format (DOC or PDF), as well as hand written notes saved on the researcher’s own 
computers, his drive at the university network, and on an external hard-drive as a backup 
copy. The researcher signed consent forms with the interviewees where applicable, stressing 
that all these reserved copies would be professionally secured by blocking them using 
sophisticated passwords while nobody would be entitled to know these passwords under any 
circumstances (except as may be required by law).  
However, despite all these assurances, the ‘newspapers-talks’ of the interviewees, particularly 
in Brussels, marked the deliberations between the interviewer and his interviewees. Basically, 
some of the latter were clearly inclined to refrain from revealing too much of their thinking 
on sensitive topics, for example relating to terrorism and resistance in the Palestinian-Israeli 
context. While some of their opinions were highly important and enlightening, there were 
others which could sometimes be seen as somewhat repetitive newspapers-talks which were 
less helpful when the researcher was trying to raise a solid argument based on reliability and 
credibility on the one hand, while uncovering definite realities or convictions hidden inside 
the minds of the interviewees on the other. Significantly, to overcome this problem, the 
author reinforced his work through in-depth research and extensive reliance on official EU 
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documents, along with the material gathered from the respondents. Hence, it was necessary to 
scrutinize these documents using Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) in addition to Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), as will be illustrated, which implied digging into texts and 
contexts alike, in order to expose the hidden meanings behind specific actions and positions 
of the EU discourse towards Hamas, and to compensate for the newspapers-talks of some of 
the interviewees.  
In the end, it is worth mentioning that, while recording most of the interviews was permitted 
by the interviewees, one of the Hamas leaders, for considerations of accuracy, preferred to 
send his answers by email. All these interviews were conducted in English except those with 
the leaders of Hamas which were in Arabic; in both cases no linguistic barriers appeared as 
an obstacle during the interviews.  
Analytical Method  
There is a range of methods that can be used to analyse data gathered through qualitative 
research.
39
 The most suitable of these methods is the one that accurately, deeply and precisely 
guides the researcher within the research process. Building on the interpretive approach for 
the analysis, this study basically made use of both Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) and 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), because of the intertwined relationship between them as 
well as their appropriateness for uncovering hidden meanings behind the EU’s policies and 
perceptions towards Hamas. Many scholars believe that the relationship between these 
methods of analysis is not separable, and that it is difficult to use one of them apart from 
implicit or explicit use of the other.
40
 In this regard and due to its focus on textual and 
contextual issues and the inter-subjective linkage between them, CDA is considered not only 
a method but also “a methodology for analysing social phenomena that is qualitative, 
interpretive, and constructionist. It explores how the socially produced ideas and objects that 
populate the world were created and are held in place.”41 Hence, the CDA provides the 
researcher with a method that takes into consideration texts and socio-political contexts alike, 
as well as the interaction process between variables of these units, or between “the social 
groups and the complex societal structures in which the discourse is embedded.” 
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Accordingly, discourse is meant to be “about the production and distribution of power, and 
struggles over knowledge, interests, identity and the social relations they enable or 
undermine”.42  
Significantly, it is almost impossible under this method of analysis to separate the discourse 
used by politicians from its broader context.
43
 In other words, analysts could refer to a 
particular set of texts during the research process but also “importantly to the social practices 
to which those texts are inextricably linked”.44 Additionally, this method is “concerned with 
how individuals use language in specific social contexts” and thereby the differences and 
contradictions of those speakers or writers.
45
 Eventually, in addition to its interest in 
analysing the socio-political contexts,
 
CDA “remains a very active line of research to date, 
and studies typically scrutinize speeches by key politicians or critique documents published 
by government agencies, institutions, or international organizations”.46 In a word, it is 
indispensable for the purposes of investigating reality from all angles and the way this reality 
is produced and displayed. By the same token, contexts too might be affected by present 
policies and practices; it might be historically driven or drawn and thereby texts should be 
read carefully in light of the historical junctures.
47
    
On the other hand, the QCA is a very instrumental method that can be used in addition to the 
CDA. In this regard, it is meant to be “the study of the text itself not of its relation to its 
context, to the intentions of the producer of the text, or of the reaction of the intended 
audience”.48 Accordingly, contrary to quantitative content analysis, it enables us to scrutinize 
particularly contents of interviews and documents for the purpose of interpreting the EU’s 
policy in terms of ‘why’ questions which constitute the most important aspect of this study:     
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Where quantitative content analysis is helpful in answering ‘what’ questions, 
qualitative content analysis can be helpful in answering ‘why’ questions and 
analysing perceptions.
49
 
Therefore, it is a significant instrument for understanding latent biases within texts, speeches 
and documents. It grants the researcher an effective instrument for studying processes which 
occur over a long period of time or that reflect trends in a specific society as well as 
providing researchers with a means for analysing data with clarity.
50
 Significantly, it enables 
him/her to conceptualize, categorize and link derived meanings, categories and concepts 
accordingly. Consequently, the clusters or codes highlighted by this method can be translated 
into themes that can be built upon within the research process. Moreover, precise and 
accurate analysis of data opens a door to further analytical understandings in this context:  
Content analysis is the intellectual process of categorizing qualitative textual 
data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify 
consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes. However, it is 
typically inductive, beginning with deep close reading of text and attempting to 
uncover the less obvious contextual or latent content therein.
51
  
Indeed,
 
lots of materials, documents, speeches, interviews, decisions and formal strategies 
might be gathered with regard to the EUFP towards Hamas. These materials should be 
categorized, characterized, coded, linked to each other thematically and scrutinized intensely 
in order to develop the researcher’s analytical competence, and to extract accurate 
conclusions.
52
 Furthermore, the QCA method can be supported through the use of the NVivo 
software program, a software package that enables researchers to organize, categorize and 
code qualitative data. This program offers the benefits of keeping research under control and 
making it thematically easy to link and analyze data.  According to Lyn Richards: 
NVivo has tools for recording and linking ideas in many ways, and for searching 
and exploring the patterns of data and ideas. It is designed to remove rigid 
divisions between ‘data’ and ‘interpretation’. To make it clearer, ‘Qualitative 
research usually requires management of complexity. As you link, code, shape 
and model data, the software helps you to manage and synthesize your ideas. It 
offers a range of tools for pursuing new understandings and theories about the 
data and for constructing and testing answers to research questions.’53  
The researcher utilised this tool to aid in the efficiency through which the data gathered for 
this study was mapped and analysed.     
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To conclude, the study of the EU’s policy towards Hamas cannot be understood without 
scrutinizing all dimensions surrounding this socially-constructed policy, including the texts 
which the researcher has, and the contexts from which these texts have emanated, as well as 
the interactive and interrelated relations between them.  Thus, although QCA and CDA stem 
philosophically from different schools of thought – QCA from neorealism which considers 
reality as fixed, independent and constant, and CDA from constructivism which perceives 
reality as socially constructed
54
 – and thus might be used separately on different occasions, 
the two combined were activated, in this thesis, being considered complementary to each 
other in the analytical process undertaken. Remarkably, both warranted the required extent of 
reliability and validity for such a study like this which was dealing with a controversial topic.     
Reference Management 
“Reference management is the process of storing, managing, retrieving, and citing references 
from various sources.”55 Accuracy and consistency of style are very important in the 
referencing process. Therefore, the researcher utilised a software programme that would 
maintain a single style of referencing throughout the study and as far as possible would avoid 
unintentional human error. The reference management software programme called “Endnote” 
is designed to help researchers and to organise their resources in as many styles as needed.  
Endnote means that the researcher “can easily insert in-text citations into the body of the 
manuscript and automatically create an appropriately formatted bibliography.”56 It also 
enables the researcher to retrieve particular references automatically from his digital library, 
without the need to entering references manually by typing.
57
 The study follows an 
author/date pattern that makes it easier for the reader to follow information sources with 
confidence. Consequently, this type of software programme has enabled the researcher to 
control the bibliography consistently throughout.    
Limitations  
The researcher faced two main obstacles, and even though neither prevented him from 
pursuing his research, they were very much at the back of his mind while he was articulating 
his thesis or conducting his interviews; this in itself constituted a kind of restriction.  
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The first of these restrictions was the ‘perspective challenge’ which was related to the topic 
itself. This thesis is a rare attempt to study the EU’s foreign policy towards Hamas using a 
West-East focus. Many previous researchers have also studied Hamas and how it has 
reflected on the EU but have used the East-West perspective; in other words, how the East 
has affected the West’s policies in the ME and how the West could contain the East. In the 
West’s approach, Hamas was mostly considered a challenge or a problem that should be 
addressed accordingly and thus appropriately studied, while ways of containing it should be 
adequately emphasized. Apart from this debate, that implicitly or explicitly presumes Hamas 
to be a problematic movement that (wisely) should have been tamed, the West-East way of 
studying the topic implies comprehensive digging in the West’s field, i.e., that of the EU, and 
at the same time does not need to take assumptions about Hamas for granted.  
In fact, the researcher appraises the deeds and behaviours of not only Hamas but also the EU 
in light of International Law and within their own contextual frameworks and structures. 
Therefore, it is basically the EU’s internal factors that have been under the spotlight, not 
Hamas as a controversial movement in the West.  In other words, Hamas is not the subject of 
this study, although its perceptions, positions and behaviours have been clarified as needed. 
Given that this movement is stigmatized as a terrorist organization in the EU, in a Western 
geographical context the researcher might, to some extent, be at risk because of the enormous 
restrictions imposed against ‘terrorism’. Given that the EU adopts a common European anti-
terrorism strategy, that the UK has also its own regulations, and that the university in which 
the researcher studies has another set of rules as well, the researcher has frequently felt he 
should be counting ‘from one to ten’ before taking any step in his work, lest he should in one 
way or another be considered as sympathetic to terrorists.  
The second restriction is linked to ‘objectivity’ as an underlying value for researchers. 
Indeed, one of the most pressing challenges to be highlighted is the problem of bias, which is 
related to the researcher’s objectivity58 and neutrality59 in such an area of study. Generally 
speaking, it is essential for the researcher to maintain a distance between himself and his 
topic; however, this guarantees the accuracy of findings and conclusions. Owing to the fact 
that the researcher is a Palestinian who has much sympathy towards his people, and who has, 
in one way or another been affected, by the EU-Quartet’s policy towards the Palestinian 
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territories during the period under investigation, it is to be expected that his work in this area 
would make him vulnerable to prejudice. As a researcher, the author found himself involved 
in an analysis that observers from diverse backgrounds would undoubtedly judge very 
differently. Certainly, the corner in which those observers might stand is a fundamental 
feature in the judgment process. While neutrality should be seen as an ideal of objectivity, 
both are controversial concepts and it is very difficult for them to be fully achieved in human 
and social sciences. Having this in mind, the researcher has made every effort, from the 
beginning, to put himself aside and to remain neutral but without necessarily shedding his 
Palestinian skin while working on such a project. To overcome any anticipated deviation, he 
has, as far as possible, left the EU and Hamas documents to speak for themselves without 
twisting the neck of truth or avoiding specific common realties on the ground.  
In the course of this analysis, the researcher considered Hamas as an Islamic Palestinian 
resistance movement not a terrorist one; however, despite its controversial deeds and methods 
with which some might agree or disagree, it remains a socio-political organization with a 
particular ideology and character functioning within the Israeli occupation context.    
Hence, the author does not hide his national background and the way in which he perceives 
the conflict in Palestine. He also has such convictions regarding resistance and terrorism in 
addition to the right and wrong behaviours exercised under these terms. Mostly these beliefs 
are shaped by his understanding of International Law and the natural human right of 
resistance when falling under specific oppression or occupation. He undoubtedly has certain 
perceptions on EU policy, not only towards Hamas but also towards the whole Palestinian-
Israeli conflict and beyond; a matter which stems from his experiences and observations on 
the ground or gathered from reading. 
However, the question is whether these previously assumed convictions and perceptions have 
affected the trajectory of the thesis or not, and whether his choices were impacted by these 
positions. Here, he can definitely say that the research was as carefully worked out as if it 
were being done in a field of thorns by putting aside all distractions from academic 
objectivity. For example, the researcher gathered all documents for or against his convictions 
and interviewed those EU officials who extremely consider Hamas as a terrorist organization 
and reject in principle violent Palestinian resistance, just as he interviewed others who 
perceive this movement as one of resistance and show understanding of such resistance. At 
the same time, as well as he was keen on presenting the positive EU’s statements and 
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declarations towards Palestinians on the one hand the researcher, on the other one, presented, 
where applicable, the negative positions towards Hamas throughout the thesis to keep the 
analysis as balanced and objective as possible. Significantly, by evidencing his views and 
arguments using a vast scale of primary and secondary resources, the author has made his 
analysis and comparisons based on the UNGARs as well as the EU norms, which are stated 
in its treaties and declarations. Furthermore, having the consideration of objectivity in mind 
due to the author’s national background, the supervisory team kept ably advising and asking 
him for alterations whenever any deviation from this target might be felt. As such, his 
research is objectively crystalized, articulated and structured without being scandalously 
affected by his personal convictions, though his identity can easily be seen.   
Descriptive Outline    
Chapter One: Methodology and Literature Review 
This chapter explains the methodology used in the thesis and how it defines the project, its 
objectives, significance, questions, methods, data collection methods and the proposed 
outline. In addition, a literature review emphasizes what work has previously been done and 
what needs specifically to be addressed by the researcher.  
Chapter Two: Theorizing the EU Foreign Policy towards Hamas   
This introductory chapter is the basis for the rest of the study by discussing the definitions, 
theories and approaches according to which the study framework is to be articulated. The 
EU’s policy, based on its position and interests in the ME, is located in a wider context of 
perceptions, readings, strategies, and controversial manifestations, while the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, as a basic motivating factor in the region, is identified as the axis around which the 
EU’s policy towards Hamas revolves. While all material is specifically organised to form a 
base for analytical logic, some of the areas highlighted for discussion are dismissed, while 
others are precisely emphasized according to their proportional significance and relevance. 
Chapter Three: EU Foreign Policy: Development and Performance 
The EU acquires its importance from its performance and its ability to act appropriately, 
either internally or externally. This descriptive chapter looks specifically at the emergence of 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the subsequent establishment of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in terms of necessities, adjustments, developments, 
effectiveness, and areas of functioning, which are emphasised as appropriate. It also 
30 
 
examines the EU institutions involved in the decision–making process, as well as the 
mechanisms and procedures employed. Finally, the EU’s foreign policy instruments are 
identified in order to explore the extent to which the EU is able to interact internationally.  
Chapter Four: The Formation of the EU Foreign Policy towards Palestine: Contextual 
historical perspective 
Following a historical overview of the emergence of the EU’s foreign policy towards the ME, 
and an examination of the context within which Europe has developed its relationships with 
the ME and its related components, the chapter looks more deeply at the tense relations 
between the Christian West and Islamic East through certain historical stages and events, that 
have left significant impacts on peoples’ attitudes and feelings on both sides and have led to 
awkward policies. These include the colonization of the Islamic East by the West and the 
substantial promotion of its own interests in the ME, as well as post-war Europe’s 
enlargement, from the 1950s, into a union with significant initiatives in the Mediterranean. 
The development of EU policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict after the EU launched its 
foreign policy initiative in the early 1970s is also discussed. 
Chapter Five: Inconsistency of the EU Discourse regarding Hamas: Norms and Values 
under Investigation 
This chapter examines inconsistencies of the EU discourse towards its norms and values in 
the context of Palestinian democracy that brought Hamas to power in 2006. In the first of two 
sections it tackles the outlawing of Hamas by the EU in an attempt to understand the context 
and backgrounds of such a policy. The evolution of Hamas, and the stages of the relationship 
between the movement and the EU are seen in the European Union Security Strategy 
(EUSS), which forms a basis for understanding the context in which Hamas was labelled a 
terrorist organization, and subsequent EU policies towards the movement. The second section 
investigates the promotion of democracy and human rights values, along with the EU support 
for the emergency status declared by the Presidency of the PA at the expense of these norms. 
Contradictions and paradoxes in the EU discourse and practice are examined in considerable 
depth. As well as articulating the basic pillars of the EUFP towards Hamas and the 
substantive approaches used, the interactions that have governed relations between the two 
actors over time and the realistic path they have taken are highlighted.     
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Chapter Six: Resistance-Terrorism Debate in the EU-Hamas Context: Paradoxes and 
Inconsistencies  
Controversial concepts in the EU-Hamas context, particularly terrorism and resistance 
constitute the main axis which both actors still debate. The chapter explores how the 
identities of both the EU and Hamas influence the way Hamas has been pursued by the EU; 
the apparent paradoxes and inconsistences in the EU discourse concerning this debate are 
pointed out. In this context, the violence perpetrated by Israel and Hamas alike, as well as the 
EU’s reactions are scrutinised. The resistance60 dogma of Hamas and its perception of 
terrorism are among the important areas discussed. In light of IHL, the right of resistance 
against the IO and the way the EU has perceived it are compared with the EU’s recognition 
of Israel’s right of self-defence. In this regard, the case of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad 
Shalit is noted to emphasise the different reactions of the EU in the case of Palestinian 
prisoners incarcerated in Israeli jails. The EU’s inconsistences are examined after some 
clarification of the Israeli discourse against Palestinians, compared to the Hamas discourse 
against the Israelis. In both instances the EU’s response is observed.       
Chapter Seven: The EU’s Perception of Israel as a Self-Driving Determinant of the 
EUFP towards Hamas 
This chapter assumes that if the logic behind the EUFP towards Hamas is to be understood, 
the EU’s perceptions of the adversary of Hamas, i.e., Israel, need to be identified.  Indeed, the 
most important actor in the external EU milieu that is taken into account while designing the 
EUFP towards Hamas, is Israel, a constant Western reality that, with full European 
assistance, has been socio-politically, culturally and physically constructed in the ME since 
1948. Given that Israel has been a European-branded product that was carefully and 
intentionally implanted into Palestine, this corner of the ME, its direct and indirect influence 
is of high importance in terms of studying the EU’s FPDM towards those states or non-state 
actors that might threaten its core existence or contradict the EU’s strategies. Thus, the roots 
of the socially-constructed relationship between Christian Europe and the Jews over time, and 
the way this socio-cultural association has been transformed from a historical adversarial 
relationship to one of friendship and alliance are examined.  
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 Resistance, in this context, is the violent and non-violent acts, means and methods utilised by individuals or 
groups of people who live under occupation, against the occupying power of their land.  
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Chapter Eight: US Influence on the EU regarding Hamas: Analytical Perspective  
This chapter illustrates the influence of the US, as an external actor, on the EU’s policy 
towards Hamas. This means revealing the security-allied construction between actors under 
particular circumstances, and the self-interest determinant in this policy represented in the 
EU’s preference for the US positions regarding Hamas at the expense of its own inspirational 
norms and values. It displays the depth of the relationship between the two actors, and the 
significant effect that the US has had on the EU in the case of Hamas. Their mutual goals and 
economic interdependence, in addition to the socio-cultural correlations between them, 
underpin the testimonies of EU officials in relation to the topic of this research. Hence, the 
contextual dimension and the partner-dependant debate in the ME, as a US domain, are 
discussed so as to understand the complementary versus contradictory role that the EU plays 
in such a conflict. The 2001 (9/11) attacks on the US and their effects on the EU’s security 
perspective towards Hamas are highlighted, as are the Quartet’s restriction on the EU’s 
functionality in the Hamas dossier and the perceptions of the EU interviewees of the role 
played by the US in this regard. This reveals the extent to which the EU is exposed to US 
influence in the matter of Hamas and Palestine in general.    
Chapter Nine: Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter explores conclusions and possible recommendations which might be made in 
light of the EU’s policy towards Hamas. The conclusions summarise the results of the 
validity examination of the theoretical approaches and tools mentioned in the second chapter, 
while formulated recommendations are directed towards future work or actions that should be 
undertaken in light of the substantial and on-going international changes taking place in the 
ME. Finally, while limitations of this research have been underscored, some suggestions are 
also offered as to how the tense relations between the EU and the ME’s socio-political 
powers might become less detrimental and more constructive for both, in light of the EU’s 
dealings with Hamas.   
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Section Two: Literature Review 
 
Divisions in light of the EU policy towards Hamas  
The EU policy towards Hamas has passed through several stages between 1993 and 2010,
61
 
but talking about this policy has become more urgent since Hamas was elected through a 
democratic process in 2006.  Although the EU’s policy is currently focused on boycotting the 
Hamas-led government in order to compel the movement to moderate its policies towards 
Israel and the peace process,
62
 it has generated a strong debate among scholars and politicians 
about the wisdom of dealing with Hamas in such a way.  This debate between proponents and 
opponents of the EU’s policy is yet to witness its end. Indeed, it has escalated as it has 
become apparent that this policy has not been fruitful, and perhaps even hindered efforts to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and European diplomacy in the ME.
 63
   
 
It is noticeable that discussions about the EU policy towards Hamas tend to focus on the 
advantages and disadvantages of using tough political instruments to compel Hamas to accept 
the Quartet conditions. Some debaters have voiced support for even tougher policies against 
Hamas,
64
 while others have called on the EU to revisit its foreign policy and thereby rebuild 
its eroded credibility.
65
 However both of the two parties have distanced themselves from 
investigating in depth the reasons for the EU policy which stand behind its punitive stance 
towards the democratically elected movement of Hamas. Therefore, they could not precisely 
interpret the contradictions inherent in the EU rhetoric, which include the promotion of 
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democracy, the rule of law and Human Rights, and its practices against the triumph of Hamas 
in the Palestinian elections of 2006.   
 
Although those who are for or against the EU policy towards Hamas have both tried to justify 
their thoughts and opinions on the matter, the arguments posed against the policy generally 
seem to be stronger and more persuasive. This is because they have discussed the logic and 
consequences of the EU’s actions without falling into the double standard trap as has been 
highlighted in the language of their opponents. Generally speaking, scholars in favour or 
opposed to the EU policy can be categorized into three schools of thought: the pro-democracy 
school, the anti-Islamism pro-Israel school and the pro-national choice school.   
 
These three schools of thought can be discerned from common arguments put forth by 
scholars in the current debate over the EU’s policy towards Hamas. With regard to the first 
school, its supporters
66
 have called for the political will of the Palestinian people to be given 
priority, thus giving democracy a role in political life even if it brings to power those who are 
categorized as radicals. They have called for an ‘engagement first’ approach rather than a 
‘moderation first’ one as called for by Minna Saarnivaara 2011 who has claimed that 
engaging with Hamas might lead the movement to a more moderate position. Therefore, the 
target here, as could be concluded from their speech, is the peace process and stability 
through taming Hamas by way of the engagement approach. However, Hamas, as the 
movement stands, may not be accepted by supporters of this school of thought.  Indeed, in 
cases where Hamas uses violent means against the Israeli occupation, even though such 
violence is guaranteed under International Law, some of these scholars might express their 
disturbance and even condemnation.
 67 
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The second school, which is influenced by the Orientalism
68
 perspective, consists of those 
who are influenced by Islamophobia in the West from one side, and those who are pro-Israel 
on the other side regardless of its behaviour and stance towards the peace process.
69
 Its 
followers believe that ‘the moderation first approach’ must be pursued with Hamas before 
engaging with it politically. According to them, any engagement with such a movement will 
be seen as rewarding terrorists and all rejectionism fronts in the ME: consequently, engaging 
with Hamas will be a devastating policy for the peace process and the Western alliance and 
interests from their point of view. The third school consists of those
70
 who support engaging 
with Hamas as one of the socio-political components of the region which has an equal right to 
secular movements and parties to compete in and win elections, and to govern, regardless of 
any special agenda-based reservations. They believe in the peoples’ right to self-
determination, national sovereignty and what follows in terms of respecting the peoples’ will 
even if it conflicts with other countries’ political calculations. This school of thought might 
not share the same ideology or political goals as Hamas, but it respects the movement’s right 
to participate in the polity on an equal footing with its opponents, and free from foreign 
interference.            
  
As can be easily seen, the dominant issue in the EU-Hamas debate is the engagement-
isolation question and thus whether the first appropriate approach should be: engage with 
Hamas or moderate it.  Indeed, the first two schools have different views about how Hamas 
can be encouraged to become more moderate in order to meet the Quartet conditions. The 
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pro-democracy school aims to drag Hamas to the ‘negotiating table’ through engagement, 
while the anti-Islamism pro-Israel school seeks to compel Hamas to moderate itself before 
permitting it to participate in the political process. The pro-national choice school seeks to 
give Hamas, as a liberation movement, the right of full participation in the political process 
and, subsequently, the full right to rule and thereby gain official recognition from the 
international community. In fact, given that Hamas has the same right as other players in the 
political realm to participate in democratic processes, competing democratically, and that 
there is no evidence that it will turn its back on democratic processes in the future, Hamas 
should be accepted by the EU and rest of the world accordingly. If the eventual goal here is 
democracy rather than satisfying Israel, Hamas will eventually be recognised alongside other 
democratically elected parties in the world. 
 
Normative Non-Normative EU Foreign Policy Debate towards Hamas;  
The importance of discussing whether the EU is a normative actor or not, in terms of its 
relationship with Hamas, stems from the significance of understanding the actor’s nature and 
motives for undertaking its foreign policy. While many definitions have been given to 
normative power, the author of this study has adopted a comprehensive and an expressive one 
to the effect that “a normative power is, therefore, a power that has its identity and strategy 
grounded on a preference for overarching rules of behaviour applicable—largely but not 
exclusively—to states and that has three essential characteristics: to have been negotiated and 
not imposed; to have been legitimated equally by representative international bodies; and to 
be enforceable on all actors of the international system notwithstanding their rank within it”.71  
 
In light of having an undemocratic policy towards the democratically elected Hamas 
movement in Palestine, the EU’s self-definition as a normative actor can no longer be taken 
for granted. Increasingly, many scholars and researchers are discussing whether the European 
Union can be considered a normative actor, as it regularly declares itself to be, or not. This 
definition of the role has become more controversial among scholars in light of the way the 
EU has treated Palestinians after Hamas was elected in 2006. In response to the foreign 
policy objectives announced by the EU, some researchers have adopted this view as a 
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descriptive conception of the EU’s status.72 Meanwhile, others believe that the EU’s 
announcements are not enough for it to be considered a normative actor.
73
 It could be argued 
that the EU is a ‘civilian actor’ but not a ‘normative one’ as Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas 
Risse argued in their study.  They have highlighted the differences between the two concepts 
stressing that most superpowers could be considered, in one way or another, normative actors 
in some respects or situations. Indeed, all of these powers “tend to build the international (or 
the regional) system according to their own principles, norms, and rules”.74 Consequently, 
neither the EU nor any other international power is eligible for the title of ‘normative power’ 
by virtue of their announcements or declarations.   
 
This is supported by Nathalie Tocci et al who have concluded that all powerful states are the 
same with regard to the ‘normative actor’ label.75 Given that the aforementioned researchers 
have set a standard for the definition of normative, they have found that all dimensions of the 
foreign policy of a state should be played consistently before that state may be considered 
normative. Therefore, the objectives of foreign policy, the means employed to achieve them 
and the intended consequences or effects thereof should be consistent, as is widely argued in 
their study. For this reason, being normative or non-normative is a proportional matter 
meaning that no one can give absolute judgement about any actor.  Therefore, this title cannot 
be taken for granted.
76
  
 
However, the normative power which adopts the promotion of democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law and peace keeping or any other such norms or values as part of its foreign policy 
should stick with them to the end. From Laura Allison’s viewpoint, “normative power 
involves the use of norms to influence others, and rather than military or economic force, 
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power is exerted through the spread of ideas and opinions through imitation and attraction”.77 
In light of this reality and the EU functionality in the world in contrast to this reality, it needs 
at least to reconsider its position, if preferred not to be bunked, so as to become more 
compatible and consistent with itself according to the same writer. Accordingly, the EU 
cannot be considered normative in respect of democracy promotion since it has turned its 
back on the outcome of the democratic process which led to the election of Hamas in 2006. 
 
According to Harpaz and Shamis, the EU is a normative actor in its foreign policy, although 
it typically struggles to present itself in such a way. They have shed light on the way the 
realists and the constructivists perceive the EU in terms of how it defines itself. Moreover, 
they have discussed the realist perspective which claims that the EU’s appearance as a 
normative actor is an effective strategy for meeting the EU’s hard power deficit and, at the 
same time, for utilizing this title to promote Europe’s material interests.  Another point of 
engagement for these scholars has been with the constructivism perspective which conceives 
the EU’s attempts to appear in such a way as those of an actor which is trying to formulate its 
own socio-political identity and to advance its legitimacy beyond its borders.
78
 However, they 
did not discuss the contradictions between the EU’s rhetoric and practices with regard to the 
case of Hamas. Even so, they have certainly illuminated this issue in a wider theoretical 
context.    
 
In an attempt to explain the discrepancies between the EU’s practices and rhetoric, Barbe and 
Johansson-Nogues have investigated the ways in which the EU typically tries to strike a 
balance between utility and values. They have deeply waded into this discussion, 
acknowledging that although the EU is said to have achieved a moral stance in its exercise of 
power, it vitiated its endeavours to be labelled as a normative actor when it breached its 
commitments to its ideals in the case of the 2006 Palestinian elections and elsewhere.
79
 
Indeed, being a normative actor requires a high level of commitment to the entire democratic 
process, especially when it happens under the (supposed) normative actor’s supervision. Al-
Fattal has discussed the consequences of the discrepancies between the EU’s rhetoric and 
practices in the case of the Hamas-led government. She has stressed that the necessity of 
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bridging this gap is highly important since it has defamed the diplomatic and political 
authority of the EU.
80
 With a foreign policy that tends to be realistic rather than normative in 
the ME, the EU has a lot to do in order to be treated as a credible promoter of democracy of 
its own sake. Seeberg claimed that the EU actions in some places in the world could not be 
considered tactical, but stem from serious realist implicit or explicit agenda; as the writer 
mentioned, the EU is “a realist actor dressed in normative clothes” no more no less.81 
Therefore, the contradictions inherent in the EU’s policy towards Hamas and other Islamic 
movements in the ME are likely to cause it harm in the long term.  
 
In addition, a normative actor should basically stick to the value of credibility as has been 
argued in a study edited by Emerson and Youngs. This value, according to the Islamists who 
were interviewed in the study, has also been systematically breached by the EU and its 
partners on many occasions. Besides jeopardizing its commitments to the value of democracy 
by boycotting the outcomes of the democratic process in Palestine, the EU has continued its 
conservative approach towards Islamists in an obvious conflict with its announced liberal 
values and objectives. Strikingly, the EU used to argue that it is a normative actor which has 
a set of unique values as objectives in its foreign policy.  Yet, there can be no doubt that its 
practices on the ground prove otherwise. As a result of this defamed and stigmatized policy, 
Islamists, among others, distrust the EU as a normative actor, and do not even differentiate 
between it and the US with regard to the Palestinian elections of 2006. It is still refusing to 
open a serious dialogue with Islamists while at the same time insisting on its non-
humanitarian policy towards the Gaza Strip which is governed by Hamas as stated in the 
same study.  
 
As Emerson and Youngs argue, this policy obviously conflicts with the liberal values which 
the EU relies on. According to the the study, the EU cannot be viewed as properly in favour 
of democracy as long as it voices support for autocrats and boycotts popular currents such as 
those represented by Islamists in the ME,  without even scrutinizing their beliefs or doings. In 
fact, using this policy has stigmatized the ME Quartet and, in particular, the EU as supporters 
of autocrats rather than democratic movements in the Arab world as emphasized in the 
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aforementioned study.
82
 Furthermore, the fact that the EU has lost credibility in these respects 
has also been highlighted by Daniel Mockli in his article, ‘The Rise of Islamists in the Near 
East: the EU, the US, and Hamas’ which confirms the same meanings as mentioned above83  
 
Al-Fattal has examined the EU’s seemingly lost credibility in light of its commitments to 
prosperity, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. She has done this on the basis of 
initiatives and agreements launched by the EU like the Barcelona process (the Euro-
Mediterranean Policy EMP) and, thereafter, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). As 
discussed in her study, Al- Fattal believes that the EU, unlike the US which has many 
complicated calculations, has too much to do in Palestine. It can put enough international 
pressure on Israel while providing ‘carrots’ for both the Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate. 
Additionally, she has highlighted how the EU lost its initiative in Palestine following two 
major events that took place there: the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 when the EU 
witnessed the Israeli destruction of Palestine without doing anything to intervene, and the 
Hamas electoral victory in 2006 when the EU turned its back on its commitments to the 
promotion of democracy.
84
 In light of this reality, Steven Everts has proposed to the EU that, 
in its attempts to reshape a credible policy, it requires innovative and creative policies which 
employ the EU’s strengths to convince the US “to adhere to particular international rules and 
treaties with full respect”. This could put the EU on track to being consistent with its declared 
objectives while also intervening between the main parties in the conflict.
85
 Indeed, the 
American factor is a vital one in deciding how the role played by the EU. Given the historical 
ties which link them together, the EU has not been willing to intervene in the ME outside of 
the margins set by the US.
86
 Thus, the EU suffers many inconsistencies in its foreign policy
87
 
due to its relationship with the US and its own perception of the conflict there as discussed in 
various studies. 
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Another interpretation for the EU discourse against Hamas was expressed by Michelle Pace 
who stressed that the EU perceives Hamas as an entity which contradicts the core European 
liberal norms on which the EU has constructed. The EU, according to the writer, is interested 
in exporting its norms and values pertaining to democracy, human rights, rule of law in its 
neighbourhood for its own interests mainly stability and security. While Hamas is hardly to 
change its thoughts, and it is used to functioning in a contradictory way to the EU’s way of 
thinking; it could not be internalized within the European framework of pre-existing social 
and normative international order. Given this Islamic movement has been on the EU list of 
terrorists and has not achieved the EU normative standards, this has implied excluding Hamas 
and treating it accordingly. In the words of Pace “Hamas is constructed as the ‘other’, an 
absolutist group which is unlikely to compromise and accept the international community’s 
norms’, and due to this fact it is treated in such a way”.88 This interpretation is presented in 
another article belongs to the same author, considering that the EU preferred Fatah to Hamas 
after the former lost the 2006-elections because the secular movement Fatah adopts EU 
liberal norms and values unlike Hamas which does not embrace these values. Hence, the EU 
preferred ‘liberal’ party rather than ‘democratic’ party.89    
 
At the same time, Pace believes that the EU adoption of the Westphalian structure of ‘nation 
states’ as “the only framework for the ‘legitimate’ use of violence” is another reason for 
excluding Hamas since the latter is a non-state actor which has threatened the EU certainties 
by exercising its violence against an independent state.
90
 Contrary to Pace’s convictions, in 
light of mechanisms pursued by the EU for dealing with other examles in the world like 
China, Russia, Israel, Libya and Syria, an interpretation built on both a Westphalian logic and 
liberal norms becomes irrelevant. Hence, researchers should discover other convincing 
explanations that lie behind the EU’ policy towards the movement in question.   
 
To sum up briefly, the EU’s foreign policy lacks consistency between its normative goals, the 
means employed to achieve them and its expected results, all of which are conditions for 
being a normative actor amongst other non-normative ones. The EU declares a set of precious 
values as objectives of its outside actions, but it is selective in dealing with the uncertain 
consequences of these actions. This selectivity has in fact damaged the EU’s credibility and 
                                                          
88
   Pace, 'When Liminals Interact EU-Hamas Relations'.  
89
   Michelle Pace, 'Interrogating the European Union’s Democracy Promotion Agenda: Discursive 
Configurations of ‘Democracy’from the Middle East', European Foreign Affairs Review, /15 (2010), 611-28. 
90
   Pace, 'When Liminals Interact EU-Hamas Relations'. 
42 
 
left it stigmatized particularly after it boycotted the Hamas-led government and the 
subsequent national unity government formed in Palestine in 2006. For these reasons, the EU 
can no longer be considered a normative power. Therefore, the motives for the EU’s rejection 
of Hamas reflect not so much its declared or adopted values, but rather other considerations 
and determinants which will in-depth be uncovered in this research.      
The ‘Engaging Hamas Approach’ vis-à-vis ‘Isolation Approach’    
In line with democratic process, the matter of whether Hamas should be politically engaged 
or not is basically supposed to be determined by the ballot box. Therefore, the people of 
Palestine are responsible for the decision to elect Hamas rather than the Quartet or the EU, as 
is commonly known. In light of this democratic axiom, the EU’s policy of boycotting Hamas 
which it has pursued since 2006 is, in fact, an attack against democracy itself, as believed by 
observers. Although it is supposed to be a national decision, many scholars and studies are 
dramatically divided over this issue: while many of them have condemned the EU for its 
policy toward Hamas
91
, others have enthusiastically supported it and even called for tougher 
action.
92
    
 
Many scholars have claimed that engaging Hamas in the political game of the ME is a 
rational policy because it has been democratically elected. According to these scholars, it is 
extremely difficult for decision-makers who are involved in the ME to ignore the political 
weight of Hamas in Palestine and the Islamists who back it.
93
 Even though it holds radical 
notions towards the peace process, and has not compromised its basic principles, the hope of 
moderating it through the engagement approach is the best option according to those scholars. 
The logic of ‘moderation through engagement’ is clearly presented by Nathan J. Brown in his 
study, Aftermath of the Hamas Tsunami (2011). According to Brown, this approach could 
help to convince Hamas to back away from its rigid stance against the peace process and, at 
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the same time, give freer rein to Western diplomacy which has limited itself since 2006 by 
boycotting the movement.
94
 In fact, this logic has mainly been supported by those of the pro-
democratic school of thought who are convinced that enabling Hamas to govern after its 
election victory is one of the demands of democracy, and thus hoping that the containment 
policy might lead to moderation. In his thesis based on this assumption Salim Zaanoun 
considered that the EU shift, from treating Hamas as a terrorist organization to a vision built 
on involving it in democracy as appeared before the 2006 elections, enhanced in practice 
stability and security compared to previous periods.
95
    
 
After the failure of the ‘West Bank First’ approach used by the EU and its counterparts, it is 
obvious that sanctions against Hamas will not push the movement to succumb to [the EU’s 
demands], as has been concluded by Carolin Goerzig. Goerzig has discussed, in her study, 
‘Engaging Hamas: Rethinking The Quartet Principles’ (2008), the faults of the EU’s 
assumptions which suppose that fruitful outcomes for the peace process can be achieved if 
sanctions and pre-conditions for dialogue are placed on Hamas before it is politically engaged 
with. Thus, according to her study, ‘watering down the Quartet conditions’ on Hamas is the 
only possible way for the EU to get out of the hole it has dug for itself. Undoubtedly, a strict 
lesson should be strictly learnt from the IRA-UK negotiations, specifically when the IRA 
refused to lay down its weapons as a pre-condition of peace. This position of the IRA has 
ultimately not been an obstacle to successful negotiations.
96
 Thus, engaging Hamas and 
containing it does not mean that it must first be disarmed. To the contrary, a dialogue could 
proceed with Hamas while it holds its weapons in hand, as Goerzig argued. Moreover, the 
rationale of disarming liberation movements before they have achieved their national goals is 
a peculiarly colonial way of thinking whereby colonial powers try to compel others to follow 
colonialists’ will according to their own narrow calculations. Thus, building a constructive 
relationship with Hamas and Islamists, based on mutual respect on the one hand and the 
rights of people to self-determination on the other, is a crucial recipe for a peaceful future as 
highlighted by Boubackeur.
97
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Furthermore, the double standards of the EU’s logic are obvious in regard to how it deals 
with Hamas and Iran, both of which hold the same thoughts towards Israel and thus 
complement each other. The EU’s refusal to talk to Hamas as a democratically elected 
movement while it talks to Iran, whose president openly called for the destruction of Israel 
and also funds Hamas by various means, is an obvious hypocrisy. This view, which has been 
raised by Sven Biscop, is supported by others who have also called for the EU to launch an 
immediate dialogue with Hamas and all Islamists in the ME alongside its dialogue with 
Iran.
98
 
 
Likewise, Emerson and Young have called for the EU to review its ‘blind eye’ policy towards 
the Islamists and, in particular, Hamas. They have claimed that ignoring these movements’ 
existence can no longer be considered ‘a benign neglect’ and, moreover, that this position 
does not benefit the EU. They have highlighted the ‘blind eye’ approach which is pursued by 
the EU towards Hamas as compared to Israel. At the same time, the US-Israeli stance, which 
has been followed by the EU, of sustaining the Fatah movement inside the West Bank and 
isolating Hamas in the Gaza Strip has been deeply refuted in Emerson and Young’s study.99 
In the same vein, Larbi Sadiki has argued that ignoring the existence of Hamas in building 
peace in the ME is like ignoring an elephant in a tidy room. Specifically, he states ‘pretending 
something in that size absent is an exercise in futility’ (sic) and thus calls for engagement 
with Hamas without betting on time factors for liquidating or undermining its capabilities. 
Furthermore, Sadiki has discussed three factors concerning Hamas which call for special 
attention: “leadership renewal, its message and political resourcefulness”,100 all of which 
have assured its eligibility of being engaged in international politics without imposing pre-
dialogue conditions on the movement.  
 
Timo Behr has also called for building good relationships with Islamists, including Hamas, in 
his paper, Dealing with Political Islam: Foreign Policy-Making between the Union and the 
Member States. He claimed that without this benign relationship, it seems unlikely that the 
EU can succeed in developing a workable strategy in the ME. Taking into account the 
example of Hamas in 2006, he argues widely in his paper that it is “impossible for the EU to 
adopt a genuine reform strategy for its southern neighbourhood without determining the role 
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of Islamist actors within this strategy”. Furthermore, he states that “Islamist actors retain a 
considerable spoiler potential in EU efforts at crisis management and conflict settlement in 
the region”, all of which are matters the EU should take into account. Indeed, if the EU wants 
to play a larger role in these issues, it “cannot escape from taking a clear position on what 
place it is willing to grant these actors in the future regional context”.101 
 
Significantly, the legitimacy of the conditions imposed on Hamas by the EU and its 
counterparts are in doubt, and not based on any legal reasoning. This lack of legitimacy is 
discussed critically in a study by Urfan Khaliq, who has waded deeply into the ethical 
dimensions of the EU’s foreign policy.102 This issue is also highlighted by Natalie Tocci in 
her study which discusses the extent to which this policy clashes with international law. With 
the exception of the condition of renouncing violence, she argued that the other conditions 
imposed on Hamas are neither persuasive nor legitimate. This is because only states can be 
asked to recognize other states and announce their commitments to previously signed 
treaties.
103
 To illustrate, if any party is elected in a democratic state, it should be subject to 
accountability in light of its deeds on the ground, not upon its pre-election rhetoric. Contrary 
to the EU’s current foreign policy, this condition should also apply to Hamas since it was 
democratically elected in 2006.  
 
The EU approach to Hamas stemmed from its miscalculating and misreading the movement. 
It is obviously influenced in this respect by Islamophobia and Terrorism studies, which 
engulfed the West after the events of September 11
th
, 2001. Yet Hamas is a very different 
movement as Jeroen Gunning discusses in his study, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, 
Religion, Violence (2007). From his close empirical observations, Gunning discusses how 
this movement respects and encourages democratization among the Palestinians.  
Furthermore, he stresses the importance of talking to Hamas directly, not only talking about it 
through others’ insights, in order to accurately understand the extent to which this movement 
is pragmatic, respectful for the basics of democracy, and its decisions are based on 
considerations of gains and losses. Due to this assessment, he concludes that continuing to 
see Hamas as a demonic movement, as the EU currently does, will not lead to stability or a 
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better future in the ME.
104
 Consequently, abandoning the conditions imposed on Hamas could 
open a door to a better understanding of its role in the context of liberation rather than 
terrorism as has been done up to now in the West.   
 
Moreover, the debate about the ‘Moderation First’ and ‘Engagement First’ approaches has 
been presented by Minna Saarnivaara in her 2010 paper, ‘The EU and Hamas: No Easy 
Options’. She stresses that while the first approach is “unlikely to commence but likely to 
last, the second approach is likely to commence but unlikely to last”. Therefore, she calls for 
exiting beyond “[the] everything or nothing” dilemma, suggesting that “[o]nly a trade-off 
between factors inducing or hindering negotiation willingness and sustainability can point to 
a way out of the dilemma between a moderation or engagement first strategy [sic]”.105  
However, those who call for moderating Hamas assume in advance that it lacks rationality in 
terms of its basics and principles. This matter that is debatable among supporters of the three 
schools of thought will be discussed further in the study.  
 
In sharp contrast to these works, anti-Islamism and pro-Israel researchers have called for rigid 
punitive measures to be taken against Hamas. One of them is Jonathan Schanzer who has 
written a study portraying Hamas as a counterpart to Al-Qaeda that deserves to be combated 
and excluded rather than engaged. According to the same source, any attempt to engage with 
Hamas in the political game or to open any dialogue with it will be considered a valuable 
reward to terrorism. Therefore, Schanzer has regularly tried to convince the West to invest in 
reformers in Palestine rather than Hamas or even Fatah which are not ready to make peace 
with Israel for different reasons.
106
 Despite the reality of Hamas as a domestic liberation 
movement, these scholars continue to claim that it is equivalent to Al-Qaeda or other 
international terrorist organizations. Another such scholar is Matthew Levitt who, in his paper 
‘Could Hamas Target the West?’, repeatedly attempts to link Hamas to international terrorist 
groups by suggesting that it will inevitably begin to target Western interests in the world.
107
 
In the same vein, Geoffery Kemp has asked Europe in his paper, ‘Europe’s Middle East 
Challenges’, to cooperate with the US and Israel in tightening the screws on Hamas by 
boycotting it. According to his study, Europe will be the eventual loser if it does not do more 
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to combat Hamas. Thus, he argues that due to geo-strategic considerations Europe will 
remain without a significant role in the ME if it does not take a tough stand against Hamas. 
Therefore, according to Kemp there can be no compromises with the movement because it 
has declared its absolute hostility to peace.
108
   
 
While some researchers have discussed the existence of two lines within Hamas, namely 
moderates and radicals or doves and hawks, Barry Rubin, the editor of the Middle East 
Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, rejected this categorization claiming that 
there are no significant differences between them. He believes that both of groups are the 
same in terms of their support for terrorism, and differ only in their tactical statements. Thus, 
in sharp contrast to Sadiki who argues for the pro-national choice school which 
acknowledges the diverse nature of Hamas,
109
 Rubin claims that Hamas is a nihilistic 
movement lacking in any peaceful insights. Accordingly, this implies that it should always be 
isolated and not rewarded by international actors.
110
 This assessment of Hamas is shared by 
many others from the same school of thought. For example, Adam Word described the mind-
set of Hamas as being built on a rigorous religious ideology which does not accept Israel or 
the West alike. For this reason, Word has appealed to the EU and its allies to place more 
pressure on Hamas without giving it any breathing room, even after it has been targeted by 
Israel and boycotted by the international community. Meantime, he called out to Western 
governments to oblige even the PA itself in taking over this duty without delay.
111
 In the 
same vein, Meir Litvak accused Hamas of transferring the conflict between the Palestinians 
and Israelis from traditional nationalist patterns to a religious level, thereby tremendously 
worsening the situation in the ME. He portrays Hamas as a movement whose driving 
ideological principles basically create the confrontation in Palestine with the West and 
subsequently its bridgehead, Israel.
112
 However, he has ignored the Israeli side which is based 
on religion, and which has regularly used Judaism to encourage Jews from around the world 
to migrate to Israel.   
 
Meanwhile, Thomas Risse has expressed no surprise about the EU’s policy towards Hamas. 
Indeed, he claims that “value trade-offs and conflicting goals are normal parts of political life 
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including foreign policy”. Thus, from this perspective, adopting the isolation approach 
against Hamas seems to be reasonable given that, as he mentioned, the movement is “a 
terrorist organization whose declared goal is both the Islamization of Palestinian society and 
the destruction of Israel” whereas Israel represents “the only consolidated liberal democracy 
in the ME and a security ally of both Europe and the US”.113 The Israeli bias in these 
statements is easily noticeable. Indeed, whether one accepts Hamas or not, a more objective 
approach needs to be taken towards Hamas in order to fully understand its significance within 
the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Hamas is foremost a socio-political movement 
with the aim of liberating Palestine.
114
 Interestingly, it has an Islamic background ideology 
but this is not its main feature as a political movement. Thus, it should be assessed in this 
context rather than in light of controversial ideas like terrorism and Islamization. Actually, 
any attempts to isolate or suffocate Hamas will not lead to stability in the ME. To the 
contrary, the political scene will continue to witness waves of violence in the region as long 
as the Palestinian cause remains unresolved.  
 
In fact, this series of calls to isolate Hamas have been challenged by other pro-democracy 
researchers who stressed the serious consequences of this approach. Amel Boubekeur is 
among those who have discussed the faulty rationale of the anti- Islamization and pro-Israel 
school of thought which has adopted the ‘moderation first’ approach in the hope that isolating 
Hamas will help to pacify it. In her study, she states that this rationale is no longer fruitful, 
and those greater attempts to marginalize Islamists and Hamas, in particular, will lead to 
further violence towards the West. Therefore, Baubekeur urged the EU to work more closely 
with both secular and non-secular parties in Islamic states. She expects that this cooperation 
will place challenges on the Islamists’ shoulders which will push them to clarify their 
positions on so-called ‘grey zones’ which usually concern the West.115 
  
In addition to the negative consequences that sidelining Hamas has had on the peace process 
in the ME, as Sadiki highlighted in his study,
116
 the EU’s policy of marginalizing and 
isolating Hamas has had the effect of weakening moderates within Hamas while 
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strengthening the position of hard-liners as has been outlined in a study by Are Hovdenak. 
Hovdenak elaborated on the extent to which the EU has undermined its own efforts to 
promote democratization and institutionalization within the Palestinian polity by its 
boycotting of the Hamas-led democratic government.
117
 However, these consequences are 
small compared to the fact that it has also breached the principles of democracy and so 
damaged the credibility of Western democracy promotion projects. For this reason, the EU 
has been portrayed as lying to the Palestinians and the other peoples of the ME.   
 
Alain Gresh has interpreted the policies of the West towards the Palestinian cause as 
reflecting a dominant feeling that Palestine is a front in the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ 
following the events of September 11
th
, 2001.
118
 This view is corroborated by Layla 
Rahbanee who has claimed that the West has gone through a period of cultural self-
redefinition in which it has moved away from a Greco-Roman background towards a Judeo-
Christian one. This redefinition of the self in Europe implies a high level of ideology in its 
behaviour towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
119
 After September 11
th
 many other areas of 
tension came to light such as terrorism, and the situations in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and many other hotbeds of tension and conflict. This viewpoint puts 
Palestine in the wrong context as has been discussed by Abdel Fattah Rashdan. By placing 
Hamas outside of its context in this way, the EU member states have mistakenly classified it 
as a terrorist organization equivalent to Al-Qaeda and other stigmatized groups, and thus 
limited any possibility of contacting Hamas or involving it in negotiations.
120
 However, the 
differences between Hamas and other stigmatized organisations should have been highlighted 
in light of Hamas’ beliefs and methods of struggle rather than preconceptions and 
misapprehensions about the movement.  
 
Likewise, Youngs and Wittes highlighted the extent to which dealing with Hamas in such a 
way has inflamed Arab and Islamic feeling towards the West as if it were an anti-Islamism 
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actor. The EU’s double standards towards Arab causes and issues have defamed the West and 
highlighted how shaky the scope of the relationship between Europe and political Islam could 
be in the future.
121
 In a similar vein, Schmid and Braizat have claimed that the sanctions 
imposed on the democratic Hamas-led government have had a hugely negative effect on how 
the West is perceived in the Islamic world. Furthermore, they have reflected on the 
depressing impact of the sanctions which have had on the feelings of Palestinians towards 
Western speeches about democracy and Human Rights. As concluded in the same study, the 
suspension of Western aid to the Palestinians after the 2006 elections was clearly interpreted 
by some leaders in the region as a backwards move by the West, symbolising a rising anti-
democratic trend.
122
 Indeed these new Western attitudes towards democracy have encouraged 
dictatorships to continue suppressing the political wills of their peoples.   
  
Approaching the matter from a different angle, BaniFadel has concentrated on the EU’s 
concern for security in the agreements which it has signed with the PA. These agreements 
give priority to the security
123
 concerns of the Israelis while making the dissolution of all 
Palestinian (terrorist) organisations a binding condition on the PA. These conditions have 
paved the way to civil war between the Palestinians and provided strong evidence of the EU’s 
double standards in dealing with the two sides: they also show a lack of accountability placed 
on Israel.
124
 Yet, as a popular movement in Palestine, Hamas and its followers in the Arab 
and Islamic world could become one of the main actors and a decisive political force in the 
ME in the future. Thus, if it did not build a strong relationship with Hamas, the EU could lose 
its benefits in the region and contribute to tensions which could ultimately lead to military 
conflict. 
 
To conclude, researchers and intellectuals from three schools of thought are divided over the 
question of whether engaging with Hamas or isolating it is the best way to achieve stability 
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and prosperity in the ME. While each school has its reasons and justifications for its beliefs, it 
is apparent that three distinct tendencies can be perceived behind them: a democratic 
procedural tendency with the political objective of taming Hamas to deal with the demands of 
the international community; the next is an Israeli and anti-Islam tendency which is clearly 
influenced by the perspective of Orientalism which justifies and urges a colonial trend in the 
EU’s policies; finally there is a national tendency which raises the value of feeling dignity 
and respect regardless of any imposed policies. The priority of the latter is the ballot box in 
Palestine and throughout the entire ME as opposed to the will of colonial powers. Thus, the 
EU policy, which focuses on boycotting Hamas and seeking peace without its approval, 
should be revisited in light of realities on the ground.  In this way, the serious consequences 
of such a policy on Palestine and the ME, on the one hand, and on Western interests, on the 
other, can be better appreciated. Many things still need to be done in order to accurately 
understand the EU’s stance towards Hamas and, in particular, the democratic process by 
which it came to power in 2006. However, the reasons for the EU’s policy have not so far 
been sufficiently highlighted or discussed. It is believed that there are many ambiguous areas 
in this relationship which need to be studied particularly the influence of identities of both 
Hamas and the EU in establishing and deepening the gap between  EU rhetoric and deeds 
towards  the promotion of democracy in Palestine in 2006. Therefore, my forthcoming work 
is dedicated to addressing these questions and areas in depth. 
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Chapter Two: Theorizing the EUFP towards Hamas 
 
The significance of theorizing the EU’s foreign policy towards Hamas lies in the necessity of 
having a solid theoretical background upon which observers become capable of reading this 
policy and predict its potential extent and functions. Hence, this introductory chapter 
furnishes a proper ground for the remaining chapters of this study by presenting the used 
definitions, theories and approaches by which the framework of the research has to be 
articulated. In this respect, the policy of the EU will be placed in a wider context, according 
to its driver’s position and interests in the ME, composed of a spectrum of perceptions, 
readings, strategies, and controversial manifestations. However, the Arab-Israeli conflict, as a 
basic motivating factor of manoeuvring in this region, is the axis around which the EU’s 
policy towards Hamas dramatically revolves; therefore, it has been specifically highlighted. 
Consequently, all illustrative modules in the study are carefully positioned so as to precisely 
formulate the foundations of the analytical logic. Thus, some of these underscored areas of 
discussion have been addressed with redundancy, while others are concisely underlined 
according to their proportional significance and relevance to the topic in question.    
Foreign Policy - a Multi-dimensional Perspective   
It is true that the concept of ‘EU foreign policy’ (EUFP) has been a debatable discourse 
among scholars of European politics, but this does not negate the fact that the EU has 
practised this  exercise whereever it has had an agreed common policy. Christopher Hill and 
David Allen are among those who have been sceptical about the possibility of having such a 
policy compared to others who enthusiastically used the conception. According to Hill, 
“‘European foreign policy’ itself was, and remains, an elusive concept”,125 while Allen 
confirms that the EU cannot be considered as having a foreign policy, unless it establishes       
a European state and hence a European government which, after developing a coherent set of 
goals and policies, enables it to function in the world consistently and effectively.
126
 Despite 
these somewhat pessimistic academic views on the EU’s status quo, the researcher pays little 
attention to the arguments of Hill and Allen, but regards the EU as having an ad hoc foreign 
policy towards Hamas as well as other areas in the world.  
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This approach stems from the reality of adopting definitions in the study, which are based on 
other scholarly opinions. For example, Daniel Thomas considers the EU foreign policy as an 
actual reality that is composed of “the set of policies adopted by the Union’s member states to 
address issues and manage relationships beyond their collective external border.”127 
Similarly, Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan believe that the foreign policy 
concept is applicable in the case of the EU, and consider it as “the area of politics which is 
directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and 
behaviour of other actors within it in order to pursue interests, values and goals.”128 This, in 
the classic view of Walter Carlsnaes, entails  
those actions which [are] expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, 
commitments and/or directives, pursued by governmental representatives acting 
on behalf of their sovereign communities, and directed towards objectives, 
conditions and actors – both  governmental or non-governmental – which they 
want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.
129
  
Since these deduced meanings of foreign policy have comprehensive and precisely 
descriptive operational processes, they are adopted here whenever the foreign policy concept 
is mentioned.   
In addition to the these meanings of ‘foreign policy’ and the EU’s foreign policy in particular, 
the EU has been formulated as a united political-economic regime that has improved 
significantly in recent decades. It is evident that this formulated entity is compatible with 
Rittberger’s definition of the regime as “sets of implicit or explicit agreed-upon principles, 
norms, rules, procedures and programmes that govern the interactions of actors in specific 
areas”.130 In fact, this integrated European regime implies having a foreign policy which 
could be read through these interactions, in particular with Hamas’s instantiations on the 
ground and the rest of the Palestinians in the wider ME context.  
In this regard, conventional and structural foreign policy will be highlighted in the study so as 
to find out the genuine European policy as pursued in Palestine and how, up to the present, 
this relates to the failure to reach any convincing outcomes. Indeed, while conventional FP is 
“oriented towards states, military security, crises and conflicts”, the latter refers to foreign 
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policy which, “conducted over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable 
political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures”.131 In light of these 
definitions, the definition adopted for the EU’s foreign policy refers institutionally to “the 
process of foreign policy coordination known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
which began in the 1970s and was upgraded by the Maastricht Treaty into a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993.”132   
Basically, the existence of ‘foreign policy’ (FP) in this context assumes distinguishing 
between “inside – an actor and its domestic context, and outside/foreign – the environment 
the actor faces”,133 in addition to the political perception of their interaction. In fact, 
everything discussed in the internal sphere which constitutes “the essence of decision”134 is 
looked at under the term “foreign policy decision-making”135 (FPDM). In practice this 
implies paying  special attention to all internal socio-political and psychological interactions 
which influence the decision-makers, while simultaneously making it imperative to analyse 
inconsistencies of the EU discourse, as a ‘unit of analysis’, so as to address the question of 
“who does what to whom, how and why”.136  Significantly, as Snyder et al emphasize, using 
this approach as a fundamental focus could be perceived as a form of “organizational 
behaviour”, according to which “the determinants of action around those officials who act for 
the political society” would be understood.137 To put it in another way, differences in foreign 
policy choice can be investigated to determine how they are steered by specifics of nations 
and the key influencing factors derived from them.
138
 As Robert Jervis explained, “if one 
wishes to probe the ‘why’ questions...underlying the events, conditions, and interaction 
patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly 
necessary.”139 
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Furthermore, studying how the decision-making process functions in the foreign policy of 
any actor “is as important if not more, than studying the outcomes of this policy.”140 This 
importance springs from the reality that “the way decisions are made can shape the eventual 
choices” which are directed towards affecting a nation’s behaviours in the international 
arena.
141
 Moreover, if it can be understood how decisions are made, it becomes easier to 
understand and, perhaps more importantly, to predict outcomes in the international field.
142
 
This analytical process can certainly uncover the cognitive processes that lead to foreign 
policy making and “get into the minds of leaders who make the decisions”,143 and in this way 
an in-depth understanding of prejudices, incentives and perspectives can be achieved.
144
 
Indeed, “the mind of the decision-maker contains complex related information and patterns 
such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national and 
self-conceptions”,145 and is a matter that requires an especially effective FPDM approach 
through which all the complexities previously mentioned could be explored.    
Accordingly, as a distinctive approach in this study, FPDM is served by a spectrum of tools 
of analysis. Given the diversity of considerations, factors, and calculations which typically 
used to build the lowest common denominator, EU foreign policy, which is collectively built 
and mostly decided through a complicated process of negotiations (including bargaining
146
) 
and trade-offs within and among member states should be understood analytically in light of 
this range of theoretical/instrumental equipment. Therefore, the outcomes of the European 
Union’s decision-making machine, which were prepared by way of familiar EU institutions, 
generally express the attitudes of the member states; however this does not negate differences 
between these states in terms of their enthusiasm and determination of pursuing adopted 
policies towards exterior actors, represented, in this case, by Hamas. Thus, it is obvious that 
getting into this investigation through a foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach
147
 with a 
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specific focus on the decision-making process (DMP) is vital in terms of achieving an 
inclusive understanding of all these variables and interactions within the EU environment. 
Eventually, as confirmed empirically and as will be illustrated in this research, the FPDM 
approach is typically “equipped with theories and models that help us understand how biases 
and errors, uncertainty, domestic politics, and various decision units can shape decisions.”148 
Another dimension of foreign policy is the external milieu which is considered a fundamental 
aspect of those related to this analysis. Indeed, “the view foreign policy analysts hold depends 
largely on the chosen level of analysis”; some concentrate on actor-based analysis while 
others focus on a structure-based perspective.
149
 For the purpose of analysis in this study, 
applying a combined actor/agent-structure approach, as discussed below, is particularly 
appropriate for understanding the environment in which the EU’s foreign policy towards 
Hamas and the Middle East has been operating.  
Furthermore, ‘foreign policy implementation’ (FPI) is another important dimension in the 
analytical process of the foreign policy which should be emphasized. However, it is different 
from FPDM and the external milieu. According to Keukeleire and Schunz, the former 
includes the way in which the mechanism of the foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) 
affects outcomes during implementation particularly when actors and their environments get 
into confrontation.
150
 The consequences of this interaction/implementation are emphasized in 
this process in order to assess the effectiveness of actors’ policies while being implemented in 
the international field. Thus FPI is highly appreciated in terms of highlighting how Hamas 
has been treated and hence the strategic impacts and reflections on all the actors involved in 
the ME.  
To conclude, the focus on the rationale discussed above will be especially instructive since 
this analytical process provides fully-developed perceptions of relations between internal 
actors and their targets. Hence, “the effects of key international, domestic, and cultural 
factors”151 of the EU’s policy towards Hamas, as well as the influential instruments used and 
their subsequent consequences, which collectively contribute to the intertwined analytical 
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process and determine how actors act and react, will be explicitly and comprehensively 
illuminated.  The aim is to be able to explore how and why decisions made by the EU have 
been drawn towards this movement in such a way, despite the fact that Hamas was 
democratically elected and, as has been argued, is simply exercising its internationally-
guaranteed right of resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Accordingly, many 
aspects of theories and approaches are applied in addressing these issues. 
Theories and Approaches in the Service of FPDM 
International relations (IR) theories and social theories in general, are used to explain, 
interpret, and understand the policies of international states or actors, and their reflections in 
the socio-political world.
152
 Indeed, their significance lies in their capability to create 
underpinning principles which constitute the basis of an accurate understanding of what 
happens, and is happening, in the political environment. Therefore, without these illuminating 
tools, the accuracy and capacity to comprehend the EU’s policies or events that have 
occurred, or even to foresee something of the future, is lacking. At the same time, one cannot 
generalize a theoretical approach without sufficient evidence, supported by a profound 
understanding, of what is going on in the political realm.
153
 Consequently, the EU’s social 
environment which is made of “intersubjective understandings, subjective knowledge and 
material objects”154 can be considered as a laboratory, in which the validity of social theories 
can be examined and from which theorists can understand socio-political actions.
155
  
In the same vein, and given that the EU is a unique international actor
156
 compared to other 
global actors, no single theory or approach can offer total accuracy in interpreting or 
explaining its policies. Indeed, according to some scholars, this duty is not as applicable as it 
is in the natural sciences or in physical realities since scientific developments mean that the 
latter may be interpreted or predicted precisely, and on the whole are not widely exposed to 
potentiality. By contrast, social sciences, including the study of EU foreign policy, have a 
high level of uncertainty which suggests the application of a diversity of tools to interpret or 
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predict their outcomes.
157
 Hence, it is almost impossible to find a single theory that deals with 
human interactions and has absolute power to answer accurately all questions that revolve 
around the policies and behaviours of a single actor.
158
  
Alternatively, scholars seek to employ multi-theories to derive a research framework for 
understanding some of an actor’s tendencies, and use these theories collectively to investigate 
all relevant aspects and dimensions. Hence, theorizing about an actor’s policies requires a 
deep scrutiny of these empirical policies in order to deduce an appropriate framework based 
on diverse theories concerning international relations (IR) and foreign policy.
159
 According to 
Brain White, in the case of EU foreign policy “a variety of different approaches can be 
justified and should be welcomed”.160 Consequently, talking about foreign policy towards 
Hamas, an ideologically and politically constructed movement,
161
 makes it imperative to use 
such a diversity of theories if all the dimensions of European policy towards the movement 
are to be understood. Therefore, due to the overlap between ideology and politics in the 
structure of the two actors, Hamas and the EU,
162
 multi- approaches are activated to provide a 
convincing interpretation of the main research question [why].      
In addition, given the relative newness of the EU compared with long-established empires 
like the United States, Russia and China, political and social theories which have been used 
in analysing the EU as a collective entity are still debated among scholars.
163
 Most of whom, 
interestingly agree that “both the classical IR theories and social constructivism, in particular, 
have had a non-negligible impact on the way foreign policy has been and is understood and 
interpreted.”164 Indeed, constructivism which has been developed in international relations 
since the 1980s
165
 has achieved many points amongst other theories and approaches used to 
analyze EU foreign policy decision making (FPDM) towards several areas in the world. This 
approach has been promulgated by several scholars (e.g., Alexander Wendt, Friedrich 
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Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf)
166
 who have pushed forward its rationale to produce one of 
the most reliable methodologies among the EU foreign policy theories. Although it seems 
ideational compared to neorealist materialism,
167
 it can propose significant interpretations of 
many realities hidden behind seemingly contradictory policies. As Emanuel Alder notes, 
constructivism “is a metaphysical stance about [the] reality that scholars seek to know and 
about the knowledge with which they seek to interpret reality.”168  
Interestingly, constructivism has not worked solely in the foreign policy field, which still 
needs further analytical scrutiny and exploration. In such investigations, 
Scholars have employed a range of methods to capture the precise pathways of 
influence through which different ideas, norms, and identities condition actors’ 
conceptions of self and interest, their decision-making procedures and causal 
beliefs, and their resulting strategies and actions.
169
 
Thus, even if constructivism is the dominant approach within the EU community at this time, 
some aspects of neorealism also remain to interpret and explain what constructivism has been 
unable to address in an actor’s policies. Even though it appears to be known that these 
theories conflict with each other, some of their aspects are complementary rather than being 
contradictory. According to Jackson and Sorensen, the debate around the differences between 
constructivism and neorealism has confirmed that the gap is much smaller: “neorealists do 
recognize the importance of ideas while constructivists do recognize the importance of 
material factors”,170 which are the basic axes in both theories. Indeed, combining these 
conceptual focal points will be noticeable in this order, depending in particular on the angle 
from which the researcher views the EU’s dynamics towards Hamas.  
In such discussions, an agent-structure approach might be considered a basic tool for 
illuminating the constructivist-neorealist argument, and by which a better understanding of 
the relationship between the EU and Hamas could be accomplished. Basically, understanding 
the role of the two extremes in such a model is crucial in diagnosing the constructivist 
rationale in this analysis and, in the same vein, detecting the parameters of neorealism 
employed. Furthermore, because neorealism and constructivism consider that ‘the state’ is the 
main unit of analysis around which international relations revolve, and since the EU and 
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Hamas alike are non-state actors, scrutinizing an agent-structure approach becomes 
indispensable in terms of its competency in justifying the rationality of using these theories in 
this particular area of research. Hence, in light of such theories, the actorness of the EU as a 
debatable issue among theorists will be conceptually theorized in a way that will clarify the 
extent to which FPA is an appropriate method for analysing the EUFP towards Hamas. Thus, 
this approach will be concisely examined in pursuit of an obvious analysis of such a policy 
towards such a movement in such an area.              
The Agent-Structure Approach and Constructivist-Neorealist Debate 
Alongside, by using aspects of both constructivism as a socio-political theory and neorealism 
in the analysis, the Agent-Structure approach, as one of the applicable tools in the analysis of 
the EU’s foreign policy towards Hamas, is utilised to accurately describe interactivity within 
the public sphere. In fact, the Agent-Structure approach is borrowed from sociology, having 
been proposed by Anthony Giddens in 1984 as a way of analysing the critical relationship 
between structures and actors in the social world.
171
 Although this approach to what is 
considered as “the most important question in social sciences”,172 is debatable amongst 
theorists and many disputes have been raised over “the nature of international reality; 
whether what exists in IR, and the explanation of it, should revolve around actors, structures, 
or both”,173 the constructivist’s explanatory framework will be partially adopted for the 
purpose of this research, while some of the illustrative neorealist rationale will also be 
enlightening in relation to the interplay between both approaches in the EU realm and the 
reality of its policy towards Hamas. Contrary to neorealism which believes that structures are 
given, and actors are not capable of altering them or changing their realities,
174
 
constructivism believes in the abilities of the two bodies to affect each other in a continuous 
mutual process out of which interests and identities are constituted.
175
 
Based on these debates, the researcher adopts specific definitions for the conceptions of both 
structure and agency/actor. However, he will make use of Jackson’s and Sorensen’s 
contribution who define structure as, “the rules and conditions that guide social action”.176 In 
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other words ‘structure’, or what some scholars also call ‘societal milieu’ or ‘societal context’, 
is made up of rules, behaviours, moral aspects, religion, history, interests, geography, 
economics and political institutions and power.
177
 These structural elements, or societal 
characteristics, represent the specifics of actors which collectively build the structure of the 
state in which actors usually (give and take) mutually as has been illustrated by 
constructivists and even ‘critical realists’.178 However, the material conditions which define 
the range of actions available to actors form the context, as implied by the term ‘structure’. 
Therefore, differences in these contexts lead, indeed, directly to differences in national 
behaviour or policies.
179
 
On the other hand, ‘agency’ or ‘actor’, as used in this research, refers to “individual or group 
abilities (international or otherwise) to affect their environment”.180 In fact, the ‘actorness’ 
concept of the EU was adopted by analysts and scholars having been coined by Gunnar 
Sjöstedt and further developed by Bretherton and Vogler. The latter two have identified five 
requirements for actorness compatible with the status of the EU; shared values and principles 
alongside formulated coherent policies, as well as negotiating abilities with others in the 
international system in conjunction with utilizing policy instruments and having domestic 
legitimacy.
181
  
Accordingly, the analytical used method in this study considers an actor-like-state approach 
which is based on the fact that the EU is not a state, since to be considered a state means 
having first to address many requirements; nor is it a normal international organization like 
any other in the world due to its unique structure and mechanisms of functioning.
182
 Other 
approaches have been similarly underlined, such as the non-state actor approach of Steve 
Smith et al., who concentrate on the actorness rather than the state in international relations 
(IR). Both approaches emphasize the same thing; namely “it is perfectly possible to speak of 
companies, regional governments, and non-state actors having foreign policy”,183 which 
essentially encompasses Hamas and the EU alike. Indeed, this matter has solved a lot of 
                                                          
177
  Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy; Theories Actors Cases. p.16 
178
 Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction eds B.Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, and Gerry Stoker 
(Political Analysis New York Palgrave, 2002). p.206  
179
  Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy; Theories Actors Cases. p.22 
180
  McAnulla, 'Structure and Agency'. p.271 
181
 Hettne and Soderbaum, 'Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global and the Role of 
Interregionalism', p. 537 
182
  White, Understanding European Foreign Policy . p.20,29 
183
 Smith, Steve, Hadfield, Amelia, and Dunne, Tim (eds.) (2008), Foreign Policy; Theories Actors Cases (New 
York: Oxford University Press). p. 3 
 
62 
 
problematic considerations regarding foreign policy analysis (FPA) and has enabled 
researchers to freely consider the effectiveness of the actor rather than whether it is a state or 
a non-state.
184
  
According to Nicholas Onuf, a constructivist scholar, the meanings of agency/actor, structure 
and rule, which constitute the tools of analysis as a basis for understanding social life that 
leads to policy actions, are interactively constructed and thereby linked 
A rule...is a statement that tells people what [they] should do…Rules provide 
guidance for human behaviour and thereby make shared meaning possible. 
Moreover, they create the possibility of agency… people, as well as social 
constructs such as states, become agents in society only through rules. At the 
same time, rules provide agents with choices, most fundamentally with the 
choice of following or breaking them. Agents have goals in mind and they do 
the best they can to achieve their goals with the means that nature and society ... 
make available to them. Agents act within an institutional context, that is, within 
the context of stable patterns of rules and related practices, but at the same time 
they act on this context. Thereby, they collectively change it but not according 
to their own choosing. Actions often have unintended consequences. Rules, 
institutions and unintended consequences form stable patterns called 
structures.
185   
 
These variables alongside others, such as norms, which interactions with others are 
coordinated by them as rules representing "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights 
and obligations"
186, in addition to “value-based expectations about appropriate behaviours, 
are the independent variables of the constructivist foreign policy theory.” As such, and 
contrary to the neorealism that is built on consequentiality, constructivism is based on 
appropriateness.
187
 Consequently, structures of states are considered as a socio-political 
environment within which actors affect and are affected in a mutual process of interaction. 
This operation of mutuality is a movable process and is subject to changes in any direction 
through persuasion and arguing between actors;
188
 a process “by which agent actions become 
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social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes intersubjective.”189 Hence, 
a state structure constituted of diverse components determines the perception
190
 of actors 
upon the aforementioned process which could lead the relationship between actors who are 
equipped with different structural backgrounds towards a specific kind of relation. This 
relation might be driven conflictually or cooperatively based on developments which this 
process of interaction has undergone.
191
      
On the other hand, the rational debate over this controversial approach should not be 
undermined. According to those from neorealism and neoliberalism (rational schools), 
structures are the only players in the international relations field not actors. From this 
perspective, preferences of the latter could be only determined from these structures while 
actors have nothing to do in terms of pursuing dictated preferences.
192
 Therefore, an actor’s 
margin is so limited that “in any particular situation there is only one rational course of action 
consistent with a specific preference set”, meaning that the actor will behave in a manner 
determined in any given situation.
193
 In other words, the actor, in this respect, seems to be “a 
prisoner of its environment” which, if applicable, should select the sole realistic preference in 
any given circumstances.
194
 This rational-choice approach is deemed to be convincing in the 
case of the EU, in view of its policy towards Hamas. Interestingly, the EU’s seemingly fixed 
and constant interest in boycotting Hamas on behalf of Israel and the US could be illuminated 
by this debate. In fact, what makes this rationale sound accurate is the EU’s attitude against 
other Palestinian factions over time, especially those that, on the one hand, have shown 
violent resistance against Israel,
195
 and on the other, those that might be seen by the EU as 
potential threats to its ME interests, such as radical Islamists. 
Thus, rational argument over the agent-structure debate should be kept alongside the 
constructivism dispute. Interestingly, in the present study, these variables are widely 
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intertwined and should not be underestimated. While some of the rational logic might be 
perceived as convincing, certain constructivist features might also be considered. In light of 
constructivism and neorealism, such an approach enables the researcher to investigate those 
determinants of the EU’s policy towards Hamas; and whether they are positioned in the EU’s 
structure or situated in the EU’s actorness and around it. Owing to the importance of the 
debate highlighted by Andrew Phillips, differentiating between neorealist-constructivist 
logics in this area of discussion will be underscored, since,   
Rationalists and constructivists diverge in their conceptions of the dominant 
logics governing agents’ actions. Behaviour through constructivist eyes is seen 
as essentially norm-driven, with states seeking to ensure a correspondence 
between their own conduct and internalized prescriptions for legitimate 
behaviour that states have derived from their identities...this position contrasts 
with rationalists’ belief that agents’ behaviour is governed not by a logic of 
appropriateness but merely by a logic of consequences. States through this optic 
are conceived as rational egoists pursuing interests formed exogenously to social 
interaction in a rationally instrumental manner, with cooperation or conflict 
being determined not by the presence or absence of norms but rather by a 
combination of resource constraints (owing to states’ finite capabilities) and the 
congruity, or lack thereof, that states perceive between their own interests and 
those of other states.
196
  
Hence, this approach makes it possible to determine passive and active groups of actors in 
such political action-games as well as the ways in which this action has flowed. Eventually, it 
becomes obvious that it has eliminated the ambiguity around the nature of the EU and 
Hamas, and whether the approaches and theories utilized are suited to viewing these actors 
freely as a subject of analysis.      
Beyond this debate, aspects from constructivism as a theoretical analytical tool in conjunction 
with major indicators of neorealism theory will be concisely highlighted as applicable. 
However, the researcher will not deeply plunge onto these philosophies in terms of their 
major or minor debates and controversial arguments within or around them, as it is not his 
area of concern. Rather, he considers main streams within these tools of analysis on which he 
relies while trying to explore the pathways of influence through which assumed theoretical 
parameters might affect the EUFP towards Hamas. Hence, the researcher will discuss these 
hypothetical aspects of theories only when they are relevant.   
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Constructivism and the Functionality of Perceptions in Foreign Policy 
Building on what has already been mentioned about constructivism, the constructivist 
rationale as developed by Wendt, clearly depends on intersubjective interaction within the 
public sphere.  As Jackson and Sorensen note, “global politics is said to be guided by the 
intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, values and knowledge held by actors.” These shared 
issues emphasize “the social aspect of human existence – the role of shared ideas as an 
ideational structure constraining and shaping behaviour.”197 This interaction between actors 
may in practice lead either to friendship or hostility, depending on the perception of the 
relationship generated in the international milieu, and indeed such a possibility can be 
understood in light of the production process of such relationship.  
According to constructivist theorists, the reality constructed through the above-mentioned 
process acquires its characteristics and is thereby drafted through human actions and 
ideational behaviours which constitute the basics of political trends.
198
 “Human relations, 
including international relations, consist of thoughts and ideas and not essentially of material 
conditions or forces. This is the philosophically idealist element of constructivism which 
contrasts with the materialist philosophy”,199 as adopted by neorealism. Hence, aspects of the 
constructivist argument are applied in this study when discussing the ideational basis of the 
divergence between the EU and Hamas. Significantly, understanding actions followed by the 
EU in this regard should be essentially anticipated by exploring explanations and meanings 
given to certain motives behind such actions in accordance with the constructivist 
rationale.
200
   
Interestingly, the question of whether or not the decision-maker’s perception matters in this 
case, has become an illuminating feature. According to Robert Jervis  
Logic permits us to distinguish between the psychological milieu (the world as 
the actor sees it) and the operational milieu (the world in which policy will be 
carried out) and to argue that policies and decisions must be mediated by 
statesmen’s goals, calculations, and perceptions.201  
Indeed, it is very important to scrutinize the way in which decision-makers perceive the 
‘other’ and the images they hold about him. In addition to further variables, the psychological 
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milieu of an actor can be also considered a decisive factor in the policy pursued towards the 
‘other’. In Jervis’s view “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies 
without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of 
others”.202 Substantially, having known one’s perception of the other could be a significant 
indicator of the nature of the relationship between them and whether it is based on hostility or 
friendship. To put it in another way, having diagnosed this factor, scholars might say “if that 
is the way the statesman saw the situation, it is no wonder that he acted as he did.”203 In 
reality, this logic may fundamentally illustrate the significance of understanding how the EU 
perceives Hamas, or even its adversary Israel, and how far the EU’s policy towards the 
former might be applied.     
Furthermore, merely being enemies or friends in the international sphere does not assure one 
specific theory rather than another, as some people might imagine. The reality is linked to 
meanings which are typically given to a particular behaviour. As Copeland remarks, “conflict 
does not confirm realism, just as cooperation does not confirm liberalism or constructivism. 
Indeed, it all depends on the degree of internalization—why the actors acted in a conflictual 
or cooperative fashion, why they treated each other as enemies, rivals, or friends.”204  
According to Wendt, “if states fall into such conflicts, it is a result of their own social 
practices, which reproduce egoistic and militaristic mind-sets.”205 In his view, broadly 
speaking, international politics is not determined by material issues as much as it is socially 
constructed by states perceptions of each other as enemies, rivals or friends.
206
 In other 
words, the reality that illuminates [why’s] questions backs the state’s foreign policy choice 
and accordingly enables constructivist scholars to interpret either hostility or friendship.  
Thus, in light of the aforementioned logic, the EU’s international system, which has imposed 
sanctions on the Hamas movement while, at the same time, having another agenda in terms of 
its views on both (Islamization and terror) in the ME, has constructed these stances on the 
basis of meanings given to Hamas’s actions and socio-political behaviours in the international 
realm. Therefore, stigmatizing an organization as being terrorist or not stems in this case, 
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from the definition of terrorism which actors adopt, since, with regard to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in particular, what the EU, US and Israel regard as terrorism is essentially not the 
same according to Hamas, Palestinians and Arabs. Fitzalan Gorman notes that terrorism has 
an “ever-changing definition”; different meanings of behaviours and their changing effects on 
people around the world could be obviously noticed but have no specifically agreed 
characteristics in the international community. Hence, “the phrase, ‘One man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter’ explains this discrepancy.”207 As noted by Jackson and 
Sorensen,     
The international system is not something ‘out there’ like the solar system. It 
does not exist on its own. It exists only as an intersubjective awareness among 
people; in that sense the system is constituted by ideas, not by material forces. It 
is a human invention or creation not of a physical or material kind but of a 
purely intellectual and ideational kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a 
system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time 
and place. If the thoughts and ideas that enter into the existence of international 
relations change, then the system itself will change as well.
208
   
However, categorizing Hamas as a terrorist organization implies that it is an enemy of the 
EU, a matter which could not be compromised by the latter. Given that “friendship and 
enmity provide the foundational structure of allegiance, of solidarity, that underpin the 
capacity for effective decision”,209 the EU’s position towards Hamas and its democratically-
elected government could be understood in this frame; thus the clash is mostly between 
meanings that are given to actions and this could not be only referred to given constant 
societal structures apart from actors effects as neorealism might suggest, but to mutual 
interaction between both actors and structures.  
 
Dialectical Relationship between Identities and Actions the State of Israel at the Centre  
According to constructivism, another significant tool steering or interpreting foreign policy, 
alongside perception and mutually affected by it, is the identity of actors. In fact, “collective 
identity of the Union is an important aspect of the EU’s presence, which shapes perceptions 
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of and behaviours towards ‘outsiders’.”210 According to Wendt, even though the frame of the 
state is retained by constructivist approaches to EU foreign policy; it is recast at the European 
level and theorized in terms of identities rather than interests.
211
 Indeed, how the EU reads 
Hamas is vital for understanding the denominating determinants of the EU’s policy, whereas 
how the EU defines itself is also essential. When these two actors speak about awareness of 
‘ego’ and the ‘other’ it is undoubtedly very relevant to this study in discussing those who 
stand at opposite poles in terms of the relationship with Israel, the main issue about which 
they differ. In a nutshell, understandings of self and others in this case are simply about 
distinguishing ideas which mainly define social groups, and individually or collectively 
constitute “states of mind which are all-pervasive in social life”.212 Thus, evoking collective 
identities based on these facts is indispensable in attempting to understand an actor’s policies.    
Fundamentally, ‘identity’ in this respect means what K. Smith defines as “images of 
individuality and distinctiveness (‘self-hood’) held and projected by an actor and formed – 
and modified over time – through relations with significant ‘others’.”213 Therefore, it lies “at 
the core of national and transnational interests, and it is so crucial for an understanding of 
international behaviour, practices, institutions and change”.214 According to Alder, in times 
either of international cooperation or of conflict and war, the identity of actors is an essential 
tool for understanding political relationships and trends amongst them.
215
 Interestingly, this 
school of thought suggests that identity is also subject to change through the same process of 
interactivity, and is considered a major determinant of foreign policy pursued among actors 
involved in politics.
216
 
Furthermore, the identities of actors that play such a role in FPDM are typically “governed by 
the normative and ideological structures that they inhabit”217 and, at the same time, are 
structured and produced through social interactive operation. That is to say, the process of 
‘give and take’ between actors plays a distinguishing role in building a collective identity and 
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thus particular preferences; at the same time, however, some aspects of identity, or what 
Wendt calls “corporate identity”,218 are typically solid to the extent that this interactivity does 
not affect the core on which the actor’s individuality is constituted. Therefore, based on these 
core issues, or what Wendt calls “baselines within identities”, which have been built 
historically, socially, and geo–strategically, the collective social identity is constructed and 
fuelled.
219
 Copeland maintains that, “unlike rationalist theories such as neorealism and 
neoliberalism, which hold interest and identities constant, constructivism considers how 
ideational structures shape the very way actors define themselves – who they are, their goals, 
and the roles they believe they should play.”220 
The relevance of the identity debate in this study stems from the necessity of shedding light 
on the motivations of the EU’s policy towards Hamas and similar entities. From the 
constructivist perspective, the most obvious failure has been the failure of constructing a 
common area through interaction between the two identities; a matter which indicates the loss 
of the capability of building collective understandings which might have enabled the EU and 
Hamas to establish a normal relationship. However, the identity of the EU, as an outcome of 
the interactivity between structures over long centuries, has crystallized into a collective 27 
member states-identity, and, according to Heather Field, is considered a foregone 
conclusion.
221
 Confirming this matter, Helen Sjursen asserts that even the enlargement 
process within Europe itself “was driven by a common pan-European identity not only by the 
norms of a liberal-democratic international community”.222 Significantly, rather than being 
built solely on economic interests, this identity is also based on geo-political, religious, 
historical and ideological factors and norms within which the Israeli state was found 
occupying a place. Thus, due to such socio-political ties
223
 the Israeli state, mainly as a 
Western colonial strategic project in the ME, can be considered as belonging to the same 
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collective identity that is based on Judeo-Christian culture and thereby Western 
civilization.
224
  
In fact, since “identity is essentially about belongings”225 the existence of the Israeli state as 
one of those within the Western legacy has been a decisive factor in the policy pursued by the 
Western countries, including the EU’s policies towards those which might threaten such 
identity belonging in the ME. Having internalized this affecting factor in the European 
collective awareness as “the noblest example of democracy and freedom in the ME, an 
exemplar that has its roots deep in the Bible and in the Zionist ideal”,226 illustrates the extent 
to which shared values and norms between the EU and Israel are considered valuable in 
building such a Western identity. In Lord Plumb’s words, these “strong spiritual, cultural and 
democratic links”227 have given the relationship between these actors its uniqueness and 
distinctiveness.   
Even though the aforementioned Judeo-Christian culture has been one of the main pillars of 
Western identity over centuries, its effect has not been as salient and tangible as it has been 
since the demise of the communist system.
228
 In fact, it is believed that “critical junctures 
such as the crumbling of long-time stable social structures are...likely to cause profound 
changes in the perception of identity and interests”.229 After the disintegration of the cultural 
structures of the old international system during the two world wars, and the subsequent 
collapse of the communist threat by the end of the 1980s, there were profound and significant 
changes involved in reconstructing Western identity with regard to Israel and the Jewish 
people. As Mariano Barbato argues, the notion of the West itself has recently witnessed a 
significant transformation “from the Cold War political community of the Free World, to the 
culturalist-religious post-89 notion of a Judeo-Christian West.”230 Hence, in this ideational-
ideological context, Israel’s status has been strikingly fostered. Defending this Jewish state 
from being harshly penalized by international society for its behaviour in Palestine, or from 
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being seriously threatened by other ME actors like Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, is one of the 
EU’s duties just as much as it is the duty of the US.231 This matter ensured Israel’s 
significance in the Western mind, especially after the events of 11 September 2001; these 
attacks which injected the conflict between the West and Islamists in the ME with large doses 
of ideology, in the face of Hamas that represents a liberation organisation dependent on 
violent means and fostered by a contradictory background ideology with its counterpart of the 
West.
232
  
Generally speaking, protecting Israel and securing its status in the ME as a fundamental 
European commitment is regarded, in one way or another, as defending the Western Judeo-
Christian heritage
233
 and thereby Western civilization which represents the core of the 
European identity
234
 that as Maria Aznar claimed, must be defended.
235
 In addition to the 
historical circumstances related to the Holocaust
236
 and the Jewish genocide in Europe in the 
1930s and 1940s, as it is discussed in this study, contemporary Europe has inherited the 
Israeli state as an existent reality, that has represented a geo-political European interest in the 
ME since its establishment at the hands of the Europeans’ ancestors in 1948.237 It was this 
blend of factors within Western European civilization
238
 that caused the building of a strong 
relationship with Israel. 
However, this relationship has brought the EU face to face with those whose violent 
resistance against Israel constitutes the core of their identity, and who, at the same time, 
define themselves as resisters with an Islamic background against the non-legitimate Israeli 
occupation.  Hence, under the definition of ‘ego’ and ‘the other’239 the EU has sided itself 
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with one party, Israel, against the other, which holds the opposite point of view towards this 
state. For all that, the slow process of interactivity between the EU and Hamas over the years 
has in fact failed in producing a peaceful rather than a contradictory structure within which 
they can act accordingly. In other words, the contradiction between the two identities, which 
is highlighted here through the use of constructivist-neorealist mechanisms, has generated a 
cautious mutual interaction between the agents which led the EU to deal with Hamas as a 
terrorist organisation lacking political reliability.
240
 This meant that there were no further 
communications with Hamas under these particular circumstances.  
Conceptually and theoretically, as Hegel states, contradiction in such socio-political 
relationships “is at the root of logic and reality alike”.241 This, indeed, was later confirmed by 
Marx who viewed contradiction and negativity as factors which “remain driving forces of 
change”.242 As the term suggests, when two realities fall equally into a contradictory context, 
especially if it is an existential violent contradiction, it will not be surprising if one or both 
might choose to behave aggressively towards the other. According to Anthony Giddens “the 
teleology of contradiction between structures is that of functional need; the need of the 
structure or system, unacknowledged by social actors themselves.”243 In practical rather than 
theoretical terms, the Israeli state, as an important identity-based element among those of the 
EU, is not only unrecognized by Hamas but has also been violently confronted by the latter in 
a way that, from the EU’s point of view, has threatened its stability in the short term and 
might affect its existence in the long one.
244
 Thus, given that identities which, as 
constructivism asserts, are produced and reproduced in structures within which, according to 
Godelier, this contradiction typically occurs, 
245
 the EU’s policy towards Hamas seems to be 
built upon this fact of rooted negativity between the identities involved.             
In this frame, the confrontation with Hamas, even after its triumph in the 2006 elections, is 
attributed in this study to the reality of Hamas as a violent existential contradiction to the 
Israeli state that has been fighting Palestinians over the same land of Palestine. Indeed, the 
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significance of constructivism in this context is represented in its solid logic, which offers 
appropriate analytical tools and assures the changeable status of these produced and 
reproduced identities in the Western structure itself. This structure, in Copeland’s opinion, 
typically leads actors, in a dialectic process, to redefine their identities and interests within 
this process of interaction;
246
 a matter that does not necessarily accept the inevitability of 
conflict or war to the death for the sake of proclaimed fixed structured. Hettne and 
Söderbaum offer an appropriate description of the European identity-building mechanism 
discussed above;  
External policies towards the outside world are closely related to the 
endogenous process of increasing cohesiveness and identity. There is thus a 
dynamic relationship between internal coherence and external impact. Identity is 
often shaped through a negative, socially constructed image of the [O]ther. In 
the European case this role has historically been given to Islam, first through the 
Arabs, then through the Ottoman Empire. This has shaped the Christian element 
in European identity leading to a tension between, on the one hand, an 
essentialist and static and, on the other, a more inclusive and dynamic 
understanding of European identity.
247
 
Indeed, such tension caused the European confusion that accompanied the EU when it 
rejected Hamas’s electoral success in 2006, and has contributed, with others, through the 
Middle East Quartet (MEQ) in the siege imposed over the Gaza Strip.  
The tension is between modern dynamic Europe which highlights its normative objectives, 
and the other culturalist-religious and imperialist Europe which cannot stand apart, or even 
remain neutral, when the matter concerns the security of one of its significant belongings, i.e., 
Israel.
248
 The EU’s hesitant position in banning Hamas between 1993 and 2003 can be 
interpreted according to constructivism theory, which sees that, “actors confronting a given 
situation do not consult a fixed set of preferences and calculate their actions in order to 
maximize their expected utility, but look to socially constructed roles and institutional rules, 
and ask what sort of behaviour is appropriate in this situation.”249 In the case of Hamas it 
seems that all attempts by international bodies to contain the movement and to lighten its 
hostility towards Israel have failed to do so. Thus, the EU, which had made the two-state 
solution a strategic objective towards solving the conflict in Palestine, decided that there was 
no longer any chance of restraining Hamas, the existential violent contradiction to the Israeli 
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state and the EU’s strategies in the ME alike, thereby proving, as traditional models of 
foreign policy decision making (FPDM) would suggest, that security matters are 
paramount.
250
 
Consequently, the identities of both the EU and Hamas have played a significant role in the 
EU’s policy towards this Palestinian movement and its political outcomes. Although the main 
factor on which they differ is the Israeli state, it is obvious that any changes in the future will 
depend on the interaction which might also occur around this factor. Nevertheless, the light at 
the end of this tunnel could be expected through constructivism theoretical lenses which 
recognize these differences in identities and suggest areas of meeting in the political space 
between contradictory actors. According to constructivism theory, since “Structures 
constitute actors in terms of their interests and identities, while structures are also produced, 
reproduced, and altered by the discursive practices of agents”,251 this case of rupture between 
the two agents the EU and Hamas can be appropriately adapted should particular 
circumstances occur.  
This adaptability mechanism, which is justified by constructivists, has the capability of 
interpreting the new EU communications with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that took place 
following the outbreak of the Arab Spring in December 2010 and the long period during 
which these moderate Islamists in the ME were politically boycotted; it means the EU and 
Hamas “can thereby emancipate themselves from dysfunctional situations that are in turn 
replicating conflictual practices.”252 In other words, having identities produced and 
reproduced in a continuous process of adaptability and interaction might yield new situations, 
and thereby preferences within which the relationship between the two actors might change, 
and consequently, meet in the middle rather than losing contact entirely with the opposite 
party. From this theoretical point of view, using tools of diplomacy between actors might 
produce a high level of cooperation,
253
 and while this has yet not happened, the possibility 
exists for the future. 
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EU’s Interests in Light of Neorealism: another Driving Factor   
Having said that the identities of actors play a significant role in formulating foreign policy 
according to constructivism does not mean that the European policy towards Hamas stems 
solely from normatively-driven ideological-civilizational bases or foundations. In fact, it is 
also a pragmatic policy, which in essence does not commit to the normative objectives of its 
announced foreign policy, as much as it is an ideational one.
254
 Therefore, European interests 
are another driving factor of the EU foreign policy towards Hamas. The definition of 
‘national interests’ adopted for the purpose of this study,  is that of Alexander Wendt, who 
defines them as “the self-regarding desire by states for power, security or wealth”,255 a 
meaning also shared by neorealists. Contrary to the neorealist analysis which considers 
national interests as exogenously determined and thereby fixed and constant, the 
constructivism school “argues that interests are context-bound and thus socially constructed 
through forces such as identity, ideas, normative beliefs and socialization.”256 Despite the fact 
that the EU’s interests are deeply intertwined and diverse in the ME, Israel’s survival as a 
substantial one of these interests is the most relevant to the topic discussed. Therefore, it will 
be given priority in relation to other European- Middle Eastern interests which will be briefly 
and separately investigated.  
Indeed, the constructivist rationale is no longer workable in terms of considering the EU’s 
interest in keeping the Israeli state secured and safe. While this interest is supposed to be 
produced and reproduced in a dialectic process within structures, according to constructivism 
theory, it seems to be a fixed and constant European interest; a matter which is not open to 
question. Interestingly, from this angle the realist rationale which views interests in this way 
– i.e., fixed and constant257 – appears more convincing than underlying constructivist 
principles. To illustrate, even if constructivism successfully illuminates the identity aspect of 
the Israeli factor and its relationship with the collective European identity, it fails 
dramatically to shed light on its having been a fixed and continuing European interest in the 
ME over a long period without being changed or compromised. Additionally, the 
constructivist logic, which is based on appropriateness rather than consequentiality, is not 
utterly sufficient for interpreting the EU’s inconsistent discourse that deals with Israel as a 
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constant interest, and prioritizes its security at the expense of its normative commitments or 
announced soft objectives in the ME.  
Alternatively, neorealism might perform this duty through its operating mechanisms which 
are rationally rather than normatively built.
258
 Therefore, it would take this seemingly 
unchangeable variable into consideration, while being at the same time capable of solving the 
contradiction in the EU’s policy between rational policies adopted towards Hamas on the one 
hand, and moral normative claims on the other. According to neorealism, actors are used to 
formulating their foreign policies and shaping their choices based on national interests driven 
by power,
259
 regardless of moral aspects or normative values which might contradict these 
interests.
 As Morgenthau states, “realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be 
applied to the actions of states.”260 Therefore, according to this rationale, preferences of 
actors in foreign policy are derived from these abstract factors in IR and policy actions are 
determined accordingly. Hence, realists believed fully in the British Prime Minister Lord 
Palmerston’s speech to the English Parliament in 1848 when he claimed that “we have no 
eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and 
those interests it is our duty to follow.”261  
Consequently, the EU’s fixed interest in securing and sheltering Israel is another major 
driving factor of the EU policy in the ME
262
 which can be understood and justified by 
borrowing these aspects of neorealism. However, as a milieu-shaping actor in the world, the 
EU has attempted to maintain the momentum of the MEPP by using its economic capabilities 
to depict the political scene in Palestine as a hotbed of tension, according to the Western 
agenda. Therefore, when security and stability as essential conditions are breached by Hamas, 
the EU has not hesitated to be firm and crucial with it, while using its abilities to bring the 
movement into its circle through tough economic and political sanctions.  
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EU’s Normativity and the Neorealism logic  
According to neorealism, international relations occur in an anarchic, rather than a hierarchic 
world which lacks a unified coordinating government, contrary to the national level where 
governments monopolise the use of violence against those who breach laws and regulations 
or infringe the rights of others. Given the absence of a global government which could 
exercise the same role as it does on the national level, actors resort to sustaining themselves 
according to their own capabilities by building a “self-help system”,263 in which each actor, 
whether or not by force, seeks to maximise its advantages and protect its interests.  
In this system, survival of actors is the most worrying aspect; therefore, their behaviours are 
conditioned to this worrying matter which gives way to pressure on states through 
socialization, and in turn leads to imitating their peers in the gaining of power, and 
competition, resulting in the building of alliances.
264
 Hence, lack of security and fear of 
unwanted consequences push states to build a competitive balance of power,
265
 which works 
as a guarantor for their interests against those who might use their own powers to attack or 
affect the former’s status in world. In this sense, “consumers of security”,266 as Waltz called 
them, or security maximizers as named by others,
267
 construct their alliances as a result of 
compromises between themselves that are intended to counter those who might threaten the 
security of their common interests and relative gains.
268
  
Significantly, these alliances or states are motivated not only by material concerns or relative 
gains, but “also pursue normative or ideological agenda in response to domestic political 
factors”. However, as most realists believe, the second normative set has never been followed 
by states at the expense of the formal material set.
269
 This fact does not mean, in this regard, 
that neorealists do not in principle recognize the role of ideas and norms in determining 
policies; on the contrary, it is obvious that a convergence between constructivism as a norms-
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based approach and neorealism as a material-based school of thought has started to find its 
way into much of the literature.
270
 From the perspective of Alexander Wendt et al, 
“materialists need not ignore cultural factors altogether. But they treat them as 
epiphenomenal or at least secondary, as a ‘superstructure’ determined in the last instance by 
the material ‘base’.”271 Thus, contrary to the constructivist perspective which considers that 
“material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations”,272 norms are 
overburdened by material considerations in IR, according to neorealist materialists.  
However, in terms of its concern about its common norms, the EU’s behaviour with Hamas is 
interpreted more by neorealists rather than by constructivists as will be illustrated.   
As suggested by neorealist scholars, states have “a role in shaping domestic and international 
security” on behalf of their citizens, in a way that serves, maintains and protects their gains 
and interests.
273
 According to Hyde‐Price, all states are interested in building a suitable 
international environment to serve their security and prosperity, and are therefore accustomed 
to utilizing their “material power capabilities not only to exert direct inﬂuence or control over 
other actors, but also to shape their external milieu.”274 Accordingly, as deduced by Mark A. 
Pollack who reviewed the contributions of various realist scholars, neorealism is 
distinguished by three core assumptions: “states as unitary actors, states as rational utility 
maximizers and the anarchic nature of the international system forcing states to place 
primacy on self-help, power, and relative gains.”275 Based on this brief account of 
neorealism, the EUFP could be understood in three aspects, as identified by Hyde‐Price,276 
1.  The EU functions as an instrument for the collective economic interests of those states in 
the context of the global economy as a traditional purpose of EEC/EC external policy. 
2.  It serves as an instrument for collectively shaping the regional milieu. This role has grown 
in response to the structural changes occasioned by the end of Cold War bipolarity.  
3.  It has come to serve as the institutional repository of the second-order normative concerns 
of EU member states.  
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Hence, if a clash occurred between the EU as a vehicle for common EU interests or as a 
cooperative milieu-shaping actor and itself as a vehicle for shared normative values, the 
formal vehicle would win in the end, as evidently and starkly concluded in many 
international examples in which the EU has found itself between the two choices. In light of 
this, the EU cannot be considered a normative power due also to the fact that it evidently 
relies on its material power capabilities and economic conditionality when trying to introduce 
its norms internationally; a matter which assures the realistic nature of its functioning.
277
 
However, the debate about whether the EUFP is realistically driven or normatively motivated 
is long lasting, and differing viewpoints have had many advocates; whereas other scholars are 
convinced that both aspects of motivations are linked and non-separable.
278
    
The most striking aspect in the EU’s foreign policy is its persistent attempt to advance its 
personality as a normative actor – i.e., as one driven by a constructivist rather than a realistic 
rationale while, like other world powers, it pursues its national interests, thus confirming the 
assumptions of the rational theorists. However, when its interests push it to function as a 
normative or civilian power, it does this as long as its required actions do not affect these 
interests, whereas it functions as a realistic power when its interests, not soft values, 
ultimately dictate doing so.   
Indeed, this is what happened in Palestine with Hamas, and with the Islamic Salvation Front 
(ISF) in Algeria during the 1990s, when the EU not only remained silent about the military 
coup against democratic outcomes after the FIS had achieved an electoral victory in 1992, but 
also promoted the Algerian military government politically, diplomatically and 
economically
279
 by concluding several cooperation agreements (including the 1995 Barcelona 
treaty) instead of penalizing it.
280
  What happened in Algeria at that time, and the way the EU 
dealt with the consequences of the military coup, clearly confirms its opportunistic nature, 
and the role of the balance of power and the security factor as realistic parameters that led it 
to perform in that way.
281
 Here, the EU opted to follow its interests rather than its values 
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(democracy and human rights), after having stood behind those who aborted a unique 
democratic attempt in North Africa.
282
 In both cases, democracy as a supposed normative EU 
value and objective was denied, and its behaviours have proven the differences between 
rhetoric and deeds.  
This has been supported from a historical perspective by Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer 
MacNaughtan, according to whom, neorealist arguments appear more convincing when the 
matter relates to the EU which pursued its policies, for example, towards the Iraq war, the 
Iran crisis, and Chechnya. EU behaviours in these various cases offered practical proof that 
“the balance of power at the international level and the uneven distribution of capabilities 
between member states have determined the outcome and the (in) action of the EU”,283 which 
it is fully consistent with the neorealist rationale. This realistic logic could be also seen in the 
EUFP approach towards Russia and China when it concentrated on its economic interests at 
the expense of its inspiring norms and values.
284
 Commenting on the use of normative 
language in these cases, Hyde‐Price points out that, “the most obvious is that universalist 
claims more often than not serve to disguise particularist interests.”285 Thus, observing the 
EU from a realistic perspective is justified and understandable in light of the aforesaid 
instances.  
Michelle Pace, a leading researcher on the EU’s democratization process has reached the 
same conclusion noted above. Pace examined the EU’s democracy promotion in the MENA, 
and attempted to match the theoretical claims regarding the necessity of exporting democracy 
and other related norms and values, and the EU’s functionality in this regard. She noticed that 
the EU had prioritized its interests, as represented in stability and security in the ME, over its 
norms. Even the normative aspects of conventions between the EU and the Mediterranean 
countries following the EMP initiative, have not been activated or, in her words, “are not 
taken seriously by EU actors”; hence, sanctions have not been imposed on authoritarian 
regimes accustomed to violating internationally-backed norms and values with their people. 
On the contrary, the EU continued to support them given their role in securing the EU’s fears 
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of the radical Islamist threat and other such vital concerns. Given the sanctions imposed by 
the EU on the Hamas-elected government in 2006, Pace concluded that the EU had proved its 
stand “in stark contrast to the EU normative principles”; thus, paradoxes and contradictions 
between EU claims and practice were fundamentally linked with a lack of coherence in the 
EU’s decision-making.286 In another study, Pace argued that the EU’s preferred model of 
democracy in the ME would protect stability, as perceived by the EU and its allies, either in 
the Arab-Israeli question or in its relations with authoritarian regimes. In her view, the EU 
boycott of the democratically-elected Hamas-led government from 2006 onward proved that 
EU donors to the PA were mostly focused on Israel’s security and protection, and had no 
intention of building a real democracy in Palestine.
287 
In the Palestinian case, therefore, the 
EU’s interest-driven policy cannot be ignored or undermined and the constructivist-rationalist 
theoretical approaches could thus be convincingly combined and utilised in analysing the EU 
behaviours and policies, as is done throughout this study.  
EU Geo-Strategic Historical Perspective on the Middle Eastern Context   
  It is obvious for realists that the Middle East is a typical example of the 
inconsistencies, hypocrisies and double standards associated with having a 
normative agenda in foreign policy, and indeed; there are countless examples of 
conflicts between ethical concerns, and as the realists say, core national interests 
such as security.
288
 
 
When discussing the EUFP towards Hamas, it is useful to look geo-strategically at the wider 
Middle Eastern context in which the EU has been functioning for a considerable length of 
time. Without understanding this context and the EU’s underlying interests which are at the 
root of both conflicts and solutions, diagnosing the aforementioned policy lacks the necessary 
consistency and will lead to ignoring the framework in which it operates.
289
 Indeed, “Europe 
has been present in Asia for centuries, and this fact alone is the key to understanding the close 
relationship that continues to exist between today’s EU and much of the region.”290 
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Therefore, claimed realistic tendencies in the EUFP are rooted in the ties which connect the 
EU with its specific interests in the ME.  
From a historical perspective, both Europe and later the EU has had substantial needs 
pertaining to the flow of oil and other geostrategic aims
291
 related to the perception of the 
conflict between the East and the West over time, along with the West’s desire to keep the 
East’s capabilities under Western control even after the European colonial states had 
withdrawn from the ME. Hence, the total European policy in the region after the First World 
War (WW1) succeeded in dividing the Ottoman legacy, through the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
in 1916 and other bilateral agreements between the colonizing and colonized states, and 
keeping the region politically controllable.
292
 In Roberson’s opinion “the Great Powers had 
come to view the region as fragmented – never as a unified whole”,293 and this fragmentation 
has enabled the West to control the governments of the Middle East, thereby securing 
Western interests through weak rulers in terms of their relationships with the outside world, 
while governors and dictators were increasingly promoted by the same powers against their 
own populations’ political will.  
Thus, possible domestic social powers in the ME, which can affect Western hegemony over 
political and economic decisions, have been treated as potential hazards towards Western 
arrangements and interests in the region. This kind of uncertainty towards the intentions of 
the ‘other’ as a driving factor of neorealism,294 has led the EU, in an obvious realistic 
trend,
295
 to act with scepticism towards Islamists in the region, especially those who are 
religiously and nationally driven in choosing their countries’ future national aspirations. In 
light of this reality, Hamas as well as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria have both 
been treated aggressively, and other Islamists in the region have been ignored and excluded 
in favour of dictatorships by the EU member states.
296
 With regard to neorealist perception, 
states are typically driven by their own uncertainty towards the intentions of others which 
might at any time affect their security.  
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Consequently, actors are habitually “tempted to expand or otherwise strengthen themselves 
and/or weaken others in order to survive over the long haul.”297 According to this neorealist 
notion, the exterior milieu is considered the main determinant of foreign policy in which 
states, as rational actors, interact to secure their interests.
298
 In such a formula, the revival of 
socio-political powers in the ME that can challenge Western hegemony over regional 
capabilities has been put under ‘fire’ by the West in different ways. Interestingly, Hamas in 
Palestine, fostered by substantial support from a broad sector of Islamists in the wider region, 
has represented one of these movements that has dramatically challenged this equation in the 
ME by concentrating on violent methods of struggle against Israel on one side, and its 
growing popularity within Palestinians on the other. This is why Hamas is believed to have 
been paying the price of this reality-challenge since its electoral triumph in 2006. However, 
in this framework, the EU’s policy towards the Palestinian Hamas movement could be 
investigated and checked.    
Conclusion 
Analytically, the EU’s foreign policy towards Hamas is seen to be based on a distinctly three-
dimensional framework. While these three analytical aspects are different in term of their 
significance, they combine and intertwine to offer an appropriate method of analysis that is 
derived from basic FPA approach and particularly its offshoot FPDM. Indeed, the domestic 
context which fuels the decision-making (DM) process, in addition to the external 
environment which the adopted policy affects and by which it is affected, and the 
mechanisms used with all their relevant outcomes, are the areas under investigation in this 
study. Significantly, in light of idealism-materialism debates, FPDM and the agent/actor-
structure approaches, equipped with a variety of models or theoretical aspects, have been 
functioned while articulating the ultimate framework of the research. Interestingly, 
constructivism theory, based on the mutual effect between structures and actors in IR and the 
changeable nature of identities, is considered to be one of the most suitable instruments of 
enlightenment in such discussions. It enables the researcher to emphasize how the EU 
defends its appreciated collective identity, reproduced and fostered from the 1950s onwards, 
when facing Hamas as an existential violent contradiction to the Israeli state whose cultural 
roots have been considered as one of the basic components of this identity.  
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At the same time, neorealism is no less important than constructivism in its capacity for 
shedding light on the EU’s interests in the ME and the way in which they are pursued; 
therefore, some of its provoked aspects or pillars, e.g., self-interests, security and uncertainty, 
have been activated. In fact, the EU’s seemingly fixed interests, including the survival of 
Israel as one of them, could be accurately perceived through these theoretical neorealist 
lenses and thereby linked to the EU’s policy towards Hamas. The aforementioned policy has 
intentionally been placed in a wider context pertaining to EU-ME relations, utilizing a 
historical analytical perspective. Thus, validity of these combined theories, modules and 
approaches will be under examination during this study.  
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Chapter Three: EU Foreign Policy: Development and Performance 
Forming an appropriate image of the EU’s policy towards others should undoubtedly include 
some idea of how the European Union Foreign Policy (EUFP) is constructed. This chapter 
therefore discusses the emergence in the 1970s of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the 
first established arm for the EUFP, and the subsequent establishment of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) in terms of necessities, adjustments, developments, effectiveness, 
and areas of functioning, all of which will be appropriately emphasized. In addition, the EU 
institutions involved in the decision-making process will also be examined, along with the 
mechanisms and procedures used in arriving at decisions. Finally, the EU’s Foreign Policy 
instruments will be identified in order to explore the extent to which the EU is able to interact 
internationally. The intention of this descriptive chapter is to introduce the EU, which 
acquires its importance from its performance and its ability to act appropriately, whether 
internally or externally.      
Building a European Foreign and Security Policy 
Among the European states, European foreign policy has been one of the most controversial 
matters; at the same time, it is one of the most frequently-debated subjects amongst EU 
analysts. Players from within and others from outside Europe have had a significant effect in 
steering this dispute. With the dawn of the European Union in the wake of WWII, the 
founding fathers of the Union cherished many aspirations. The long-hoped for peace and 
security were perhaps the main motivations, but this new European way of peace, represented 
in the eventual creation of the EU, certainly did not function in a vacuum; the onset of the 
Cold War, the Korean War, and other international crises dominated the political atmosphere 
around the world and in particular in Europe.
299
 Hence, while these critical international 
circumstances put considerable pressure on the main unifying players, they made European 
endeavours towards a common foreign policy a doubtful matter, because of the presence of 
the agendas of many individual states within the new intergovernmental framework.  
In response to these challenges, several attempts were made to build Europe a foreign affairs 
entity of its own; however many obstacles were found which transformed this debate into a 
significant taboo.
300
 The European Coal and Steel Committee (ECSC), or Treaty of Paris, a 
French economic initiative, was launched in 1951, and was followed by another initiative 
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directed towards building a defence system of its own for Europe, which would reflect the 
newly-generated global interactions that began in the wake of WWII. In 1952 the Union’s 
founding fathers signed the European Defence Community (EDC) pact, according to which 
these economically-united countries would operate in a wider context.
301
 This did not 
represent any form of opposition to NATO which, since 1949, had linked the two sides of the 
Atlantic in the face of any potential Russian threat. In spite of the failure of the pact two years 
later,
302
 it was an attempt by the European side to take the initiative and to rely more on 
themselves instead of being dependent on the leadership of the US and NATO.  
Predictably, the continuous-sovereignty debate since that time has dominated any progression 
in this dossier. Crucially, the European states, by and large, remain reluctant to concede that 
some of their national sovereignty in the security and defence sector will be decided by 
‘others’, even if these ‘others’ are under the supervision of EU institutions.303 This was 
precisely the reason behind the veto instigated by the French National Assembly on the EDC 
initiative, even though it was their own government that had proposed the project.
304
 Despite 
the veto, the French government tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to take the lead from the 
US in protecting Europe’s continental security, to the extent that during the Gaullist phase it 
withdrew from the military structures of NATO in an attempt to reduce American hegemony 
in the resolving of European affairs on the one hand, and to raise Europe’s political voice on 
the other.
305
 Given the complexities of the situation after WWII, and the failure mechanisms 
of the EU’s decision-making with regard to international political affairs after the end of the 
Cold War, this area has remained in need of adjustment with regard to the future of Europe. 
Cancelling the EDC from the European agenda in the 1950s did not stop the European states 
involved in the ECSC from functioning indirectly on an international political level. Indeed, 
having signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the member states were by implication granted the 
competence of the European Economic Community (EEC) to hold negotiations and as a 
result were able to carry out agreements with third parties over economic issues. These 
agreements would not have been secured without member states proposing limitations, and 
defining “their relations with the rest of the world, and (creating) external expectations about 
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the role of the EU as a major power which also entailed foreign policy related choices.”306 In 
this way the European economic presence in the world made it inevitable that the Europeans 
would gradually increase their political ‘actorness’, even if this was happening without any 
previous intentions on their part. Eventually, and notwithstanding the cautiousness of its 
member states with regard to conceding some of their sovereignty on foreign and security 
affairs, the EEC agreed a mechanism which guaranteed the lowest common denominator 
between them.  
The Emergence of European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
Generally speaking, the French leadership continued the search for a political role for the new 
European body throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1960s France had returned to the 
table to ask its other partners in the EEC for a greater political role for Europe in the 
international field, and from the 1970s onwards it succeeded in building an “incremental 
process of trial and error, trying to circumvent this taboo”.307 In 1970, member states 
approved a proposal, delivered by their foreign ministers, to increase the political weight of 
the Europeans internationally, and to agree appropriate common actions.
308
 Under the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) arrangements, this cooperative programme saw the 
member countries framing a foreign policy towards specific issues and areas in the world, on 
the basis of what was known as the Luxemburg Report.
309
 In fact, this development, which 
was sustained by a Political Committee, fulfilled some of France’s desires for a stronger 
European voice in the international arena, and satisfied the Germans who also benefited 
greatly from this development.
310
 Practically speaking, the general basics of a European 
foreign policy, upon which the European Community (EC) would act in the coming period, 
had already been outlined by the early 1980s.
311
       
In addition to other kinds of cooperation, the EPC was determined as a framework that was 
separate from the Community, and had a strict intergovernmental voting mechanism that 
implied unanimity in decisions relating to foreign affairs. Although the Commission was 
associated with this body, the European Parliament (EP) had no significant role in decisions 
made by the heads of state governments, and the European Court of Justice had no right to 
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review decisions made by EPC. Management of the EPC involved only the president of the 
Council, assisted by the past and future presidents who together made up ‘the Troika’, which 
conveyed details of the EEC’s positions to third countries.312 Significantly, “EPC’s objectives 
were modest: regular consultations, coordination of national positions and where possible 
common actions.”313   
Within this framework, the Community’s economic resources were used increasingly to back 
the decisions made by the EPC, especially in cases that involved the imposition of sanctions 
against third parties such as, for example, “Poland in 1982, Argentina during the Falklands 
crisis in 1982, and South Africa from the mid-1980s.”314 This additional power did not allow 
the EPC to discuss defence subjects; instead it preferred to leave this area to NATO which, in 
effect, had been the sole body responsible for the security of Europe since 1949. Alongside 
the EPC, there was intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice and internal affairs. 
Increasingly, however, many problematic issues in the European sphere imposed themselves 
on the European decision-makers, including such matters as terrorism, air traffic security, and 
organized crime and drug-trafficking.
315
 Accordingly, away from the Community, 
cooperative initiatives and coalitions were agreed between member states at the 
intergovernmental level, and paved the way for more advanced and operational types of 
collaboration.  
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Necessities and Effectiveness  
The cumulative effects of a diversity of challenges since the 1980s have led to essential 
changes in the mechanisms of European decision-making. The completion of the European 
single market, the collapse of communism, the eruption of ethnic wars in the former 
Yugoslavia and the reunification of Germany, along with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
constituted the main factors challenging the EPC mechanism in the post-Cold War era.
316
 
Indeed, with the emergence of these challenges around the end of the 1980s, “the EC 
appeared well positioned to increase its international influence and develop a stronger foreign 
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policy profile.”317 However, the question for debate is whether the EPC instrument was 
sufficient to deliver an adequate level of functionality in the new world order or whether it 
should have been developed further. In practice, European leaders had no choice other than to 
develop an outstanding level of performance internationally, and this needed new 
mechanisms for acting and new procedures for taking decisions. In due course this led to the 
adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and the emergence of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) as a method of operating and according to which it became possible 
to pursue much more crucial and decisive policies in the foreign affairs arena.  
Although this new European agreement was surrounded by much scepticism as well as by 
doubts as to its effectiveness, this body lost no time in establishing itself as one of Europe’s 
major political arrangements, which soon led to new expectations and new sorts of behaviour 
and interaction towards the outside world. Significantly, CFSP has become ‘an important 
aspect of modern European diplomacy’ which is cooperatively led by intergovernmental 
policy-makers representing the EU member states.
318
 Hence, this development, opening the 
door to other political improvements in the next decade or so, could be regarded as a 
considerable change in the functionality of the EU in an international context. 
It is obvious that the new CFSP complements the previous EPC policy that, in fact paved the 
way for it to enhance the status of the EC on the international stage and strengthen mutual 
relations and joint actions among the member states. In terms of goals, the CFSP was 
obviously intended to strengthen European integration in the post-Cold War era, as well as to 
manage inter-institutional relations and make them more compatible with new developments 
globally. Furthermore, it concerned not only Europe’s identity and how its values and 
interests in the world should be safeguarded but also the way in which Europe should 
promote democracy, cooperation and human rights in conformity with principles of 
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international law.
319
  In addition, it was concerned with the credibility of the EU which was in 
need of effectiveness and proper actions and reactions.
320
   
However, words and symbols are not like deeds and behaviours, and although EU member 
states were concerned about developing policy-making instruments, they did not all show 
equal levels of enthusiasm. As a result, and owing to the lack commitment of member states 
towards the success of CFSP, their aspirations for an effective and credible foreign policy fell 
short, since CFSP was not provided with either the necessary apparatuses or an enabled 
institutional structure.
321
 Such weakness increased the likelihood that the CFSP would be a 
failure, either in or outside Europe. Crucially, the problematic situation in Yugoslavia along 
with the Gulf Conflict during the 1990s, confirmed the failure of the new Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) mechanism to address these kinds of foreign affairs promptly, 
appropriately and adequately; a matter which required the performance of the new 
mechanism to be developed by sidestepping the restrictions of the previous EPC 
instrument.
322
  
Accordingly, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997,
323
 and subsequent treaties attempted to tackle 
the factors which had undermined European performance during the tenure of both the EPC 
and the CFSP. The major qualitative change made via the Amsterdam Treaty was the creation 
of the position of Secretary General / High Representative of the CFSP, and the High 
Representative, supported by back up units, was accordingly delegated to help “the Council 
and the Presidency in the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy 
decisions.”324 The second important innovation under the Amsterdam Treaty was the creation 
of a new ‘common strategies’ instrument, upon the basis of which the strategy towards the 
Mediterranean was duly formulated along with other strategies towards Russia and Ukraine. 
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Furthermore, the relationship between the EU and the Western European Union (WEU)
325
 
was reinforced after the former had gained access to the latter’s abilities which were devoted 
to humanitarian, rescue and peace keeping tasks.
326
 Broadly, the Treaty adjusted some of the 
provisions of the CFSP to enable it to improve its abilities to act in the foreign affairs field.  
Triggered by the crisis in Kosovo during 1998-99, the EU made another significant leap 
forward represented in its adopting of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as “an 
international crisis management policy, whose aims include helping to prevent conﬂict and 
rebuild societies emerging from war.”327 In fact, this crisis showed up the EU’s weakness and 
inability to act appropriately, and put tremendous pressure on the Union to adjust itself so that 
it would be capable of preventing socio-political catastrophes in its own backyard.
328
 
Therefore, the British and French governments agreed on the principle that a military power 
was needed with the capacity to take autonomous action should it be necessary. Hence, at its 
meeting in Cologne in June 1999 the European Council adopted the goal of establishing the 
ESDP, followed by another decision at its Helsinki summit to commit itself to being able to 
deploy military forces if needed; it was also agreed that committees with a military and 
security nature would be created within the framework of the Council.
329
 These developments 
were successful, and several military and civilian missions have been subsequently deployed 
in many places, such as Macedonia, the Balkans, Africa and the ME.  
In practice, the CFSP was qualitatively altered by the establishment of the ESDP, with the 
former moving “from a declaratory foreign policy focused on diplomacy to a more action-
oriented foreign policy focused on a more proactive crisis management.”330 Another 
significant and innovative addition to the CFSP included in the constitutional proposal in 
2004 and approved in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, was the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) which would cover all aspects of the EU’s external encounters. At the same 
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time a new position was created for the Union’s Foreign Affairs came into effect – that of 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – which in practice 
combined the leadership of both the EEAS and CFSP.
331
  
The CFSP has dealt with many areas, including geographical, political, state-actors, non-state 
actors, and thematic aspects. First, EU-US relations which had already been improved were 
further deepened and thoroughly coordinated over time, both collectively and separately. 
Secondly, relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which had been reorganized 
and reconfigured along with the end of the Cold War era and various phases of European 
expansion, were further strengthened. Third, relations with developing countries and the 
Mediterranean region, regarded as very significant to the EU for their economic and political 
impacts, were established and formalised through various conventions. Relations were 
confirmed with the former state of Yugoslavia from which the EU, having managed the crisis 
in that area for over three years, had learned a number of lessons. The CFSP also had to deal 
with common trade policies which were established with other countries or organizations, 
such as that with the World Trade Organization (WTO).
332
 In addition, the EU, through the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, intervened in humanitarian crises and geopolitical 
conflicts, including the ME conflict, in which the EU role would become highly 
controversial.
333
 Consequently, and even though the EU is still far from being regarded as 
purely supranational, it has made incremental attempts around the world to increase its 
functionality to match its capabilities.    
Institutions of Decision–Making 
It is generally known that the three main EU institutions involved in the decision-making 
process are the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament (EP).
334
 These three 
institutions are assisted in an advisory capacity by two other committees; the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) which functions as a consultative body of the 
European Union, reflecting Europe’s socio-occupational interest groups,335 and the 
Committee of the Regions which plays the role of an advisory body, “representing local and 
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regional authorities in the European Union”.336 The importance of each differs according to 
the limits of the powers that have been conferred on them through various European 
treaties,
337
 particularly the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 which above all forms a constitutional 
convention in light of which details of authorities can be precisely understood. Other EU 
institutions, such as the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank 
and the Court of Auditors, in addition to the European Council, all  fulfil specific roles as 
specified in the Treaty. This institutional structure aims “to promote [the EU’s] values, 
advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, 
and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions.”338      
Over all of these institutions stands the European Council, which came into existence 
informally in 1974 within the framework of the EPC and gained its formal status in 1992.
339
 
As the Lisbon Treaty states, it consists of the Heads of state or government of the member 
states, together with its President and the Commission President, while the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part in the 
Council’s meetings, held twice in every six months. Fundamentally, its responsibilities 
involve defining the general political directions and priorities for the EU without being 
formally involved in legislative functions. After the European Council’s President has been 
elected by the member states using the Qualified Majority Vote (QMV),
340
 he or she is 
expected to assist in achieving consensus and cohesion within the European Council, in 
addition to other duties that include ensuring consistency between member states and sound 
functionality in external affairs.
341
 Hence, overall strategies for, and the main purposes of the 
CFSP, including those related to defence implications, should be identified by the Council.
342
  
With regard to the decision making process and “on the basis of strategic guidelines laid 
down by the European Council”, the Council of Ministers is considered the main decision-
making actor, and first and foremost must give its approval to any decision before it is 
implemented. In practice, this body consists of representatives at ministerial level from each 
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member state, and exercises legislative and budgetary functions in conjunction with the 
Parliament.
343
 
The European Parliament (EP) is another important EU institution whose powers have 
continued to expand. Basically, it is proportionally composed of EU citizens, and while it 
should not exceed 751 representatives, who are elected for five-year terms, no member state 
should have fewer than six representatives or be allocated more than 96 seats.
344
 Noticeably, 
while the 1957 Treaty of Rome
345
 initially gave it very little voice in the legislative process, 
these days the EP is able to refuse legislations proposed by the Commission, and to amend or 
even to block them. Additionally, certain types of international agreement as well as the 
Community budget should be approved by the EP, including funding for external actions.
346
 
This competency will be considerably enhanced after November 2014 when many provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty will come into force. Accordingly, “the Commission will be responsible 
to the EP”, and the latter “may vote on a motion of censure of the Commission”; implying 
that if this happened the Commission members would submit their resignations, and that the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would 
consequently resign from all duties in the Commission as well.
347
 Thus, although the EP 
currently does not have a strong voice internally or externally, it has been increasingly 
gaining powers that over time have enabled it to function significantly.  
The European Commission also acts as a ‘government’ of the EU with specific provisions. In 
reality, this body, composed of 27 Commissioners, consists of a representative from each 
member state, including the President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy who should be one of the Vice-Presidents. In practice, all its 
members should be independent of their national governments, and strictly should act apart 
from the influence of any other national voices; they “shall be chosen on the ground of their 
general competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt”. According to the Lisbon Treaty, other provisions will be implemented from 
November 2014 onwards, based on the role of the Parliament in determining the 
                                                          
343
 Ibid. Art 16 :1-6 
344
 Ibid. Art 14:2-4 
345
 It was an international treaty signed primarily between six European member states in 1957, and considered 
the establishing treaty of the European Economic Community EEC. For details see; EU, 'EU Treaties', 
<http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm>, accessed 15 March 
2012. 
346
 Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World . p. 35 
347
 EU, 'Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union'. Art. 17:8 
95 
 
Commission’s figures and their official positions after being proposed by the Council of 
Ministers.
348
 Fundamentally, its role has been fostered over time to the extent that it has now 
delegations in 123 countries. With regard to its roles, the Commission has amalgamated 
many duties simultaneously; as the Lisbon Treaty says 
The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and 
of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. It shall oversee the 
application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. It shall execute the budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise 
coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. 
With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases 
provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union’s external representation. It 
shall initiate the Union’s annual and multiannual programming with a view to 
achieving interinstitutional agreements.
349
 
 
Adopting Decisions: Mechanisms and Procedures 
Despite amendments to the CFSP dossier intended to strengthen its functionality, the 
effectiveness of the EU’s foreign affairs is hugely still below expectations. Whereas key 
players favour a more effective CFSP, mainly France, Germany and Britain, they are 
countered by other EU member states who are apparently reluctant to support some of their 
controversial endeavours.
350
 However, the CFSP is full of aspirations,
351
 and being merely a 
more developed copy of the EPC has lowered its performance quality. In the case of the 
CFSP the mechanism of decision-making, which remains substantially unchanged from the 
EPC days, needs consensus; this has made it difficult to achieve decisions on problematic 
areas in the world, and has enabled any single member state to prevent decision from being 
agreed rather than implemented.
352
 Hence, it might be concluded that common EU policies 
can be achieved only when member states have identical preferences, or will otherwise fail if 
and when their preferences diverge.
353
  
However, the European Parliament has limited roles to play in this mechanism, along with 
the fact that there is no substantial central budget which could be used if it was necessary to 
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take action. The European Commission on the other hand, has a greater authority over 
external issues but Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) “is formally the rule here [where] 
member states retain considerable powers to block the adoption of policies they do not 
like”.354 Due to such shortcomings, CFSP’s performance has not lived up to expectations and 
there are still insuperable divergences amongst member states which prevent the EU from 
playing a more internationally-significant role. In 2003, for example, divisions within the EU 
over the US-led invasion of Iraq reflected the extent to which member states differed 
regarding foreign policies.
355
 Consequently, since “CFSP is by far the weaker structure of the 
EU’s dual system of foreign affairs”,356 decision-making on foreign affairs continues to 
operate within a framework of day-to-day policy-making and has not yet risen to the 
formulating of substantial policies at key strategic levels.
357
    
In security and defence affairs, the inter-governmental decision-making process remains 
formally administered by the Council of Ministers which authorises civil servants (the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives) to follow up the decision-making process while 
the Council is not in session. These civil servants, known by their French acronym 
‘COREPER’, represent their own governments from offices based in Brussels. Alongside the 
Political and Security Committee, known as COPS, which represents the permanent body of 
the CFSP, they are responsible for reaching a consensus or a compromise and for preparing 
the work of the Council of the EU.
358
 The COPS has the authority to overcome all potential 
obstacles in order to achieve what is called the ‘necessary consensus’ and ‘necessary 
compromise’, away from media pressure.359 This decision-building mechanism has been 
adopted by member states in order to guarantee full control by their governments over all 
issues related to security and defence affairs. This involves taking account of the many 
significant intergovernmental procedures, calculations and determinants stipulated by the 
member states before the necessary supranational agreements can be reached with regard to 
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the required outcomes.
360
  
Even though many technical and substantial obstacles have prevented the CFSP from 
functioning effectively, it is notable that more than 1000 resolutions were embraced over the 
period between 1993 and 2008, with a gradual increase from just 15 per annum in 1993-1995 
to an average of 108 per annum in 2004-2008. Despite the QMV mechanism, most of these 
resolutions, joint actions and common policies “involving high-profile diplomatic disputes, 
economic sanctions, and even the use of military force” were unanimously adopted.361 These 
developments indicated that civil servants, represented by both COREPER and COPS, were 
playing a facilitating role, with the Council of Ministers giving its approval to the outcomes 
of their efforts.
362
      
As a method of voting in the EU Council of Ministers, QMV rather than consensus has 
resulted in a qualitative technique that reflects the distribution of power between member 
states in EU decision-making. Following the EU enlargement the debate revolved around the 
crucial factor of improving decision-making efficiency while securing a fair representation 
for each member state. Notably, “the accession of a large number of new members put 
pressure on the capacity of the EU’s decision-making structures to produce collective 
agreements”, and innovative mechanisms were needed to keep up with increasing demands, 
both internally and externally.
363
 Therefore, given that the demographic weighting of the EU 
member states is different, this implied diverse voting weights in a mechanism that was 
agreed by the EU and that has established a significant level of stability amongst its member 
states. For example, the UK, Germany, France and Italy were each given 29 votes, while 
Austria, Sweden and Bulgaria have only ten each. Similarly, the rest of the EU member states 
were weighted according to the percentages of their populations.
364
 Although this mechanism 
was adopted and distinctively activated, it has also been subject to revision by the EU 
member states over time (Figure 1).    
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Figure 1: Distribution of Votes in the EU for each Member 
State/2012
365
 
Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom 29 
Spain, Poland 27 
Romania 14 
Netherlands 13 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal 12 
Austria, Bulgaria, Sweden 10 
Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Finland 7 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovenia 4 
Malta 3 
TOTAL  345 
 
While the rule governing decision-making in the European Council is by consensus,
366
 the 
Council of Ministers, as noted, acts according to the QMV system unless otherwise specified 
in the treaties. According to Lisbon Treaty, this procedure means that, until November 2014, 
when decisions are being adopted they must be supported by 255 out of a total of 345 votes, 
representing the majority of the members (14 states) and 62% of the EU’s citizens. However, 
if the Council acts on a decision that has not been proposed by the Commission or the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a special majority 
consisting of two thirds of the members (18 states) and representing 62% of the citizens must 
be guaranteed for that decision to be approved. From November 2014 onwards, decisions will 
have to be supported by 55% of the member states (at least 15 of them) and include 65% of 
EU citizens.
367
 At the same time, the blocking minority must include four member states 
representing 35% of the populations of the EU plus one member, “failing which the qualified 
majority shall be deemed attained”.368 Interestingly, where the Council does not act on a 
proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, the QMV system must consist of 72% of the Council members, 
representing 65% of the EU population.
369
 Thus, even though most of the EU’s decisions 
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have been agreed unanimously, the QMV system constitutes a distinguished tool by means of 
which dozens of resolutions have been adopted over time.  
Procedurally, the CFSP decision-making machine should pass through several processes 
before a decision is reached. First, common strategies, where the member states have 
common interests, are to be agreed unanimously by the European Council. Usually, these 
strategies will determine the EU’s goals, means and duration, according to which it becomes 
possible for these common areas to be implemented. Secondly, when implementing these 
strategies joint actions and common positions are approved by the External Relations Council 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers using QMV. In this respect, “the Council may, using 
unanimity, implement joint actions and common positions separately, not as measures 
implementing a common strategy.” Joint actions are mostly decided in specific circumstances 
where operational action is required from the EU, and the member states are obliged to 
follow the EU’s lead in their own foreign policies and with international organizations.  
The EU’s approach to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature is meanwhile 
defined by common positions held by the member states who have established important 
interests in common.
370
 Furthermore, the Council’s assent to certain agreements is required 
by QMV whereas the EP approval is not essential, e.g., in the case of trade agreements. Yet 
the Council is required to consult the EP for cooperation and development cooperation 
agreements, using QMV where applicable. In the case of association agreements the EP’s 
assent is required while the Council decides by unanimous vote.
371
 Thus, understanding these 
procedures and provisions, while examining the EU’s FP towards Hamas, is essential for 
realizing the path which is being followed when adopting strategies, joint actions, common 
positions and agreements in the EU institutions.     
The EU’s Foreign Policy Instruments 
When acting collectively towards a non-EU actor, the EU has a diverse set of instruments 
which is, or can be, used to affect this actor. In fact, policy instruments denote tools “used by 
policy-makers in the attempt to get other international actors to do what they would not 
otherwise do.”372 In this respect, the EU can activate economic, diplomatic and military 
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instruments in its attempt to affect others.  Economically, since the EU is the largest trading 
bloc in the world as well as one of the largest aid donors, other states make huge demands for 
agreements with the EU, a situation that enables the latter to exert significant influence on 
international affairs, either negatively or positively according to circumstances. Negative 
influence might include imposing economic and financial sanctions on third countries, for 
example by embargoing certain exports, boycotting imports by others, increasing tariffs, 
delaying the conclusion of agreements, and so on. Positive influence could include tariff 
reduction, providing aid, extending loans, concluding alliances, and so on.
373
 In the case of 
‘normal’ and non-conﬂictual relationships this dimension is considered the main EU 
instrument.
374
 Second are the instruments of diplomacy, which are applied through the CFSP. 
Understandably, these will include high-level visits, supporting action by other international 
organizations, diplomatic sanctions, sending special envoys, sending election observers, 
imposing arms embargoes, and so on. Finally, there are the military instruments, which are 
based on the European Council’s decisions at Helsinki regarding the establishment of the 
ESDP. Despite the large gap between expectations and the EU’s capabilities in practice, the 
EU has launched several military missions in various parts of the world. In spite of that the 
Lisbon Treaty has enabled the EU, if required, to function more promptly and efficiently than 
previously,
375
 it is believed that the above-mentioned instruments have been inconsistently 
implemented, depending first and foremost on the EU’s interests rather than being 
normatively activated as was clear in the case of Hamas.   
Conclusion 
The European Union emerged from a complicated past full of wars and conflicts amongst 
individual European states themselves. Its emergence represented a qualitative leap in 
international relations through which it has been able to overcome many obstacles. Although 
it began its journey based on economic imperatives, it has become a political actor with a 
minimum common denominator in its foreign policy. The ability to function in this way has 
pushed EU thinking into a complicated process of negotiations and agreements with 
outcomes which have included common strategies, provisions and joint actions, reflecting 
both its internal and external strengths and weaknesses alike. Interestingly, there are still 
many issues which need to be developed in running this process of integration and unity, but 
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the foundation for such action has already been constructed. The most complicated aspect is 
the decision-making mechanism which usually leads either to divergence or convergence 
amongst member states, depending on the sensitivity of subjects under discussion. Therefore, 
all treaties, headed by the Lisbon Treaty, have been approved with the aim of easing the 
process of decision-making and facilitating the functionality of the EU in the agreed areas.  
In fact, due to the differences in the interests and calculations of member states especially 
those who have had a heavy presence in the world, such as UK, France and Germany, the 
EU’s foreign and security policy is the most difficult area amongst other areas of discussion. 
Significantly, the EU member states have, on many occasions, been unable to agree on 
specific decisions. However, in the case of Hamas, they agreed unanimously on a common 
position that involved stigmatizing the movement as a terrorist organization, boycotting it and 
subsequently even besieging its democratically-elected government. Once such a decision has 
been issued in such a way by the Council of the EU, it becomes extremely difficult for it to 
refer the decision, due to the tough decision-making mechanism and its requirement for 
unanimity, as explained above. Consequently, the EU institutions have been hardly 
constructed, and whereas many decisions were subject to controversy and thus rejected, the 
controversial foreign policy amongst member states has been harmonised in the case of 
Hamas. This has had many subsequent repercussions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and has 
caused the EU’s credibility to become vulnerable, as the following chapters will emphasize.    
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Chapter Four: The Formation of the EU Foreign Policy towards Palestine: Contextual 
Historical Perspective 
 
Europe is as much a cultural idea as it is a geographical one. What makes 
Europeans European are unifying cultural symbols, from Aristotle to the teachings 
of the Bible.
376
   
                                                                                                              
‘To understand discourses then is to understand the underlying logic of the social 
and political organization of a particular arena and to recognize that this 
arrangement and the structures of power and meaning underpinning it are not 
natural, but socially constructed’.377 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discover the extent to which the tension
378
 between the EU and 
Hamas is one of instantiations and manifestations of the tension between the West and the 
Islamic East over time.
379
 There are two sections; the first considers the history factor, with 
regard to the perception of the relationship between the two geopolitical regions over 
centuries. While inherited feelings and beliefs about the Islamic East and the way that 
Europeans have perceived it are fundamental in today’s EU policy in the ME, the Islamic 
East’s perception of Europeans is also of crucial importance. Furthermore, the historical 
development of the prominence of European countries, namely the UK and France, in the 
East is emphasized in order to explain the roots of European relations with the ME.  
The second section sheds some light on the historical involvement of the EU, following its 
establishment as a Union, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and focuses on the EU’s financial and 
political roles in the MEPP. Understanding the relationship between Hamas and the EU leads 
inevitably to looking at the engagement of the EU in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a 
historical perspective. This is to say that this chapter will investigate the weight of the East-
West history as effectual, not essentially decisive, factor in constructing each actor’s 
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perception about the conflict, and the effect of the historical cultural background of both the 
EU and Hamas on the DM process in question.           
 
Section One: Inherited Historical Tension 
 
It is believed that throughout history, the Western countries have attempted to control the 
Islamic East, and to reshape it in a manner that would make it less of a threat to them and 
render it more compatible with their interests. Self-interest and identity have thus played 
significant roles in this regard, driving invasions, wars and even settlements. This section 
shows how historical issues are deeply entrenched in present-day policies, and how such 
hegemonic tendencies for controlling others continue to affect the political scene.    
History and Politics: Playing on the Same Field 
Whether it was said by George W. Bush or Osama Bin-Laden, it was not a mere a slip of 
tongue that the nature of the conflict in the ME could be regarded as a ‘Crusader War’. Nor 
does it matter whether their conclusions are right or wrong; the most important thing is the 
dynamics that enable such attitudes to function. Neither of these individuals specialised in 
history, but history typically tells its story to all, whether politicians, intellectuals, or ordinary 
people. In speeches broadcast through the media, Bin Laden rarely ceased his call for 
Muslims to defend their lands and beliefs in the face of the new crusades,
380
 while George W. 
Bush justified the American ‘war on terrorism’ in 2001 and subsequently the invasion of Iraq 
and Afghanistan in 2003 in the same way, inspired by religious trends
381
 and events from 
history such as the crusades.
382
  
Similarly, when General Allenby proudly entered Jerusalem on 9 December 1917 following 
his triumph over the Ottoman forces, he profited from being considered “the conqueror of the 
lands of the Bible”,383 while some of his soldiers saw themselves “as modern-day 
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crusaders”.384 At the same time, churches in Britain and many people around Europe 
celebrated Allenby’s control of Jerusalem, seeing his victory as the most important event for 
730 years after the Muslim triumph of expelling the Crusaders from the city in 1187.
385
 By 
the same token, Allenby was hailed in the American press as Richard the Lion-hearted who 
had finally won the Crusades and ejected alien ‘others’ from the Holy Land.386 Thus, this 
common understanding among politicians and public alike indicates the importance of culture 
and identity in fuelling tensions in certain areas and strengthening motivations towards 
conflict.        
Similarly, memories of the major battle of Kosovo in 1389, in which Serb forces were 
miserably defeated by the Ottoman Empire and its local alliances, were underlined in 1989 by 
Slobodan Milosevic, the Serb strongman, on the 600th anniversary of the battle, promoted by 
the full panoply of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
 
As is well-known, this exploitation of 
history resulted in a savage massacre of Kosovar Albanians in 1999.
387
 By the same token, 
according to Christopher Catherwood, Arabs still remember the ‘betrayal’ by the West, 
represented by Britain and France, at the beginning of the twentieth century when the latter 
denied the promises made to Husain Bin Ali by Sir Henry McMahon. However, this feeling 
of betrayal, exemplified in the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, the subsequent Balfour 
Declaration in 1917 and hence the creation of the Israeli state in 1948, remains constantly in 
the background of the relationship between the Arabs and the West, particularly Europe.
388
 
Thus, in times of conflict, the conventional societal mind-set clearly takes into account 
factors that seem, prima facie, to be hidden in remote history or already buried.      
Therefore, it is not difficult to find out that relationships between major actors in today’s 
politics can be traced back to the deep past, where such matters are rooted even if they are not 
superficially apparent at a glance. Although some scholars do not believe in the cycle of 
history, others are convinced that history repeats itself
389
 and can have international 
repercussions just as much as on-going politics, if not more so.  It is noticeable that those 
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who believe in the cycle of history and its imprint on present-day politics seem to present 
more compelling justifications than their counterparts. Strikingly, when looking at the 
rhetoric used by leaders to justify their deeds (and sometimes crimes), it is often difficult to 
ignore the obvious impacts that can be caused by reviving memories with the tools for 
digging into history. Thus, the thin and sometimes invisible line that links the past and the 
present continues to affect actions undertaken in politics as is clear from the examples noted 
above.  
Unfortunately, in times of conflict it is often customary to recall many experiences from the 
past to prove their presence in difficult situations, whereas some of these remembered historic 
events are unlikely to be forgotten or ignored.  Effectively, their heavy shadow remains to 
accompany present politics; however, politicians or intellectuals typically attempt to conceal 
them. Proportionally the difference becomes how much emphasis could historically have 
been given to this event or that. For example while Bin Laden typically tried to call the 
Crusades into the present in his attempts to interpret what had been done by American forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bernard Lewis was convinced that Arab and Islamic sentiments did 
not go back to such early times but reverted no further than the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the onset of imperialist interference in the 
ME.
390
 According to Lewis, what made the crusades matter in our own time was not the 
perceptions of Muslims in the Middle Ages, but the perception of those in the nineteenth 
century and later, when Christian Europeans started again to invade the Dar al-Islam and 
finally gained the upper hand.
391
 This notion was not accepted by Edward Said who 
considered that Western perceptions of the Islamic East were rooted in the Western culture 
and in some of its manifestations even referred to the Middle Ages, as highlighted in his 
argument about Orientalism.
392
 Thus, even if some scholars attribute some of today’s politics 
to Medieval History and others refer to modern history, it is absolutely clear in both cases 
that the cycle of history plays significant roles in framing politics and designing actions and 
reactions.    
Studying the EUFP towards Hamas should be consistent with the historical context within 
which relationships of this kind between the West and the ME have developed.  Indeed, the 
conflictual relations and tensions that are typically defined in this case and are full of 
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scepticism and tension cannot be observed without looking at perceptions of the relationship 
with the East that to a considerable extent have governed actions and policies over past 
centuries. Europe undeniably “...has a complex set of historical legacies, close economic, 
social and political ties, and deeply embedded fears and security concerns that deﬁne and 
characterize its overarching relationship with the ‘classical’ ME.”393  
Therefore the problem, as underlined by Edward Said is that “the West portrayed the ME as 
the 'Orient', but more importantly as the exotic and alien 'other', an altogether different place 
from the West.”394 For socio-political, economic and religious considerations from the 
Crusades up to the present, this alien ‘other’ has been an objective for subjection. Between 
the two points of history many substantial landmark events, wars, and crimes have happened 
and have heavily influenced inherited feelings and attitudes between the two arenas of the 
powers concerned, either within the elite or among the public. This has caused tensions and 
poisoned relations between the two counterparts (the West and the ‘exotic other’ represented 
by the Islamic East), that have been experienced in significant political events or positions 
whenever history might be able to offer proof for this or that part of a conflict. Consequently, 
calling on history, even infrequently, does not negate its consistency in affecting people’s 
positions and trends over time. Rather, it indicates, particularly in the case under 
investigation, the significance of revisiting history in order, among other things, to scrutinize 
certain current EU policies in the ME, including the EU’s position towards Hamas.          
Tension between Memory and History in the East-West Debate 
With the coming of Mohammad as a prophet in the Arabian Peninsula, the face of the Arab 
region changed and many repercussions echoed through the old world. Fundamentally, he 
and his successors were able to build a united empire over a vast area while at the same time 
defeating two significant empires; the Persian and the Byzantine. In 638 CE, Caliph Omar 
entered Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina, and ended the reign 
of Byzantium in this particular territory. Because Byzantium persecuted not only adherents of 
non-Christian faiths, but also those who did not follow their specific version of Christianity, 
“Jews and Christians [...] warmly welcomed Omar into Jerusalem, glad that Byzantine 
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tyranny was over.”395 At the same time, differences arising among the populations of the 
Byzantine Empire, which extended over a vast area of Europe as well as the Levant, 
weakened the Empire that gradually receded, losing substantial territories in Europe after 
being further weakened by the new Islamic Empire. From that time onward, Europe was 
fragmented, remaining a dis-united political entity until Charlemagne, or Charles the Great, 
king of the Franks, became ruler. Meanwhile, the growing Islamic Empire became great and 
powerful and appeared to be controlling the political scene throughout the old world.  
The first attempt to unify the remnants of the Western Roman and Germanic strains in one 
coherent state was undertaken by Charlemagne, who in 800 CE was crowned the first 
Christian Emperor since the collapse of the Western Roman Empire 300 years earlier. 
Accordingly, he joined the Germanic and other lands with the Roman lands of Italy to form 
the Holy Roman Empire under which, for the first time, European states were united in 
leadership and policy. Understandably, this new situation witnessed fluctuations in size and 
in power over the next millennium, being gradually broken down into independent or invaded 
states. These fractions in Europe in fact persisted until the second unifying mission that was 
attempted by Napoleon in 1806.
396
  
Not long time after Charlemagne had built his Empire, eleventh century Europe began its 
efforts to conquer the Islamic East, in particular the Levant. Although there were many 
obvious differences and rifts among the invaders, these internal European problems were put 
aside while the West attempted to control Jerusalem and the surrounding areas. Hence, 
Europe launched its expeditions against the Islamic world under the banner of the Crusades, 
which served to unify them as well as to align the Eastern Byzantine Empire with them as 
well.
397
 This was another chance to unify Europeans in the face of the ‘other’. Even if the 
Eastern Byzantines were politically different,
398
 as Christians with a mission to invade the 
Islamic East, particularly Jerusalem, their expeditions succeeded in deepening the rift 
between the Islamic East and the Christian West for a considerable length of time, 
introducing themselves as those who followed Charlemagne’s unifying steps for all of 
Europe.
399
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However, these expeditions had a profound effect on people in the targeted region. They have 
been described as brutal, savage, and aggressive attacks against non-fighting Eastern people; 
even so these crimes were not representative of Christianity as a religion; “the true brutal face 
of Christian Europe was seen in the bloodthirsty escapades known as the Crusades which 
represented the terrible wars between Europe and Islam”400 that continued for around 200 
years. Thus, following the Islamic conquest of the city of Jerusalem, for example, while 
people from various religious backgrounds had found a peaceful home in that city for the 
next six centuries,
 this was ruined when “the Crusaders came from the West and slaughtered 
its inhabitants – Jews, local varieties of Christians, and Muslims – all alike.”401 Because of 
these actions “the crusades have rooted both anti-Semitism and demonization of Islam deep 
into the European psyche.” 402 Consequently, the so-called ‘holy wars’ (or Wars of Religion) 
during that period and subsequently the triumph achieved in Jerusalem were regarded, in the 
words of Alastair Crooke, as “Christian rediscovery of a new ‘self’ – and the consequences 
that ﬂowed from it still shape the world in which we live today.”403 According to Crooke, 
“the Muslim had from the eleventh century been firmly established as the Christian ‘enemy’, 
and as such was both necessary and integral to the emerging identity of western 
Christendom.”404 
On the other hand, although the Crusader occupation of Jerusalem and the rest of the Islamic 
region lasted around 200 years
405
 Muslims ultimately triumphed, with the conquest of Asia 
Minor, the Balkans, and Constantinople itself in 1453.
406
 This Islamic triumph allowed the 
Islamic Empire to grow until, following the era of the Crusades, it found itself capable of 
threatening the West. Therefore, from 1526 onwards the Ottoman Empire, which had 
significantly grown, started its plans to conquer Europe which was no longer sufficiently 
united or powerful enough to defend its boundaries against the Ottoman forces. Thus, many 
countries in Europe, such as Hungary, Greece and Romania, were conquered by the Ottomans 
whose forces stopped only at the borders of Vienna which was threatened twice by them.
407
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These Ottoman attempts to control Europe also worsened relations between the Islamic East 
and the West and fuelled European fears of the strong Islamic world. Indeed, even if these 
wars launched against Europe came long after the Crusades, in Western eyes such Ottoman 
expeditions were both offensive and unjustifiable. Thus, the relationship that had been built 
upon conflicting identities of Islamic East and Christian West worsened over time. Indeed, 
although “the era of European rule in the ME was over until 1917, when the British under 
General Allenby recaptured Jerusalem”,408 the Crusader massacres, along with other wars and 
events over the following centuries between the Eastern Islamic world and the western 
Christian world (e.g., the French campaign against Egypt and the Levant during 1798–1801), 
raised tensions equally in the politico-cultural atmosphere between people on both sides. In 
effect such tensions became part of their history and collective cognitive psychological 
construction that is typically felt in times of conflict rather than times of peace.  
Interestingly, after the 2001 attacks on the US, there seem to be a tendency for Western 
countries to defend the Crusades as a reaction to the identity of those who had carried out 
these attacks; this simply hardened the already shaky relations between Islamic East and the 
West, and their suspicious legacy.
409
 Consequently, ever since the era of Charlemagne, the 
Eastern and Western regions of the Mediterranean have witnessed wars, massacres, and 
political and cultural clashes, which have left their mark on conflict management on both 
sides up to this time.      
European Colonization of the East and the Most Enduring Tension; the Establishment 
of Israel 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire after its failure to take Vienna for the second time in 
1683,
410
 and the subsequent loss of its conquered areas in Eastern Europe, encouraged the 
European countries to overcome the ‘sick man of Europe’.411 In this way, the era of 
colonization, launched by Napoleon Bonaparte of France in 1798, began to take hold in the 
Islamic regions for the second time since the Crusades. This was exemplified in the invasion 
of Egypt and simultaneous attempts to capture the Eastern Mediterranean. However, 
Napoleon failed to retain control of the invaded areas, and he and his European successors 
were portrayed in the Islamic world as the new crusaders who sought to seize their Islamic 
state and their lands. Even if their motivation might have been different from the Crusaders, 
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the thin line between the two periods has disappeared in favour of accusing Europeans for 
their deeds and behaviour against the Islamic regions. As Catherwood mentioned, “the deeds 
of a band of West European soldiers at the end of the eleventh century has come back to 
accuse us, and now to our permanent disadvantage [sic].”412 Indeed, this claim was reinforced 
by the European colonization of other Islamic countries, such as Algeria which was occupied 
by the French in 1830, and Aden which was occupied by the British in 1839. These two 
occupied areas fell in the hands of the new colonists, who successfully continued their 
attempts to seize other Islamic countries, including Egypt, taken by the British in 1882, 
Tunisia and Morocco taken by France in 1881 and 1912 respectively, and Libya taken by 
Italy in 1911.
413
  
With regard to the relationship between the Christian West and Islamic East, the Ottoman 
collapse in WWI formed a significant milestone in modern history. Basically, according to 
Western scholars, this development was “the key to the shape of today’s Middle East”, 
particularly as the aims of one of the Islamic groups in the Muslim world is the restoration of 
the Islamic Caliphate which had accompanied the Sultan’s title throughout the Islamic era.414 
While some of these groups express their desires in an extreme fashion, others are more 
moderate in revealing their aspirations, as could be seen through their continuous rhetoric. 
Moreover, as a result of the demise of the Ottoman Empire, most of what are now known as 
the ‘Arab countries’ fell under direct European rule, in the form of the British and French 
mandates, at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
Accordingly, the Arab World from the Arabian Sea in the East to the western coast of the 
Atlantic was under direct European control, since the aim was to prevent this region from 
coming to power ever again; were this to happen it might again threaten the European states 
as had happened with the Ottoman Empire before it was stopped at the gates of Vienna. In 
practice, this European colonization was harsh; it has also left a damaging socio-political 
legacy amongst the peoples of this colonized region. Significantly, the Europeans were able 
to divide the area into fragile pieces called states or emirates under the common banner of 
‘divide and rule’. Generally speaking, this has been widely perceived as a conspiracy to target 
Arab lands and wealth; it has also left miserable memories in terms of murdered and tortured 
people and devastated villages and homes caused by the policies of the European colonists: 
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“the Arab world felt bitterly against the West and against what they regarded as imperialistic 
interference by Western powers in their internal affairs.”415 On the whole, while the 
Europeans were able over many years to defeat the Ottomans and to seize Arab land, they 
failed to build bridges with local populations apart from showing the spirit of hegemony that 
has continued in one way or another to direct their actions and reactions.     
Fundamentally, European imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century was the 
major factor underlying the tense relations with the Islamic East. In reality, one of the circles 
in the series of conflict was the UK’s treachery towards Sharif Hussein who had been 
promised the gift of a united Arab state after defeating the Ottomans in WWI. This promise, 
which was delivered by Sir Henry McMahon in what is historically known as the McMahon-
Hussein correspondence, was never fulfilled by the British. Instead, Britain, France, and 
Russia signed a secret agreement according to which these countries would take over much of 
the Ottoman Empire and rule it themselves. This agreement, known in terms of its content as 
the Sykes-Picot plan, decisively contradicted all the promises given to Hussein. Regardless of 
the perspectives and ambitions of the peoples of the Middle East, the region was fragmented 
according to the needs of the great powers and of course against the UK’s promises to 
Hussein.  
Meanwhile, the peoples of the region were forced into colonies, protectorates and mandates 
“which were structured for them and contributed to the emergence of an ideology among 
[them] that denied the validity – particularly the moral validity – of these results.”416 By the 
same token, there was no longer room for “Hussein’s wishes or for anything that he thought 
that the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, had promised him.”417 As 
Catherwood points out, “this was old-fashioned imperialism of the worst kind”, by which the 
UK and France caused damaging impacts on future relations between the Christian West and 
the Islamic East.
418
 Indeed, Sykes-Picot has become a very telling and unforgettable example 
of “Western imperialist treachery towards the Arabs”, many of whom “felt betrayed at the 
time, and have continued to feel aggrieved ever since.”419   
Understandably, having been fragmented in the nineteenth and twentieth century, such 
                                                          
415
 Ibid. p. 198 
416
 B.A.Roberson, 'Introduction', in B.A.Roberson (ed.), The Middle East and Europe the Power Deficit (2 edn.; 
London and New York: Routledge, 2005a). p. 4-5 
417
 Catherwood, A Brief History of the Middle East  from Abraham to Arafat. p. 169 
418
 Ibid. p. 169 
419
 Ibid. p. 171 
112 
 
feelings of anger and hurt among Arabs also stemmed from the reality of being interrupted in 
a developing socio-political context that owed its main characteristic to being part of the 
Ottoman Empire. This context included “open trade, commercial flows, and relatively easy 
movement of peoples within the same basic framework of law – the Shari‘a and Ottoman 
kanun”,420 and was disrupted by those colonials who occupied the region after WW1, carving 
it up into feeble entities called ‘countries’ or similar. Furthermore, these ‘pieces’ or 
‘countries’ were dominated and run by rulers and governors who, having been brought to 
power mainly by Britain and France, were mostly backed by the West. Accordingly, these 
European powers are often perceived locally as helping to shore up regimes of dubious 
legitimacy; a matter that has contributed to deepening the tension between these forces and 
the peoples of the ME.
421
 Commenting on the consequences of Western colonization of the 
Islamic East and the socio-political context from which peoples of the region were uprooted, 
Barbara Roberson notes that  
it had been the practice of Muslims to live in any part of the Islamic world, not 
just their birthplace and to do so with psychological ease. This historical legacy 
has bequeathed a sense of unity, of relatedness, connectedness, cognition of 
mutuality, of shared fundamental values and shared attitudes to authority, 
government and legitimacy. This has produced a peculiarity in the region that is 
not overcome by the brief span of the mandatory period. There is a sense of 
something interrupted rather than of a natural social and political evolution into 
the modern era. More specifically, there is a sense of social development 
fractured, of political development hijacked, producing a psychological unease 
with the present over and above deteriorating economic conditions and the need 
to find the centre again—an Islamic society or some version of it—that would 
lead to some modicum of control over their situation. This has formed the 
psychological base for the social discontent that has contributed to the rise of 
political Islam and the pressures for political and economic reform.
422
 
This feeling which has accompanied inhabitants of the Arab region as a result of their 
ambitions  having been ignored for a long time by European colonials, has failed to bequeath 
a common ground of perspectives between the West and the Middle East that can bridge the 
gap caused by the era of colonization. Ultimately, nostalgia for unity and national dignity, of 
which the Arabs were deprived during the colonial time and beyond, has been a motivating 
factor for overcoming the realities imposed on them by the colonizers, and for restoring their 
significance in modern history.       
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Additionally, what has increasingly tarnished this relationship between the two socio-political 
regions was what happened after the Sykes-Picot Agreement, particularly towards Palestine. 
The Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917, which was stated in a public letter addressed 
to Lord Rothschild,
423
 himself Jewish, is one of those inflammatory factors that has 
considerably worsened the political situation in the ME. According to Arthur Balfour, the 
British Foreign Secretary, the Jewish people had the right to build their state in Palestine,
424
 
and the British would support them in achieving this target and facilitate their migration to 
the new land accordingly. Britain, as the mandatory force on the ground, and the new Jewish 
settlers ignored the political rights of the indigenous people, and firmly suppressed them, 
backed by Lloyd George, the British Prime Minster who, for socio-political and religious 
reasons, strongly believed that the construction of Jewish statehood was essential.
425
 Even 
though this promise was “completely incompatible with the earlier pledges made to 
Hussein”,426 and contradicted Sykes-Picot, Britain persisted with its project and assisted the 
Jews to migrate to Palestine on the basis of Balfour’s declaration and the subsequent 
statement of mandate by the League of Nations.
427
 Understandably, this new English policy, 
which was supported by other Western countries, was not accepted by the Palestinians and 
the Arab countries, and their resistance against British rule and the Jewish settlers continued 
until the establishment of Israel in 1948,
428
 the year which began a new era of conflict. 
Overall, a great sense of the Western countries’ betrayal arose in the Arab World as a result 
of this declaration, and has had a damaging effect on the Middle East ever since.
429
 
With the establishment of the state of Israel, political and ideological tension between the 
Christian West and the Islamic East increased dramatically and reached a peak.
430
. As is 
commonly known, this result would not have happened without the obviously partial policies 
adopted by the British Mandate, especially those policies which were related to Jewish 
immigrants, and allowed them to build the institutions of a Jewish state in Palestine.
431
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Indeed, building this state on another people’s land and causing the problem of Palestinian 
refugees, without having solved it even after 60 years, has exacerbated the crises between the 
parties who are involved in this dilemma. 
Through their policies in the ME before and after the establishment of the state of Israel, the 
UK and France “became the undisputed external actors” who had created, and to a great 
extent fostered, this entity.
432
 In other words, the East-West tensions which have deepened 
over time as a result of the colonial era and, “...most enduring, the Palestinian people’s 
homelessness have hardened the roots of the conflict and turned the region into a 
battleground for international economic and political interests.”433 Significantly, “a feeling 
arose that Israel was the creation of Western imperialism”,434 and this deepened the rift in the 
relations between ‘the colonials and the colonized’ in the East. Even so, this Arab-Israeli 
conflict developed exponentially as a result of the decision on 29 November 1947 by the 
United Nations to divide Palestine; this must be understood in light of the roots of the history 
of the ME and the sequence of events over time, which paved the way for all developments 
after that date.
435
 This is how the Palestine-Israel conflict has become one of the most 
complex struggles in contemporary history, having involved the two superpowers in the Cold 
War era and automatically aligned the rest of the world beside one of the two poles of the 
conflict.
436
  
 Subsequent events and wars in the ME have undoubtedly deepened scepticism between the 
Western community and the Arabs too. Wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 2008 
provide significant evidence of the prejudicial policy that has been followed by the West, i.e., 
the US, the UK, France, and eventually the EU, as experienced by the Arabs and Palestinians. 
Some of these powers sided with Israel in its war against the Arabs, as in 1956, while most 
have backed Israel, either militarily or economically and diplomatically. Despite dozens of 
international resolutions issued by the UN, Israel remains reluctant to accept them, and 
international society is still unable to compel Israel to respect what has been voted upon 
internationally. As commonly interpreted in the Arab world, this Israeli intransigence is 
considered a standard outcome of Western support for Israel, either directly or indirectly. 
Therefore, given that the West, including the EU, has not followed any serious policy to 
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prevent Israel from going too far in what, from the Palestinians’ point of view, are its 
devastating policies, the Palestinians, unsurprisingly, are entirely sceptical towards the EU 
and the West in general.
437
  
To summarise, against its inability to solve the problem, which was basically caused by 
European countries, or the lack of a genuine desire to do so, the EU has confined its role 
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict to reshaping the Palestinian structure to acknowledge the 
existence of Israel state in secure and recognized boundries, in addition to the tension-
reducing and fire-extinguishing policy. These policies are proved to have failed in meeting or 
overcoming the challenges and repercussions caused by Europeans in the region over time; a 
matter that mirrors their failure to build stable relations with Arabs based on solving the 
conflict that they began in 1948. Thus, as has been clearly seen, the European legacy and 
thereby the tensions of East-West relations were inherited from the impact of history, which 
has bequeathed substantial and serious consequences for the region, both physically and 
psychologically.
438
 Accordingly, EU-Hamas relations have been affected by this legacy of 
scepticism and tension; European mind-sets perceive the Middle East as an area which is to 
be shaped in a controllable way, while Hamas believes that the Western countries are totally 
involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that their role has never been neutral.
439
 As 
such, the hegemonic European mentality affected by its attempts over time to shape and 
reshape the ‘other’ in accordance with its interests, is still thinking of shaping and reshaping, 
inter alia, Hamas’s choices through enforcement if persuasion no longer works. Thus, 
psychological factors built on history, ideology and politics cannot be underestimated or 
sidelined while analysing socio-cultural and political backgrounds of the EU decision-making 
process towards such a movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
437
 Larbi Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization : Elections without Democracy (OUP Oxford, 2009). p. 265 
438
 B.A.Roberson (ed.), The Middle East and Europe the Power Deficit. p. 4 
439
 See Hamas, 'Hamas Charter', (1988). Art.22 
116 
 
Section Two: The Functionality of the EU in a Middle Eastern Context 
 
The Middle East has undoubtedly been important for the European countries over a very long 
period of time, not only because of the historical links between Europe and the ME as  
discussed in the first section, but also due to current European interests in this rich but 
volatile area.
440
 According to the EU presidency conclusions in 1992, “instability is a 
permanent feature of this region”, and was therefore a matter that affected both the Union’s 
interests and international security.
441
 This point of view had also been expressed earlier, in a 
memorandum from the UK Prime Minister’s Office in 1960; the UK’s perception was that 
the ME would “remain unstable”. Because of this, “it is impossible to say how it will 
develop; so many different forces are contending for power both within each country and 
between the various countries of the area”,442 which implied that the region would need to be 
dealt with in an exceptional way by outsiders. However, relationships between the EU and 
this volatile ME are influenced by numerous factors which affirm the vitality of the latter in 
terms of the EU’s concerns, and reflect the sensitivity of events and developments which 
might take place in this area. These factors range mostly between substantial economic 
interests and regional security demands, centred in the neighbouring Mediterranean.
443
  
Economically, the Middle Eastern countries, including the Arabs, are the largest market for 
European exports and constitute the biggest supplier of imports to the EU.
444
 With increasing 
demand for Middle Eastern oil all over the world, this strategic product remains the dominant 
commodity without which the wheels of the world’s industry would cease to turn. From a 
Western perspective, the fact that about “48% of the world’s proven oil reserves445 are in the 
Persian Gulf (16 % in Saudi Arabia alone), and well over 32 % of the world production is in 
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the Middle East”, is what makes this region of significant interest.446 In fact, “the Persian 
Gulf’s share of total exports is projected to exceed 67% by 2020”,447 and this reality alone 
assures the importance of any and every event that might affect the flow of oil to Europe and 
the rest of the world. Despite all attempts to discover alternatives to oil, in this regard the 
world is still at the beginning of a long and uncertain journey, a matter which also makes the 
ME a focus of special European interest.
448
  
Alongside, and linked to, the economic interests of the EU in the ME are security matters, 
which are a substantive requirement for stability and peace as a guarantee of the security of 
the region’s strategic interests.449 These security demands are considered a milestone for 
stable relationships and assurance that developments in the ME will have minimal negative 
impacts on Europe. Consequently, the West and the EU in particular, has no choice but to 
neutralise threats coming from the region “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
means of their delivery, ‘religious extremism’ and international terrorism, the smuggling of 
drugs, weapons, uncontrollable population migrations etc.”450 which can affect the future of 
the EU’s daily life.  
At the same time, the existence of Israel in the ME and what is labelled as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict that is considered “a key problem for all international players in the region”,451 make 
it inevitable that the EU member states must do as much as they can to control the general 
situation in the region because of its direct and dangerous influences on relations between the 
Arab countries and Europe.
452
 According to a memorandum in the British archive, the Arab-
Israeli conflict has been always perceived as “a permanent source of danger to Western 
relations with the Arabs”453 which jeopardises Western interests in the ME. Likewise, 
according to the EU, this conflict needed be solved for the ME to be secure and appropriately 
controlled. Due to its significant proximity to Europe as considered the rear gate of this 
continent, the ME is a very important area in terms of its role in achieving safety and stability 
of the European house as confirmed by the EUSR to the Middle East peace process Marc 
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Otte.
454
 More recently the German President, Johannes Rau, asserted in his speech to the 
Israeli Knesset that without stability in the ME, a prosperous and peaceful future for Europe 
is unlikely to be achieved, since “no one can live a quiet life if his neighbours are threatened 
with political and social insecurity”.455 Thus, mutual common economic and security interests 
have contributed closely to building the EU’s vision of the ME, on the basis of which the EU 
functioned in that geopolitical area, developed its allies, and defined its enemies.    
As discussed in Section 1, up to the 1960s the roots of the EC’s policy towards the conflict 
could be detected largely through the policies of the main European players – mainly the UK, 
France and Germany. However, the following decades have become equally important for 
understanding the extent to which the EU’s current strategy towards the Middle Eastern 
conflict is linked to previous European policies. According to some observers, the guidelines 
and principles of today’s EU policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict began to take shape 
during the 1970s with the introduction of the EC’s foreign policy instrument, 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which started to function in the ME in 1970.
456
  
Until then the EU member states had lacked a collective policy towards the conflict but the 
EPC offered an adequate response to major challenges such as the Six-Day War in 1967 and 
its subsequent consequences.  
However, during the 1950s and 1960s the EU member states continued to act individually in 
the international arena as well as towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, but despite several 
attempts to build a common foreign policy they were reluctant to embrace the idea, preferring 
to make their own decisions on foreign affairs issues. In this respect, the European countries 
had sided with the Israeli state against attempts by the Arabs and Palestinians to delegitimize 
it in the international society.
457
 In 1956 the UK and France, together with Israel, embarked 
on the Suez War against Egypt, building a strong alliance against their common enemy 
represented by the Arab nationalist strongman Jamal Abdul Nasser.
458
 Although they did not 
achieve their goals from the war, the UK and France continued to give political, diplomatic 
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and military support to the Israeli state in the ME at the expense of Palestinian political 
rights.
459
 In addition, Western public opinion had considerable sympathy for Israel, the 
nascent Jewish entity that had been generated from the devastating wars in Europe in which 
Jewish people had been major victims.
460
 Thus, the policies of the European countries during 
the 1950s and 1960s, supported by sympathetic public opinion towards Israel, represented a 
significant basis upon which the EPC’s collective policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
could be shaped.      
Individuality of action and reaction to the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Unified Policy 
Ambition  
Any analysis of the EC’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict should take into 
consideration the international changes that occurred in the ME from the beginning of the 
second half of the 20th century. The US attitude to the ME, in the context of the Cold War, 
now started to play a part.  In the wake of the Suez War, that marked the decline of the 
British and French interest in international affairs, the US came on the scene to fill the 
vacuum, and was able to build up a substantial relationship with Israel, which it regarded as 
the first line of defence in the face of the expansion of Communism and a major guarantor of 
Western interests in the region in times of crisis.
461
 Significantly, and because of the limited 
instruments at the disposal of the six EC member states, the Europeans were happy with this 
US policy, which on the one hand reduced their international responsibilities, and on the 
other constituted a guarantee for the security of their own interests.  
Given the European role in establishing Israel in 1948, the EC member states and the rest of 
the European countries continued to protect and foster Israel’s new statehood with all 
possible means while the Arab states were leading a campaign in the world to correct “the 
historical European mistake”462 by which an alien state has been manufactured on another 
people’s land called Palestine. This campaign was accompanied by much propaganda from 
the Arab leaders who used many words, although fewer acts, against Israel; a matter that 
created an impression that an “existential threat” might be available against the Jewish 
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entity.
463
 This led to much European sympathy with Israel as well as a certain feeling of 
hostility towards its enemies, as represented by Arabs and Palestinians.
464
  
Even so, within this strained political atmosphere the EC, formally and collectively, had no 
common position towards the conflict because of the absence of a joint foreign policy 
through which these positions could be tackled. As long as the Middle East, in which Israel 
existed, did not witness any dangerous turmoil or serious disturbances, the EC would 
continue its policy towards the conflict without major alterations. However, as the economic 
interests of the EC expanded, any eruption of the conflict, if it happened, could affect the 
EC’s interests in the ME which is regarded as a vital supply artery for life in Europe.  
Therefore, without having a parallel political structure through which the EC could respond if 
necessary, this economically-functioning body was unable to protect its interests. In the 
event, the outcome of much of what the EC had been thinking about in this regard emerged in 
1967 on the eve of the Six-Day War.  Meeting at the Rome Summit, the EC representatives 
found themselves unable even to agree on a statement expressing an opinion as to what was 
going on between Israel and Egypt.
465
 Subsequently, when the war broke out, European 
positions were found to be widely divergent, with each state adopting a different position 
from the others and thereby reflecting the extent to which the EC institution was 
unresponsive and fragile in times of political crisis.  
Indeed, this war which was much commented on in the Western media “was not just a crucial 
turning point in the Arab‐Israeli conflict, but...was also the trigger for the European 
Community to launch a common foreign policy”,466 and, in broad terms, for the initiation of a 
new European approach towards the whole region.
467
 Interestingly, in the absence of a 
common policy, France and the Netherlands, two EC member states, found themselves taking 
opposite stands regarding the war; while France was pro-Arab and condemned the Israeli 
occupation, the Dutch openly celebrated the defeat of the Arab armies.
468
 Thus, as a result of 
inadequate coordination of their positions during the ME crisis in 1967, the six EC member 
states and particularly France, felt there was a significant need to promote and boost Europe’s 
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international political role. In fact, this would be seen to happen shortly after the war.
469
   
In this context the EPC was agreed as the framework in which the European positions 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict would be discussed. In practice, it took three years after the 
Six-Day War before the European states could decide on a statement that would express their 
collective opinion about elements such as refugees or Jerusalem, since it was necessary for 
the member states to agree that their deliberations regarding international political issues, 
particularly in the ME, would be held under the auspices of the EC. Accordingly, after the 
first EPC meeting in Munich in November 1970 “the ME conflict has been an almost 
permanent feature of EPC discussions, regardless of the very limited success achieved by the 
EC in dealing with the matter”.470 Despite the extremely critical situation in Palestine after 
the war, the EC members, under pressure from France, succeeded only in secretly adopting a 
joint paper based on UN Security Council Resolution 242.
471
 This so-called Schumann Paper 
was kept behind closed doors, and no further initiatives, agreements or compromises related 
to the ME conflict were approved until October 1973 when another momentous war broke 
out between Egypt and Syria on one side, and Israel on the other.
472
 Interestingly, the nine EC 
member states reacted individually, as they had done in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in 
1967, which necessitated discussion of this new problem within the EPC framework.
473
  
In October 1973, Arab countries triggered a retaliatory oil crisis when the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) rather surprisingly imposed an oil embargo on the 
West, in varying degrees, by categorizing individual Western states into three groups: hostile, 
like the US and Netherlands; neutral, like Belgium, Denmark and Germany; and friendly, like 
the UK and France. Since the stances of the Western countries towards the Israeli occupation 
and the political rights of the Palestinian diverged significantly, the embargo took these 
differences into account, thereby causing fundamental internal cracks amongst EC member 
states and subsequently leading to direct fallouts over the perception of the relationships 
between the West and Arab countries. Significantly, the differences in the oil embargo policy, 
were based on a country’s positive approach to the whole Arab-Israeli conflict and the extent 
to which it was close to acknowledging the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians.
474
 
Thus the EPC frame formed an appropriate tool for use in bridging the gap between member 
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states over political issues, as would be seen subsequently in the European reactions to the 
Arab oil producers’ embargo.   
Accordingly, and under intense pressure by OPEC member states who were exploiting the 
EC’s need for oil,475 the EC agreed for the first time over issues that favoured Palestinian 
political rights. In November 1973, and as a result of the oil embargo, a joint Declaration was 
adopted which mentioned the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and called for the Israeli 
state to pull out of the territories occupied in 1967. Notably, “in its subsequent efforts to play 
a mediatory role in the Arab–Israeli conﬂict, European diplomacy appeared, at least from an 
Israeli and US perspective, to place its interests in energy security before those of impartial 
peace making.”476 This matter would affect EC efforts to become, in Israeli eyes, a 
trustworthy mediator in the conflict,
477
 and would enhance the US monopoly of the peace 
process thereafter.
478
 In fact, this shift in the EC’s discourse achieved its goals when the 
embargo on the EC was removed, except from the Netherlands which suffered more than the 
others from the sanctions. 
However, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Palestinian political identity had been ignored and 
even neglected, to the extent that the West and in particular the EC member states, excluded 
it from their discourses. Even though the 1947 UNGA Partition Plan in Palestine had implied 
two states beside each other, one Palestinian and the other Israeli,
479
 the 1948 War resulted in 
the obliteration of the Palestinian identity after fragmenting the Palestinian people and exiling 
them from their homeland. Surprisingly, their political rights had not been activated in the 
aftermath of the 1948 war, and none of the Western countries had asked, let alone agreed to 
stand with the fragmented Palestinians in building their entity in the framework of the 
international society. Strikingly, the only concern shown to Palestinians in their diaspora was 
a fleeting humanitarian glance, as was very obvious from Security Council Resolution 242 
which did not even mention Palestine or the Palestinians in its content.
480
 As a result, they 
were subject to international assistance and relief in matters concerning their daily lives 
rather than being dealt with as a people with the full right of self-determination in their 
homeland. Thus, even if it had happened under pressure from the oil crisis, the EC move 
toward acknowledging Palestinian political rights was, from the Arab delegates’ point of 
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view, considered a significant, but not in itself a sufficient progression in the right direction.     
Following the joint Declaration noted above and the taking of a new step forward, an EC 
summit was held in Copenhagen which, surprisingly was attended by representatives of the 
Arab states who delivered the Arab demands as a symbolic move in the effectiveness of the 
oil crisis. For the first time the EC member states were obliged to admit foreign 
representatives to their summit which, along with the November 1973 Declaration, provoked 
resentment and criticism from the US and other states
481
 due to the EC’s “willingness to 
submit to Arab demands to escape the oil embargo as viewed by the US.”482 Regardless of 
this accusation, the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was launched and was later formalized (in 
July 1974) to address important issues pertaining to the EC’s economic interests and to 
arrangements that would secure its future relationships with oil-producing countries. Two 
aspects were considered; a motivating European economic one, and one of a political nature 
that was needed by Arab countries. While the EC intended to secure its economic interests 
and was reluctant to acknowledge the political dimension in negotiations, the other party 
wished to exploit this initiative in its conflict with the Israeli state, believing in the leverage 
of the EC in the Arab-Israeli dossier.
483
  
In other words, in addition to the economic aspects of the dialogue, the Arab countries 
frankly wanted to convince the EC to acknowledge the PLO as a legitimate representative of 
Palestinians on the one hand, and on the other to push the EC to minimize its relations with 
Israel and to pressure the US to stop supporting Israel.
484
 Thus, the EAD, before entering into 
a state of clinical death in 1989,
485
 failed to achieve the significant leap in relations that both 
parties desired; nor was it able to put an end to the “apparent tension”486 between them. 
While the EC could only give verbal support to the Arab demands, the Arabs needed the EC 
to play an actual and an effective role in deterring the Israeli occupation of the Arab 
territories because of Europe’s special ties with Israel. Hence, the pressure applied by OPEC 
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did at least succeed in prompting the EC to start formulating a new united approach to the 
conflict based on rejecting the consequences of the 1967 War; however, the policy did not go 
beyond certain limits until the beginning of the 1980s.  
Venice Jump: Declarations in Response to the Continuous Israeli Occupation   
The new EC pro-Palestinian and Arab initiatives continued in a noticeable way during the 
1970s and up to the 1980s. Commenting on EU statements directed towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the MEP Kyriacos Triantaphyllides confirmed his belief that the EU had made very 
good declarations but was fundamentally weak in implementing them.
487
 In this regard a 
further joint statement was issued in June 1977, following other statements adopted in 
1976.
488
 The most important of these was the 1977 statement in which the nine EC member 
states reaffirmed that the only path to resolution of the conflict in the ME would be to 
acknowledge the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their national identity and the 
right to have their own homeland. In addition to endorsing the right of the Israeli state to exist 
and be recognized, the statement confirmed that representatives of all parties involved in the 
conflict, including the Palestinian people, should be called on to participate in a negotiated 
just and lasting peaceful solution, based on Security Council Resolutions 224 and 338 and 
other principles related to international law which, according to the EC, had assured “the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force”.489  
In this way, the Palestinian cause became a substantial issue, occupying “the heart of the ME 
conflict” in the framework of a comprehensive peace settlement proposed by the EC, rather 
than “a process built on bilateral negotiations” as had been the case with the Camp David 
negotiations between Israel and Egypt in 1978.
490
 In  this statement, which came as part of a 
continuous process of development in the EC stance towards the rights of the Palestinians, 
the EC was fundamentally reconfirming previous statements in this regard and paving the 
way for the Venice Declaration on 13 June 1980; a declaration which crystalized the EC’s 
position towards the conflict over the next decades.
491
 
It is commonly agreed that the Venice Declaration was a significant ground-breaking 
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innovation of the EPC whose principles are “still valid for the EU today”.492 Indeed, after the 
bilateral Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt had been signed under the aegis of 
the US in 1979, a feeling of EC interests being ignored or marginalized was generated 
amongst the nine EC member states, to the extent that some observers considered the 
subsequent EC initiative as more of a European reaction to the Camp David Accords than a 
European project.
493
 Conventions of this kind, according to the EC, would prolong the 
duration of the conflict in the region, which in turn would jeopardise Europe’s interests and 
might affect its stability. Therefore, despite the EC’s unenthusiastic welcome for the Camp 
David agreements,
494
 it continued to seek a comprehensive settlement through which the 
conflict would be terminated.  
Because of this and given the ‘tensions’ that arose in the ME after the Camp David Accords 
in 1979, the EC heads of state and government as well as foreign ministers agreed on 
numerous principles, gathered into what was known as the Venice Declaration in 1980.
495
 In 
the EC’s opinion, this Declaration constituted a major basis for the achievement of an 
inclusive peace settlement. In addition to previous confirmations on the legitimate rights of 
Palestinians, the EC considered other matters like the PLO, Jerusalem, and the construction 
of settlements in the Arab-occupied territories, thereby acknowledging the Palestinians’ right 
of self-determination. According to the Declaration, the PLO should be included in 
negotiations as the representative of the Palestinians; the status of Jerusalem should not to be 
changed by the Israeli occupation; and the construction of settlements in Arab-occupied 
territories was illegitimate and contradicted international law.
496
 Furthermore, Israel was 
asked to withdraw from all Arab territories it had occupied in the 1967 War. This remarkable 
change of position by the EC represented a major shift in its outlook on the conflict in the ME 
to become “the basis for European policy ever since”,497 and was even regarded as a far-
sighted initiative for dealing with the situation in the coming decades. By and large, from this 
momentous Declaration onwards, “all European countries came to accept the general 
framework for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement irrespective of whether the left or right was in 
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power.”498  
Surprisingly, the 1980s did not witness any noteworthy European activism, and Europe’s role 
in the ME question was not prominent. Various developments happened in the region which, 
on the whole, gave the impression that the EC was paralysed. The most challenging was the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which complicated the political scene in the ME and 
caused a huge confusion to all actors involved in the conflict.
499
 Although this challenge 
raised the sound of war rather than the sound of peace, the EC member states returned to their 
individual actions and reactions without any significant collective policy towards the new 
events in the area. This situation was also noticeably affected by a new leadership coming to 
power in France, led by François Mitterrand who was “considered to be a friend of Israel and 
a supporter of the Camp David process”.500 Generally speaking, this cast a heavy shadow 
over the rest of the EC members since until this surprising change in its policy, France had 
been the most enthusiastic pro-interventionist party in the ME conflict. This shift was 
accompanied by the firm desire and apparent manoeuvring of the newly-elected President 
Ronald Reagan in the US, who was reluctant to accept any European initiative to move away 
from the Camp David process.
501
 As a result, the EC during the 1980s lacked even a 
minimum consensus on policy towards the ME such as that which had governed its attitudes 
and approach throughout the 1970s.  
The demise of the bi-polar world order in the late 1980s and the subsequent vacuum which 
was rapidly occupied by uni-polar US hegemony in the ME left a marginal role for the EU in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The way the Cold War era ended might have benefited the EU had 
the latter sought to make a more significant contribution to the political solution in the 
region.
502
 However, instead of redefining US-EU interaction and “the dynamics of burden-
sharing in the region”, the EU opted to follow the old policy by handing the papers on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to the US mediator, who in theory accepted the mediatory role of the 
Russians in the Arab-Israeli peace process launched after the Madrid Conference in 1991.
503
 
Although the European countries were keen to push the conflicting parties towards a 
comprehensive solution, the direction of the political settlement between Palestinians and 
Israelis had become distanced from the influence of EU power which had been significantly 
                                                          
498
 Dieckhoff, 'The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ',   p. 54 
499
 Musu, European Union Policy Towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process the Quicksands of Politics. p. 40 
500
 Ibid. p. 40 
501
 Bindi, 'European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview'. p. 21 
502
 Musu, European Union Policy Towards the Arab–Israeli Peace Process the Quicksands of Politics. p. 19  
503
 Ibid. p. 19  
127 
 
marginalized over time.
504
 This was very obvious with the signing of the Oslo Declaration of 
Principles between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 
1993, at which the EU merely acted as a witness, being neither a mediator nor a partner.  
Thereafter, the EU played an economic and logistic role that was complementary to the 
political role of the US in the peace process. Significantly, at many points during and after the 
1990s, “the stagnant ME Peace Process ...represented a signiﬁcant test of the EU’s ability to 
effectively combine multilateral and bilateral conﬂict-resolution strategies towards the Arab-
Israeli conﬂict.” In this respect the EU spent a lot of time, effort and money in implementing 
initiatives issued by others, especially the US until it found itself accused of becoming  a 
“payer but not a player” in the peace process.505 Thus, the EU in the new post-Cold War era 
was, on the one hand, captive to its desires and the expectations of others of being a political 
superpower as well as a leading player in the economic sphere, while being able, at the same 
time, to function appropriately without disturbing the US role in the on-going negotiation 
process between the parties involved in the conflict. This situation left no room for political 
involvement by the EU, and assured the dominant position and influence of the US in the 
new uni-polar world order in general, and in the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular.
506
         
Financial Actor but in the Service of Politics; Toothless Broker  
Despite the deficiencies in functioning represented by the failure to grasp the historical 
moment to perform independently and effectively in the ME, the EU continued to act as a 
complementary economic agent with some political aspects, rather than being a normative 
actor concerned with justice, democracy, human rights, and international law. Theoretically, 
the EU adopted several domains that were potentially open to joint action in the ME, but in 
practice and in terms of supporting the rights of the Palestinians, its role became quite 
humble. These areas, through which the EU’s performance has been guided were outlined in 
the Presidency’s conclusions in the 1992 Lisbon Report and cover the following;507 
 Developing systematic action to support the process of negotiations launched by the 
ME Conference in Madrid on the basis of the relevant Resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council which should lead to a just and comprehensive solution to 
the Arab- Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question.  
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 Ensuring the Union’s active involvement in the Peace Process. 
 Making efforts to persuade Israel to change its policy regarding settlements in 
Occupied Territories and to persuade Arab countries to renounce their trade boycott.  
 Supporting moves towards regional integration 
 Ensuring the full compliance by countries of the region with the relevant treaties and 
agreements on disarmament and arms control including those on non-proliferations, 
and with the relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. 
 Supporting the foreign policy aspects of fighting terrorism and illicit traffic in drugs.  
 
This vision was translated politically through moves on the ground, which in practice 
prolonged the conflict instead of ending it. Such moves ranged from support for the Roadmap 
for Peace co-sponsored by the EU in June 2002, to the Annapolis Process in 2007 and other 
statements and declarations as previously discussed. The Roadmap which was proposed by 
the Middle East Quartet (in which the EU participates with the US, UN and Russia), 
emphasised “the need for Palestinian institution-building and economic recovery with a view 
to enhancing the strength and viability of the future Palestinian state”508 as stressed in the 
EU’s statement about the ME. Similarly, the Annapolis Process committed the Israelis and 
Palestinians to implementing Roadmap obligations and to reaching a peaceful agreement 
within a specific time – although this commitment has been bypassed without peace being 
achieved.
509
 This failure to achieve peace in Palestine through negotiation has not changed 
the EU’s attitude to other potential alternatives. Instead, it has involved itself in the process 
through a financial gateway, which has transformed the EU from being interested in solving 
the conflict towards achieving a state of coexistence with it.          
It is obvious that the EU domains mentioned above are subject to specific understandings and 
assumptions based on simply putting its weight behind MEPP, regardless of the balance of 
power governing the process between the parties involved, not to mention Israel’s reluctance 
to implement international resolutions related to the Palestinian cause or even practical Israeli 
policies on the ground. Therefore, the soft language used by the EU in this context explicitly 
reflects the extent to which it might be prepared to intervene at critical moments if necessary; 
a matter that confirms the nature of the EU entity in this regard as a toothless broker. In 
principle, its concentration on the peace process contradicts the basic logic of Hamas that is 
centred on rejecting this process and even the Israeli state itself which has constituted a brand 
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name for the efforts of Western countries towards the Jewish people for more than a century. 
As expected the EU’s role, in light of its guidelines and despite its different functionality at 
several junctures during the past two decades, has been financially tangible in a way that 
supports politics, while it has been absent in other aspects expected by the Palestinians.                 
Not surprisingly, in the ME peace process that began in Madrid in 1991 and culminated in the 
Oslo Declaration in 1993, the EU became a financial actor rather than being a political 
player. The fact that it is a part of the Quartet does not mean that it significantly affected the 
political attitudes in the ME as much as it reflected the extent to which the EU-US 
partnership in the ME might work in the framework of the MEPP. In fact, the EU dedicated 
itself to serving behind the scenes and fostering US efforts to push the parties in the conflict 
to reach a significant agreement. The EU therefore became the major donor to the nascent 
PA, which has been established as a result of the Oslo process. Hence, the EU and its member 
states contributed financially to supporting the Palestinians with more than 50% of the 
international assistance received by them, which as noted, amounted to some €1 billion per 
annum. According to the EU’s declared objectives, this assistance was “intended to foster the 
conditions for peace, stability and prosperity in the region, notably by advancing the 
Palestinian state-building process, promoting good governance and encouraging economic 
recovery with a view to enhancing the viability of the future Palestinian state.”510  
Such assistance was distributed in Palestine between numerous state- and society-building 
activities in a direct and controlled way by the EU, aimed at reconstructing the Palestinian 
infrastructure in a different way. These activities included (1) humanitarian and emergency 
aid directed to Palestinian families affected by poverty and conflict through UNRWA and 
PEGASE mechanisms;
511
 (2) state-building activities dedicated to establishing institutions of 
the state and governance, with a major focus on empowering all sectors of the PA and 
encompassing education, health, police, and the judiciary; (3) Palestinian economic activities 
aimed at “encouraging the Palestinian private sector including credit guarantees, vocational 
training and trade facilitation”; and (4) border assistance (an EU border assistance mission 
(EUBAM Rafah) had been established in November 2005 but was suspended in June 2007, in 
order to help ensure global criteria at the Rafah passage between Egypt and Gaza). In 
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addition there were trilateral dialogues on such issues as trade policy, energy, and transport, 
which were organised by the EU between the European Commission, Israel and the PA.
512
  
Furthermore, civil society activities were included in the EU’s assistance to Palestinians and 
were directed towards changing the entire Palestinian structure to comply with the 
requirements of the stages of the peace process. In this area of activity the EU concentrated 
on normalizing relationships between Palestinians and Israelis by constant support for 
projects known as ‘people to people’ (P2P). For this purpose the EU launched its ‘Partnership 
for Peace’ programme, devoted to enabling “local and international civil society initiatives 
that promote peace, tolerance and nonviolence in the ME”, with the aim of building mutual 
confidence between the two societies on the ground.
513 
  
It should be remembered that all the activities supported by the EU would have far-reaching 
consequences relating to the structure of both the Palestinian state and Palestinian society. 
Therefore, it was clear that the objective in this discourse was to restructure the Palestinians 
in a way that would have enabled them to live side by side with the Israeli state in a peaceful 
manner and recognizing their supposed enemy in an independent and sovereign state. 
According to Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, in this case the EU preferred a 
structural foreign policy in which the actor “over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape 
sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures”. It should, 
however, have pursued a conventional policy which implies being “oriented towards states, 
military security, crises and conflicts”,514 and tackles the roots of the problem instead of 
merely dealing with its manifestations.  
Although the Maastricht treaty was activated in 1993, and through it the CFSP was  
introduced to and equipped with more significant tools, the EU’s contribution to the peace 
process, in a political sense, was limited to multilateral negotiations “which dealt with global 
issues (economics, environment, refugees, arms control, water), the area in which little 
progress was achieved.”515 Later, the EU nominated Angel Moratinos who became the 
European Special Representative (EUR) for the MEPP in December 1996, in order to assist 
the US in its mediation between Israelis and Arabs.
516
 Despite the relatively humble position 
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that he and his successor in 2003, Ambassador Marc Otte,
517
 played in this case, it reflected 
the EU’s willingness to take a practical political role in the peace process in a way that might 
change the impression that it was merely an economic actor.  
In practice, this did not change the traditional EU image in the Arab-Israeli conflict as much 
as it opened other windows through which technical and logistical assistance could be given 
to the Palestinians. Thus, the EU’s role has been actually devoted to issues related to building 
state institutions even before the state itself is established, or even making notable efforts to 
do this. The impression is that the EU does nothing except assist the Israeli occupation, when 
it is the occupation that should be responsible for dealing with such matters, according to 
International Law concerning the obligations of occupiers towards those whose lands are 
occupied.
518
 In this way, the EU has established its presence as a funding actor rather than 
taking some other role in the Arab-Israeli situation. 
Apart from the discussion whether it is the EU’s responsibility or the ocuupation’s one, 
looking more deeply into this question suggests that while it is true that the EU has not 
played a fruitful and effective role in bringing the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations to an 
appropriate end, it has in fact been an active player in terms of building the new Palestinian 
generation and authority in favour of new political era. It has done so through its effective 
involvement in structuring the Palestinian socio-economic and governmental sectors that 
were under construction from 1993.
519
 In fact, by playing a part that complemented the 
starring role of the US, and by financing the PA, it was able to influence the political attitude 
of the Palestinians to remain compatible with the outcomes of the Oslo peace process, 
through which the EU had started to see an end to the dark tunnel in which both Palestinians 
and Israelis had long been trapped. According to the EU, this promising process could have 
put an end to the turmoil in the ME that was jeopardising its interests and vital flexibility.  
Therefore, money that was used for spending in the form of assistance to Palestinians 
became, in one way or another, directed political money or what Rory Miller called “politico-
humanitarian” contributions.520 In this way the EU safeguards this so-called peace process 
from any potential deviation which may derail it, as the following two examples show. Thus, 
in addition to the fact that the EU controls the flow of money given to Palestinians, the 
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Palestinians themselves have, governmentally, become noticeably dependent on the EU, as 
noted above, for many aspects of their daily lives, which in turn has affected the 
independence of the PA’s political decision-making.  
To put it more simply, the EU, relying on having the upper hand along with its interests in 
MEPP, has asserted that it does not accept the violent struggle against the Israelis, regardless 
of what the situation may be, and the only path the Palestinians have to follow is 
negotiations.
521
 This implied that the EU might ask the PA to dismantle the Palestinian 
military resistance factions,
522
 which immediately placed the PA in a state of serious 
confrontation with a broad section of its people who were imprisoned, and even had their 
human rights violated as was reported by international human rights organisations. This has 
happened respectively in the mid-1990s and from 2000 onwards, following the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada.
523
 Interestingly, the most blatant examples were seen on two occasions; the first was 
when Yasser Arafat, mindful of EU-US assistance to the PA, was obliged to assent to a Prime 
Ministerial position for Mahmoud Abbas, as dictated in the Roadmap proposed by the Middle 
East Quartet including the EU in 2002. The second occasion was in 2006 when Hamas won 
the public elections.  
In the first example, EU assistance was channelled through the financial ministry under the 
control of the new prime minister and away from President Arafat who was known to be a 
supporter of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It was an obvious attempt to bring to power those who 
favoured a negotiated solution to the conflict supported by Abbas, at the expense of those 
who were pro-violence in the struggle against the Israeli occupation. 
In the second instance, following the public democratic elections in 2006, all kinds of 
assistance that usually passed through the Palestinian government were stopped, because the 
government was headed now by Hamas. Instead, financial assistance started to be channelled 
to Palestinians through the presidency office by means of the Temporary International 
Mechanism (TIM), and away from the legitimate government and the finance ministry; a 
matter which contradicted the basics of good governance, the rule of law, and democratic 
principles, which the EU consistently declared as its foreign policy objectives. It was obvious 
that this assistance was political and was directed to one section of the Palestinians while 
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prevented from reaching others, depending on their commitments to the MEPP, rather than 
the EU being loyal to democratic outcomes and the requirements of good governance. In fact, 
this use of assistance, and the subsequent incitement of the Palestinian security services by 
outside actors including the EU
524
 deepened the rift between Palestinians themselves to the 
extent that it caused a serious civil war between Fatah and Hamas in 2006 and 2007, as well 
as a very severe Palestinian socio-economic failure and aggravated poverty. According to 
Nathalie Tocci and Benedetta Voltolini,   
EU diplomacy in the context of the Quartet failed to induce compliance by Hamas 
and, in response the EU, taking the lead from the United States, boycotted the PA 
government and withheld assistance to it. The policies of boycott, sanctioning, and 
closure pushed the OPT [Occupied Palestinian Territories] to the humanitarian and 
economic brink.
 525
 
This, in fact prompted Amnesty International to launch an appeal to the Quartet, asking it not 
to “subordinate fundamental human rights to political considerations”.526 Hence, it is clear 
that the EU has dedicated its assistance to Palestinians in the service of the international 
agreements between the parties, which has made it likely that aid would stop or be used as a 
means of punishment if needed. This, in one way or another, confirms that the EU’s role in 
the peace process is “supplementing the co-sponsors’ efforts, instead of running counter to 
it”,527 meaning that it has been a functioning actor in the MEPP, not as a mediator but as a 
sub-contractor to the US in its management of the peace process in the region. 
Wider Regional Role  
In its attempt to exploit the momentum generated from starting the peace process, the EU 
launched several regional projects in the ME, among other interests, to contain aspects of the 
conflict in a cooperative way, though with few signs of success.
528
 Fundamentally, the EU 
sought “to make its political weight in the region commensurate with its economic influence 
as the biggest trading partner of the Mediterranean third countries”, which qualified it to 
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function differently in its attempt to assist in the MEPP.
529
 Interestingly, the EU launched the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) initiative or the Barcelona Process in November 
1995, an enterprise that encompassed all 15 of the EU member states linked to the 12 
countries in the south of the Mediterranean, and building on other agreements negotiated with 
these countries by the EC during the 1970s. From Michelle Pace’s perspective, one of the 
objectives of the EMP was represented in the fostering of links “at a political, social, 
economic, and cultural level between Mediterranean signatories to the Barcelona 
Declaration.”530  
Another approach to the ME that was launched in 2003 by the EU Commission was the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This initiative was further developed in 2004 to 
include the EU’s 16 closest neighbours, including Israel and the PA, and was aimed at 
“strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all” and “building upon a mutual 
commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, 
market economy principles and sustainable development)”, as mentioned in European 
Commission sources.
531
 
The ENP was followed with the signing of bilateral Action Plans between the EU and each 
country;
532
 Israel, for example, has benefited greatly from this but has failed to implement the 
normative aspect of the agreement.
533
 These action plans were officially designed to promote 
such normative dimensions as linking the export of democracy and other associated norms 
with the economic incentives made available.
534
 Whereas these normative attitudes were 
simply clarified rhetorically, the material aspects of the initiative, represented in security and 
stability “at its borders and in proximate geographical areas”, were genuinely the realistic 
goal of the EU; a matter which confirms the EU’s pragmatic and realist agenda.535  
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From a European perspective, these initiatives were deeply enriched by the framework that 
was later developed and that was known as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM);
536
 this 
body “serves as a forum for regional dialogue and remains the only multilateral context 
outside the United Nations where all parties to the conflict can meet and work together on a 
range of issues.”537 Against this background, it seems highly significant how the EU 
monitored its Action Plans with those countries which used to breach the very core of their 
normative obligations, such as Israel or other authoritarian regimes in the ME. In fact the EU, 
given its economic or political interests, has not moved seriously against the breaches of 
these agreements and has kept its normal relationships with them, as will be analysed in the 
chapters that follow. As a result, this realistic attitude within the EU’s foreign policy has, as 
asserted by an EP civil servant, resulted in “a deficit of credibility”,538 a matter which shows 
how the EU weighs its interests in the surrounding political sphere, thereby confirming its 
pragmatic nature, and its readiness to compromise on its values and norms. 
Even though these EU approaches tackled political, cultural, and economic dimensions, the 
EU failed to bridge the gap between the Arab states and the Israeli state through the EU’s 
intended frameworks. In fact, these initiatives did not represent a genuine attempt to deal with 
the Palestinian question,
539
 nor did they bring forward meaningful proposals for including 
Israel within the ME as a normal state.
540
 In other words, building on the momentum of the 
peace process from the 1990s onwards, the EU tried, through these initiatives and other goals 
related to the roots of the ME conflict, to integrate Israel into the region. Using the logic of 
‘infiltrating by the window instead of entering through the main door’, it thereby allowed the 
Israeli state to gain the fruits of the presumed peace without having yet achieved it. This 
equation, as is commonly known, was not accepted by the Arab countries in the partnership 
process started in Barcelona. As a result, “Policymakers [...] also found it almost impossible 
to promote substantive advances in the EMP without there being a corresponding progress in 
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the MEPP.”541 Hence, the EU has recognized that without solving the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and particularly the Palestinian question, its interests, as perceived through these initiatives, 
will not be correctly achieved. As a high-ranking figure in EEAS stressed, by solving the 
problem the EU could exploit its relations with Israel and the Arab world to the fullest; 
otherwise, everyone will suffer the consequences. It is not only the need to defend 
international law and its legality but also the EU’s pressing interest in solving this major ME 
cause. In his view, achieving this could be done based on the security structure in the region 
which would have to guarantee Israel’s status in the ME as a normal respected state beside 
peaceful neighbours.
542
 Thus, according to an EP civil servant, the lost credibility of the EMP 
and other initiatives will be restored if the political issue rather than the economy is dealt with 
properly.
543
   
Conclusion 
The apparent contradiction between the EU and Hamas in terms of their perception of the 
MEPP is an extension of the contradiction between domestic national powers in the ME and 
external powers which have attempted to impose their perceptions of the region through 
enforcement rather than cooperation and persuasion. Accordingly, the ensuing tension 
between the parties has left the region exposed to the balance of power on the one hand and 
their perceived interests on the other. More simply, when insiders and outsiders perceive a 
specific area of conflict with each other in an existential way, the most powerful party tries to 
impose its demands on the other until the latter succumbs to the former. Similarly, the less 
powerful resorts either to surrender or to resistance, in an attempt to keep its interests as 
perceived in its own decision-making process. In a complicated situation such as the MEPP, 
the less militarily powerful party has had other significant points of power by which it goes 
on trying to achieve its goals. This has been the case with the historical tension in the ME 
between the indigenous people and the imperialistic foreigners who perceive issues related to 
this area from their point of view rather than the perspective of the inhabitants. 
In a word, the EU’s foreign policy towards Hamas is very much compatible with the 
perception of the conflict in the ME through the timeline along which the identity of players 
has occupied a significant place. Therefore, the conflict between the two parties can be seen 
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as an episode of the conflict in the ME and at the same time about it. Strikingly, one party 
represented by the West and, in particular, the EU’s major member states, has sought to 
establish a homeland for the Jews in Palestine and continues to foster it and secure its 
existence in the region by all political, economic and military means. Meanwhile, the other 
party, represented by Hamas, has, since its emergence, been fighting this logic since it 
regards its conflict with Israel as an “existential conflict” rather than one involving borders, 
as Hamas leaders have stated on many occasions.
544
 These contradictory points of view, 
supported by a historical and ideological agenda, have caused the relationship between the 
Hamas movement and the EU to deteriorate as will be discussed below.   
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Chapter Five: Inconsistency of the EU Discourse regarding Hamas: Norms and Values 
under Investigation 
 
In practice most states have proved ‘rational’ in the sense that they are keenly aware 
of the structural distribution of power in the international system, and do not pursue 
their normative agendas at the expense of their vital national interests.
545
   
  Adrian Hyde‐Price 
 
It was clear both to the US and to the EU that Hamas was a terrorist organization 
and, while its electoral victory was basically fair, Hamas ‘must be seen to fail’, lest 
others in the region imitate its path to power.
546
 
 
This chapter examines inconsistencies in the EU’s discourse towards its norms and values, in 
the context of the Palestinian democracy which brought Hamas to power in 2006. It 
illustrates clearly how these norms have functioned when they are examined in practice on 
the ground. The conclusions deduced, based on the gap between theoretically-founded claims 
and practically-implemented policies, could be read in light of the EU policy being  
realistically driven, and built on self-interest principle under which norms occupy a 
secondary and marginal position. However, this does not negate that the aforementioned gap 
is also socially constructed through a process of conflictual interaction between actors’ 
preconceptions, norms and attitudes, producing specific contradictory meanings amongst 
players in the Palestinian-Israeli field, as will be illustrated in this chapter. Hence, the EU’s 
normative discourse which, it is claimed, drives its FP towards Palestine, is the subject of 
inquiry. Significantly, this analysis will address the socio-politically constructed perception 
of the EU’s marginalization and ignorance of its own norms, in favour of specific interests 
that are interrelated with the international coalition’s demands, as represented in the Quartet’s 
three common political conditions.  
The anticipated findings will be deduced from the two sections that make up this chapter. The 
first section tackles the EU’s outlawing of Hamas, in an attempt to understand the context and 
background of such a policy. In this regard the evolution of Hamas, along with an overview 
of the stages of its relations with the EU, will be highlighted, by examining the European 
Union’s Security Strategy, which constitutes the basis for understanding the context in which 
Hamas is a terrorist organization, and the subsequent EU policies towards the movement. The 
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second section investigates the issue of promoting values of democracy and human rights, 
along with the EU’s support for the emergency status declared by the Presidency of the PA at 
the expense of these norms. Thus, contradictions and paradoxes in the EU discourse and 
practice will be examined in considerable depth in this area of the research. In addition to 
articulating the basic pillars of the EUFP towards Hamas and the substantial approaches used, 
significantly, this chapter confirms the necessity of highlighting the interactions that have 
governed relations between the two actors over time and the realistic path they have taken.     
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Section One: Outlawing Hamas: Context and Backgrounds 
The Emergence of Hamas and the Beginning of the Dilemma 
Among numerous changes that occurred in the ME and subsequently left a significant imprint 
on the MEPP, was the emergence on 14 December 1987 of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Hamas),
547
 a political and a military extension in Palestine of the Muslim 
Brotherhood Movement (MBM).
548
 The latter has had a notable existence in Palestine from 
the 1930s, although its fortunes fluctuated following political changes in Palestine and 
throughout the whole region up to the end of the 1980s. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
following the rise of Arab nationalism that accompanied the triumph of the Free Officers 
Revolution in Egypt in 1952, as well as the strength of communism in the region, the MBM 
was quite fragile.  
However, by the late 1970s and influenced by the triumph of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 
1979 and the retreat of Arab nationalism after the death of Jamal Abdul Nasser, it had started 
to regain its strength and its regional presence.
549
  Significantly, its presence in Palestine was 
limited mainly to the charitable sector, through which it mobilized generations of Palestinians 
culturally and religiously by way of universities and mosques,
550
 while countering secular 
Palestinian factions represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was 
the dominant entity in the confrontation with the Israeli occupation throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.  
Thus, until the emergence in 1987 of its offshoot Hamas, the MBM distanced itself from 
becoming notably involved in altercations with the Israeli occupation,
551
 leaving this duty to 
other national and mainly secular Palestinian factions. This approach enabled it to build its 
strength, in terms of its robust membership and considerable popularity amongst Palestinians, 
based on a vast social network of successful health and charitable programmes and of 
educational performance in kindergartens, schools, universities and mosques.
552
  As a result, 
the MBM did not particularly attract the attention of the EU or any other superpower since it 
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did not intervene either in politics or in the violent Palestinian struggle against Israeli 
occupation.   
With the eruption of the first Intifada in 1987, a historical decision was taken by the MBM’s 
leadership to create Hamas as a political and military arm of the Brotherhood. However, over 
time the MBM became totally absorbed into Hamas which, instead of being simply an arm of 
the ‘mother-movement’, became the main Islamic actor in Palestine. During the first Intifada 
from 1987-1993, the performance of Hamas, which was competing with the PLO, was based 
on the MBM’s heritage of popularity and mobilization amongst Palestinians, and Palestinian 
public opinion, which had been more or less monopolized by the PLO before 1987, was now 
shared with Hamas.  
As stated in its very expressive founding charter issued in 1988, the Hamas movement 
asserted the right of Palestinians to fight against the Israeli occupation until the removal of 
Israel from the whole land of mandatory Palestine by jihad.
553
 It also reiterated staunchly that 
it had come to correct ‘a historical fault’, which had materialized in 1948 and was represented 
by the establishment of the state of Israel and the subsequent consequences embodied in the 
diaspora of the Palestinian refugees. Convinced that the Israeli state would not give up until 
obliged through force to do so, Hamas consistently refused peace negotiations or 
conferences.
554
 This robust position against the ‘Zionist’ occupation of Palestine, as Hamas 
was accustomed to describing it, was not translated into physical behaviour until the early 
1990s when, in return for the targeting of Palestinians during the Intifada by Israeli military 
forces, this nascent movement rather surprisingly took to targeting the occupiers wherever it 
could do so, with stones, demonstrations and similar methods.  
Hamas developed its means of fighting incrementally, in the process becoming more violent 
and attacking Israeli military and civilian objectives alike. In its attempt to justify the leap 
from applying simple methods of protest to adopting more forceful means, Hamas claimed 
that it had been attempting to react in a fashion similar to the way the Israeli occupation itself 
acted against Palestinian civilians, whose property, children and land were considered 
legitimate targets for the Israeli machine of destruction.
555
 Accordingly, this new Islamic 
revolutionary movement developed in a way that produced many headaches for the 
                                                          
553
 Hamas, 'Hamas Charter'. Art. 15 
554
 Ibid. Art. 13 
555
 Author's Interview, 'Usama Hamdan', (Turkey, 15 December 2012). 
142 
 
international sponsors of the MEPP, who were unable either to contain this controversial non-
state actor or to put an end to its ability to affect the region’s political trajectory.  
Overview of Stages in the Relations between the EU and Hamas  
As the Hamas movement has become more effective on the political scene in Palestine, it has 
attracted much attention from international actors, including the EU which has gradually 
developed its stand towards the movement. In fact, it is customary to link this stance to the 
level of violence on the ground and to the direction taken by the conflict between Israel and 
Hamas. Therefore, the EU’s relationship with Hamas has gone through various stages, each 
of which covers specific periods of time and events. Significantly, the EU had no official 
communications with Hamas during these stages, except for the period between 2000 and 
2003.
556
 Other talks, communications and dialogues were conducted with Hamas through 
representatives from EU member states, research centres, and individuals close to the 
decision-makers in the European Union as they define themselves. Some of these 
communications took place in European states, while others were in Arab countries and 
inside Palestine itself. Some were conducted in public, with the rest held in private, as 
demanded by the Europeans.
557 
These stages, as depicted by Usama Hamdan, the 
International Relations Commissioner of Hamas (IRCH), and presented in this study,
558
 
indicate the significance of the path along which relations between the two parties have 
flowed. 
The first phase was the stage of identifying the movement. In fact, following its establishment 
and its robust involvement in the first Intifada, Hamas was approached by European envoys 
to the ME who communicated with it in various ways, although, according to a leader in 
Hamas, without adopting specific stands towards this relationship.
559
 In principle, the EU was 
interested in the PLO, which clearly showed a trend towards peace with Israel after the 
Palestinian National Council’s meeting in Algeria in 1988, hoping this would open up an 
actual opportunity through which the Arab-Israeli conflict might be resolved. Were this to 
happen, Hamas and other Palestinian factions would no longer find any opportunity to act but 
would have to accept the reality on the ground resulting from the peace agreement.   
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Secondly, from the European side there was a phase of hesitancy in the relationship; this 
could be seen after Hamas had been designated by the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
on 8 October 1997.
560
  In fact, as much as it wanted to support the peace process effort in the 
ME, the EU tried not to exceed the US position which had stigmatized Hamas as a terrorist 
organization. It is worth noting that the EU was interested in supporting the PA’s institutions, 
and wished the MEPP to reach its concluding stage through negotiation and establishing the 
Palestinian state in 1999, as had been anticipated following Oslo I in 1993 and after the 
signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in 1994;
561
 according to this approach other 
Palestinian strategies would no longer be able to find a foothold in the new Palestinian state. 
In the same vein, after the big bombing attacks launched in Israel by Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad in 1996 following the Israeli assassination of Yahiya Ayyash,
562
 Europe’s indecision 
over policy produced a stalemate. Accordingly, the EU participated actively in the summit 
against terrorism held in Sharm al-Sheikh in March 1996, condemning the explosions by 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad that targeted Israelis, and implementing the summit resolutions 
without officially outlawing Hamas or, so far, putting it on its black list. 
The third phase was the stage of a partial opening up in the wake of the al-Aqsa Intifada on 
28 September 2000; strikingly, with the eruption of this Intifada, everything that had been 
achieved in the MEPP seemed to vanish and the whole region was put at risk. The most 
interesting aspect of this was Hamas’s performance during the Intifada and the speed with 
which it was able to reconstruct itself after being targeted simultaneously by the PA and 
Israel in the late 1990s. In this phase, the EU condemned the Palestinians for their violent 
resistance, and called on the PA to dismantle Hamas and Islamic Jihad, ‘including the arrest 
and prosecution of all suspects’, and at the same time demanding “a public appeal in Arabic 
for an end to the armed intifada”.563 In addition, the EU placed the military wing of Hamas, 
the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, on its list of terrorists.
564
 Although Hamas had been 
condemned by the EU for its attacks against Israelis, EU officials were keen to make contacts 
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with the movement in an attempt to find an exit from the circle of violence. Therefore, 
official communications were launched by the EU with Hamas during this stage, based on a 
process of dialogue about controversial topics linked to the conflict between the two 
parties.
565
    
In 2003, the inclusion of the political wing of the movement, under Israeli-American 
pressure, on the EU’s list of terrorists marked the inception of the fourth phase in the 
relationship between the EU and Hamas.
566
 Nevertheless, although EU institutions officially 
welcomed and were committed to the declaration of Hamas as a terrorist organization,
567
 
several European states and even some EU Parliamentarians continued to communicate with 
Hamas in various ways.
568
 Indeed, the confusion surrounding the EU’s position towards 
Hamas was obvious after the latter’s participation in local and municipality elections in 
2005/2006.  
Finally, we turn to the stage of post-legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 
2006. The substantial victory of Hamas in the legislative elections (winning 74 out of 132 
seats) put pressure on many actors involved in the MEPP. Among these actors was the EU, 
which plunged into apparent confusion as a result of falling between its commitments to the 
normative objectives of its foreign policy in the ME on the one hand, and the requirements of 
the MEPP on the other.
569
 Officially, the EU, alongside the US, was the sponsor of the 
elections, and in fact, these elections were one of the demands made by the EU in its attempts 
to reform the PA and make it more democratic and transparent. In the same vein, and due to 
the importance of such an event to the MEPP, it urged the Israelis to facilitate these elections, 
regardless of any reservations:  
The European Council emphasises the importance of the elections for the 
Palestinian Legislative Council foreseen for January 2006. It urges Israel to co-
operate fully with the Palestinian Authority on the preparation and conduct of 
the elections, especially concerning freedom of movement for all candidates, 
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election workers and voters, in particular in East Jerusalem, and welcomes the 
launch of the EU's Electoral Observation Mission.
570
 
The EU was therefore fully aware of the intention of Hamas to compete democratically in the 
elections,
571
 which implicitly meant respecting, accepting, and dealing with the outcomes of 
the democratic process, a lesson that had been taught for many years by its own institutions 
and EU-funded NGOs in Palestine and elsewhere. That is why the EU ended up by falling 
over the contradiction between its normative ethics and its actual interests as a result of 
favouring the latter at the expense of the former; this confusion has been visible since 
2006.
572
 
Accordingly, the EU and the Middle East Quartet (MEQ) adopted three conditions that were 
to be imposed on Hamas so that it could be accepted as a recognised player in the ME 
political field; (i) recognising the right of Israel to exist; (ii) respecting all previous signed 
agreements with Israel; and (iii) renouncing violence.
573
 Otherwise, the Hamas-led 
government would be boycotted; all sorts of cooperation with it would be stopped; and the 
financial assistance to and through it would be suspended. After Hamas had refused the 
conditions, as outlined above, all the threats were implemented and strictly monitored; they 
undoubtedly affected all Palestinians and pushed them into a very harsh situation socially, 
economically and politically, as is discussed in the following sections.  
The European Security Strategy and Hamas 
The EU’s position on Hamas was consistent with the European security strategy (EUSS) that 
was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. This strategy was built on the 
estimation of threats that surrounded the EU and might affect its stability and security. In this 
context, therefore, external and internal threats against the Union were inextricably linked 
and the EU could not ignore any of them, because of the serious effects that might occur in 
Europe and its vitally important surrounding areas. Accordingly, having identified these 
challenges, the EUSS clarified the strategic objectives and assessed the expected implications 
for the entire EU.574    
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It is worth noting that the EU’s close neighbours, as well as its internal European concerns, 
are an incentive that drives EU interference, action and reaction in the ME and elsewhere. 
Given the indisputable link between development and security, the deterioration of the latter 
certainly affects the former, and thereby influences trade and investments flows, in addition 
to the wellbeing of nations. Convinced of this fact, the EU has identified three key challenges 
facing Europe, according to which the EU determines its actions for or against Hamas, among 
others.   
The first of these challenges is terrorism. The EU has made a concerted effort to fight against 
terrorism, either within Europe or anywhere else that might affect it or its allies directly or 
indirectly. The second is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which the 
EUSS regards as the greatest threat to European society due to the possibility of certain 
terrorist organizations acquiring such weaponry, and because WMD represent a significant 
threat to Europe’s populations. The third key threat is regional conflicts “which can have 
direct and indirect impacts on EU interests regardless of their geographical location.”575 Such 
conflicts might lead to terrorism, violation of human rights, organized crime, and ‘failure 
states’, while the wellbeing of Europeans, their economies, and their political relations might 
become vulnerable to instability, as well as jeopardizing the peace and security of the whole 
world.  
Accordingly, the EU pursued three objectives in order to secure its safety, promote its values, 
and maintain its interests. The main objective is to address threats; however, after the events 
of 11 September 2001 in the US, the EU, in association with the US, has increased its efforts 
to combat terrorism, pursue its policies against the proliferation of WMD, and intervene in 
regional conflicts where this is deemed necessary. The second aim of this strategy is to build 
security in the regions bordering the EU, which implied interference in those regions, and 
also explained its insistence on participating in the peace-building process in Palestine, based 
on effective economic assistance to the PA. The third objective is to develop an international 
order based on effective multi-lateralism which will be able to guarantee stability and 
security through international organizations. In this regard, the best protection for EU 
security, as adopted in the EUSS, is “a world of well-governed democratic States.”576  
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Given these key issues, the EU made considerable progress in building a coherent foreign 
policy, and according to the EUSS, is still working in the right direction. Hence, many policy 
implications were included in the EUSS as guidelines for more cohesive and accurate 
performances. However, the EU needs to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives in 
order to counter new threats and, if necessary, intervene rapidly, robustly and effectively. In 
addition, the EU looks to increase its competences to build a more capable Europe in all its 
aspects, making use of the capabilities of its member states along with those of the EU itself. 
Furthermore, it needs to ‘pursue coherent policies’ that followed the same agenda in all fields 
of activity. Finally, it is convinced that achieving its ultimate goals internationally has to be 
done in full coordination with its partners, and by activating all its relationships around the 
world, particularly the transatlantic ones which, due to historical considerations, were 
perceived in the EUSS as irreplaceable. Thus, it is obvious that this strategy was ambitiously 
constructed and directed towards building a global EU player, the security of which “is very 
much a focus of its European foreign policy.”577  
Significantly, all perceived reforms insisted on by the West and, in particular, by the EU, 
were implemented in full compatibility with the EUSS guidelines, with the aim of settling the 
most problematic regional conflict because of its potential to affect Europe and disturb its 
relations with the Arab and Islamic world. Hence, it could be said that, as a driver and a 
seeker of security
578
 in the ME, in addition to being a milieu-shaping actor, the EU engaged 
in radically constructing the PA in order to serve its own interests on the one hand and the 
MEPP on the other. In this context, the coming to power of Hamas would essentially place 
the EU’s plans and properties, as asserted in the EUSS, as well as the validity of its normative 
teachings under examination. Thus, the EU’s objectives in fighting terrorism and solving 
regional conflicts would be substantially affected, especially because the triumphant Hamas 
movement has previously been put on the EU list of terrorists and it has, at the same time, 
challenged the structural peace-building process which has considerably been promoted by 
the EU after 1993.  
                                                          
577
 Seeberg, 'The EU as a Realist Actor in Normative Clothes: EU Democracy Promotion in Lebanon and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy', p. 91 
578
 See also Ellner, 'Regional Security in a Global Context: A Critical Appraisal of European Approaches to 
Security', p. 10-24 
148 
 
 
Outlawing Hamas: an Attempt to Understand the Context  
 
The Council is committed to using sanctions as part of an integrated, 
comprehensive policy approach which should include political dialogue, incentives, 
conditionality and could even involve, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures 
in accordance with the UN Charter.
579
 
In light of the EUSS, Hamas has been banned and stigmatized as a terrorist organization. 
Given that the EU has declared its fight against terrorism and is manoeuvring to stabilize 
regional conflicts, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been an EU priority, especially after a 
Palestinian leadership represented in the PLO, assisted by the EU and the US, has already 
begun the process of stabilization after the signing of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and 
Israel in 1993.  Therefore, after dealing directly or indirectly with Hamas for a period of 13 
years without any significant reservations on the part of the EU’s special envoys to the ME, 
such as Alastair Crooke and other European diplomats, the EU had transformed Hamas from 
being a political profile that could be talked to or negotiated with, into a security subject 
which had to be seen in light of the EUSS.  
Significantly, before it had been consigned to the terrorist list, Hamas had been approached 
and pursued through political dialogue in an attempt to influence its political stance and its 
military performance prior to and within the Al-Aqsa Intifada. In this regard, the room for EU 
activity had been wider than it was after Hamas was put on the black list. According to 
Usama Hamdan, in the context of EU-Hamas relations, securitizing Hamas and then 
declaring it a terrorist organization was the EU’s first big mistake.580 The EU clearly 
distanced itself from dealing with one of the most significant players in the Palestinian line-
up at a time when it was crucial to talk to Hamas to facilitate the EU’s goals in Palestine, as 
represented in a peaceful settlement between the parties in the conflict which could not be 
done without the acceptance of Hamas.  
Alastair Crooke, the political and security advisor (1997 - 2003) to Javier Solana, High 
Represintative for (CFSP), agrees:  in his view, the list of terrorists is “one of those things 
from which it’s almost impossible to get a name removed,581 and if certain people, like 
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Hamas, were put on that list, attitudes towards building the peace process in the ME would 
harden. This opinion was shared by a high-ranking official at the EEAS who stressed that if 
there was an attitude to get Hamas out of this list, the 27 member states of the EU would have 
to agree to the removal of Hamas from it which is hardly likely to occur;
582
 while Kyriacos 
Triantaphyllides, Vice-Chair of the Delegation for Relations with the Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC), saw it as the same reasoning for not being active in forcing Israel or 
sanctioning it for its behaviours in the Palestinian territories.
583
  
This mistake in effect became an element in another of the world’s historical turning points; 
this time it was exploited by Israel and its allies to corner and isolate Hamas. The attacks on 
New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001 changed the world dramatically. For 
the first time in its history the US was attacked on its own soil and its own heartland, and its 
dignity was seriously wounded. The US administration immediately launched its ‘War 
against Terrorism’, calling on the entire world to determine whether it would stand with the 
evil alliance or the good one.
584
 Israel seized the opportunity to benefit from the new 
circumstances in the US and called for Hamas to be dealt with in the same way as Al-Qaeda. 
According to Daud Abdullah, director of the Middle East Monitor in London, Israel 
succeeded in combining the two images in the US and Palestine. As a result, the Palestinian 
resistance movement and other similar examples against occupation such as those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were put in the same basket with Al-Qaeda, regardless of the incentives behind 
their violent operations and the type of targets in all cases.
585
  
The link between these two actions, i.e., banning the military wing of Hamas and the ‘9/11’ 
attacks on the US, was confirmed by the anonymous senior official at the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), who noted that the 9/11 attacks had left a heavy shadow over the 
status and the probable fate of Hamas.
586
 From the perspective of an EEAS committee 
member, who also requested anonymity, if 9/11 had not happened, “the EU could have been 
communicating with Hamas for a long time.” He blamed Hamas for not having recognized 
that moment and for failing to understand the significance of the EU’s subsequent alteration 
of its historical mode of approach towards terrorism; public opinion was no longer able to 
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distinguish between such operations targeted at people, and the EU was left with no choice 
but to make the decision against Hamas.
587
 However, the fact that the EU showed no clear-
cut reaction to Israel’s massacres in Palestine, for example, in the Jenin Camp in May 2002, 
which killed dozens of Palestinian civilians and demolished hundreds of homes, indicates that 
the EU policy towards Hamas has been inconsistent and clearly imbalanced; why was Israel 
censured but eventually tolerated, while Hamas was considered to be a terrorist organization? 
This deliberately-mixed perception of Hamas’s resistance was duly adopted by the US, which 
then sought in particular to convince its European allies to ban Hamas as had been done 
against Al-Qaeda; this was the result.
 588
  
In addition to the direct pressure applied on the EU by the Americans, both collectively and 
separately, Israel’s friends amongst the European states played a significant role in banning 
Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the military wing of Hamas, on 27 December 2001.
589
 While doing so, 
the EU, which had engaged in official communications with Hamas only since 2000,
590
 left 
considerable room for its diplomatic efforts with the movement’s political wing, in order to 
calm the situation within the Al-Aqsa Intifada in Palestine and to influence Hamas’s positions 
towards the conflict. According to Hamdan, this was in the interests of the EU which 
thereafter played an effective role in declaring a truce from the Palestinian side in 2003, 
under the supervision of Alastair Crooke who was the direct mediator in this declaration.
591
    
Along with being in sympathy with the US, the European attitude towards banning the 
political wing of Hamas after doing so with the military wing was another significant factor 
influencing events. Significantly, the violent resistance adopted by various Palestinian 
factions, mainly Hamas, during the Al-Aqsa Intifada that erupted on 28 September 2000, 
changed the way of thinking of the Europeans who perceived attacks by Hamas against the 
Israelis as being similar to the attacks that were occurring in the US and elsewhere. 
According to Berlusconi, addressing the Israelis, 
Since 2000, [the] wave of terror of the Second Intifada [has begun] and brought 
your people’s stamina to the test. We Italians were conscious, from the first 
moment, of the fact that terror is challenging not only the United States and 
Israel, but all democratic states of the West, and even moderate Arab countries. 
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We have since taken part – from Iraq and Afghanistan, from Bosnia to Lebanon 
– in fighting terror and promoting peace. With our soldiers and Peace Corps, we 
have made a contribution to making the world safer and more just, and we have 
paid the price in human life.
592
 
Thus, the context in which the Palestinian Intifada had been identified was the context of the 
global war against terrorism, launched after 11 September 2001.
593
 Thereafter, subsequent 
European behaviours towards Hamas would involve ways of containing the danger to Israel 
that might be represented by the Hamas movement.  
Despite the obvious difference between Al-Qaeda and Hamas, as confirmed by Phil Bennion 
and other EU respondents,
594
 and the nature of their targets as well as the logic dominating 
them, the resistance that Hamas represented in Palestine against the IO was ultimately 
perceived in the same way as the terrorism represented by Al-Qaeda. According to Franco 
Frattini, the European Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security “Israel 
[was] struggling with the same terrorist threats as Europe but on a much larger scale”; he 
considered Hamas as of those radical Islamist groups who threatened Europe and Israel 
alike.
595
 Despite the refusal of Marc Otte to accede to such equalizing between two 
organizations which he did not regard as being the same,
596
 this was, in fact, a clear cognitive 
deviation against Palestinian factions and their cause. This deviation was condemned, for 
example by Mark Perry and Alastair Crooke who believed that the EU’s policy of 
deliberately equalizing different actors by putting them on the same black list was 
unreasonable and would sabotage the EU’s ability to function in the Arab-Israeli conflict.597 
Confirming the accuracy of the principle that ‘one size does not fit all’598, many scholars have 
pointed out that in this regard the logic of mixing different actors and putting them on the 
same scale is an inaccurate policy followed by the EU.  
At that point, Hamas was an undesirable player even though it could have been persuaded to 
change instead of being isolated. Significantly, however, after years of being fought by both 
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Israel and the PA between 1996 and 2000 in the wake of the Hamas military revenge 
operations that followed the Israeli assassination of Yahia Ayyash, Hamas surprised 
observers by returning to the scene, as a stronger and more cohesive body in the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada. As a result, through its envoy Alastair Crooke, the EU opened the historic 
‘continuous dialogue’ with Hamas in an attempt to stop the mutual violence between 
Palestinians and Israelis, although it was not proportionate. But, as Hamdan revealed, despite 
Crooke’s success in reaching a truce on the Palestinian side on 21 June 2003, thereby gaining 
the time needed for Europe to try and stop Israeli operations in the Palestinian territories, the 
mediator failed to convince the Israelis to address the Palestinian declaration of a truce. Israel 
did not respect the declaration; indeed, the Israeli Education Minister Limor Livnat, speaking 
on Israeli Army radio, described it as “a trick”.599  
During this period, Hamdan continued to report every Israeli violation of this truce to Crooke, 
in order to highlight the pragmatic approach adopted by Hamas and all the Palestinian 
factions, compared with the rigid position of the Israelis. In fact, after 50 days of the truce 
being breached by the Israeli side without being either overtly stopped or condemned by the 
EU which at the same time, was controlling the military action on the Hamas side,
600
  the 
situation exploded again. On 19 August 2003 a member of the military wing of Hamas 
bombed an Israeli bus, killing and wounding dozens of people. Two days later, on 21
 
August 
2003, the Israelis assassinated ‘Ismail Abu Shanab’, a senior figure in Hamas.601  All this 
happened while the US and the EU were meeting in Aqaba in an attempt to get the peace 
negotiations back on track; at this meeting, according to Solana, the Palestinian leadership 
committed itself to ending terrorism and violence. Considering that their efforts in Aqaba had 
been wasted by the breaking of the truce, the EU therefore threatened that “those choosing 
another path, rather than the Roadmap, will face consequences”, and promised to cut off the 
external support for Hamas.602 Hence, the EU, affected by the ‘war on terrorism’ launched 
after the attacks on the US in 2001 and the pressure from the latter and Israel,
603
  has closed 
the only remained diplomatic channel with Hamas and put it on the list of terrorist 
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organizations. Paradoxically, while Hamas had been dealt with in such a way, Israel’s 
military actions and breaches during the 50-day truce were not addressed by the EU in the 
same way. 
 
 
In this respect, the British government played an important role among the European states 
after US President George W. Bush had expressed Washington’s frustration with the EU 
because “the US was left to do the ‘heavy lifting’ with Israel”, whereas no parallel European 
action had been launched in Palestine alongside the US ‘war on terror’.604 It was not long 
before Jack Straw, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the UK, had informed the Prime 
Minister’s foreign affairs adviser, David Manning, accompanied by Alastair Crooke, that he 
had convinced Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, to put Hamas on the list of 
terrorist organizations. All this coincided with the pressure exerted for the same purpose by 
President Bush on senior EU officials at the annual EU-US summit in June 2003.
605
 
Prompted by the poisonous atmosphere prevailing after the Hamas military operation had 
terminated the declared truce in 2003, Nigel Sheinwald, Manning’s successor,  angrily 
informed Crooke “that security in Palestine could [only] be achieved by eradicating the 
‘virus’ of Hamas from Gaza, and eliminating its ‘disease’ from the region.”606 
In fact, the period of banning the movement had been remembered by Franco Frattini, who 
expressed his pride for the reality that under the Italin Presidency of the EU, while he was 
serving as a Foreign Minister, Hamas had been proscribed as a terrorist organization for its 
hostile stances towards Israel and the MEPP.
607
 He justified this step by saying that   
Hamas has never abandoned its plan of destroying Israel and still rejects the 
principle of [a] two-state solution. That’s why Hamas cannot be a viable 
interlocutor, neither for the international community, nor for the poor 
Palestinian people who should sooner rather than later realise that Hamas has 
brought them only disaster.
608
 
Commenting on this, Ivo Vajgl, a member of the EP refused the categorization of Hamas as a 
terrorist organization, arguing that the aims and objectives of Hamas were not terrorism; its 
goals were dedicated to assisting its people. Even though it was blamed for its acts of terror, 
these acts were not sufficient for it to be considered as a terrorist organization “like Al-Qaeda 
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for example”.609 Contrary to this seemingly sound logic, Hamas was crucially proscribed by 
the Council of the EU supported also by the European Parliament EP,
610
 whereas they 
continued to maintain significant relations with Israel at all levels, despite Israeli policies on 
the ground that, as statistics revealed, were clearly breaching human rights and targeting 
Palestinian civilians far more severely than the policy that Hamas had followed with the 
Israelis.
611
  
Remarking these developments, Ilan Pappe pointed out that, “Israel ...eventually succeeded in 
convincing the EU to associate Hamas with all the forces that the West [was] fighting against, 
in the so-called war against terror.”612 Strikingly, this had happened regardless of the fact that 
Hamas was a resistance movement without hidden agenda, as commonly known, in terms of 
the international conflict with so-called terrorists. Building on the aforementioned 
developments, the EU’s sanctions-based policy towards Hamas became, ironically, part of a 
comprehensive approach that is based on seeking peace and security between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis.   
Top-Down Approach against Bottom-Up Tactic with Hamas 
After the decision regarding Hamas had been taken by the EU institutions in 2003, the EU 
made a significant change in the way it approached the movement; it no longer followed a 
‘bottom-up’ tactic but moved to a ‘top-down’ approach. This suggests a transformation by the 
EU from political dialogue with Hamas, as followed by Alastair Crooke after the start of the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada, to the dialogue of power after Hamas had been stigmatized as a terrorist 
organization. Indeed, the EU’s decision to declare Hamas as a terrorist meant replacing the 
mechanism of persuasion as a method for change with the mechanism of force, commands, 
and stipulations. However, according to the bottom-up approach, influencing Hamas’s 
attitudes to a peace process as well as to violent resistance could be done through a socially-
constructed methodology that comes with a process of deep dialogue. Therefore, as a MEP, 
Ivo Vajgl also pointed out that starting from the bottom with Hamas might prove more 
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effective and persuasive than using the language of commands and obligations.
613
   
Alastair Crooke fully agreed with this assessment.  He had been shocked by the decision of 
the British government and the Council of the EU to cut ties with Hamas. Not only would this 
interrupt the significant efforts he had exerted between 2000 and 2003 to achieve a kind of 
breakthrough with Hamas in its policies and attitudes on the ground, but at the same time it 
would also block any possibility of influencing the movement in the future.
614
 Given that the 
new approach chosen towards Hamas was a one-way exercise, this meant boycotting Hamas, 
stopping all official communications with it and thereby using the same language of power 
and threat that had so far been applied by both the US and Israel. Thus, having despaired of 
taming Hamas or turning it in another direction through dialogue (and public elections later), 
the EU, as noted by Gazi Hamad,
615
 continued to follow its normal alliance policies regarding 
Israel and the US, and opted to activate a big-stick policy, in theory and in practice, against 
Hamas in Europe and in Palestine itself.  
However, it is important to point out that even though Hamas was consigned to the EU’s list 
of terrorists, it should not be assumed that political contacts with the movement were also 
forbidden. Close scrutiny of statements issued and reissued by the EU since 2001 gives no 
indication that communications with Hamas were prohibited. Accordingly, with regard to 
those entities on the EU’s ‘inventory of terrorists’, these EU Council statements appear to 
have assumed that “the European Community shall order the freezing of the funds and other 
financial assets or economic resources of persons, groups and entities listed” not to cut talks 
with them.
616
  
Many officials from the EP have defended this understanding of the EU statements, but to no 
avail. According to a member of ME Unit in the EP, who preferred not to be named, there is 
an obvious lack of knowledge regarding this issue; freezing the financial assets of those 
committed to terrorism does not mean suspending political contacts with them. He described 
his desperate attempts in the EP to highlight the difference between the two issues as being 
like “a lone voice in a desert”. In his opinion, the way the EU had decided against Hamas, 
and the subsequent suspension of communications with the movement, had come about 
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because of the EU’s reliance on the US and its exclusive relations with Israel.617 Margrete 
Auken (MEP and Vice-Chair of the Delegation for Relations with the PLC) maintains that the 
EU’s procedures against Hamas were undoubtedly wrong and the subsequent boycott was 
unreasonable. Even if Hamas was on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations, communications 
with it should not have stopped. The EU needed to remember how the US had put pressure on 
the UK to conduct negotiations with the Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, although Sinn Féin 
was on the US list of terrorist organizations.
618
 Maintaining the boycott against Hamas for so 
long without any solid grounds exemplified the extent of the EU’s dependence in its foreign 
policy, and its lack of courage.              
With regard to the extensive, socially-constructed infrastructure that the Hamas movement 
had succeeded in building in the Palestinian territories, numerous examples of cooperation 
between European-based associations and Hamas’s own social network have duly been 
sought out and banned. Notably, received many donations from European Islamic supporters, 
Hamas cooperatives are no longer able to collect such contributions, even though this aid is 
directed only to social purposes such as educational and health institutions or the 
impoverished.
619
 As a result, the activities of supporting agencies in Europe have also been 
actively targeted or closed down, and contributions to Hamas-related associations or charities 
are significantly reduced following pressure from Israel.
620
 In Palestine, Hamas had become a 
security issue and, as the EU demanded, was expected to have been effectively restricted and 
dismantled by the PA. According to the Roadmap launched by the Quartet Committee on 24
 
June 2002 and then agreed, with reservations, between the PA and Israel, the Palestinians 
were regularly asked to renounce violence and to disband their military factions, including 
Hamas.    
Thus, the PA certainly pursued some groups belonging to Hamas and jailed them, but lacking 
ability and political will was unable to end Hamas’s military power on the ground. In a 
similar manner to the mechanism used by it, as mentioned above, the EU openly spent 
significant time and money in its diplomatic communications with the PA in an attempt to 
stop the Al-Aqsa Intifada. At the same time, it continued to condemn the Palestinian 
resistance against the Israelis and boycott the Hamas movement. In consequence, the EU 
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abandoned persuasion and dialogue as a method of changing the Hamas dossier and adopted 
a more clinical choice but in the hands of the PA and Israel.   
New Era with the Death of Arafat 
After being besieged in his office on 29 March 2002, and seeing the massacres perpetrated 
against Palestinians in Al-Aqsa Intifada as evidence of the absence of a partner in the Israeli 
government, Arafat’s view of the political situation implicitly reflected the loss of hope in the 
peace process with Israel. Significantly, the US and Israel declared Arafat an obstacle to 
peace and called on others in international society to boycott him.
621
 The EU’s 
representatives tried to maintain diplomatic channels with Arafat in the hope of affecting his 
attitudes towards the Intifada, but over time he became completely besieged, until his 
suspicious death on 23 November 2004.  
During this period of siege, there were many Western attempts to redistribute Arafat’s power 
and to affect his control of the Palestinian security sector which, had Arafat agreed, should 
have had a significant part in ending the armed resistance. In this connection, and as a result 
of the reform process, Abbas was put next to him for the first time as a Prime Minister, to 
play the role that Arafat had refused. This change, which happened under pressure,
622
 was 
backed by the EU and the US alike, in the hope that Abbas could stop the Palestinian 
resistance which constituted a huge challenge to the peace process; both the EU and the US 
were outraged by every armed Palestinian operation against the Israelis. Therefore, the ME 
Quartet “support[s] immediate Palestinian action to restructure and consolidate, under Prime 
Minister Abbas, all security services, and calls on all states to assist in such efforts’.623At this 
weighty juncture Western hopes were renewed and rebuilt on the new Palestinian leadership 
represented in President Abbas who did not hide his negative response to the armed 
Intifada.
624
 
Following this political development, and accompanied by the heavy Israeli stick used to 
suppress the Intifada, a new political atmosphere began to develop in the PA, characterized 
mostly by Palestinian cooperation with the West’s efforts to reform the PA according to a 
new political dogma compatible with the regulations mentioned in the Roadmap. The US and 
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the EU shared this duty, focusing on the political, security and financial sectors in order to 
legitimize the new Palestinian leadership which lacked the revolutionary charisma of 
Arafat.
625
 Without the personality of his predecessor, Abbas would be strengthened by 
legitimacy at the ballot box, which would reinforce the man and his approach. This, from a 
Western perspective was considered more rational than Arafat’s leadership. Consequently, 
Abbas easily won the Palestinian presidential elections on 9 May 2005 achieving a 
participation rate of 62.52 percent of voters in the electoral process.
626
 Hamas boycotted these 
elections, but participated later in the parliamentary and municipal elections in 2005 and 2006 
respectively.   
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Section Two: Democratic Rhetoric: Realistic Practice 
 
 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law.
627
 
 
 
 
 
Paradox No.1: Contradiction between Democratic State-Building and the National 
Liberation Process  
 
Significantly, the debate as to whether the Palestinians were in a period of democratic state-
building or an era of national liberation has been valid within Palestine as well as among 
outsiders since the Oslo Accords in 1993. Contrary to the perceived views of Hamas which 
finds no contradiction between them,
628
 from the EU perspective these two phases have had 
different requirements and it was a foregone conclusion in favour of the notion that 
Palestinians were in an era of building rather than of liberation in its classical sense. There 
was, therefore, an obvious contradiction between engaging in what the EU called ‘violent 
actions’ on the one hand and participating in a democratic electoral process on the other.629 
Hence, those who wanted to participate in the general Palestinian elections were advised by 
the EU to change their minds if they wished to engage in the democratic process.   
The Council welcomes the Palestinian Authority’s statements condemning violence 
and urging Palestinian groups who have engaged in terrorism to abandon this 
course and engage in the democratic process. The Council recalls the EU’s position 
that all factions, including Hamas, should renounce violence, recognise Israel’s 
right to exist, and disarm. Ultimately, those who want to be part of the political 
process should not engage in armed activities, as there is a fundamental 
contradiction between such activities and the building of a democratic State.
630
 
Therefore, from the EU side it was clear that recognizing the right of Israel to exist and 
abandoning ‘resistance’ in addition to disarming, were the criteria that Hamas should have 
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adopted when it thought about participating in the general Palestinian elections on 25 January 
2006. In fact, the EU did not raise its voice obviously against Hamas’s participation, as it 
would have done had it planned, in the event of its advice being overlooked, to ignore the 
outcomes of the democratic vote. The EU felt that the outcomes might be significant (though 
not to the extent of the striking success that Hamas actually achieved). It therefore nominated 
a special committee to monitor the elections
631
 but did not express its reservations about 
Palestinian factions that did not meet EU perceptions, as noted above, or about those 
stigmatized as terrorists according to its regulations. Otherwise, the EU should have 
explained how it had agreed to observe and fund an electoral process whilst significant 
players in that process were terrorists.  
Contrary to the intention of Hamas, which participated to protect the resistance project,
632
 the 
Europeans thought that the parliamentarian way could have tamed Hamas had the movement 
gained a significant minority in the PLC as the containment policy
633
 itself suggested.
634
 In 
Ahmed Yousef’s view, the EU monitored the elections to close the road in front of Hamas by 
questioning the integrity of the elections after celebrating a triumphant Fatah as the EU had 
predicted.
635
 Yet, following this prediction, the most important objective of such elections 
was to foster the ME peace process by enabling the new Palestinian leadership. This had been 
mentioned repeatedly by the EU; thus,  
The Council underlined the importance of the forthcoming elections for the 
Palestinian Legislative Council as an essential element for progress in the peace 
process. The Council emphasised that violence and terror are incompatible with 
democratic processes and urged all factions, including Hamas, to renounce 
violence, recognise Israel’s right to exist, and disarm. The Council urged Israel 
to facilitate the preparations and conduct of the elections, including in occupied 
East Jerusalem.
636
 
It could be said that the EU, like Israel and the US, counted on their false readings of the 
Palestinian political scene by considering Fatah an unbeatable faction; a matter that 
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unintentionally led them to pave the way for Hamas to win this very important round in the 
long political battle between it and them.  
After the election results appeared on 26 January 2006, the EU reiterated its stance towards 
the necessity of abandoning the violent way pursued by Hamas and other Palestinian factions 
in their resistance.637 Concerning the success of Hamas, the EU’s emphases have become 
more important due to the fact that Hamas had come to power and not as a minority in the 
PLC as it was expected to be.
638
 Instead of leaving the newly-elected Palestinians to 
determine their priorities and thereby resolve contradictions in their discourse without being 
put under pressure, the entire body found itself placed under rigorous EU and US (rather than 
Israeli) conditions and requirements; a matter which complicated the Palestinian political 
scene and greatly hardened the internal situation. Any concessions could have been given by 
the elected body in this regard might have appeared weakness in front of the Palestinian 
constituencies. Therefore, according to Hamas, the matter has become not only an issue of 
national dignity but also a matter of credibility that should have been maintained by the 
democratically-elected majority in the PLC. Thus, from the EU’s perspective the perceived 
contradiction between violence and the democratic process is not the same as that of Hamas 
and other similar factions. In fact, according to Hamas the Palestinians are still going through 
the liberation process which implies activating all possible methods of resistance, whether 
they are political or militant means.
639
 Hence, the conflict between the EU and Hamas 
perceptions has significantly put the two parties on opposite sides.  
 
Palestinian Democracy, from a Demand to a Dilemma  
According to the internationally-backed Roadmap, this new era of reconstruction of the PA 
implied political and economic reforms within it. Hamas had been brought to a new, 
unpredicted and remarkable socio-political situation which confused the EU’s regional 
agenda. In fact, Hamas was able to make a breakthrough in its classic political position of 
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boycotting the Oslo Accords and their implications when, contrary to its well-known twelve-
year policy against the Accords, it agreed to participate in the general elections held in 
2005/6. Not only did it participate but observers from around the world were astonished when 
it gained great success in all the electoral rounds for municipal elections and in those for the 
PA parliament
640
 (these elections were described by the European Union Election 
Observation Mission (EU EOM) as fairly driven and impressively conducted).
641
 Although 
the expectations of these Western-supported reforms were eventually different from the 
genuine outcomes, the worst predictions did not reach the level of the possibility of Hamas 
achieving a huge electoral triumph. Surprisingly, none of the decision-makers who had been 
dealing with the ME in general or with the PA in particular, was adequately prepared to deal 
with this new era in which Hamas would lead the PA government.  
Hence, the EU’s initial reaction was one of hesitation followed by embarrassment at the 
situation in which it found itself. If it had dealt with the outcomes of the elections, it would 
have found itself cooperating with an obviously terrorist organization on its own list of 
terrorists. At the same time, had it not cooperated with this democratically-formed Hamas-led 
government, it would have jeopardized its own interests and normative values, and thereby its 
credibility. It therefore attempted to influence Hamas’s attitude towards the peace process by 
welcoming the results, reminding the newly-elected PLC of its responsibilities, and laying 
down guidelines through which the EU could cooperate with, or support the PA.  
The Council welcomed the holding on 25 January of elections to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) and congratulated President Abbas and the 
Palestinian people on an electoral process that was free and fair. The Council 
fully endorsed the statement made by the Quartet issued on 26 January… .The 
Council expects the newly elected PLC to support the formation of a 
government committed to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict with 
Israel based on existing agreements and the Roadmap as well as to the rule of 
law, reform and sound fiscal management. On this basis the European Union 
stands ready to continue to support Palestinian economic development and 
democratic state building.
642
  
The situation for the EU was now hanging in the balance; on the one hand, the essential 
processes of democracy ought to have been pursued in support of Abbas, while on the other, 
democracy had become the dilemma on whose horns most of the political actors in the OPT 
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were stuck. Therefore, every effort had to be exerted by regional and international actors 
involved in managing this period to solve the impasse, by using political, financial and even 
military tools. Politically, it was clear that the Hamas-led government would not be 
recognized internationally until the political requirements stipulated in the statements of the 
EU and the Quartet had been met. However, many countries including in the Arab world in 
general, were involved in these political demands, particularly the Egyptian regime which was 
no less intent than Israel or the Palestinian Presidency in tightening the rope around the neck 
of Hamas. Accordingly, Hamas kept refusing the political dictates emanating from the Quartet 
and refused to bargain away its principles with promises of international recognition or 
money; a position that brought its government to the world’s attention.  
However, the EU supported the PA for its functional security role in the region rather than for 
its desire to build a democratic state. In fact, the PA’s importance lies in its role of resolving 
the conflict based on a two-state solution in which Israel would survive peacefully and be 
recognized as a normal state.643 The conflict has become the most dangerous conflict in 
Europe’s backyard, and the PA’s role represented the stability which could have been 
achieved in the region if peace had seen the light. Therefore, as a condition for receiving the 
EU’s continuing financial and political support, the PA’s main duty would be to assure 
stability through the struggle against terrorism and violence. As the EU Commissioner for 
External Relations commented,     
We have worked to maintain the only viable partner in peace that Israel can find 
and we should continue to support the PA, especially in its fight against 
terrorism. While the PA has made mistakes and must correct them, the PA is the 
only structure that can provide stability in the Palestinian territories.
644
 
Hence, the security role that was awaited by the EU would be no longer available after 
Hamas had come to power. The EU feared that the political and financial investments that 
had been made in the PA could be ruined following this significant change in the political 
scene. According to Ilan Pappe, the EU perceived Hamas as a real threat to the PA, not only 
in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank, and this therefore implied sacrificing its norms 
and values.
645
 As Hamas had been elected on a specific political agenda it would remain 
committed to its promises, regardless of the consequences.
646
 In the circumstances, the EU 
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representatives refused any kind of formal communication with Hamas’s governmental 
members, thereby imposing another layer of pressure.  
In this regard, the EU was authorized to “spearhead efforts to develop proposals for a 
Temporary International Mechanism to facilitate the direct delivery of assistance to the 
Palestinian people to meet basic needs, without the money passing to or through the PA 
government” that was led by Hamas.647 Whereas the Palestinian people had expected to reap 
some reward from their democracy, instead they found themselves sanctioned, and from the 
starvation of their children, paying the bill for their free democratic choice which had come 
about contrary to the will of the Israeli-Quartet. According to an EU representative, the 
Palestinian people “should sooner rather than later realise that HAMAS has brought them 
only disaster”; a clear indication of the reality behind the sanctions imposed by the EU and its 
partners against Hamas.
648
    
Significantly, in the opinion of many observers and monitors of democracy in the ME, this 
matter was entirely incompatible with the EU’s claims to be a normative entity, and 
enthusiastic about democracy and good governance.
649
 Undeniably, teachings around 
democracy were heavily contradicted by the EU’s behaviour towards the elections in 
Palestine, and its following attempt, via the Middle East Quartet, to impose stipulations on 
the winners. As Benita Ferrero-Waldner remarked in a speech, “we cannot work directly with 
the government that came to power after these elections, as long as it does not accept the 
basic principles of the Peace Process, advocates violence and does not recognize Israel’s right 
of existence.”650 Due to the fact that “the difference between civilian power and soft 
imperialism lies in the overall importance of values and norms, and also whether negotiations 
are carried out in a symmetric, dialogical way rather than by imposition”,651 the EU’s 
determinants of such a position will be emphasized in the following chapters, so as to identify  
what kind of entity the EU is in dealing specifically with Hamas and more broadly with 
Palestine; i.e., is it a realistic entity or a normative and civilian one. Consequently, EU policy 
in this area is investigated, mostly on the issue of whether the Palestinian elections were a 
                                                          
647
 EU, 'Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Visit Israel and the Palestinian Territories ', (Press Release, 
IP/06/792; Brussels, 16 June 2006). 
648
 Frattini, 'From the Outside, Looking In: International Perspectives on the Middle East'. 2008 
649
 Are Hovdenak, 'Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions ', Democratization, 16/1 (2009b), 59-80. 
650
 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 'The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A Partnership for Reform', 
(SPEECH/06/341; Hamburg, 2 June 2006). 
651
 Hettne and Soderbaum, 'Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global and the Role of 
Interregionalism', p. 38 
165 
 
practical contribution to the democratization process of the region by the EU, as has been 
claimed,
652
 or an obvious instance of its failure to deal with the requirements of democracy 
when its results were at variance with its wishes. 
Boycott and Siege in Reply to Democracy: the Sacred Cow 
In a response to Palestinian democracy and the subsequent Hamas-led government, Israel and 
the international community participated in imposing a blockade on the Palestinians,653 
essentially linking any convergence with the new Palestinian representatives to the latters’ 
acceptance of the demands of the Quartet Committee. These demands involved recognizing 
Israel, renouncing violence, and accepting agreements that had previously been signed with 
Israel. However, Hamas’s negative response to these demands hardened positions towards the 
movement itself, as well as to the Palestinian people generally and their government. As a 
result, Israel and the Quartet decided to pressure the newly-elected body until they were sure 
that all their political requirements had been fulfilled, and inevitably led to a severe socio-
economic crisis in the Palestinian Territories.
654
 While Israel decided to stop all kinds of 
facilities from which previous Palestinian governments had formerly benefited, including 
financial dues, the EU and its allies in the Quartet decided to stop funding the Palestinian 
governmental budget through the usual channels and to direct its donations to specific 
sectors, mainly education and health, through the Palestinian Presidency held by Abbas. 
Furthermore, the EU refused to open diplomatic talks or political dialogues with the Hamas-
led government or those elected to the PLC, while the EU member states prevented Hamas 
ministers and PLC members from visiting their countries. Those who visited some of these 
states legally after being invited by European civil societies were, according to Ahmed 
Yousef, disgracefully detained and deported.
655
 This happened to the Health Minister, 
Bassem Naim, in Holland on 4 May 2007, and to PLC members Ismail al-Ashqar, Salah 
Bardawil, and Mushir al-Masri in Bulgaria on 14th February 2013 as Ahmed Yousef also 
confirmed. According to Jarmo Oikarinen, a Member of the EP, this commonly-confessed 
“wrong behaviour” on the part of the EU against the Hamas-led government stemmed from 
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“unpreparedness rather than being something which was kind of what would eventually have 
happened anyway.”656  
This unpreparedness put the EU into a state of confusion, and without checking the 
usefulness of the criteria imposed on the Hamas-led government, the EU blindly followed the 
Israeli rhetoric in this regard and adopted the Quartet’s demands which, according to a high-
ranking official in the EP, who preferred not to be named, had become somewhat of ‘a sacred 
cow’.657 In view of the fact that as a result of these Quartet demands, the EU had tied its 
hands and restricted its diplomacy without achieving any success with Hamas, it was obvious 
that the three conditions had become more of a burden on the EU than on Hamas. Hence, to 
all intents and purposes the political, diplomatic and financial blockade had become a shared 
Israeli-international responsibility, albeit to varying degrees.    
Accordingly, the direct consequences of the blockade started to affect the Palestinian people 
directly, especially as the Palestinian economy was/is dependent on Israeli-international 
financial commitments to the PA. Indeed, the government, which was boycotted financially, 
politically and diplomatically, found itself besieged and in a very difficult situation since it 
could not guarantee the salaries of government employees and at the same time, had no 
significant control over the entire government staff who were loyal to the Fatah movement, 
particularly those in the security sector. As a result, humanitarian conditions became 
catastrophic and the rift between the universally-supported Fatah and the internationally-
isolated Hamas deteriorated very badly, and eventually resulted in the takeover by Hamas of 
the Gaza Strip on 14 June 2007.   
Although this Hamas control over the Gaza Strip put an end to the civil war between Hamas 
and Fatah for about a year, the Palestinian humanitarian situation became worse than ever, 
because Israel straight away imposed a full blockade on the Gaza Strip, and on 18 September 
2007 declared it a ‘hostile entity’.658 This vicious blockade affected everything in Gaza 
including, as stressed by EUHR Ashton, schools, hospitals, housing, and even sanitation.
659
 
All commercial relations with Israel and other countries were severely affected after the 
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Israeli occupation decided to restrict the quantity and quality of what was allowed to enter or 
to leave the Gaza Strip. Significantly, these new tough procedures led to a very dangerous 
situation in which unemployment and poverty rates in the Gaza Strip reached unprecedented 
levels. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, the unemployment rate in 
December 2009 had reached 42 percent and poverty rates stood at 80 percent, while the 
Israelis allowed no more than 25 percent of what was normally required to meet the total 
needs of the Palestinians to enter Gaza.
660
 Moreover, Gaza had suffered “substantial damage 
to infrastructure and agricultural land, and delivery of public services was constrained by 
multiple challenges” caused by the lack of supplies, which led to the closure of 95 percent of 
its industry and left 60 percent of the population ‘food insecure’, along with the fact that “90-
95% of water [was] not suitable for human consumption.”661 In reality, the blockade, imposed 
by Israel and silently condoned by the EU, apart from some timid calls for Israel to open 
crossings with Gaza, as discussed later in the thesis, “plunged the Gaza Strip into a deep 
socio-economic crisis.”662 In effect, the Hamas-led government was experiencing a new kind 
of siege which had become tougher after it took control of Gaza in 2007.    
In responding to the Palestinian humanitarian crisis caused by the blockade and the 
subsequent war on Gaza, the EU turned itself into a sort of ‘Red Cross’ association. In 
addition to its faint calls for the blockade to be eased, or sometimes to be removed 
completely (which Solana tried to do),
663
 the EU took on the role of a charity concerned with 
the delivering of humanitarian aid to the Gazans, instead of behaving strongly, firmly and 
loudly against the suffocation of the entire population. The most fascinating position adopted 
by the EU was during the ‘Cast Lead’ war against Gaza in 2008/9, in which the EU attempted 
to compensate for its political and diplomatic weakness in the face of the massacre by calling 
for,       
Immediate humanitarian action: food, urgent medical aid and fuel should be 
delivered to the Gaza Strip; the evacuation of the injured and unhindered access of 
humanitarian workers should be made possible through the opening of crossing 
points. The European Union, the leading aid donor to the Palestinians, dispatched a 
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field mission to provide the most appropriate response as quickly as possible in 
cooperation with the United Nations and NGOs.
664
 
This kind of discourse indeed represented a charity that might be concerned with 
humanitarian aid rather than representing a very important superpower that had hugely 
invested in the peace process in the ME, while focussing on human rights, democracy, and 
the rule of law.  
However, the Palestinians caught up in the war were awaiting internationally-supported 
justice, or powerful interference from such international actors, to halt the rocket 
bombardments and the killing operations. Had these donations and this kind of discourse 
come from the Red Cross or similar charitable organizations, it would have been understood 
and welcomed. But coming from the EU, which had many available alternatives to stop the 
war on Gaza, it reflected the language of the biased actor in favour of the strong, i.e., Israel, 
the actor whose attacks were/are somehow justifiable and understandable under the slogan of 
the right to self-defence in the face of Hamas rockets. Astonishingly, the EU behaved as if 
what had happened was simply a minor earthquake or so, whereas the situation should have 
dealt with more seriously, especially after the devastation on the ground and the disastrous 
images that were widely seen through the media. Ignoring the political side of the conflict 
and refraining from using its capabilities to stop the war or to deter Israel for its crimes could 
be considered a kind of collusion by the EU with Israel, and entirely contrary to the EU’s 
commitment to human rights.  
Hence, EU policy towards Hamas has been pragmatically driven rather than being 
normatively motivated. Nevertheless, although the world’s image of the EU is generally 
drawn as if its foreign policy is based on the desire to promote democracy and human rights, 
the example of Palestine has proved that the EU makes its calculations beyond the norms or 
values that would be seen as driving factors in this field. These calculations are based on cost 
and benefits balance and on principles of self-interest rather than morals and ethics, 
especially when pertaining to the siege imposed on Gaza that plunged the Palestinian people 
as a whole into daily suffering. As Ilan Pappe notes,        
...it is a realistic policy devoid of any moral or ethical dimension; it also 
succumbs to intimidation and fear, a policy that gives in to fear. Even the US, 
when it invaded Iraq, claimed that it was motivated by an ethical code and that 
code was democratization, regardless of whether this was right or wrong. But 
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the EU does not say ‘we boycott Hamas and enable Israel to do what it does in 
the name of democracy or human rights ... even in the right of Israel to defend 
itself’. There is no ethical code here; the only thing they do is to say ‘we have to 
follow a policy which is not ours so we follow the American policy’.665    
Pappe’s analysis dovetails with Stefania Panebianco’s conviction that the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy shifted after the 1990s and that it was driven by interest-oriented policy 
focused on security needs rather than by principles, ideals and values, with these elements 
being “replaced by a more pragmatic vision of the EU’s global role”.666 Thus, the absence of 
an ethical code has submerged the EU into a realistic policy that has affected its normative 
image and led to paralysis of its diplomatic capabilities as it awaits the US and Israel’s signal 
to change.   
Wait-and-See Approach Losing  
Due to its preconceived perception of the structure of Hamas and its attitude towards Israel 
and the peace process, the EU rushed to adopt a boycott approach rather than a wait-and-see 
approach against the newly-elected body. According to Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, an MEP 
the EU should have thought twice before taking this decision; “it is not reasonable to say you 
want elections and then, if the outcomes do not please you to some degree, you boycott the 
winners and impose sanctions.”667 Presumably, the EU could have respected the results and 
dealt with the PA in a manner consistent with its democratic legacy and teachings while 
calling on Palestinians to conduct the elections as a preparatory approach for reform of the 
political system.  
The EU could in fact have adopted the wait-and-see approach instead of the hastily-adopted 
boycott approach, in order to allow newly-elected individuals time to pick and choose their 
political choices freely, from a position of authority, and according to what politics dictated. 
Substantially, behaviour on the ground was more important than theories, and had Hamas 
been left alone and dealt with accordingly, without being encircled, the movement might 
have adopted a new behavioural approach towards the conflict without appearing to betray its 
constituencies or being subjected to the dictates of others, especially Westerners.  However, 
Hamas was certainly not expected to make any dramatic change in its political attitudes under 
pressure; therefore, a creative mechanism should have been adopted based on respect for 
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people’s choices. This logic was understood in an inter-parliamentary meeting held in 2006 
between the European Parliament, the United States Congress under what was known as 
Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue. As their recommendations noted, “the international 
community cannot realistically expect a complete turnaround from Hamas on this question, 
but responsible behaviour.”668 Hence, it should have been left to Hamas to behave 
responsibly, without being threatened with starvation and isolation.    
Against this background it appeared that after outlawing the movement in 2003, boycotting 
the Hamas-led government was the second big mistake into which the EU had fallen. Indeed, 
many of the researcher’s EU interviewees confessed that boycotting Hamas had been a 
mistake; according to an interviewee from the EEAS, who preferred to remain anonymous, 
Solana had personally revealed that at that turning point in the ME’s affairs, the EU’s 
behaviour was absolutely wrong.
669
 Significantly, the EU had proved its obvious bias as a 
mediator by sacrificing its declared values rather than its interests.
670
 The presence of Hamas 
in power should have formed an opportunity to be seized, not ignored or neglected by the 
international society, and the EU in particular. If any progression was to be achieved in the 
peace process, any internally-supported Palestinian faction needed to be included, not the 
opposite; according to Michael Docherty, the European Commission’s Europe Aid Geo-
Coordinator Palestine (AIDCO) the EU’s position towards Hamas in 2006 was a mistake.671  
Against these views, and finding itself in a corner, isolated, besieged and with nothing to 
lose, Hamas set out to act in accordance with its theoretical convictions, not essentially 
through politics.  Because of its approach, the EU forfeited a significant diplomatic channel, 
replacing it by providing huge support to the Fatah movement and to the Presidency of the 
PA, represented by Abbas whose party had lost the elections as well as their monopoly over 
the leadership of the Palestinians. Even though Marc Otte, the EU’s former Special 
Representative to the ME peace process, had expressed his point of view on the necessity of 
dealing with the Hamas-led government but the EU’s realistic approach had overcome its 
normative foundations and objectives. Some weeks after Hamas had been elected, Otte stated 
in a private meeting with Saeb Erekat, head of the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs 
                                                          
668
 EU, '62nd Interparliamentary Meeting between the European Parliament and the United States Congress and 
Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (Tld) ', in European Parliament (ed.), (Charleston (South Carolina) and 
Washington D.C., 1-5 December 2006). 
669
 Author's Interview, 'Anonymous/EEAS/Policy Adviser', (Brussels, 22 June 2012). 
670
 Author's Interview, 'Usama Hamdan', (Turkey, 15 December 2012). 
671
 Author's Interview, 'Michael Docherty', European Commission EuropeAid - Geo- Coordinator-Palestine 
(AIDCO) (Brussels, 1
st
 June 2012). 
171 
 
Department, that “the EU has to deal with the reality of a Hamas-led government. EU must 
prevent the unravelling of institutions and works in which it has invested.”672 Clearly, his 
initial view, as well as the logic of ‘responsible behaviour’, had been put aside, with the EU 
opting to boycott the Hamas-led government until it fulfilled the Quartet’s conditions as set 
out in its statements. 
Proscription was not the only policy pursued by the EU but it resorted implicitly to 
incitement against the democratically-elected body.  Indeed, turning its back on democracy 
outcomes per se was a big mistake made by the EU,
673
 but incitement against the Hamas-led 
government was one of the EU’s realistic tendencies, as could also be deduced from its 
discourse. Astonishingly, in December 2006 following the formation of the Hamas-led 
government, Solana asked President Abbas to take whatever steps were necessary to bring the 
Palestinian people out of the bottleneck after he had failed his ‘impossible’ mission of 
forming a national government with Hamas. The EUHR was clear about pushing Abbas to 
take ‘difficult decisions’ and assuring him that he could count on the EU’s support. As Solana 
said,       
The President [Abbas] has made tremendous efforts to form a government of 
national unity. This has been very difficult, impossible, and therefore the 
President now has to take some difficult decision and, in those decisions, I can 
tell you clearly, you can count on our support’.674 
From this kind of discourse, which holds essentially non-normative goals, the role of the EU 
in hardening the internal Palestinian situation could be seen. According to Ahmed Yousef, 
the EU and the US remained the prime movers against the democratically-elected 
government and contributed to the creation of the rupture between Fatah and Hamas; this led 
to the failure of the eleventh government (of National Unity) and the descent into the morass 
of infighting.
675
 There was no attempt to wait patiently to see whether or not the Hamas-led 
government could succeed in the long term in bringing stability and peace to the region. 
Instead, this government from its formation underwent sanctions, destabilization, and 
incitement from the international community, including the EU. This is proof of the West’s 
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so-called “schizophrenic attitude towards democracy promotion”,676 and it calls into question 
the credibility of the Democracy Advocates.
677
 
Gazi Hamad spoke of being very surprised, when the EU-Quartet conditions were announced, 
about the remarkably short time granted to Hamas to adapt itself to the new era. He had been 
in Europe in the aftermath of the electoral triumph of Hamas in 2006, trying to assess 
Hamas’s new position and the time it would need to adjust its discourse and its policies. As 
he pointed out, any adaptation process should have been done without the sword of the EU-
Quartet’s three conditions hanging over the head of Hamas. Conditionality had undeniably 
complicated any adjustments that could have happened, and had hardened the political 
situation to an extreme extent.
 678
   
And as is also discussed in this chapter, despite the negative ultimate objective of Saeb Erekat 
(head of negotiations in the PLO) with the EU towards Hamas, he considered that failing to 
give Hamas a chance to govern would be “a strategic mistake”, because, in this case, it would 
mean that Hamas would not itself fail but would be made to fail by Fatah and its international 
ally;679 a matter that would increase the political balance in favour of Hamas. Furthermore, 
according to Ioannis Kasoulides, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the EP, as 
well as MEPs Ivo Vajgl,
680
 and Kyriacos Triantaphyllides,
681
  boycotting the democratically-
elected Hamas in 2006 had been a slip-up; “it was an opportunity which we lost and the EU 
should have given Hamas a chance and the latter might have changed bit by bit as has 
happened with the PLO itself.” 682 According to Tabraz, this triumphant movement should 
have granted an opportunity to prove whether it would be a boon or bane for the political 
process in the region.
683
 In other words, abandoning the Wait-and-See approach in favour of 
imposing sanctions and conditions had worsened the conflict in Palestine, and amongst the 
victims of EU policy had increased feelings of being betrayed by this power that had spent 
money, time and effort to convince the Palestinian leadership of the need for democracy and 
electoral representatives. 
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It is worth noting that, after years of boycotting the Hamas-led government in Gaza, and the 
severe humanitarian consequences of that policy, the EU’s recent opinion is that Hamas 
cannot be ignored and “will have to be part of the solution” in the future.684 This also 
confirms that the policy, as pursued, has not succeeded either in bringing Hamas to the EU 
circle or even to achieving a solution without it. The exit strategy from the cage in which the 
EU now finds itself will be to reconsider its statements, and for the EP to take the lead in this 
regard. However, as suggested by a European official,
685
 MEPs could also approach their 
Hamas counterparts in the PLC, as they did with their counterparts in the era of dictatorships 
like that of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, if this happens it will breach the wall of 
fear which the EU has built around itself because of its relations with the US and Israel. 
However, what prevents the MEPs from doing so, according to Ilan Pappe, is electoral 
calculations and the self-interest of those who wish to be re-elected to the EP or to domestic 
parliaments.
686
      
Paradox No. 2: Human Rights Double-Standard Test  
The EU has not complied with its own stated values and norms in the POT. Fundamentally, 
one of the normative goals of the EU’s FP in the world is the enforcement of human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law.
687
 For this purpose, it has included a special article in most of 
its agreements with other countries under the ENP umbrella. Amongst these countries has 
been Israel which signed the Action Plan Agreement with the EU in the year 2000. The 
Agreement is largely restricted to the implementation of human rights and, as stated in its 
Article Two, should this commitment be breached all its provisions would be subject to 
revision. According to Article Two, “relations between the Parties, as well as all the 
provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic 
principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential 
element of this Agreement”.688 Accordingly, in the light of human rights reports, including 
those issued by the EU institutions themselves, EU-Israeli relations should have been revised 
and appropriate measures taken. Nevertheless, instead of actions it seems to have been 
sufficient to deliver words, which have changed nothing in Israel’s policies against 
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Palestinian human rights and the IHL.
689
 As the MEP Kyriacos Triantaphyllides confirms, it 
is not enough for the EU to say ‘No’ to the Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza; it 
should employ its resources in making Israel respect the IHL.
690
 
Despite the obvious cases that have been investigated internationally, Israel has been 
consistently tolerated by the EU, and has not in practice been accused of, or sanctioned for, 
its violation of Palestinian human rights; on the contrary, relations have been fostered and 
strengthened at all levels. According to the principles of the EU sanctions policy,  
[The EU is] committed to the effective use of sanctions as an important way to 
maintain and restore international peace and security in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter and of our common foreign and security policy. In 
this context, the Council will work continuously to support the UN and fulfil our 
obligations under the UN Charter.
691
 
Yet the EU has many relations with Israel and according to Margrete Auken, should pressure 
it to stop its violations of human rights and to adjust its policies in accordance with IHL.
 692
  
However, while such voices may be heard amongst EU staff, others confirm that sanctioning 
Israel or pressuring it will result in the EU being excluded from engagement in the political 
process in the ME,
693
 or will even cause the process to be suspended, so that ultimately 
nothing at all will have been achieved.
694
 Ironically, the sanctions imposed by the EU against 
Iran have not prevented it subsequently from engaging in negotiations with the Iranians about 
their nuclear programme. It could be said that the EU’s fears about imposing sanctions on 
Israel are not justifiable in light of its sanctions against Iran or Syria and other countries in 
the world. Whereas the MEP Ioannis Kasoulides has supported the notion of imposing 
sanctions on these countries he firmly refutes the idea of applying the same procedures 
against Israel because, if imposed, these sanctions would be replaced by the US thus making 
the whole procedure meaningless.
695
 If this logic was sound, sanctions should not have been 
imposed on Syria in 2012 because Russia and Iran then supported the regime, both the 
militarily and financially.    
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By the same token, even if sanctions on Israel were found to be a good idea, it would be 
impossible, according to the interviewee from EEAS, to secure the unanimity of the 27 
member states of the EU for such a procedure.
696
 While this, as an abstract idea, is true from 
one side, on the other it does not absolve Europe from its collective responsibility towards 
respecting the implications of the Action Plan agreed with Israel. In the opinion of MEP 
Jarmo Oikarinen, the problem of the Action Plan between the EU and Israel is that, in the 
event of procedures being breached no specific mechanism is in place to deal with such 
situations.
697
 In fact, there are two reasons why, fundamentally, this justification does not 
reflect reality; first, because if the human rights pillar itself, as a basis of the agreement, were 
to collapse the EU, as implicitly understood, would have to undertake a serious revision 
process; so far no such situation has occurred. Secondly, this action is recognized in principle 
in the EU treaties themselves, to the effect that, 
Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted 
according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the 
common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to 
interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or 
more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures. The 
Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.
698
 
The absence of any intention towards sanctioning Israel economically, either partly or fully, 
as Article 228a quoted above suggests in such cases, has been clarified by MEP Kyriacos 
Triantaphyllides who said that as well as being rather a meaningless procedure because the 
US stands behind Israel,   
Sanctions are not always the best route [to take]; however, the goal could be 
achieved by persuasion through strong argument rather than sanctions. If you 
look at your opponent, let’s say a proud nation that has its own perspectives for 
the future, you do not try to diminish their pride by imposing sanctions. On the 
contrary, you should try to apply to this pride and face, which your opponent 
wants to have for himself in addition to the picture that portrays him, and 
thereby you should try to influence him.
699
 
Although this soft logic might be considered attractive, it reflects the EU’s bias towards one 
party rather the other in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas Israeli pride is respected by the 
EU, Palestinian pride was not taken into account when the Hamas movement was categorized 
as a terrorist organization, nor later when sanctions were imposed on its government in 2006, 
with all the unfortunate results that followed. The EU had evidently turned its back on a 
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signed agreement about human rights when this related to Israel, while making use of this 
discourse in other international cases; a matter which has affected the credibility of the EU in 
the world.
700
  
Various violations of Palestinian human rights at the hands of the IO have been underscored 
by the EU institutions but without appropriate EU reaction. According to their reports, Israel 
has systematically resorted to tightening living conditions at all levels for the Palestinians.
701
 
The people under occupation are Israel’s responsibility, and in this regard Israel should have 
behaved in compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention;
702
 however, it remains 
complacent about violating the organizational regulations of the situations of people under 
occupation. International regulations stipulate that, in the case of occupation, “starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited”, as are all kinds of attacking or destroying 
“indispensable objects to the survival of the civilian population”, regardless of what the 
motive might be.703 In fact, Israeli behaviour throughout the conflict has failed to respect any 
of these prohibitions.  
From the perspective of the MEP Paul Murphy, the EU and the US did not react adequately 
because they never do unless their own interests are threatened–which is a realistic 
illustration of the nature of such superpowers in the world.
704
 According to an interviewee 
from the EEAS, the EU does a lot behind the scenes; however Israel does not listen.
705
 Closed 
meetings took place between specialized delegations and were intended for discussing 
relations between the EU and Israel, according to the Action Plan that had been signed 
between them. However, such unlawful Israeli obstinacy would be taken care of through 
more dialogue with the occupying authority, in deference to its powerful status, whereas the 
political stubbornness of Hamas, as the weak party in the conflict, was dealt with by 
sanctions, and boycott, again confirming the double standards applied by EU policy in this 
regard.     
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Although such devastating policies have escalated to the level of war crimes (e.g., the ‘Cast 
Lead’ operation in 2008-09),706 the EU found it sufficient to launch verbal condemnations 
only,
707
 and the Israeli state was merely urged “not to resort to disproportionate action, to 
avoid the destruction of civilian infrastructure.
708
 On another occasion, when Israel targeted 
the only power station in Gaza in June 2006,
709
 the EU stressed that “everything must be 
done to prevent humanitarian situation from worsening”. It was enough to call for an urgent 
move to restore power for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians whose homes no longer had 
electricity.
710
  
In addition to targeting this vital resource of life for Gaza’s people, Israeli violence was also 
aimed at schools, hospitals, agricultural lands and civilian neighbourhoods, but needless to 
say was not regarded as terrorism by the EU, whereas the Hamas rockets fired into Israel 
were always considered as such, even though they left no significant casualties compared to 
the casualties amongst Palestinians; they were sharply and loudly condemned but no attempt 
was made to understand the motives behind such Palestinian behaviour. Yet, the violations of 
Palestinian human rights, which have constituted severe examples of internationally-
prohibited violence, have failed to convince the EU to revisit its relations with Israel, based 
on its own normative and declared foreign policy goals.        
The discourse used by the EU is characterized by the language of inducement rather than the 
language of sanctions and threats. Therefore, observers have found no indicator of threats or 
anger against Israel in the EU’s documents, whereas this is extensively found in the 
Palestinian case. Accordingly, the EU “urges” Israel, has to “persuade”711 Israel, expresses 
“its urgent concern”712 about humanitarian conditions for example in Gaza, and “calls on”713 
Israel to allow aid to reach the people. Significantly, the EU’s use of these indulgent words 
and phrases in its reaction to the humanitarian plight of the Palestinians indicates how 
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different it could have been in the opposite circumstances. Had the Israelis been suffering 
from violations of human rights by Palestinians, the EU’s reaction would undoubtedly have 
been quite different. To put it in another way, when the victims were Israelis, the EU 
discourse was firm and clear, contrary to the case if Palestinians were/are the victims, as 
noted above: “The Union must continue to PRESS [my emphasis] the Palestinian Authority 
to take concrete steps to arrest and bring to justice those who commit terrorist acts.” 714 
Significantly, when the matter relates to Israeli security, ‘Pressure on the PA’ is the 
appropriate expression to use in this context according to the EU, not the policy of 
‘Persuasion’715 that is used with the Israelis. However, the EU’s pressure-policy had many 
degrees of intensity, ranging from political strain to financial compression in order to push 
the PA forward to fight effectively against those who were called terrorists, “even though this 
will probably done be at the expense of further democratisation of Palestinian society.”716 
Thus, the contradictory policies that were implemented – the persuasion-policy versus the 
pressure-policy – reflected the reality of the EU’s prejudiced positions when the identities of 
victims or perpetrators were different. Accordingly, the EU’s response to Israeli human rights 
violations, and its insistence on sanctioning Hamas but not Israel at the same level, can be 
understood as being in accordance with the neorealist school of thought; “when taking action 
is cheap, that is, when the target is a weak or isolated state with limited or no capacity to 
reciprocate, sanctions are imposed.”717 This affirms the EU’s inconsistency in implementing 
its sanctions policy on one party in the conflict but not the other, for reasons that cannot be 
justified.   
Paradox No. 3: Bypassing Democratically-Elected Hamas Supporting Emergency Status  
The EU and its partners determined that the Hamas-led government had two choices; change 
or failure. However, from the EU’s point of view, if Hamas did not change its agenda and 
convictions, it should be stifled into giving up. In the EU’s discourse, it preferred a ‘Hamas-
to-change’ approach, rather than a ‘getting-Hamas-to-fail’ approach but this had to be 
achieved at lightning speed. Unlike the US which, as Marc Otte emphasised, favoured the 
second approach, the EU “[would] encourage Hamas to change” and would find a way to deal 
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with the situation accordingly.
718
 Hence, the EU confirmed that its aim “[was] not to bring 
about the failure of the Hamas government, but to persuade it to accept [its] criteria.”719 
Paradoxically, while the EU’s attempt to persuade Israel to lessen its iron grip on Palestinians 
was by giving advice, its method of convincing Hamas to change was by imposing sanctions 
and threats. This way of dealing with Hamas meant the EU had no choice but to accept what 
the Quartet required for Hamas, or alternatively, to let Hamas be brought to its knees under 
international sanctions. The EU position was clearly illustrated by Solana when he stressed 
that the EU “does not want in principle to see the Hamas government fail”; nevertheless, in 
order to be “regarded as a fully-fledged political entity”, Hamas was expected to abide by the 
Quartet’s demands, as well as proving its commitment to the rule of law, democratic 
principles, and the diversity of the Palestinian society.
720
 Whereas the political conditions 
were genuine, in light of the EU’s policy with the PA in Ramallah and the authoritarian 
regimes in the wider ME, the rest of the demands relating to internal Palestinian issues were 
scarcely to be believed. Thus, the awaited change was related to the peace process and thereby 
to Israel; otherwise a Hamas-led government would face dire consequences.     
Despite efforts to adjust its discourse according to the new situation, Hamas was asked to 
adopt embarrassing political requirements without being given sufficient time to prove its 
“responsible behaviour” in these new circumstances.721 Indeed, the EU was convinced that 
Hamas could not change its past but could change its future;
722
 therefore, the Europeans 
counted on their sanctions to bring Hamas to the ‘house of obedience’. When Hamas took its 
decision not to change on the basis of the Quartet’s coercive conditions, the only EU response 
was to pursue the ‘getting-Hamas-to-fail’ approach instead. Hence, the EU and the US both 
perceived Hamas’s electoral victory as one of their own errors that should not have occurred. 
But since this had happened, they had to regain the initiative and influence the Hamas-led 
government so that it would fail, lest others in the region might follow its political path; it 
“must be seen to fail”.723 Therefore, every effort was exerted to guarantee one or other of the 
two choices; accept failure or undergo change. In this regard, the EU and other international 
entities used the power of sanctions and political pressure, while the military pressure on 
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Hamas was left to Israel. In similar vein, some of the Palestinian security forces took the 
initiative to put spokes in the government wheels, for the purpose of pushing it to fail.  
In their attempts to lessen the consequences of the siege on the Hamas-led government and 
the severe socio-political situation in Palestine, Hamas and Fatah reached a common 
understanding to bypass the crisis that had emerged. This settlement, known as the Mecca 
Agreement, was mediated by Saudi Arabia on 8
 
February 2007 and was based on a 
previously-agreed statement, finalised on 25 June 2006, called the ‘Prisoners Document’. 
Significantly, Hamas showed “unprecedented flexibility” over both settlements;724 this was 
seen as a move towards fulfilling the international conditions. Hamas had agreed to respect 
the previously-signed agreements between the PLO and Israel, and authorised the PLO to 
negotiate with Israel, with the proviso that any final agreement would have to be approved by 
the Palestinian people in a public referendum.  
Given this progress, a National Unity Government (NUG) was established, consisting of 
members from the main Palestinian factions and led by Hamas. While the EU was ready to 
deal with the independent members of the government, it refused to open diplomatic channels 
through those who belonged to Hamas. Thus, despite the flexibility shown by Hamas and the 
new common political programme between it and Fatah, the EU, backed by the Quartet, 
insisted on the same political demands being loudly and clearly spoken. Although this 
represented a good opening for the EU to rebuild its position towards Hamas, it failed to 
benefit from the opportunity.
725
 Apparently, the EU followed the US position regarding this 
government, and did not seize the chance to move forward and build on what had been 
achieved.
726
                
Israel’s attitude to Hamas as well as the EU and the leadership of the PA was clear enough 
from the beginning. Like the EU, Israel sought to get Hamas to fail, but in addition it 
remained in contact with the Palestinian security sector, represented by those who were loyal 
to the Presidency of the PA. According to the Israeli delegation to the security meeting with 
the PA, the US, and other regional security parties, following the formation of the Hamas-led 
National Unity Government in March 2007,     
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If Hamas, supported by its Shiite sponsors (Iran and Hezbollah), makes gains, it 
[would] have a great impact on the ME. Therefore, these regional powers are the 
key to solving the challenge, since Hamas gets money, weapons and political 
support from these powers. If we fail, we put the future of our children at 
stake.
727  
Therefore, these partners perceived the failure of Hamas as a common goal, due to the unique 
entity that the Hamas movement might become in the event of its success in the leadership of 
the PA and its impact in the wider ME. Over the period of a year, some of the Palestinian 
security forces, led by Mohammad Dahlan and Abu Shaback, had significantly failed to 
topple the Hamas-led government, despite fabricating a variety of crises, including, inter alia, 
military clashes with Hamas forces; it was this matter that led to the division between the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in June 2007. Notwithstanding, and with the aim of isolating 
Hamas’s agenda and ideology, the PA continued these attempts to achieve a political 
breakthrough in the negotiations with Israel. In its attempt to convince the EU of the need to 
make genuine efforts in this direction, the PA’s objective went beyond a Hamas failure in the 
Gaza Strip. According to Saeb Erekat, the PLO’s Head of Negotiations, in a confidential 
memorandum, “If Hamas fails in Gaza the whole Brotherhood movement in the Arab world 
will fail. They have to fail. If we come with a good peace agreement, people in Gaza will 
revolt against Hamas. They will be finished.”728 
Hence, not only would Hamas fail but so would the entire Muslim Brotherhood, through 
politics and not just through the sanctions regarded as necessary by the PA. Therefore, in this 
respect all the political partners perceived the end of the Hamas-led government in their own 
way, and although having different means, they have all had the same purpose. Contrary to 
the democratic logic sustained by the EU over time, the outcomes of democracy as 
represented in Hamas should have been seen as failing in the running of the PA, a matter 
which contradicts the principle of the rule of law as a supposed impelling value for the EU 
sanctions that were imposed on Hamas.    
In such a context, the EU has had no option but to keep on supporting Abbas so that he can be 
used in getting the peace process-based solution on track without the need to pass through 
Hamas. This has been reaffirmed by the Council of the European Union several times, 
emphasizing the crucial role of Abbas in “ensuring stability” in the region by pursuing “a 
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peaceful solution of the conflict with Israel.”729 Accordingly, based on the principle of non-
engagement with Hamas, the EU has shown strong support to Abbas in his stand 
contradicting the choice of Hamas.730 Under the financial and political pressure exerted on 
Hamas by the EU-Quartet, the internal situation of the Palestinians sank into the gutter until 
Hamas ended the exceptional confrontation with the PA security forces which were loyal to 
Abbas in Gaza. However, during this exceptional disputation between the two parties, 
hundreds of people on both sides were killed in the clashes, and in-house security was 
minimal. Indeed, as Carolin Goerzig argues, the EU had a stake in the polarization between 
Fatah and Hamas through its policies against the latter.731 Eventually, the decisive actions of 
Hamas were faced with exceptional presidential reactions in Ramallah, ending with the 
dismissal of Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas Prime Minister, and the declaration of a state of 
emergency on 14 June 2007; the formation of an emergency government led by Salam Fayyad 
followed on 17 June 2007.
732
        
Colonial EU Attitude or Not: Paradoxical Discourse  
Oblivious to the democratic outcomes and the reconciliation agreement between Hamas and 
Fatah in Mecca, and the subsequent National Unity Government in March 2007, the EU 
remained enslaved by its previous attitude towards Palestinian democracy, systematically 
making the same demands on Hamas, and boycotting its members in the new Palestinian 
government while talking to independent figures and Fatah members.
733
 Despite the progress 
that had been achieved in the manifesto of the new government as previously mentioned, the 
international position did not change, eventually reaching the point of declaring the state of 
emergency and the subsequent emergency government. Significantly, the Hamas-led 
government continued to function in the Gaza Strip, on the basis of the results of the 
democratic elections in 2006, and ignoring the declaration of emergency status and the 
Presidential decisions against its leadership, while Salam Fayyad led an emergency 
government sustained by President Abbas and the Fatah movement. The EU, as represented 
in the Council and the Parliament alike, immediately condemned Hamas for its actions in 
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Gaza and its subsequent seizing of the Strip,734 while putting its weight behind Abbas and his 
government, and supporting both the state of emergency and the emergency government, 
deactivating the logic of the rule of law as one of the EU’s inspiring presumed norms.735  
After the political and geographical divide that had resulted from the external and internal 
pressures imposed on the Hamas movement, the EU realized that the new situation would 
jeopardise all its investments in the PA, led by Fatah, and that the PA should have been 
supported regardless of what democracy might have said. Therefore, it resumed its direct 
financial and political support to the PA’s emergency government in Ramallah, and started to 
draw the international community together to sustain it thereafter as a permanent government 
in the face of Hamas in Gaza. Thus, the EU censured Hamas and understandably adopted 
Fatah’s points of view and attitudes towards the conflict between the two parties. Indeed, in 
full accord with Solana’s previously-mentioned address regarding incitement against Hamas, 
the EU behaved as if it was desperate to see an end to Hamas’s leadership of the PA 
government. In her interpretation of this behaviour, the MEP Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck 
claims that the EU had been very scared of having Hamas in government and was relieved 
when they saw other Palestinians forming a government without Hamas.
736
 It had therefore 
lifted all the restrictions imposed in the era of the Hamas-led government and had resumed its 
support for Fayyad’s government, even though the latter was not covered legitimately by the 
PLC. This is why the EU has been accused of being a supporter of authoritarian regimes 
regardless of the democracy outcomes under such regimes.
737
    
It was obvious that the EU had again turned its back on Palestinian democracy when it 
supported someone in the Palestinian government who had gained just three seats in the 2006 
PLC elections, in which Hamas gained 74 seats. When Marc Otte was asked how the EU had 
accepted this coup against democracy, represented in the nominating of Salam Fayyad, 
supported by the minority in the PLC, he remarked that 
Regardless of the democratic elections results, it is not the EU’s business to go and 
solve this dispute over the legitimacy of a government. It is an internal Palestinian 
affair, and we are not a colonial state to impose this attitude; it is not our business to 
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go and dictate to another party how they should compose their government.
738 
Paradoxically, it is not the EU business to dictate the legitimacy of Fayyad’s government 
because, as Otte said, the EU is not a colonial state. From the points of view of other MEPs, 
the EU is a soft power and it cannot impose specific policies on others in the world.
739
 If that 
is so, then what could be said about the EU’s intervention in the Hamas-led government in 
2006 and the subsequent National Unity Government in 2007? And what could be said about 
the EU interventions, not only in the configuration of these governments but also in their 
political manifestos, clearly aimed at trying to impose particular political attitudes on Hamas 
and its partners. In spite of the agreement between Fatah and Hamas that was supported by all 
the Palestinian factions in the Mecca Agreement in February 2007, why did the EU, as “the 
presumed soft power”,740 insist on refusing all the agreed formulas? Further, what could be 
said about the boycott and the siege imposed on these governments – was this not a colonial 
policy against the will of the people? It is obvious that more than anything, these are colonial 
policies.    
Nevertheless, democratic elections were one of the EU pressing demands requested by the 
EU from the PA leadership in the framework of its perception of the reform, including 
achieving the rule of law, in Palestine. As previously explained in this research, the 
emergency government and the subsequent one launched by Abbas without the PLC’s 
approval are very expressive in this regard about the EU’s double-standards policy. As MEP 
Paul Murphy remarks, this double-standard policy reflected the EU’s “imperial” attitude; 
“those who talk about democracy are not really democrats.”741 The outcomes of Palestinian 
democracy should have been recognized after it had brought Hamas to power because the 
subsequent EU dilemmas have stemmed from this basic fault. All that can be said thereafter 
about the EU’s inconsistencies is linked to that initial error, as confirmed by a policy analyst 
from the EP who preferred not to be named.
742
 Hence, the support granted to the emergency 
status and government emanated from that context, which was full of contradictions. 
Fayyad has first and foremost admired the EU for his security achievements in the West 
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Bank, for which he specifically received direct political and financial support;
743
 this explains 
the EU’s perception of the PA’s highly-appreciated security role at the expense of democracy 
and human rights. It is believed that the EU’s perception of stability promotion on its 
boundaries is built upon the need to reshape the ME through solving the key factor for 
tension in the region, i.e., the Arab-Israeli conflict.
744
 Whereas this could have not been 
achieved by the EU giving support to Hamas, perceived by the EU as an example of 
instability even if it had come to power democratically, the EU’s objective of maintaining 
stability in its own backyard would be promoted by supporting Fayyad’s government, even if 
he had been not democratically nominated for his position. As others believe,
745
 this again 
proves the nature of the EU’s Mediterranean FP, which in the first place is built on a self-
interests determinant rather than on values, as might be claimed.   
Conclusion 
Inconsistences of the EU’s discourse and practice towards the Hamas dossier in the context of 
Palestinian democracy have been obvious. Its motivations are not its norms and values as it 
claims; on the contrary, in this regard the EU’s realistic tendency has been the driving power 
of its policy. As Klaus Brummer also concludes, “although norms and values play a role in 
the EU’s sanctions policy, more often than not they are upstaged by security and economic 
interests.”746 Apart from putting Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations because of its 
resistance, the EU worked side by side with the PA, calling on it to dismantle the Hamas 
network  and then to contain the movement through the process of public elections. It counted 
on democracy as a way to contain Hamas violence; however, this did not work with Hamas 
since contrary to the EU’s calculations, Hamas achieved significant results that enabled it to 
take the lead in the government of the PA and the PLC. Accordingly, the government was 
faced with sanctions and political conditions from the EU and its partners, in an attempt to 
compel the Hamas-led government to make concessions that favour Israel’s security.  
In theory, however, the EU’s anticipated behaviour was to stand for its commitment to the 
norms and values it had previously declared and to give the new democratically-elected body 
the chance to prove its ‘responsible behaviour’ amongst Palestinians. With the EU having 
turned its back on this fact, the subsequent deterioration in Palestinian human rights resulting 
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from the sanctions imposed by Israel and the Western alliance should have convinced the EU 
of the need to activate its expertise by making Israel respect the IHL and to reconsider the 
procedures it had pursued after 2006. Instead, it opted to follow a double-standard policy in 
this regard, dropping the wait-and-see approach in favour of the top-down method based on 
commands, conditions and pressure rather than on persuasion and dialogue. This mechanism, 
constructed of preconceptions and fixed and constant resolutions, confirms the realistic 
tendency ingrained within the European psyche towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict rather 
than the opposite normative trends.     
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Chapter Six: Resistance -Terrorism Debate in the EU-Hamas Context: Clash of Visions 
 
Yes, there are circumstances in which [TERRORISM] is justifiable, and yes, there 
are circumstances in which it is effective. The importance for me is that the South 
African example proved something remarkable: the apartheid regime looked like a 
regime that would last forever, and it was blown down. It is hard to argue that, on 
its own, a political struggle would have delivered. The striking at the heart of a 
regime’s claim on a monopoly of power, which the ANC’s armed wing represented, 
was very significant.
747
 
             David Miliband 
                                                                                 
 
This chapter scrutinizes controversial concepts; particularly terrorism and resistance in the 
EU-Hamas context, which constitute the main axis around which both actors are still at 
variance. Palestinian armed resistance against the Israeli Occupation (IO), as perceived by 
Hamas, holds the same meaning as the notion of terrorism perceived by the EU in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. However, the main argument of this chapter is built on the idea that these 
two divergent perceptions have interactively contradicted, producing the conflicting socio-
political relations which have governed the two parties over the past decade or so. In light of 
the realist-constructivist debate, the contradictory behaviour in EU policy, in terms of what 
should and should not have been considered terrorism, is socio-politically constructed and 
built on identities and an interests-based vision towards the conflict in Palestine, not 
essentially on the norms and values previously declared by the EU.  
The researcher has attempted to demonstrate that, if breached by one party in the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) would receive different ideologically-
motivated reactions from the EU if the same violation occurred through another party. This 
indicates that the identity of the actor has become the significant factor through which the EU 
has dealt with definitions of terrorism and resistance, and thereby adopted its policies towards 
Hamas in the above-mentioned context.   
Accordingly, the apparent paradoxes and inconsistences in the EU discourse concerning this 
debate will be highlighted, and the violence of both Israel and Hamas, along with the EU’s 
reactions, will be scrutinised. An important area that needs to be discussed is Hamas’s 
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‘resistance dogma’ and its perception of terrorism. In light of IHL, the Palestinians’ right of 
resistance against the IO and the way this has been perceived by the EU will be compared 
with the EU’s recognition of the Israeli right of self-defence. Therefore, the case of the 
abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit along with the EU’s reaction will be examined to 
observe and compare the different reactions towards cases of Palestinian prisoners 
languishing in Israeli jails. In this regard, and after shedding some light on the Israeli 
discourse against Palestinians, compared to the Hamas discourse against the Israelis, the 
realistic tendency of the EU’s inconsistences will be clearly examined along with the EU’s 
response in these two specific cases.       
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Section One: Imbalanced EU Discourse 
 
The EU’s myopic policy towards Israel versus its open-eyed policy towards Hamas is 
investigated in this section. Here I will illustrate the nature of the rhetoric that the EU adopts 
in dealing with the two parties of the conflict in Palestine.  
A Debatable or Fixed Concept: Politicizing the Definition of Terrorism  
Terrorism is a controversial topic amongst international and regional organizations, as well as 
being a debatable concept amongst interdisciplinary scholars.
748
 It is one of the rare concepts 
in IR that so far has not been agreed across the world; therefore, researchers in this field will 
find more than a hundred definitions, all of which include common elements although 
differing dramatically in others.
749
 Significantly, the main common denominator among these 
elements and definitions relates to the far-reaching psychological effects beyond the direct 
targets of such criminal behaviour.
750
 Many of the international and regional conventions that 
tackle this issue have been approved, but essentially no precise definition has been adopted. 
In fact, these treaties have given descriptions of the acts of terrorism, and measures for 
fighting such acts around the world, while its exact characterisation remains in dispute. 
Disagreements spring from the various perceptions of this phenomenon among different 
cultures and backgrounds.
751
 However, this has not prevented regional organizations from 
agreeing on a specific designation for terrorism that is usually compatible with the socio-
political culture of actors themselves.  
Significantly, two major obstacles have prevented the UN General Assembly from reaching 
an agreement on the definition of terrorism, but this has not affected the spirit of cooperation 
amongst the member states. As Myra Williamson argues, when commenting on the gap 
between different perceptions of this concept, “the difficulties [in the agreement] arose over 
the extent to which states and their military forces should be excluded from the 
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[convention’s] provisions.”752 Some of the UNGA’s hegemonic countries have insisted on 
keeping a ‘state’s acts’ within conflicts from being considered when terrorism is discussed, 
whereas others perceive that state actors or non-state actors are both among those entities and 
should be under the same umbrella if an investigation has to be undertaken.
753
 The second 
main problem impeding agreement amongst UNGA member states is the need to exclude 
those who exercise their right to fight against occupation or colonization from being 
incorporated into the definition of terrorism. However, while one party considers that any 
kind of fighting perpetrated by armed groups against the injustices they experience under 
occupation or colonization is not part of the proscribed terrorist acts, the other party does not 
agree about these exclusions even if relevant to those previously mentioned.
754
 In the main, 
this division in the perceptions of the UN’s member states has not barred different kinds of 
cooperation amongst them; on the contrary, they have agreed on many policies in this regard 
based on the principle that ‘we cooperate as we have agreed upon’.  
In light of the above-mentioned debate, regional organizations have built their own policies in 
fighting terrorism that are compatible with their identities, perceptions, interests, and even 
alliances. For example, in 1999 the Organization of the Islamic Conference
755
 adopted a 
Convention Combating International Terrorism, the preamble to which excluded the right of 
resistance to all kinds of occupation and colonization. This was fully compatible with the 
situation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
756
 By the same token, the Council of Europe,
757
 
for well-known reasons pertaining to Israel and to the European states that contributed to the 
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the UK, has not excluded the right of resistance 
from its definition of terrorism, and in this regard has not highlighted the role of state or non-
state actors.
758
 In fact, it is believed by European legislators that the behaviour of states is 
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already dealt with in other international conventions that formulate specialised legislative 
conventions about terrorism for non-state actors. Thus, the difference between terrorism and 
the right of self-determination lies at the very core of the international debate, and is a matter 
that has had serious consequences for EU politics, as well as for other global entities. Yet in 
this context, the question remains as to whether the EU has adopted its own definition that is 
consistent with IHL as well as with the norms and values that it has embraced as the 
motivation for its FP.                    
The EU has undoubtedly been highly committed to maintaining the basic norms and values 
experienced by its peoples over decades since the Second World War. Thus, legislation 
concerning terrorism has been adopted largely with the intention of keeping their lives 
peaceful and neither threatened nor disturbed by enemies. Given this context, laws have been 
drawn up for tackling terrorism. For 24 years following the adoption of the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 1977 by the Council of Europe, the EU was 
party to a number of international conventions directed against organized crime, along with 
other treaties focused on maintaining global peace and security. However, the Council did not 
give a specific definition of terrorism as much as it adopted descriptions of specific acts that 
should have been regarded as acts of terrorism to be banned and resisted. 
Following the attacks on US targets on 11 September 2001, the terrorism debate was 
highlighted with the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution demanding that all the 
UN’s member states should double their efforts in fighting and pursuing all forms of 
terrorism, and take tangible procedures in this regard.
759
 Accordingly, the EU felt the need to 
improve the 1977 Convention and to build a new strategy appropriate for the post-9/11 
threats. A new European pact was therefore approved after 2002, and a new European 
Framework on Combating Terrorism was drawn up. This identified a number of acts and 
terrorist crimes that all member states, cooperating fully with each other, needed to fight 
through domestic legislation. 
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The significance of such an agreement lies in the details it provides to emphasize the types of 
terrorist behaviour that can affect people’s dignity and status. Thus, according to the 
framework, all acts committed with one of the following aims are deemed to be terrorism;
760
  
- Seriously intimidating a population.  
- Unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain 
from performing any act.  
- Seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic 
or social structures of a country or an international organisation. 
The following offences are also included among terrorist infractions, as enshrined in the 
strategy;   
(a) Attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death. 
(b) Attacks upon the physical integrity of a person. 
(c) Kidnapping or hostage taking. 
(d) Causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an 
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the 
continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or 
result in major economic loss. 
(e) Seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport. 
(f) Seizure of manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, 
explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and 
development of, biological and chemical weapons. 
(g) Release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods. 
(h) Interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental 
natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life. 
(i) Threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).  
This outstanding debate about what could and could not be tolerated, deviated somewhat 
from being normatively motivated when the Council of the EU excluded state actors from 
being susceptible to accusation under the same framework and set of considerations. By 
doing so, the EU mostly designed its rulings against armed groups that were likely to be 
convicted as terrorists in the event of committing one of the violations noted above. 
Therefore, if non-state actors were the perpetrators of such crimes the framework would 
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become applicable; whereas, if perpetrated by states, the latter would escape this 
stigmatization.  
Clearly the preamble to the EU Framework states that “actions by the armed forces of a State 
in the exercise of their official duties (in armed conflicts) are not governed by this 
Framework Decision.”761 This implicitly suggests that armed groups, which neither represent 
a state nor are organized by a state, in a situation of occupation are among those considered 
under this definition, whereas the occupying state itself is not.  In this regard, if the debate 
amongst the UN member states about these issues was taken into consideration, the design of 
the EU framework would specify the underlying reason for its exclusion of state actors. But 
even if the EU decision has been lawfully justified, the colonially-motivated political 
tendency behind it is apparent. Quite simply, the EU representatives do not wish to find 
themselves involved in sanctioning some of the EU’s major states and/or allies like Israel or 
the US, for their violation of the provisions of the Framework. This understanding is based on 
the notion of the need to retain the sole right to use violence in the hands of states.   
Michelle Pace attributes the European stance to the fact that there is “a Western, strongly-
held perception that the Westphalian structure of nation states is the only framework for the 
‘legitimate’ use of violence. The logic followed is that states may practice violence but when 
movements use it, such violence threatens traditional understandings.”762 When Phil Bennion, 
member of a delegation for relations with the PLC, was asked about the reason for not 
accusing Israel of being terrorist, he clearly mentioned that Israel is a state and therefore it is 
difficult to describe its acts as terrorism.
763
 Accordingly, Israeli behaviours and policies, 
violating some or all the above mentioned offences, would never be subject to the definition 
of terrorism or to the same treatment against terrorists, whereas those who fight against 
injustice in Palestine are labelled as such.        
Leaving Disease: Dealing with Symptoms  
Terrorism is a concept that has accompanied the Palestinian factions over the years of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The Fatah movement and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), in addition to other Palestinian groups, had been regarded as terrorist 
organizations that would be subject to boycott and ban by the West; and had been largely 
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dealt with on the basis of this perception. In fact, regardless of being involved in violent 
actions outside or within Palestine, all those who violently expressed resistanceagainst the IO 
were prosecuted and convicted as terrorists in the Western discourse.  
In the West, however, equating violence against the IO with terrorism has been of the reasons 
behind the isolating of Palestinian factions. Hence, the resulting perception by the EU of 
Hamas as a terrorist organization is one of the manifestations of this kind of equation 
between violent resistance and terrorism. Therefore, the EU has made much of its attempts to 
stop the violent Palestinian resistance considering it terrorism, while it has allowed the causes 
of such violence to function without making any genuine efforts to deal with them 
appropriately.           
It is commonly known that, as long as the causes of a disease are left to persist without being 
cured, eradicating the symptoms may have a temporary effect but the disease will probably 
re-emerge. Because the international community refrained from intervening to solve the 
Palestinian problem, the only alternative open to the Palestinians has been active resistance 
until they can achieve their legitimate goals.
764
 Since 1948, the IO has suppressed another 
people without the necessary oversight by international society, which has pushed many 
Palestinian brigades to rely exclusively on their power rather than on the rest of the world.  
As Hamdan confirms, Hamas is one of the factions that has adopted various forms of 
resistance to bring the occupation to its knees.
765
 Remarkably, international society, and the 
EU in particular, have engaged in attacking the symptoms but have left the disease alive; they 
have fought Palestinian violence while, in practice, enabling the IO to flourish. Thus, the EU 
has directed its financial and diplomatic resources towards putting an end to violent 
Palestinian resistance without dealing seriously with its causes. 
Moreover, instead of focusing on eradicating the violence of the occupation itself, the EU is 
blamed for its part in aiding the occupation
766
 by sponsoring the PA’s administrative 
expenditures, which should have been the responsibility of the Israelis. Because of the failure 
of the Oslo Accords, the transition phase that should have led to the Palestinian State instead 
became an open-ended, EU-funded period of time. Therefore, as asserted by an unnamed 
member of the DG External Policies at the European Parliament, although the PA is there, it 
is an undisputed fact that the legal status of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) 
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remains under the IO and subject to its policies, as well as being rigorously controlled by 
it.
767
  
Interestingly, according to IHL,
768
 the Occupation, which should bear its responsibilities in 
this regard, does not pay anything for them; a matter that has transformed the IO into a five-
star occupation in which the hegemonic power confiscates lands and punishes people 
whenever it wants, while another power pays for everything else on the ground. Thus, 
significantly, instead of helping Palestinians, the EU has “taken over the task of the 
occupying power in many aspects”769 by enabling it to continue without considerable 
financial burdens and, at the same time, without being affected politically in terms of ending 
its status as a power of occupation. From the Hamas perspective, the EU’s aid is a straight 
political bribe that is given to the PA to cover “the immoral unholy European-Israeli strategic 
alliance”, and to allow passing the two-state solution in favour of the state of Israel.770 
Accordingly, the EU has not exerted much effort in order to benefit from being the funder on 
the Occupation’s behalf, in affecting the conflict’s political track, but alternatively it put its 
weight behind the PA to stop the Palestinians’ violent resistance.        
Portraying violence in certain forms and then applying this concept to the Palestinians 
without the Israelis is a pragmatic and rational rather than a moral EU policy. Significantly, 
the violence that is portrayed by the EU as terrorism is the violence of the weak party, not the 
strong; it is the violence that is accompanied by blood-shed and casualties on the Israeli side 
at the hands of the Palestinians, whereas the same violence against the Palestinians does not 
attract the same response from the EU. Hence, the legitimate question which continues to be 
valid; why does targeting Israeli civilians or settlers differ from targeting Palestinian civilians 
by besieging them, confiscating their lands, devastating their properties, and uprooting their 
trees and crops, in addition to the daily killings? Why is Palestinian resistance called 
terrorism while the devastating Israeli policies are not?  
When a sample of EU officials was asked this question, most gave generalized answers that 
bypassed the reality; in other words, the position could not be interpreted as anything but a 
policy of double standards.
771
 Instead of giving an obvious clarification of the terrorism 
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discourse based on the reality on the ground in Palestine, they resorted to talking about their 
broad condemnation of all acts of violence from both sides, but did not offer a balanced view 
of their reaction to the violence against the Israelis and the violence against the 
Palestinians.
772
 Some of them privately confessed that the policy contained a double-
standard; it was not built on the norms or values of the EUFP but on rational choice models 
based on profit and loss calculations, while others remained elusive without giving specific 
answers.
773
 Hamas as well as other Palestinians and Arabs understand that the special Euro-
Israeli ties do not allow the EU to toughen its discourse with the strong party in the conflict, 
i.e., Israel.   
Consequently, the problem of Hamas’s violence, per se, is not to be considered as terrorism, 
though its methods are controversial. In fact, it is one of the instantiations of the Israeli 
occupation that represents violence itself. However, the main problem lies in the occupation 
which encompasses all manifestations of violence that are embodied in the deliberate 
breaching of human rights settlements and of the Geneva Conventions, that organize the 
situations of people under occupation.
774
 If the EU had played the role of the balanced 
mediator, it would have addressed the problem from its roots, not merely its instantiations. It 
should have dealt with the disease, not just its symptoms. According to Noam Chomsky, “any 
rational person would agree that violence is not legitimate unless the consequences of such 
action are to eliminate a still greater evil.”775 Hence, if comparison was to be done between 
the violence of Hamas resistance and the violence of the Israeli occupation, there would be no 
doubt that the former, in principle, has come in the context of eliminating ‘ a still greater evil’ 
represented in the violence of Israel. While the EUFP, as noted in Chapter Three, is 
motivated by norms enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty focussing on human rights and freedom, 
this has implied being objective, balanced, and at the side of the oppressed party, rather than 
being the other way around, as Ilan Pappe emphasizes.
776
 Thus, causes of the violence should 
be focused on and thereby eliminated by the EU before outlawing the reactions to the causes.  
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However, treating Hamas as a security aspect has failed, while the violence has persisted. The 
conflict between the Israeli state and the Palestinians is first and foremost a political conflict 
with social and security aspects. All these features should have been tackled together in order 
to put an end to the escalating conflict. Focusing on the Hamas violence and linking it to 
terrorism will not help to end the circle of violence in the region. If this had happened in the 
case of Northern Ireland, no peace would have achieved. According to Chris Patten, the then 
EU Commissioner for External Relations, commenting on the situation even before Hamas 
had been put on the EU’s list of terrorists:   
If, when we were fighting Irish terrorism in Northern Ireland, we had totally 
concentrated on the security measures, and had denied that there was any 
political or social context, all our friends, in America and elsewhere, would have 
thought we were crazy. Of course there was a security dimension but there was 
another, political, dimension as well. And until it is recognised that there are 
legitimate Palestinian political ambitions, then I’m afraid the violence will 
continue.
777
  
This opinion is shared by the MEP Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, who asserted that without 
talking to Hamas and differentiating between the Hamas military wing and its political wing, 
it would be hard to make any progress in the peace process; However, in Northern Ireland the 
EU adopted a feasible approach when it maintained communications with the IRA during the 
many years of conflict.
778
 This understanding has not been widely disseminated within the 
EU’s institutions but has undoubtedly remained as private convictions among individual EU 
officials; as a result, the security aspect has remained the only route followed to supress the 
violence of Hamas. The apparent ‘double-standards treatment’ of conflicts in both the Irish 
and Palestinian cases indicates the specificity of Israel in such a conflict, as perceived by the 
EU. While “a diplomatic process that draws Hamas into state-building and peace efforts on 
the basis of reciprocal region-wide commitment to non-violence” is required,779 the EU’s 
double-standards policy has left no room for the containment of Hamas and the Palestinians’ 
anger in the future.  
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Softness with Israel Harshness with Hamas
780
  
It appears that when the EU has tried to act against violence, it has been somewhat 
inconsistent; instead of dealing with the principle regardless of the perpetrators it has tended 
to deal differently with those who commit violence according to their identities. From the 
EU’s perspective, if the violence has come from the Palestinian side it cannot be understood 
outside the context of terrorism, whereas if it comes from the Israeli side no such contextual 
description is likely to be given. Whereas the EU has dedicated its financial and logistical 
capabilities to assist the PA in its fight against the armed Palestinian resistance, practically it 
has not done anything of significance to terminate the long-lived Israeli violence against 
Palestinians. This has been repeatedly obvious in the EU discourse, for example, being 
mentioned in the EU presidency conclusions after the collapse of the truce that was declared 
by the Palestinians in June 2003, and that was not respected by the Israelis:    
The European Union unequivocally condemns terrorism and will contribute to 
efforts aimed at cutting off support, including arms and financing, to terrorist 
groups. It is also ready to help the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to stop 
terrorism, including its capacity to prevent terrorist financing. The Union 
demands that Hamas and other groups immediately declare a ceasefire and halt 
all terrorist activity, and recalls that the Council is urgently examining the case 
for wider action against Hamas fund raising. It is essential that all concerned, in 
particular the countries of the region, condemn terrorism and assist in efforts to 
eradicate it.
781
 
It is obvious that the language used, the anger expressed and the rigour highlighted, in 
addition to threatened implementation, are unambiguous and highly telling. It is also striking 
that when the matter concerns condemnation of Hamas and Palestinian violence against the 
occupation, the prejudicial expressions, e.g., terrorism, cutting off support to terrorist groups, 
the readiness to help the PA to prevent terrorist financing, terrorist activity, calling for wider 
action against Hamas, and calling on regional countries to assist in eradicating terrorism, are 
all contained in a single paragraph.  
On another occasion the Quartet described the Palestinian attacks as “brutal”, condemning 
Hamas and other factions for their defiant behaviour; “the Quartet members deplore and 
condemn the brutal terror attacks against Israeli citizens carried out by Hamas, Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade since presentation of the Roadmap.”782 
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Indeed, the EU spared no words in condemning the resistant doings of Hamas and invested 
hugely in the PA’s security sector, thereby enabling it to act as demanded by the International 
Roadmap. Significantly, “since 2005, the EU has been involved in supporting the 
development of a democratic and professional Palestinian police force”, that will be capable 
of acting against armed Palestinian groups like Hamas.
783
 Hence, the EU had no problem with 
sanctioning the organization or punishing it for its resistance by cutting off its financial life 
blood, leaving no doubt that the movement would not be tolerated by the EU and that further 
punitive actions could be imposed on it.       
On the other hand when the same statement called on Israel to assume its responsibilities, the 
language used and the actions to be pursued later on were vastly different from the previous 
sentiments directed against Hamas.  
The European Council calls on Israel to take action to restore trust and abstain 
from any punitive measures including extra-judicial killings, and to act in 
accordance with international law. It also calls on Israel to reverse the settlement 
policy and activity and end land confiscations and the construction of the so-
called security fence, all of which threaten to render the two-state solution 
physically impossible to implement.
784
 
In this case, the European discourse is devoid of offensive language. It clearly adopts the tone 
of one friend advising another to act in accordance with international law, without any hint of 
sanctions if this has not been addressed. Surprisingly, the EU kept calling on Israel to restore 
trust, abstain from punitive measures, reverse the settlement policy, and end land confiscation 
and construction of the wall in the West Bank without expressing its enthusiasm or anger as it 
did in the Palestinian case. Undoubtedly, all the issues mentioned, including the extra-judicial 
killings perpetrated by Israel, are in fact devastating aspects of Israeli policies and actual 
behaviour, and are being systematically followed by Israel against the Palestinians. 
Surprisingly, all these things, which MEP Ivo Vajgl describes as acts of discrimination and 
apartheid,
785
 are undoubtedly regarded as violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
and are clearly censured by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but they are not being 
stopped by the EU, nor do they even prompt a genuine EU reaction.
786
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Inexplicably, neither the EU nor the US has dealt with all these infractions appropriately, i.e., 
as violence that deserves to be denounced as terrorism or, at the very least, sanctioned. In 
addition, and as mentioned above, while the Quartet including the EU accused Palestinian 
military factions of having committed brutal acts since the Roadmap presentation in 2002, 
they did not see this brutality when it came from the Israeli side. For example, in the Gaza 
Strip on 22 July 2002, Israel deliberately targeted, inter alia, an entire building and all its 
inhabitants, together with the building next door, with the intention of killing Salah 
Shehadeh, a leading figure in Hamas. Although this Israeli attack, which killed 17 innocent 
people and injured about 140, was condemned by various human rights societies,
787
 in 
general there was no incentive for either the Quartet or more particularly the EU, to describe 
the Israeli act as brutal or even to condemn it in the way that had been done with Hamas and 
similar factions when they attacked Israelis. Thus, the inconsistency in the EU’s rhetoric was 
an obvious indication of its realistic attitudes towards the parties in the conflict that was 
based on biased perceptions rather than being morally driven.     
The international reform plan for the PA that was presented in the Roadmap outlined the 
procedures which were to be followed in order to suppress the armed Intifada; in this way, 
both logistically and financially, the US and the EU supplied the necessary experience and 
the physical requirements to assist the PA, whilst the latter, through its security sector, got the 
job done on the ground. At the same time, paradoxically, while the EU involved itself in the 
fight against Hamas and the armed resistance in Palestine and in Europe alike, it did none of 
this with Israel which, over time, had sponsored the violence of the occupation and facilitated 
the Jewish settlers’ aggression towards Palestinian civilians and lands in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. However, for the purposes of the peace process as claimed, the EU clearly 
believed that the idea of sanctioning Israel was never to be on the table because of the 
negative effects on EU-Israel relations which are not subject to such a way of behaviour.
788
 
Hence, the harshness expressed against Hamas in the EU discourse against the softness 
towards the IO that was largely responsible for the violence in Palestine, represent in reality 
socio-politically motivated types of discourse that reflect the imbalanced EU’s perception of 
the two parties in question.   
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Dismantling the Hamas Network: Patting the Israeli Shoulder: Exposing Policy    
Scrutinising the language used and reactions from the EU in response to Hamas and Israel’s 
actions is indispensable in characterising the inbalances in EU policy and discourse related to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the Hamas 
movement became increasingly powerful, both politically and militarily. As a result of the 
Palestinian atmosphere which was full of tension because of the occupation that year, as well 
as the PA’s disappointment over the failure of the Oslo Accords, Hamas benefited 
significantly from all aspects of the new situation. After more than four years of suppression 
by both the PA and Israel, Hamas seized the opportunity to rebuild its organization at all 
levels and proved to have considerable capability to act robustly against the occupation 
alongside other Palestinian factions; a matter that duly raised its popularity among the 
Palestinians and in the whole Arab and Islamic world.  
Apart from the military and financial support it received from Iran and Syria, Hamas also 
gained sympathy from many international charitable organizations which increased its 
resources as the new situation required. In fact, this development at the start of Al-Aqsa 
Intifada enabled Hamas to become a powerful regional organization whose word became of 
high importance in the Palestinian question. Over the years of the Intifada it distinguished 
itself through its military activities as well as its charitable accomplishments, but its militants 
also gained significant points in the battle with the Israelis.  
Al-Aqsa Intifada surprised the international players in the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly 
the EU and the US. It is true that in this regard, Hamas was not the only Palestinian player 
but in 1987 it had been the most significant Islamic figure, having fuelled the first Intifada 
through the quality of its military operations against the Israelis inside Israel as well as in the 
OPT. These operations led to historical shifts, mainly the reoccupation of the PA land in 
2002, in addition to the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, and the subsequent 
wars in 2008/9 and 2012. With each of the Hamas operations in the first and second Intifada, 
the EU would call on the PA to dismantle the Hamas military network and put an end to its 
“terrorist activities”.789 Basically, the EU was keen to disarm Hamas, arrest its members and 
prosecute all those it called “suspicious” terrorists,790 even though it knew that such methods 
of suppression were unlikely to affect a movement so rooted in its society. This was obvious 
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in many EU documents and was stated on many occasions; for example, in 2001,  
The European Union would remind the parties of the pledges demanded of 
them: the Palestinian Authority: the dismantling of Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s 
terrorist networks, including the arrest and prosecution of all suspects; a public 
appeal in Arabic for an end to the armed intifada.
791
 
Fundamentally, the armed Intifada, without any lawful logic, lacked acceptance by the EU, 
whereas the armed occupation and its devastating machines, accustomed to punishing the 
Palestinians and confiscating their lands, remained out of the question. Undoubtedly, had the 
equation of disarming Hamas and other armed Palestinian factions succeeded, it would have 
played in favour of the Occupation but not of its victims; however, the latter were refused by 
the EU even to exercise their primitive methods of resistance under the pretext that this might 
destroy the peace process. Therefore, disarming Palestinians and dismantling their resistance 
networks as an EU requirement, could be interpreted as a free service to the Israeli 
occupation, especially as the EU’s demands were not accompanied by any EU pressure that 
would affect the Israeli position. Whereas the EU’s subjective and prejudicial language was 
clear when the matter concerned the Palestinians, the EU’s implicit attitudes towards the 
conflict were exposed through its objective and neutral language with the Israelis. Notably, 
the rest of the EU statement quoted above was obvious in revealing how the Israeli position 
had been perceived by the EU and the extent to which the EU commented on it,        
The European Union would remind the parties of the pledges demanded of 
them: the Israeli Government: withdrawal of its military forces and a stop to 
extrajudicial executions; the lifting of closures and of all the restrictions 
imposed on the Palestinian people; a freeze on settlements and an end to 
operations directed against Palestinian infrastructures.
792
 
Clearly the EU language in the first quote was full of judgments and subjective words, while 
in the second quote the language was devoid of any such things.  
However, in light of the unequal and disproportionate deeds of both Hamas and Israel, the EU 
should have reacted in the opposite direction. In the first case, the Hamas movement might 
have targeted Israeli civilians as was debated, but the Israelis actually did so, with violent 
consequences that were proportionately and tremendously greater than anything Hamas could 
have done. In fact, this Israeli disproportionality has been highlighted by the EU itself on 
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various occasions but without any verbal or practical escalation against the occupation.
793
 If 
the consequences and impacts of attacks of both parties are examined, there is no doubt that 
the figures would be very telling. According to the following statistics from B’tselem, the 
highly reputable Israeli human rights NGO, the figures for fatalities during the conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, launched on 29 September 2000, to 
the end of Operation Cast Lead, launched against the Gaza Strip by Israel between 27 
December 2008 and 18 January 2009 are very telling, if the comparison is made (see Figures 
9and 10).   
Strikingly, over the eight years between 2000 and 2008 the Israelis killed far more 
individuals than the numbers killed by the Palestinian factions collectively. While the Israelis 
killed 4905 Palestinians, just over 20 percent of this figure represents Israelis killed by 
Palestinians. And whereas the number of Israeli minors killed accounted for just under 12 per 
cent, the number of Palestinian minors was nine times higher than their counterparts on the 
Israeli side and constituted around 20 per cent of the total of Palestinian fatalities (Figure 9). 
Similarly, in the Cast Lead operation against the Gaza Strip, the gap was more obvious than 
ever. While 1396 Palestinians were killed during just 21 days (three weeks), only nine Israelis 
were killed, of whom six were militant soldiers. Despite the fact that of the Palestinians 
killed, 345 were minors, no Israeli children were killed at all.  According to the same 
statistics, whilst 350 of those killed by Israelis came from the militant Palestinian factions in 
the war, most of those who died were civilians who, as stipulated in the IHL, should have 
been protected. These important figures simply demonstrate the substantial gap between the 
fatalities caused by the violence that was exercised by both parties involved in the conflict.  
However, other impacts are illustrated elsewhere in this study. Thus, the Palestinians and 
thereby Hamas were not those who were more violent in this conflict; on the contrary, the 
Israelis themselves were undoubtedly responsible for the loss of the vast majority of lives 
(Figure 10).  
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Figure 2: Fatalities from the Second Intifada Outbreak to Operation' Cast Lead'
794
 
Data by date of event, 29.9.2000-26.12.2008  Occupied Territories  Israel 
Gaza Strip West Bank Total 
Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces  2999  1790  4789  69  
Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians  4  41  45  2  
Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians  39  200  239  492  
Israeli security force personnel killed by 
Palestinians 
97  146  243  89  
Palestinian minors killed by Israeli security 
forces  
635  316  951  3  
Israeli minors killed by Palestinians  4  35  39  84  
 Palestinians killed during the course of a 
targeted killing 
277  107  384  0 
Palestinians who were the object of a targeted 
killing 
150  82  232  0 
  
Figure 3: Fatalities during Operation 'Cast Lead'
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Data by date of event, 27.12.2008-18.1.2009 Occupied Territories           Israel 
Gaza Strip West Bank Total 
 
Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces 1390  6  1396  0 
Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians 0 0 0 3  
Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians 5  0 5  1  
Palestinian minors killed by Israeli security forces 344  1  345  0 
Palestinians killed during the course of a targeted 
killing 
20  0 20  0 
Palestinians who were the object of a targeted killing 2  0 2  0 
Palestinians who did not take part in the hostilities 
and were killed by Israeli security forces (excluding 
the objects of targeted killings). 
759  5  764  0 
Palestinians who took part in the hostilities and were 
killed by Israeli security forces 
349  1  350  0 
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Palestinian police officers who were killed inside 
police stations 
248  0 248  0 
 
Significantly, the EU’s call for disarming the Hamas movement because of its attacks against 
Israel was not paralleled by any such robust calls, even for disarming the Israeli settlers who 
undertake so many attacks against Palestinian citizens and properties in the Palestinian 
Territories.
796
 Nor did the EU call for sanctioning Israel because of the role it had played in 
targeting Palestinian civilians. This is entirely compatible with the justification given by Chris 
Patten, Commissioner for External Relation of the EU, who regarded the peace process as the 
main element on which such judgments should be based. In his opinion, extremists needed be 
apprehended as far as was possible, but those who persisted in opposing the peace process 
must be the EU’s target in the war against terror, regardless of Israel’s policies in this context. 
According to the same source, this was the exact reason for “calling for the dismantling of the 
terrorist networks of Hamas and Jihad”.797 In commenting on these EU positions, Ahmed 
Yousef accused the EU of being blind when the matter is related to Palestinian victims while 
it maintains an open-eyed policy when the same matter concerned the Israelis. In his view, the 
EU discourse should not be biased as long as it was driven by neutral incentives and 
normative motivations; otherwise, nothing of its discourse could be trusted.
798
  
Therefore, the question as to why the EU expressed its anger in such a manner when the 
Palestinians stood behind the violence, but did not do so when the Israelis committed even 
more violent actions against Palestinians is constantly asked by Palestinians and among 
observers. Significantly, stripping Hamas of its military power while simultaneously leaving 
Israel as the dominant and powerful occupying state, without questions or sanctioning, can 
only be understood if the nature of the EU alliance with Israel is recognized. In this regard, 
the PA is regularly asked by the EU to make every effort to stop acts of terror, emphasizing 
that “the legitimate use of force is the responsibility of a single institutional authority”; a 
principle that must be speedily implemented as the EU demands.
799
 However, by enabling the 
PA, with its weakened status, to control the military power that is available in the hands of its 
people, the Palestinians will lose a very valuable asset in the business of deterring Israel’s 
policies on the ground. While international society is incapable of preventing the occupation 
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or putting an end to its manifestations, the Palestinians will become totally exposed and 
vulnerable to every Israeli attack. Thus, the EU’s insistence on dismantling the armed 
Palestinian groups and limiting the use of force in the hands of the PA, has played a 
significant role in turning the Authority into a kind of police state against its people, in the 
service of the Israeli occupation.       
Hamas Rejection of Suffering the Consequences: Sustained Resistance  
The Palestinian-Israeli negotiations were officially launched in 1993, while the Palestinian 
right to self-determination and the refugees’ right of return to their homeland have been 
guaranteed and reaffirmed by the UNGARs since 1947.
800
 Since then, international society 
has been unable to compel, or even to persuade, Israel to accept these resolutions and allow 
Palestinians to exercise their natural political rights in their homeland. Despite the fact that 
millions of Palestinian refugees are in exile in a fragmented diaspora, international society 
has failed to bring an end to their sufferings over time, and remained idle and ineffectual. 
However, it has attempted through UNRWA and sometimes through other NGOs to provide 
humanitarian and material assistance to the refugees living in camps without paying serious 
attention to their political needs and aspirations. After 1972, the EU was among the entities 
that responded in such a way to the conflict and to Palestinian suffering when it started its 
Palestinian relief programmes through the UNRWA.
801
 Undoubtedly, ignorance of the 
political needs of the Palestinians and the Israeli actions against them drove the Palestinian 
factions – some represented in the PLO and others not, and with leaders from various 
ideological backgrounds – to exercise their right of resistance against the Israeli occupation. 
Thus, there has been an obvious attempt by the Palestinians to recover their occupied 
homeland without waiting for the United Nations’ resolutions to be implemented at some 
future date.    
Crucially, a breakthrough occurred in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 1993 when the Oslo 
Agreement between the PLO and Israel was signed but without the Palestinians, both within 
or outside Palestine, being consulted or called to a referendum. The Knesset (Israel’s 
democratically-elected representative body) was consulted and voted in favour of the 
agreement, as did the Palestinian Central Council in 1993 and the National Council in 1996, 
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although neither were democratically elected and therefore had no popular authority.
802
 This 
meant that a number of Palestinian factions, mainly Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which were not 
represented among the PLO institutions, were left out of the agreement. This has enabled 
them to act independently, regardless of what the PLO had signed. Thus, they dealt with Oslo 
as an illegitimate agreement, in terms of it having been signed by an undemocratically-
elected Palestinian body, alongside what were regarded as serious concessions in the Accord 
presented by the PLO leadership to Israel since they touched the very core of Palestinian 
rights.
803
  
Given that this treaty has become much like a constitution, in light of which the entire 
struggle for freedom by the Palestinians should be balanced, as the agreement itself 
anticipated, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have been clear from the beginning about their position; 
they have not recognised this agreement either as a policy or as a reference for 
Palestinians.
804
 A Hamas statement on the eighteenth anniversary of the Oslo agreement 
reiterated its constant strategic positions, describing this Accord as disastrous and a serious 
deviation in the political track of the Palestinian cause.
805
 These factions have instead 
continued their methods of struggle against the Israeli Occupation by exercising their right of 
resistance, consistent with international law which guarantees this right for those who fall 
under occupation or military aggression as commonly recognized.
806
  
Hence, Hamas’s insistence on the exercise of violent struggle against the obligations of the 
Oslo Agreement has therefore put it face to face with those, including the EU, who are 
interested in the MEPP. Significantly, Hamas’s opposition to this process has gradually 
developed to challenge the very core of the Accord and its stipulations; a matter that has 
jeopardized the efforts invested by the EU and the US since the Madrid Conference in 1991. 
Contrary to the PLO’s commitment and due to the fact that its establishment had been before  
these agreements, the Hamas movement has introduced itself as a legal combatant 
organization for freedom, and significantly its identity is linked to this reality rather than 
being for or against the Oslo Agreements. Thus, Hamas could, in theory, claim that it does 
not bear the consequences of agreements in which it did not participate, and neither the EU 
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nor any other international entity has the right of dictation of the way that should be followed 
to liberate the Palestinian homeland since no actions have been taken by international society 
to terminate the on-going Palestinian plight since 1948, according to Hamad.
807
         
 
 
Section Two: Internationally Recognised Resistance or Not? 
Having scrutinized the EU discourse directed at Hamas and Israel and the imbalanced nature 
of the rhetoric and policy used in this regard, in this section I analyse Hamas’s resistance 
logic and the continuously biased nature of the EU response in light of international law. 
Violence against Civilians 
The debate concerning the perceptions of the EU and Hamas towards targeting civilians 
during the Al-Aqsa Intifada has not been sufficiently highlighted. These diverging opinions 
are built on contradictory interpretations of the conflict in the ME. According to the EU, 
Hamas’s targeting of Israeli civilians was unjustifiable; therefore Hamas deserved to be 
stigmatized as a terrorist organization. At the same time, the targeting of Palestinian civilians 
by the Israelis was symbolically condemned and seen ‘not acceptable’, but same thing was 
not enough to stigmatize the latter as a terrorist state or a war criminal, as could be deduced 
implicitly and explicitly from the EU discourse. Although, most of the EU officials 
interviewed by the researcher managed to avoid shedding light on this paradox, it was not too 
difficult to conclude that their answers were clearly linked to the significance of Israel in the 
European mentality.
808
 According to Takis Hadjigeorgiou, a member of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in the EP, this is clear evidence of the double standards policy pursued by the 
EU in the Arab-Israeli context.809     
In the case of occupation of others’ lands or states, civilians must be neutralized and 
protected against any kinds of hostilities or attacks
810
 between the occupier state and the 
armed groups in the occupied territories, according to the Fourth Geneva Convention.   
There were two main classes of civilian to whom protection against arbitrary 
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action on the part of the enemy was essential in time of war; on the one hand, 
persons of enemy nationality living in the territory of a belligerent State, and 
on the other, the inhabitants of occupied territories.
811
 
The convention is also keen on distinguishing between those civilians who could join or 
become militants and those taking no part in any acts of war. The second group is the one 
which must be protected, neutralized and sheltered from any aggressive attacks, while the 
former group is not included; therefore, civilian persons to be protected are meant to be 
those who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they reside in the zones, “perform no 
work of a military character”.812 According to this definition, all Palestinian civilians must 
be secured from being attacked or targeted except those who participate in military acts 
against the Israeli occupation. 
In the same vein, Israeli civilians who participate with their army in aggressive acts against 
Palestinians are not included or safeguarded according to the convention. Significantly, 
Jewish settlers who reside illegally in the internationally-recognized Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, in practice act as part of the aggressive Israeli machine against Palestinian lands 
and properties rather than the population itself. Hence, the Hamas movement and 
Palestinians in general do not regard those settlers as protected civilians as identified by the 
Geneva Conventions, even if they are called civilians and do not wear military uniforms. 
Therefore, as Usama Hamdan confirmed, based on this perception they are legitimate targets 
for the Palestinian resistance, and Palestinian factions are accustomed to considering them in 
the same way.
813
 
In addition, Jewish citizens in Israel who serve in their army from the age of 18 (and, as 
reserve forces, participate annually in targeting Palestinians and contributing to aggressive 
acts against them), are also excluded, according to Hamas’s interpretation of the Geneva 
Conventions. This is to say that Jewish civilians in Israel do not meet the definition of 
‘civilians’, but are on the contrary part of the occupation that has caused the Palestinian 
tragedy since 1948, and continue in various ways to participate in this on-going dilemma. 
Someone who serves in the Israeli army in the morning and goes home and takes off his 
military uniform in the evening cannot be considered a protected civilian.
814
 Thus, whenever 
Hamas, like other Palestinian armed factions, targets Israeli civilians either in the Jewish 
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settlements in the OPT or inside Israel, it does not feel guilty about breaching international 
law, but considers that it is fighting military forces, whether or not they wear military 
uniforms. In this way, it reminds the EU and others in the world that targeting those who are 
part of the hostilities, such as settlers or those who act in a military rather than a civilian 
manner (e.g., the so-called reserve forces within Israeli society), represents an aspect of the 
Palestinian right of resistance which is internationally guaranteed.  
Had this Hamas perception been accepted, the EU would have not put the movement on its 
list of terrorists. Therefore, while Hamas justifies its actions in the way described above, the 
EU is clear about not distinguishing between Israeli civilians, refuses any kind of targeting 
them, and considers those who have already been targeted as innocent victims.
815
 And while 
the EU has frequently expressed, in numerous occasions, its rejection of targeting civilians 
on both sides,
816
 its anger, reactions, and sympathies have not been voiced equally. 
Observers can feel the warm sympathies and the furious reactions of the EU when the 
victims are Israelis, whereas this cannot be felt in the case of Palestinians. In the former 
case, the perpetrators “of all these atrocities must be brought to justice”;817 they are also 
considered the real enemies of peace who must be fought by the international society, 
including the PA and Israel.
818
 But in the opposite case, as for example, when the Israelis 
were the perpetrators of war crimes against civilians in the Gaza Strip during the ‘Cast Lead’ 
war in 2008-9, they were not labelled ‘enemies of peace’, nor was there any call to bring 
them to justice, since they were still seen as people interested in a peaceful resolution. In this 
way the Hamas approach towards Israeli civilians is completely rejected by the EU.              
Hamas’s Philosophy of Resistance and the EU Response  
In Islam, avoiding harm to civilians during conflicts with enemies is a religiously-motivated 
principle that has been theoretically adopted by Hamas.
819
 Contrary to Ervin Staub’s 
conviction that Hamas has ideological agenda against the ‘Jews’,820 the movement has never 
directed its military operations against the Jewish people outside Palestine, and has never 
asked its affiliates in the rest of the world to do so. In reality, it has constantly sought to 
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ensure that Hamas respects all religions and all their followers, whoever and wherever they 
might be, thus confirming that its problem is only with the Zionists in Palestine.
821
 
Considerably, Hamas has systematically rejected the targeting of civilians around the world, 
and has condemned all such attacks, regardless of the identities of perpetrators and victims 
alike,
822
 in such instances as the targeting of Washington DC, New York, Madrid, London 
and Norway, as well as the Arab Gulf States.
823
 There is no justification for killing innocent 
people even if their country is involved in aggressive acts against others as Hamas 
believes.
824
 
Civilians are protected in Islam and in IHL, but Palestine is a different story. In explaining 
Hamas’s viewpoint, Hamdan notes that it is a story of occupation, where settlers and citizens 
have been involved in hostilities against the occupied people for a long time,  
We do not target civilians; we only target Israeli settlers and soldiers in our 
martyrdom operations. If we had wanted to target civilians we could have killed 
many more than those who have already been killed. We could have targeted 
schools, universities, kindergartens, sports stadiums and hospitals. All these targets 
would have been very easy for our members if we had wanted to attack them, but 
we did not because we know that many innocent people would have been killed in 
these places. We usually targeted places or buses in the morning or evening and in 
the weekends while our targets were among soldiers or reserve forces and settlers 
who tended to move between their stations and military bases or workplaces. If 
innocent people were killed in these operations it did not happen intentionally. 
However, as occupied people, we consider our land, Palestine, a ‘clash line’ and 
those who consider themselves civilians in the Israeli society should have kept away 
from this line as we always suggest. We are not terrorists in the way the EU has 
mistakenly put us on its list of terrorists; we have always said we are as much the 
victims of Israeli terrorism as those innocent victims of 11 September 2001 and 
London or Madrid. The only thing we have done is to defend our people.
825
            
Ahmad Yusuf, adviser to the Prime Minister in the Hamas-led government in Gaza, added 
that “Hamas rockets on Israel were basically not focused on Israeli civilians, but were 
directed against military bases inside Israel”, and was one of the internationally-supported 
rights of the Palestinians in this armed conflict.
826
 Hamas lacks the precision available to the 
Israeli army by mostly having homemade weapons, which may cause ‘collateral damage’, 
although as Yousef points out, the resulting victims on the Israeli side do not compare with 
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the huge numbers of Palestinians killed.
827
 Hence, Hamas has its own philosophy of 
resistance which, as its leaders and supporters claim, is seen to be consistent with IHL.    
Based on this particular philosophy, Hamas as a resistance movement has justified the use of 
its methods in fighting its Israeli enemy. In fact, its popularity in the Arab and Islamic 
world, rather than in Palestine itself, has been gained in light of its robustness against the 
occupation, including its energetic military operations inside Israel.
828
 The sympathy it has 
gathered as a result has stemmed from its forceful targeting of the Israelis, regardless of 
whether they are called civilians or militants, since as far as Hamas is concerned there is no 
difference; both are involved in hostilities against the Palestinians. In one of the rounds of 
indirect negotiation with the Israelis via the Egyptians, Hamdan suggested an agreement 
built on the definition of civilians according to the Geneva Conventions, to be accepted by 
both Hamas and Israel, but the latter refused this. In Hamdan’s view, Israel rejected his 
proposition, knowing that the Geneva definition did not provide full protection to the Jewish 
settlers in the West Bank and Gaza, or to the Israeli reserve forces, in the way it did for 
Palestinian civilians.
829
 According to Ahmed Yousef, before Hamdan’s initiative, Ahmad 
Yassin had explicitly proposed that both sides should stop targeting civilians, but Israel had 
refused and its machine kept killing civilians and targeting “the stones and trees of 
Palestine”.830 Thus, when directing its resistance machine against the Israelis, Hamas 
remains consistent and beyond the context of terrorism has had its own narrative, to which 
the EU should have listened.   
 However, such logic is not accepted by Israel and its alliances as represented in the EU and 
the US, and as a result they do not accept the Hamas interpretation of the international 
conventions. Although statistically many more Palestinian civilians are killed at the hands of 
the Israelis than Israelis are killed at the hands of Hamas,
831
 and regardless of the nature of 
the eventual targets, whether military personnel or civilians, Hamas’s violent resistance has 
been regarded as terrorism, while Israel has not been dealt with in such a way.
832
 
Significantly, without having scrutinized the Hamas perspective or examined the deeds of 
each party, the EU announced Hamas as a terrorist movement that had to abide by the Oslo 
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agreements and their commitments, leaving no room for any forceful methods of resistance 
or compromises over this issue. According to Marc Otte, Hamas “has no way but to stop all 
acts of terrorism in theory and practice.” The EU is interested in the peace process, and 
thereby all kinds of violence would devastate the efforts in which it has invested towards 
solving the conflict. After the Palestinians, represented by the PLO, have adopted peace as 
the only way to achieve their rights, no Palestinian body would have the right to return to 
violence.
833
 
Paradoxically, from the EU perspective the Palestinians must accordingly remain captive to 
the peace process, regardless of what the other party might do, and this will remain valid 
even if, after twenty years of negotiation, the five million Palestinian refugees continue to be 
prevented from exercising their right of return to their homes inside Palestine as proposed by 
UNGAR 194. Despite land in the OPT being confiscated and planted with more than half a 
million Jewish settlers,
834
 (contrary to international law which stipulates that “the Occupying 
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies”835), the EU expects all Palestinians to keep their resistance in check and stick to 
negotiating with the Israelis.
836
    
In the same way and in light of the unceasing violations of the Palestinians’ human rights 
while negotiations have been continuing, they have no other alternative but to negotiate and 
negotiate, without any outstanding political support from the EU apart from money, words, 
and statements. This logic appears strange in terms of answering Palestinian questions; how 
long must they wait until given their rights, and under which circumstances might 
international society, including the EU, put an end to the Israeli policies on the ground or 
impose sanctions against it?  Thus, the presumed captivity of the Palestinians to the peace 
process forever is baseless, and the EU’s assumptions are not sustained by sufficient actions 
to make it credible amongst the armed Palestinian factions who believe that the peace 
process is no longer valid.
837
        
Significantly, although the peace process has not produced fruitful results for the Palestinians 
and in terms of the two-state solution has led nowhere, even after 20 years, the EU continues 
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to count on negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.
838
 In this regard, Israel is left 
to control all inputs and outputs of the peace process without outstanding progress on the 
ground; indeed, opportunities for achieving peace are diminishing significantly. Hence, the 
EU’s insistence on bilateral talks between the weak Palestinians, represented by the PA, and 
those who have the force on the ground has played out in favour of the occupiers, who have 
barely moved towards implementing international resolutions about Palestine. Thus, the EU 
has indirectly played the role of the contractor for extending the age of the occupation by 
leaving it to control Palestinian land and lives, in addition to the potential results from such 
bilateral talks in such circumstances.
839
      
Right of Defence vis-à-vis the Right of Resistance in the EU-Hamas Context  
The EU has continuously confirmed the Israeli right of self-defence, but has never formally 
recognized the Palestinian right of resistance. It might recognize the latter in theory or on 
particular occasions but so far this has not happened in the Palestinian case. An anonymous 
member of the EEAS committee, whose views were shared by the MEPs Ioannis 
Kasoulides,
840
 Ivo Vajgl
841
 and Kyriacos Triantaphyllides,
842
 noted that if the resistance was 
peaceful and based on recognition of Israel’s right to exist, it would be recognized by the EU, 
but if it meant violence against Israel, the EU would not recognize it under any 
circumstances.
843
   
From the perspective of Jarmo Oikarinen in the Policy Department of the Directorate-General 
for External Policies of the Union, “the EU’s position is derived from the belief that political 
violence is not condusive to a political solution.” He insisted that the region needed to escape 
from the cycle of violence, not to legitimize violent factors.
844
 Contrary to the EU’s belief, 
what was already legitimized by international law, i.e., armed resistance under occupation, 
clearly did not need more legitimization; however, in the case of Hamas, by neglecting this 
right the EU had become involved in a process of de-legitimizing something that was already 
covered by international law; a matter that conflicts with the core normative principles upon 
which the EU itself was founded. According to the UN charter  
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.
845 
Given that this internationally backed right of self-defense is valid, and nothing has been 
undertaken by the Security Council to stop the continuous Israeli aggressions in the 
Palestinian Territories, the EU position becomes contrary to UN logic.  
Indeed, the de-legitimization process becomes clearer, when noticing an anonymous high-
ranking EEAS member claims that the EU wants to see a negotiated solution and the ground 
should have to be prepared for this. In his opinion, the Palestinians’ armed resistance as well 
as the Israelis’ construction of settlements conflict with this objective, and because of this the 
EU wants to see trust and confidence-building, not the other way around.
846
 Indeed, this 
mixing of perceptions of something already banned by the IHL, like the Israeli settlements, 
and other things already legitimized by it, like armed resistance against occupation, is a 
policy of those who do not wish to abide by international regulations as much as stick to their 
own interests and realistic calculations. Even if EU spokespeople talk about accepting 
peaceful resistance (adding the word ‘peaceful’ to resistance in fact has no basis in 
international law),  ‘armed’ resistance to the occupation on the other hand is the only 
description of ‘resistance against occupation’ to have been emphasised by the UNGA, and is 
discussed in this context below. 
Therefore, with each Israeli attack, these meanings are called on by the EU to remind both 
parties in the conflict of their responsibilities and limitations. The responsibility of the Israeli 
state is to defend its people but in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL), 
whilst Hamas has to disarm and dismantle, since the only choice it has is to accept the status 
quo and to abide by the PA’s regulations, as stated in the Oslo Accords and other Palestinian-
Israeli agreements.
847
 Despite the failure of these agreements, the Palestinians are obliged to 
behave within the restrictions of these conventions, even though their lands are increasingly 
being turned into Jewish settlements, thousands of their people remain in Israeli jails, and 
their hope for an independent state is vanishing, from the EU perspective Hamas, as well as 
other Palestinian factions, must remain calm, and avoid violent resistance that might sabotage 
the peace process.     
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The EU condemns all acts of violence which cannot be allowed to impede 
progress towards peace. The EU recognises Israel’s right to protect its citizens 
from attacks, but emphasizes that the Israeli Government, in exercising this 
right, should act within international law.
848
 
The EU more than others knows that Israel has not abided by IHL and has continued to 
violate basic human rights, as is asserted in its own documents and human rights reports.
849
 It 
also knows that Israel is not just defending its people but has been fully engaged in detaining 
and killing innocent civilians, confiscating Palestinian lands, building settlements in the 
internationally-recognized occupied territories, building a separation wall in these territories 
(contrary to IHL), and since June 2007 besieging the Gaza Strip.
850
 Israel also devastated 
Palestinian infrastructure deliberately, during the wars on Gaza in 2008-09 and 2012 or 
earlier, as well as targeting agricultural land, universities, and playgrounds.
851
 Significant 
aspects of these objectives are entirely unrelated to what Israel calls terrorism and, as the EU 
Commissioner for External Relations remarked, 
It is difficult to see how the destruction of the Gaza airport, the destruction of an 
EU-funded forensic lab and the destruction of vast areas of arable land can help 
fight terrorism or increase Israel’s security. I would argue the opposite. 852 
Although this was the case from the EU’s point of view, it would not do anything rather than 
trying to coax Israel into seeing that its policies would not help in fighting terrorism. Despite 
all these well-known violations, the EU continuously confirms the Israeli right of self-
defence: nor have these abuses pushed the EU into affirming the Palestinian right to work 
against Israeli policy. Hence, even if they are under occupation the Palestinians must set the 
rhythm of their movement to the tone of endless negotiations with Israel as perceived by the 
EU. In reality, the EU’s position is not related to the Oslo Accords, nor to the PA’s 
commitments as might be inferred, since even before the Oslo agreements the Palestinian 
right of resistance had not been officially recognized; this means that the EU position is 
principled.        
Not only has the Palestinian right of resistance been unrecognized by the EU but it has also 
been stigmatized as terrorism, especially in relation to violent or armed methods of 
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resistance. As mentioned in its statements, the EU “rejects and fights violence regardless of 
the motivation”;853 however, this fight launched against violence distinguishes between the 
victim and the executioner in favour of the latter instead of listening to the victim’s narrative. 
Hence, the violence of the victims against oppressive occupation is considered to be terrorism 
though guaranteed in international law, whereas the violence arising from the Occupation 
against IHL is considered as self-defense, not terrorism – or in the worst cases not 
proportionate and merely conflicting with IHL with which it should become compatible 
through adjustment.  
As described by both Margrete Auken
854
 and the MEP Paul Murphy,
855
 this double-standard 
policy towards the parties in the conflict, has affected the EU’s image in the ME, where 
people have begun to consider EU policy in this regard both imbalanced and incredible. 
According to Ilan Pappe, 
this unfair double-standard EU policy, in ethical terms, is not an exeptional case. 
It has to do with the very way that the EU uses the Arab-Israeli conflect; namely 
terrorizing the Palestinians, regarding evey Palestinian act as an act of terror, 
and legitimizing almost every Israeli act as self-defence or justified war.This 
was not only specific to the way the EU dealt with Hamas, but it is part of a 
bigger double-standard picture pertaining to Western policy in the so-called 
‘war on terror’. In the case of Hamas, it is in regard to the right of the 
Palestinians for self-determination and to struggle against occupation, and it is a 
double standard in the area itself where the good guys are those who are yours, 
but if they don’t serve your interests they become terrorists.856   
Hence, regarding Hamas resistance as terrorism is based on an unsettling balance that 
observes one of the parties in the equation but remains blind to matters concerning the other 
party.  
Given that the Palestinian people have suffered under occupation for over 60 years, their right 
of armed resistance, along with their right of self-determination, undoubtedly represents an 
example of a people’s continuously-confirmed rights, based on a number of UN General 
Assembly Resolutions (UNGAR). According to such resolutions it was strongly suggested in 
1960 that exposing people “to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a 
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an 
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.” Therefore, “all armed action 
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or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to 
enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the 
integrity of their national territory shall be respected.”857 In cases of continuing occupation 
that failed to abide by UN regulations, the UNGA clarified its position unambiguously in 
resolutions issued in 1974 and 1978;
858
  
It reaffirm[ed] the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial 
integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and 
foreign occupation by all available means, particularly armed struggle. In addition, 
it strongly condemn[ed] all Governments which d[id] not recognize the right of self-
determination and independence of all peoples still under colonial and foreign 
domination and alien subjugation, notably the peoples of Africa and the Palestinian 
people.  
 
It is obvious that even armed resistance is recognized by the UNGA as a method through 
which a people under occupation could seek their independence. Commenting on the debate 
regarding the Palestinian right to resist, Ahmed Yousef noted how it was the West itself that 
had legitimized the use of unrestricted methods of armed resistance against colonization and 
occupation; as was obvious in Algeria when the population launched their armed resistance 
against French colonialism, and in the case of Vietnam’s resistance against the American 
occupation as well as in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In these and in 
other examples around the world, armed resistance had attracted Western support, “so why is 
the case of Palestine different?”859  
As an organization under such an occupation, Hamas has the same right to resist by all 
means; therefore calling it a terrorist organization seems irrelevant. Even though it may 
breach certain regulatory norms in its struggle for freedom, this does not mean its 
internationally-recognized right of resistance must be confiscated, or that it should be 
delegitimized. Generally speaking, the EU should have adopted the UNGARs and expressed 
its understanding of what motivates the violence used by Hamas, exactly as it has expressed 
its understanding of the violence perpetrated by Israel without calling it a terrorist state or 
confiscating its right of self-defense, despite Israel’s systematic breaches of IHL. According 
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to EU sources, 
Israel has every right to respond to inexcusable acts of provocation. But while 
Israel is entitled to do what is required to protect its security, it should do so in a 
way which does not escalate the situation and which is proportionate and 
measured, conforms to international law, and avoids civilian deaths and 
suffering.
860
 
Contrary to the methods it applied in sanctioning Hamas, the EU countered Israel’s arbitrary 
use of the right of self-defense with advice and recommendations. It confronted Israeli 
disproportionality through processes of appeasement and talks only, though this 
disproportionality breached the very core of international law. Hence, the EU’s advice for the 
Israeli Occupation was that it should defend itself but in a proportionate way so as to win the 
hearts and minds of the Palestinians. According to EU sources, “the battle against terrorism is 
not so far from the battles for hearts and minds”;861 a matter that makes it necessary to avoid 
targeting Palestinian civilians. In this contradictory way, the EU has perceived the rights of 
both.         
Since the EU recognizes that the Israeli state has had the right of self-defense, it should do the 
same if it is a normative power directed by its declared values, morals and norms. If the EU 
does not commit itself to this logic, its considerable bias in this regard reaffirms its realistic 
policy of double standards, based on self-interest and balance of power rather than on ethics 
or morals. In interpreting this political behaviour by the EU, the MEP Takis Hadjigeorgiou, 
noted how 
we come to that period in history where the major powers in the EU and in the 
world decide whether you have the right to resist and to take up weapons to fight. In 
my opinion, the world is changing dramatically and people have the right to fight in 
order to win their freedom. It is hard to find a country that has won its 
indepencdence without weapons. The right of resistance is the right of freedom but 
the people who have power in the EU believe we have reached a certain time in 
history when we can solve problems without resistance; they don’t give the right to 
resist but they don’t give the impression that they are trying to solve the problem 
peacefully.
862
 
Thus, in his interpretation, while people have the right of resistance as a counterpart of 
freedom, the decision about this is dominated by the world’s major powers and thereby it is 
given to others but not taken by those who seek it, which indicates how the role of the 
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balance of power functions when it comes to the rights of the weak. Accordingly, the EU’s 
problem with Hamas is represented in the former’s ignorance of the latter’s right to resist 
against Israeli civilians and at the military level. In this regard, the EU has consistently 
condemned Hamas’s resistance against both levels, and considered all kinds of violent 
actions as a sort of criminalized terrorism. This was obvious, inter alia, in two occasions in 
which Hamas kidnapped Israeli soldiers, whereas the EU considered the process of captivity 
as an act of terror.  
The first incident involved the abduction by Hamas of Corporal Nachshon Wachsman in the 
West Bank in 1994. After expressing “its profound horror and outrage”, the EU called Hamas 
a terrorist group which wanted to destroy the peace process.
863
 The second involved the case 
of Gilad Shalit, and is discussed in detail below. Thus, Hamas is asked to abandon all kinds 
of resistance regardless of its target, whatever the Palestinian circumstances might be, and 
wherever its enemy is located. As the Quartet Committee demanded,     
All Palestinian individuals and groups must end acts of terror against all Israelis, 
anywhere. The Quartet calls on the Palestinian authorities to take all possible steps 
to halt immediately the activities of individuals and groups planning and conducting 
attacks on Israelis.
 864 
 
 
Hence, in the EU’s view, all Israelis everywhere must be immunized against being targeted 
by the Palestinian resistance, terror, regardless of whether they are in military uniform or 
civilian clothing. This stems in Gazi Hamad’s standpoint from the fact that the EU refuses 
Palestinian resistance in principle.
865
 The apparent inconsistency in the EU’s discourse can be 
seen by scrutinizing the position of David Miliband, then UK Foreign Secretary, who was 
asked whether people denied political opportunities were justified in acting violently. His 
answer was unequivocal; “I think the classic case for Europeans is always ‘if you were in 
France in 1942, would you have joined the French resistance?’ and of course the answer is 
‘yes’”.866 Although his comment was in the context of the violent struggle against South 
African apartheid, there is no reason for accepting such a position in that context while 
refusing it in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Thus, EU policy in this regard is 
very obvious; it is built on stripping Hamas of the right of resistance against the occupation 
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and keeping the right of self-defense in the hands of the Israelis; a matter which has left far-
reaching consequences on the EU’s credibility as a normative actor based on the 
internationally-respected principle of the Rule of Law.     
Gilad Shalit versus Palestinian Prisoners: How Perceptions Have Interacted  
On 25 June 2006 Hamas abducted Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier who was on duty in the 
Israeli army besieging the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, he was released on 18 October 2011 in a 
deal between Israel and the Hamas movement. In fact, the soldier became one of the most 
famous soldiers in the world due to the attention generated by his captivity in Gaza. 
Ironically, when abducted he was wearing his military uniform, as Margrete Auken likes to 
mention when commenting on the illogical accusation of Hamas’s involvement in 
‘terrorism’.867 He was one of those human tools used by the Israeli occupation to worsen the 
circumstances of the Palestinian people in Gaza, one of the poorest areas in the world.
868
 
Having been kidnapped by armed Palestinian groups including Hamas, he became a prisoner 
of war and was held as a bargaining chip for the purpose of releasing Palestinian prisoners in 
Israeli jails as his hijackers constantly announced.  
Interestingly, the EU took up his case and the humanitarian conditions in which he was 
confined, and through separate statements issued by all EU institutions, called systematically 
on the Palestinians to release him.
869
 Few of these statements focused on Shalit’s French 
nationality, as some might have interpreted as a cause for EU concern, but instead focused on 
his Israeli identity and his right to be free with his family; a matter which appeared in huge 
numbers of EU documents concerned with his case. However, when Salah Hammouri, a 
French Palestinian, was imprisoned by the Israelis for six years between 2005 and 2011, there 
were no EU documents dedicated to his situation, as was issued regarding Shalit, nor was he 
even mentioned until his mother launched a harsh criticism of France’s double-standard 
policy in this regard.
870
 Had the secret behind the EU’s concern about Shalit been his French 
identity, this would also have applied to Hammouri as a French citizen in an Israeli jail, 
meaning that this debate is no longer valid.      
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Both before and after the abduction of the Israeli soldier, thousands of ‘Palestinian Shalits’ 
remained in Israeli prisons, neither discussed nor even mentioned in EU documents 
throughout the conflict. According to a human rights report by the Addamir Association on 1
 
October 2011, the month of Shalit’s release, there were 5434 Palestinian political prisoners in 
Israeli prisons and detention centres, including 17 PLC members and 286 administrative 
detainees, as well as 36 females and 262 children.
871
 As agreed between Hamas and Israel, 
1027 Palestinians were to be released in exchange for Shalit, but huge numbers of prisoners 
remained in Israeli captivity. While the above-mentioned trend has generally dominated the 
EU discourse over time, a few documents have noted the topic of the PLC prisoners, but in 
the context of Shalit’s case,872 where both sides are called on to release Shalit and the PLC 
prisoners,
873
 or in the context of the need for “mutual trust-building measures” to be taken by 
all sides.
874
 Thus, the PLC prisoners have not attracted much attention in the EU documents 
while other Palestinian prisoners have almost been excluded from such any EU consideration.  
However, the difference is not only in the number of documents dedicated either to Shalit or 
to Palestinian prisoners, but also in the manner in which the EU directed its discourse towards 
the Palestinian groups or to the Israeli state. In the first case it used to call for the 
“unconditional”,875 and “immediate release of Sergeant Gilad Shalit”,876 or “the urgent 
release of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers” (referring also to the Israeli soldiers abducted by 
Hezbollah).
877
 As such, after reminding Israel of their deep friendship, and condemning the 
kidnapping of Shalit, Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative, issued a very clear 
petition for the release of the Israeli soldier. Interestingly, Solana expressed no understanding 
of the Palestinian right of resistance against the occupation, not only at the civilian level at 
this specific time but also against the Israeli military institution in particular, apparently 
forgetting the reality of the thousands of political prisoners languishing in Israeli prisons 
contrary to the Geneva Conventions. In his words,     
I would like to say, very clearly and loudly, that we have condemned the 
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kidnapping of the soldiers. There is no reason to do that, it is something 
absolutely unacceptable. And I would like to say this as loudly as possible, as 
clearly as possible and I would like to say, also very clearly, that those who may 
have influence to help solve this problem, they have to do it soon, immediately, 
now.
878
 
Significantly, the EU’s reaction on the abduction of the soldiers was firm, crucial and strong, 
whereas this frankness was nowhere to be observed when talking about the Palestinian 
prisoners. In fact, the immediate release of Palestinian prisoners for freedom was supported 
internationally by the UNGA which, clearly and in principle,  
demanded the immediate release of all persons detained or imprisoned as a 
result of their struggle for self-determination and independence, full respect for 
their fundamental individual rights and the observance of article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, under which no one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
879
 
But, when Solana was asked by a journalist to comment on the arrest of the elected PLC 
members by Israel he could only say that it was “not helpful”,880 an expression that in no way 
compared with Solana’s comments on the detention of Shalit. Astonishingly, using different 
phrases and expressions in a very short statement Solana strongly condemned the latter’s 
abduction and called for his release ‘immediately now’. In spite of the military duty that 
Shalit was proceeding around Gaza, Solana described the attack as ‘absolutely unacceptable’ 
and happened with ‘no reason’, confirming the EU’s opinion, in his words, ‘loudly’, ‘as 
loudly as possible’, ‘very clearly’, ‘as clearly as possible’, ‘also very clearly’. In fact, the 
deep gap between the two languages used in the two cases reflects the extent to which the 
EU’s leaders are biased and scandalously sympathetic to one party rather than the other.      
However, representatives and ministers of the Palestinian government who had been 
imprisoned after the abduction of Shalit did receive some moral support when the EU called a 
few times for their immediate release.
881
 Given that this happened in the Shalit context only, 
the EU clearly used another kind of rhetoric when speaking of the Palestinian prisoners in 
general, different to that dedicated to Shalit. Purposefully, the Israeli soldier was the aim 
when issuing European statement, while Palestinian prisoners were merely a mean to achieve 
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the ultimate goal represented in releasing him. This could be read, for example, in EU 
statement stressing that “mutual trust-building measures by all sides, including a significant 
release of Palestinian prisoners, may help to create a constructive atmosphere leading to the 
release of Sergeant Shalit.”882 Hence, when talking about Palestinians, the EU’s call for their 
release only came about in order to serve another purpose, and not because the Palestinian 
prisoners are prisoners for freedom and have, immediately, urgently and unconditionally, to 
exercise their right to freedom without further delay, as the above-mentioned UNGAR 
suggested. In commenting on this paradox, Ilan Pappe asserts that Israel succeeded in 
marketing Shalit to the EU as a NATO soldier similar to those fighting in Afghanistan against 
terrorism.
883
 Therefore, the EU’s use of language in both cases was widely different and 
reflected the extent to which Israeli interests were/are prioritized.      
The EUHR Catherine Ashton expressed sympathy with Shalit and his family after his release, 
in a special statement that failed to mention any of the thousands of Palestinian prisoners and 
their families, whose suffering was no less than that of Shalit. Her statement was another 
reminder of the EU’s imbalanced position, since one soldier could scarcely equal the 
Palestinian numbers released in the deal, and because Shalit had been captured in a military 
context while most of the Palestinians were political prisoners, seized in quite different 
circumstances by Israel. Remarkably, Ashton welcomed Shalit’s release but ignored the 
release of the huge number of Palestinian prisoners, not to mention those who for the same 
political reasons remained in Israeli jails, saying that,  
I warmly welcome the news that Gilad Shalit will soon be able to return home 
after five years of captivity putting an end to the long ordeal that he and his 
family have endured. During my visits to Israel I personally shared my concerns 
and expressed the support of the EU and of the international community at large 
to Gilad’s family.884 
Even though hundreds of the Palestinian prisoners were children and administrative detainees 
who had been imprisoned contrary to IHL,
885
 not to mention the 40 or so PLC members and 
ministers who were in Israeli jails, the EU did not find it necessary to devote a special 
statement to the difficulties that they had encountered, or even to mention them loudly. This 
prompted the MEP Frieda Brepoels to question the Commission about Ashton’s failure to 
welcome the release of the Palestinians as she had done with Shalit, or to mention those who 
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remained in Israeli prisons. Although the answer received was not a direct response to this 
criticism, the EU Commission affirmed that it had prompted informal discussion with various 
human rights committees on issues related to the Palestinian prisoners.
886
 Again, the EU’s 
behaviour confirmed the double-standard policy used in the conflict in favour of Israel; 
reflecting the psychological aspects of the EU towards the parties in the ME conflict.     
Collective Punishment: What if it was the Opposite    
The blockade and its subsequent outcomes have been part of Israel’s collective punishment of 
the Palestinians and have been also carelessly dealt with by the EU. Targeting the Palestinian 
infrastructure, as well as using a policy of starvation against people under occupation, is one 
of the premeditated and excessive punishments being applied contrary to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. Indeed, by threatening and thereafter targeting the lives of civilians in Gaza as 
its reaction to some Palestinian attacks against it, Israel has shown no respect for the IHL, 
while the EU did virtually nothing to prevent Israel from applying such a policy. According 
to the Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni before the ‘Cast Lead’ war was launched against 
Gaza,         
It is an untenable situation that Israeli children should be under Kassam rocket 
attack on a daily basis, while life in the Gaza Strip carries on as usual. This is 
totally unacceptable. If life in Israel is not as usual, as it needs to be, neither will 
life in the Gaza Strip be as usual [sic].
887
 
Therefore, from the Israeli perspective the equation was obvious; Israel’s response to the 
primitive rockets
888
 fired from the Gaza Strip would be to ruin the lives of the Gazan people. 
Although not all Palestinians were involved in such military actions, in Livni’s view, their life 
should have been unusual; exactly as life for the Israelis was unusual. Furthermore, she 
threatened to use all possible means, even beyond military action, to turn Gaza into “a hell”, 
in a clear signal of Israel’s control over Gaza’s electricity, water, and imports and exports 
which could all be used in the fight against Hamas. In her words, 
Gaza is dependent on Israel and on Israel's willingness to continue letting it lead 
a certain type of life. I think we can, and should, think of using some of these 
means in order to convey the message that there is no such formula: we cannot 
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continue to accept a situation wherein kindergarten kids are under daily threat 
while in Gaza life continues as usual [sic].
 889
 
Thus, Israel’s subsequent use of such punishments against all civilians in Gaza was well-
planned at the political level in Israel, and deliberately implemented. The plan was clear 
since, as Livni said, Israel wanted to convoy a clear message to Hamas and other armed 
Palestinian factions to the effect that it was ‘Palestinian life versus the Israeli life’. Any 
inconvenience in Israel would be followed by inconvenience in Gaza. Even if those to whom 
this message was conveyed did not constitute the entire population of Gaza, the latter still had 
to pay the price collectively. This meant that innocent civilians would be the victims of the 
occupation that should have protected them. Even when rockets were shot by other 
Palestinian factions that diverged from Hamas’s position, it was Hamas that controlled Gaza, 
and Livni had no intention of looking at factional nuances. The only thing she knew was that 
life in Gaza “cannot go on there as normal.”890 The problem with this Israeli message, which 
was broadcast in separate press conferences with EUHR Solana and Italy’s Foreign Minister 
D’Alema, was that it became permanent policy against the Palestinians. Even though Israel’s 
threats and logic were against international law, the EU representatives expressed a 
significant level of indifference towards such statements and their consequential outcomes. 
Contrary to what had happened with Hamas, the EU did not regard Israel’s dangerous 
equation, as highlighted by Livni, as some kind of terrorism. Despite Israel’s frankness in 
justifying its policy against innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip and its subsequent crimes in 
Gaza, the EU dealt with this fact in its usual manner. Indeed, what made the Israeli formula 
acceptable to international society, in terms of not being reckoned an obvious terrorist state, 
would also make it valid in the case of Hamas. Hamas could equally well have said that, as 
far as Palestinian life was unusual as a result of the Israeli occupation, Israeli life would not 
be usual inside Israel. It could also have said that, as long as five million refugees were living 
miserably in camps, dispersed from their homes because of the occupation, the lives of five 
million Israelis would not carry on easily. Unless their lost homes, lands and properties were 
restored to the Palestinians, Hamas would not end its resistance against those who illegally 
controlled these valuable possessions. This Hamas logic, based on the reality that its 
resistance is simply in reaction to the Israeli occupation, has not been accepted by the EU; 
and because Hamas held such convictions it is as a result stigmatized as a terrorist 
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organization, while the same Israeli logic, practically applied, has been strikingly tolerated. 
Accordingly, the inconsistency of the EU’s values and its practices once again confirmed its 
double-standard policy and was charted in the Arab-Israeli conflict as favouring one party 
and strongly opposing the other.                      
Conclusion 
It is obvious that in the Palestinian context, there is a big gap between resistance and 
terrorism, both theoretically and in practice. While the IO is responsible for the violence that 
accompanies its policies in the Occupied Territories, resistance against the Occupation has 
been sustained by international law. However, controversial acts of resistance should be seen 
in their context as a reaction against specific anticipatory actions represented in the 
occupation itself, with all the instantiations that have challenged the core existence of the 
Palestinians on the ground. Indeed, there is no reaction without it being anticipated with an 
action by somebody; therefore, the resistance, either in Palestine or in any other occupied and 
colonized place, should be viewed from this perspective. If the actions of the armed groups 
should have been deemed as terrorism by the EU, the violence of a state, even if its name is 
Israel, should likewise have been deemed as terrorism.  
These socio-political concepts have stemmed from the EU’s previously-constructed 
perceptions of the two parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict and from contradictory meanings 
given to particular behaviours and policies followed by both. Against this background it 
appears highly significant that the EU’s recognition of the Israeli right of self-defence should 
have been at least accompanied by the belief in the right of resistance for those suffering 
under occupation, in accordance with the IHL. If the EU entity is a normative power driven, 
inter alia, by the rule of law, it should have looked at the two sides from this perspective. If 
the EU respects Israeli rights while turning its back on Hamas’s rights, this indicates the EU’s 
realistic agenda that is built on interests and the ‘balance of power’ principle, rather than the 
normative claimed considerations. Hence, the EU’s response to the violation of the IHL by 
both Israel and Hamas should be dealt with in the same way, so that it is seen to be a capable 
mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict; otherwise, the EU will not be in accord with the 
declared motivations and values of its own foreign policy.            
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Chapter Seven: The EU’s Perception of Israel as a Self-Driving Determinant  
 
 
‘It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to 
the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others’.891 
                  
 
 
This Chapter: Why and How 
This chapter is based on a major assumption to the effect that if we wish to understand the 
logic behind the European Union’s foreign policy towards Hamas, we have to identify how 
the EU perceives Hamas’s adversary, Israel. Indeed, when drawing up the EUFP towards 
Hamas, the most important actor to be taken into account in the EU’s external milieu is Israel 
– a constant Western reality that, since 1948, has been socio-politically, culturally and 
physically constructed in the ME, with full European assistance. Israel has been a European-
branded product that was carefully and intentionally embedded in this corner of the ME, i.e., 
in Palestine. Significantly, its direct and indirect influence is therefore of high importance, in 
terms of studying the EU’s FPDM towards those states or non-state actors that might threaten 
its core existence, or contradict the EU’s strategies concerning it. However, these strategies 
are based, inter alia, on settling the Israeli state within secure and permanent boundaries with 
peaceful relationships with its neighbours. Here the study focuses on examining the roots of 
the socially-constructed relationship between Christian Europe and the Jews over time, and 
how this socio-cultural association has been transformed from being a historical adversarial 
relationship into one of friendship and alliance.  
Significantly, FP decision-makers are generally used to being influenced by inter-subjective 
meanings generated from the process of interaction between a diversity of cultural, 
psychological, political and even religious factors. Therefore, beliefs, values and perceptions 
of the Europeans about Jews, and lately the state of Israel, will be duly emphasized.  Taking 
account of the fact that the constructivist school of thought deals with International Relations 
(IR) from an intersubjectively interactive perspective, the Judeo-Christian identity that 
dominates the strong Euro-Israeli bond and that has been socially produced and reproduced 
through various historical junctures, will be among the matters under investigation.  
                                                          
891
 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.  p. 28 
229 
 
An understanding of the ideological factors and the cultural backgrounds of the EU policies 
towards Hamas will be gained by articulating the reasons behind the deep internalization of 
the Israeli state in the European mentality. This will be compatible with the actor-structure 
approach adopted in this thesis, which involves analysis of the structure of the interior and 
exterior milieus of the actors, and out of which the Euro-Israeli relationship has arisen. In the 
second section, this will be further enhanced by scrutinizing some recent EU documents or 
speeches directed by leaders of the EU to the Israelis in different occasions which support our 
conclusions regarding the profound bond through which the two actors are associated, and 
that undoubtedly affects the DM process towards Hamas. 
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Section One: Constructing the Bond: Ideologically Inspired Socio-Political Process 
 
Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would 
attract our people with a force of marvellous potency…we should there form a 
portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to 
barbarism. We should as a neutral State remain in contact with all Europe, which 
would have to guarantee our existence. The sanctuaries of Christendom would be 
safeguarded by assigning to them an extra-territorial status such as is well-known to 
the law of nations. We should form a guard of honour about these sanctuaries, 
answering for the fulfilment of this duty with our existence. This guard of honour 
would be the great symbol of the solution of the Jewish question after eighteen 
centuries of Jewish suffering.
892
 
                                                                                                  Theodore Herzl 
 
Clash of Identities: Hamas vis-à-vis the EU and Israel 
The combining of perceptions between the Jewish community, represented latterly by 
Zionism, and European leaders from the 18th century onwards, provoked inter-socially 
constructed meanings which constituted the foundation of a continuing and strengthened 
relationship between the two actors. This collective and sympathetic perception towards 
Jews, which eventually resulted in 1922 in the Mandate by the Council of the League of 
Nations under the influence of the European superpowers, produced and legalized a new 
socially-constructed reality known as ‘the Jewish home land’. This new reality was based on 
historical acknowledgements, as mentioned in the Mandate, rather than on legal or lawful 
considerations.  After being legitimized by the UK mandate and the Council of the League of 
Nations the phrase was taken out of its historically-common cultural framework and 
considerably politicised. In fact, after repeating the substance of the 1917 Balfour 
Declaration, the Preamble to the League of Nations Mandate continued:  
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the 
Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national 
home in that country, the Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country 
under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the 
establishment of the Jewish national home, and the development of self-
governing institutions.
893 
 
 
Notably the text speaks of the history and the reconstituting of the Jewish national home 
which, according to Jewish narratives, had ended two thousand years of suffering. 
Interestingly, the confluence of the two actors’ perceptions of their interests in Palestine (a 
mixture of material and non-material considerations) interacted effectively and 
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intersubjectively,  constructing a new identity for Palestine, as well as a new identity for the 
European-Jewish coalition in the ME that is built on the Western Judeo-Christian perception 
of this sacred place.
894
 This identity has produced and reproduced through a process of 
interaction between the constitutive elements of the two actors over time, and has eventually 
crystalized in recent decades to become what has been politically seen as an entity that is 
strong and not subject to bargaining.  
Practically speaking, the new crystalized identity that came about with the British mandate to 
Palestine contradicted the very core existence of the Arabs in this area on the eve of that 
historical turning point, and affected the area’s long-defined Arab identity. The region has 
been therefore beset by a striking and inflammatory clash of identities which would 
eventually come to govern the entire political scene. Undoubtedly, the relationship with 
Hamas cannot be examined without an awareness of the way Hamas defends the Arab and 
Islamic identity by representing a vast current of people not only in Palestine but also in the 
Islamic World, while the EU and Israel together still defend the newly-created identity for 
Palestine that followed the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and establishment of the Mandate in 
1922.      
The European-Jewish vision of Palestine was compatible with the vision proposed by 
Theodor Herzl as a founder of Zionism, and the combined vision of the colonial states from 
that period onwards. According to Herzl, Israel would be the safeguard of Western 
civilization in the face of barbarism, and an outpost against an undeveloped and divergent 
Asia. As a result, according to Herzl, Europe should in return guarantee the security and 
existence of the Jewish state.895 Thus, the mutual roles and responsibilities with Europe in this 
regard were clearly defined from the Zionist perspective and the former would represent the 
other part of the equation. By the same token, the significance of the creation of a Jewish 
home in Palestine was highlighted by Herbert Samuel, who became the High Commissioner 
of Palestine in 1920 after the British occupation. In a memorandum to the War Cabinet, 
Samuel suggested that under UK protection, such a Jewish community would be of great 
importance to the UK by shielding Egypt from the potentiality of being constantly menaced 
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should Palestine fall into the hands of any other contradictory continental Power.896 Taking 
other considerations into account, this suggestion underlined the UK’s interest in the 
circumstances of WWI and the situation in the post-war era, and accordingly met Herzl’s 
perception of such a relationship between the two actors. 
This perception was promoted by another memorandum in 1939, describing the benefits 
which, in the event of war, the UK would gain by having a Jewish state in this specific corner 
of the world. As the memorandum revealed, the “Jewish population in Palestine would 
produce a disciplined army and be provided with wealth and industrial capacity for war 
production in that strategic corner of the world which would be an added source of strength to 
us in case of war.”897 Significantly, this assessment remained constant over time, especially 
during the Cold War period when Israel was perceived as the protector of Western interests in 
the ME, should these receive direct or indirect threats from any extension of Communism. In 
this case, in the opinion of the UK’s Prime Minister in 1979, Israel would be “the only one 
state in the region, which would stand up and fight beside the West against the extension of 
Communist influence”; similarly, “if the Middle East were to be the scene of a major 
East/West confrontation, Israel would probably be the West’s only ally.”898  
Hence, the bilateral perceptions of both Europe and Israel would define the steps and policies 
followed in Palestine, including more recently by Hamas as a movement that contradicts the 
bases around which this strong Euro-Israeli coalition is constructed. Consequently, the two 
crystallized identities that have been established around Palestine by the two sides have fallen 
into a conflict in which Hamas has been boycotted and its electoral triumph ignored. 
Historical Contextual Review of European-Jewish Relations  
 
Virtually the whole of Europe, with its 2000 years of history, bears the burden of 
the moral debt towards the Jewish people whose eradication was planned during a 
dark period of the century which is now coming to an end…. however, throughout 
that period in which the Christian religion had such a profound influence on the 
development of European societies, the collective curse borne by the Jewish people 
contributed greatly to its tragic destiny, that of a people cast out of the land of 
Abraham and then continually rejected or humiliated almost everywhere else. Anti-
Semitism, which fifty years ago produced the horrors we have heard and read so 
much about, has its roots in this long historical development which is common to 
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Europe as a whole. If we wish to see justice done, it is our duty to acknowledge it, 
and I do so now.899 
                             Nicole Fontaine 
Before the early religious reform movements in Europe during the 15th century and onwards, 
Jewish people living under Catholic hegemony in Europe and elsewhere, were barely able to 
gain their religious freedom due, inter alia, to the common belief in Europe that they were the 
killers of Jesus Christ.
900
 “This arch crime [sic] of ‘deicide,’ of murdering God, turned the 
Jews into the embodiment of evil, a ‘criminal people’ cursed by God and doomed to wander 
and suffer tribulation to the end of time.”901 Regardless of whether this perception was 
entirely correct or quite erroneous, this was the pretext used over time by Christian clergy in 
Europe against Jews whose rights were systematically violated and confiscated.
902
 According 
to Perry and Schweitzer, it is obvious that “without that Christian anti-Judaism, lethal and 
genocidal European anti-Semitism would have been either impossible or at least not widely 
successful.”903 In fact, this feeling, created an atmosphere of hostility and hatred toward Jews 
who had lived under its shadow, politically oppressed and socially isolated
904
 for a long 
time.
905
 
 From the 16th century and the European Religious Reform Movement (ERRM) that began in 
1517 with the Protestant Reform movement led by Martin Luther, collective European 
feeling against Jews witnessed a notable change. Significantly, amongst many issues which 
were subjected to revision in this period was the relationship with the Jewish community 
who, according to Luther, should have been better treated by Christians. Luther’s ideas were 
included in an important book, considered pro-Jewish, entitled That Jesus was Born as a Jew, 
which portrayed Jews in a more favourable light and contradicted popular beliefs in Europe 
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regarding the collective accusation of ancestral Jewish guilt against Jesus.
906
 This idea with 
its wider meanings is believed to be one of the driving factors of the support given to Israel 
by the EU, in the opinion of an official from the EEAS.
 907
   
Subsequently the importance of the value of the Jewish race was religiously internalized in 
the newly-generated atmosphere in Europe as something associated with the Christian 
doctrine of salvation that links the return of Jesus to earth with the return of Jews to ‘their’ 
land, ‘Palestine’, as commonly interpreted from the Old Testament.908 Ever since, 
establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine, as ‘a promised land’ given by God, has become 
some kind of interest for those known as ‘Evangelicals’,909 or later as Christian Zionists,910 
rather than being exclusively a Jewish interest. According to Stephen Spector, “the alliance 
that many born-again Christians offer to Israel and the Jewish people is astonishing to many 
Jews”, and as a Jew he, like many others, does not share the major dogmas that constitute the 
heart of evangelicalism.911 This matter shows the extent to which this widespread notion has 
become common in Western culture.
912
  
The chief biblical imperative to bless Israel is God’s promise to Abraham in 
Genesis 12:3, which promises a reward for those who bless the Jews and 
punishment for those who curse them: ‘I will bless those who bless you and 
curse him who curses you’. This verse is by far the most prominent reason that 
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evangelicals cite for their backing of the state of Israel.
913
 
Hence, this change in Christian perceptions of Jews has formed the basis on which 
cooperation between the two parties has observed its prominence and distinctiveness.   
Whereas the idea was not one of their concerns in the era of religious reform during the 16th 
century, Jewish societies believed for the next three hundred years or so that building such a 
state is solely God’s responsibility and not the task of a human being, contrary to the 
internalized and widespread convention amongst Evangelicals, who did not mind whether 
this mission is God-given or inspired by humans. During this period, no significant Jewish 
political movement developed, and no interesting common political aspirations were adopted 
until Theodor Herzl, with other Jewish leaders and associations, formed the Zionist 
movement which was equipped with a clear ideological and political background based on 
the need to build a Jewish state.
914
 At the first Zionist Conference, organized by Herzl and 
held in Basel in 1897, it was eventually agreed that this state was to be in Palestine as the best 
holy place in which such a state could be built, and around which the scattered Jewish 
populations could gather.
915
 At the same time, these moves were addressed to others who 
were religiously motivated and interested in the idea, including evangelical Christians who 
ably influenced, inter alia, generations of UK politicians and at the beginning of the 20th 
century were able to inspire famous historical figures, such as Arthur Balfour and Lloyd 
George, to lead various moves that favoured Jews.
916
        
For historical, socio-political issues and other causes within Jewish society itself or in the 
broader social environment, tangible expressions of hostility and hatred towards the Jewish 
people, prevailed in many parts of Europe and beyond.
917
 Significantly, this caused much 
suffering, to the extent that Jews were sometimes deprived of citizenship rights or even 
exiled, simply because they were Jews;
918
 a phenomenon known as ‘anti-Semitism’ that was 
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directly linked to what was known as ‘the Jewish question’.919 The instantiations of such a 
phenomenon emerged in Europe and had a disproportionate effect on the entire Jewish 
presence from one place to another. In fact, these problems in Europe and elsewhere were 
among the factors that later shaped the establishment of Zionism; they constituted the 
background against which relations between Europe and Jewish society had to be 
dramatically strengthened especially from the second part of the 20th century and beyond.     
Utilizing the Powerful and the Capable Actor  
Based on religious considerations and racial discrimination, the above-mentioned 
phenomenon rooted in Europe and substantially empowered the Zionist leaders, enabling 
them to function effectively and launch many manoeuvres aimed at achieving their objectives 
in Palestine; this implied the business of solving the Jewish question once and for all.
920
 This 
could only have been done through a cooperative relationship with the UK, the largest 
colonialist state at the time, by convincing it to assist Zionism to realize the dream of the 
Jewish people in Palestine.
921
 For many reasons related to the international context during the 
period of WWI,922 the necessity of ending what were known as the Eastern and Jewish 
questions,
923
 and the evangelical thinking that significantly affected decision makers,
924
 the 
demands of the leaders of Zionism were scrutinised by the UK, which accordingly decided to 
address them.
925
  
It is believed that an amalgam of these various factors has socio-politically and geo-
strategically pooled together, producing a socially-constructed result which was represented 
in the building of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Here, it was planned, the Jews would 
end their suffering on the one hand and the colonial powers would fulfil their aspirations 
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towards the legacy of the Ottoman Empire on the other. This, along with other policies that 
were pursued within the European societies themselves, required the Jewish state to come 
into existence to the advantage of those colonialists; a responsibility which the UK seized by 
issuing the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and subsequently approving this statement through 
the Mandate that was adopted by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922.
926
  
The historical international resolution confirming the Balfour Declaration, as represented in 
the Mandate, substantially reflected a very strong signal towards Jewish society and its status 
in the world, and meant that a new era of conflict in the ME was dramatically engendered. 
Thus, assisted by international society, as represented by the League of Nations and in 
particular by the UK as the main power responsible for the occupation of Palestine in 
WW1,927 the Zionist leaders succeeded in turning the dreams and aspirations of both Zionism 
and the pro-Zionist evangelical Christians on the one hand and the colonial states on the 
other, into a reality.  But this reality was in Palestine and was undertaken at the expense of 
another people; a matter that complicated the Jewish problem by transferring it from being 
initially a simple humanitarian task on the part of the Europeans to becoming ultimately a 
colonial interest with a religious embellishment. This articulated juncture in the Middle East 
would mark the path of politics for those countries, particularly in the West, interested in the 
region’s IR since the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Consequently, historical 
development in Palestine has become the basis on which all other policies and compromises 
or settlements have come to be dependent.    
In a nutshell, the Jewish question which had been problematic for many European states 
during the 19th and 20th centuries eventually found its concluding stage in Palestine in 1948, 
and thus, from the West’s perspective, it is no longer permitted to turn the clock back 
anymore.
928
 After the conflict had reached its peak during WWII between those who, based 
on a historical anti-Jewish image in Europe that mixed religious and socio-economic 
considerations and perceived the Jews as a bloc of evil, and those who associated Jews with 
the Christian image of a biblical people affected by the ERRM and the Age of Enlightenment, 
the historical conflict ended with the triumph of the latter groups who had successfully 
shaped a new collective Judeo-Christian bond.  
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Accordingly, it can be concluded that the historical clash of interests between the Jews and 
their original countries in Europe was dealt with over time within three frames, of which the 
first was through attempts of making a historical reconciliation with the Jews in Europe that 
benefited from the new political and ideological values that arose as a result of the ERRM in 
the 16th and 17th centuries, and the Age of Enlightenment that accompanied the French 
Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries.
929
 Within the framework of this reconciliation in 
Europe, the common values between Christians and Jews, based on ideological background, 
religious roots, and geopolitical interests, have been restored.930 Hence, the freedom and 
values generated enabled Jews to function politically and ideologically in Europe. The second 
frame was through creating a Jewish state in Palestine in which the political aspirations of the 
Zionists would find expression; this particular duty was the responsibility of the colonialist 
states, namely Britain and France which had paved the way in the ME during the colonial 
age. In this context, political relationships between Jewish leaders and politicians from 
European countries were considerably strengthened until the objective of both sides had been 
achieved in 1948.  
The third way has been seen in the continuing European commitment
931
 to the existence and 
security of Israel after being established in a hostile environment. Given the unanticipated 
massacres against the Jews in Germany and other European states during WWII and the 
episode of genocide commonly known as the Holocaust, a general collective reaction evolved 
in Europe, consisting of a mixture of sympathy and feeling of guilt towards the Jewish 
people. Significantly, the generating of such feelings pushed European states other than the 
UK and France to stand alongside Israel during its formation, as a way of compensating for 
Europe’s role, both direct and indirect, in the Holocaust.932 The strength of this commitment 
towards the security and existence of the nascent Jewish state has differed proportionally 
from one state to another, according to the part played in the catastrophe which took place in 
Europe, and to the influence of the Jews or their evangelical supporters in an individual 
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country. The latter, according to Ilan Pappe, are still to some extent affecting the DM process 
amongst EU politicians,
933
 a matter that has given the Israeli state a kind of immunity in 
international society and made it feel that it is a great and powerful state. The collective 
European commitment, in addition to other internally-implemented policies in Europe 
regarding the fate of the Jews, reflects the extent to which the coalition with the new state is 
strong and based on a solid cognitive background that was basically constituted following 
WWII.   
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Section Two: European Leaders’ Perceptions of Israel Indestructible Promise 
 
 
 
Europe and Israel need each other. Neither is conceivable without close ties 
between the two. Europe is fully aware of this interdependence, and wishes to give 
it a constructive role, recognising its importance in full. The only way to overcome 
the many remaining difficulties is to walk towards the future together.
934
  
                Josep Borrell Fontelles 
 
Collective perceptions of Israel in the discourse of the EU leaders over time reflect the nature 
of commitment the EU has made to Israel’s security and existence. Significantly, their 
religiously-based discourse and historically-affected speeches, directed on various occasions 
to the Israelis, are very telling in terms of why the EU deals with parties of the conflict in a 
differing manner. However, the Hamas’s discourse is the reverse of all attitudes which 
adopted by the EU leaders towards this conflict. Significantly, Hamas preserves its discourse 
by claiming that all of Palestine, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, is wholly 
the property of the Palestinians and the entire Islamic ‘umma’, as confirmed in its 
documents.
935
 It is therefore undoubtedly the case that those Europeans whose policy in the 
region is based on the reality of Israel being in existence – and having to remain in existence 
within secure and peaceful boundaries – would stand beside Israel if and when its security is 
jeopardized.  
In the following analysis this profound relationship and the way European leaders have 
perceived Israel will be underlined in order to understand the extent to which the relationship 
is socially constructed, produced and reproduced, and how it might be subjected to another 
reproductive process under certain circumstances in the future. This is to affirm that the EU’s 
position on Hamas is part of the ‘game of axes’,936 where the EU has aligned itself decisively 
with one party against the other in the Hamas-Israel context. Thus, figuring out the incentives 
behind the EU’s policy towards Hamas will be clearly understood in light of the documents 
under analysis. Unearthing this reality by the end of the analysis, will enable the 
inconsistency of the EUFP towards Hamas to be interpreted unequivocally.   
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Israel as a Stronghold of European and Western Jewish-Christian Culture  
As confirmed by many of the EU officials interviewed in Brussels, the European vision of 
Israel is based on a diversity of factors, including history, culture, Holocaust, economy and 
politics.
937
 However, cultural influence is the most solid and expressive of these features, and 
identifying Israel as part of European heritage and culture, and thereby one of the organic 
elements of Western civilization, is indeed a significant determinant of the relationship 
between the EU and Israel. To a large extent, the mixture of religion and geopolitical realities 
in a geostrategic region fosters the foundations on which the policies of actors are usually 
built. Hence, being proud of such a Jewish-Christian culture, the EU reveals the depth of such 
European perceptions of Israel and the extent to which the EU is ready to stand for Israel 
when there is a need for action. 
However, when the major driving actors of the EU and marginal actors alike, as well as high-
ranking figures in the EU voice their beliefs about the meaning of Israel and the role it 
represents in the ME, then there is no alternative but to recognize this cultural background 
which casts its shadow on the allied partners: the EU and Israel.         
We respect Israel’s heritage, which is part of our own European heritage. 
Whenever we deride our Jewish heritage in Europe, we deride our own values. 
Whenever we show contempt for Israel’s contribution to our own civilisation, 
we show contempt for a valuable aspect of our own identity. Whenever we deny 
the incalculable suffering of the Jewish people, we deny the basis of our own 
dignity. Ladies and gentlemen, our continent’s Judaeo-Christian heritage has 
been decisive in shaping the shared values of today’s European Union.938 
In this way Hans-Gert Pöttering, President of the European Parliament (PEP), expressed 
European convictions about the reality of Israel. In his speech to members of the Israeli 
Knesset a year after Hamas’s electoral victory in the the PA elections in 2006 and just two 
months before it seized the Gaza Strip in 2007, he stated that Israel is part of “our own 
European heritage”, “our own civilization”, “our own identity”, “our own dignity”, and “our 
continent’s Judaeo-Christian heritage” which have combined to shape the shared values of 
the EU and Israel, and had brought them close to each other as partners. 
This understanding is compatible with other discourses delivered by major European leaders 
at different times. Indeed, Lord Plumb of Coleshill, a previous PEP, had stressed the same 
meanings in the same surroundings, 18 years earlier, confirming European awareness of the 
                                                          
937
 Author’s Interviews, 'Marc Otte, Margrete Auken, Paul Murphy, Kyriacos Triantaphyllides and Others', 
(Brussels, June- October 2012). 
938
 Pöttering, 'Speech by the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering to the Knesset'. 
242 
 
nature of the relationship between the EU and Israel that has been constructed on profound 
cultural, historical and political associations, building a strong alliance between the two 
parties.
939
 Furthermore, speaking on behalf of the EC, he believed that Israel’s “sacrifices” 
and the continuity of its sacrificing are “to preserve our ideals”. Despite the fact that Hamas 
had made its appearance just a year before this speech, and that the First Intifada (1987-1993) 
was at its peak, mentioning the continuous Israeli “sacrifices” in this context on behalf of 
European “ideals” was eye-catching; and a matter that could be interpreted in light of the 
cultural bond between the EU and Israel.  
By the same token, the PEP Jerzy Buzek (2009), when directing his speech to the Israelis, 
reminded them that they are “an extension of Europe, its part”. Interestingly, his speech, 
delivered four years after Pöttering’s discourse, also highlighted the same meanings, 
confirming the Euro-Israeli relationship as belonging to the same “community of values” and 
“common heritage” as well as the same kind of democracies and ideals which, according to 
him, should when combined “be at the core of our common action”.940 These agreed 
definitions by the three EP presidents of the relationship between the EU and Israel over time, 
inevitably stemmed from a common cultural background which obviously indicated the 
nature of the perception of Israel held by the EU.    
The Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi considered that “our” faith, Jewish-Christian 
culture, and the European-Jewish “perceptions of people and history” are the bases which 
steer both parties towards democracy and defend liberty for all people of the world. In 
Berlusconi’s opinion, as delivered in a speech to the Knesset in 2010, this uniting of culture 
and values had transformed Israel “into a fort of European and Western culture…as one 
based on the superiority and greatness of the man made in God’s image”. Thus Israel, based 
on such cultural values, is a true democratic state which deserved to celebrate its construction 
on values of freedom and justice, a matter that puts it on the same level as European 
democracies. Therefore, these uniting values, guided by a Jewish-Christian heritage, have 
given the Israeli state the meaning of being a fortress for the West in its conflict with 
contradictory ‘others’ in the East, as well as making it a symbol of this option of freedom and 
democracy beyond the boundaries of the West.
941
 It is worth noting that Berlusconi’s rhetoric 
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followed a severe war on Gaza in which Israel was condemned for perpetrating war crimes 
by targeting civilians and using excessive and disproportionate force in its confrontation with 
Hamas in 2008/9.
942
  
In their interpretation of the strong relationship with Israel, a member of the EEAS who 
preferred not to be named,
943
 as well as Christian Berger
944
 from the EEAS and Ivo Vajgl 
from the EP
945
  all considered that this kind of common and rooted culture is undoubtedly one 
of the major determinants behind the EU’s support for the Jewish state.   
This was also perceived by José María Aznar, Spanish Prime Minister between 1996 and 
2004, and Jerzy Buzek, both of whom regarded Israel as “a fundamental part of the West”, 
and its history as part of European history. Both considered too, that the Western, European 
and Israeli destinies are inseparably intertwined.
946
 After reminding the West of its Judeo-
Christian roots, Aznar emphasized that “if the Jewish element of those roots is upturned and 
Israel is lost, then we are lost too”.947 Significantly, Aznar, as a well-known politician, 
understood that the culturally and geopolitically constructed European-Israeli identity is 
something that belongs to the same civilization. Thus, defending Jewish identity and 
existence and giving it strong shoulder is one of the requirements of defending oneself. The 
problem of the European side is that it does not make much effort when Judaeo-Christian 
values are challenged by others who target the Israeli state which, in his view, belongs to the 
Western front.
948
 As he repeatedly asserted, the West must never forget the meaning and the 
message behind the existence of Israel; “Israel is on our side in the battle against Islamism 
and terror”. In such a conflict between what he perceived as Judaeo-Christian values and 
Islamists and terrorism, Israel has constituted a bulwark of Western culture and 
civilization.
949
 In such a context, Hamas – believed by the EU to be one of the “terrorist 
organisations” that has challenged Israel and the whole colonial project behind it – 
represented per se an element of the ‘other’ front that encountered the very core of the West’s 
Jewish-Christian identity.    
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These European feelings of ‘belonging’ towards Israel were then widened to encompass the 
whole of mankind. Surprisingly, as viewed by Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘Israel’ did not mean simply 
“the fulfilment of a promise at the heart of Jewish identity”, or “a return to Jewish roots”, but 
was a modern, forward-thinking and nationally- and universally-geared state that belongs to 
all humankind. In his words,   
the State of Israel doesn’t belong only to its citizens; it also belongs to all those 
in the world who see themselves as heirs to Judaism. The State of Israel also 
belongs to all mankind, because the values underpinning it are universal values. 
These are values of justice and law.
950
 
Thus, from his standpoint Israel is a valuable and unique entity that should be embraced by 
all who consider themselves as heirs or successors to Judaism, which in the first place means 
Christians. But according to Sarkozy, this is not enough, and in fact Israel belongs to all 
people in the world due to its symbolic reality, built on the underpinning principles of 
integrity and morals. This means that the protection of Israel is the responsibility not only of 
the heirs of Judaism, but also of the entire world. Strikingly, Israel, the ‘occupation state’ 
according to international law, which has been responsible for the Palestinian refugee 
phenomenon and much devastation on the ground since 1948, is from such a perspective a 
universal entity because of its founding values and significant culture. Evoking these 
meanings in such a context and in such a way reflects the extent to which the European 
leaders are prepared to take a neutral mediatory role in the Arab-Israeli conflict or, in 
particular, a balanced relationship with Hamas whose ideology is built on contrary 
convictions.        
This highly-motivated cultural discourse has significantly highlighted certain aspects of the 
backgroud of the EU’s policy regarding Israel’s security and status. In fact, Pöttering, Lord 
Plumb, Buzek, Berlusconi, Aznar and Sarkozy are merely examples of important European 
leaders who have spoken to, or about, Israel, influenced by a common recognized culture and 
heritage. In his interpretation of such EU-Israel relations, an unnamed EEAS member 
claimed that by being, in effect, Christian Europe’s older brothers, the Jews have received 
such support from the EU.
951
 While this produced and re-produced identity was alive in 
certain areas in Europe long before the establishment of Israel, it has been collectively 
characterized and recognized in the continent after WWII. This identity has played a 
momentous role in designing over time the EU’s relations with Hamas and across the ME. 
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However, due to the sensitivity of the responses to which it might give rise it is not political 
speech made on a daily basis.   
Unbreakable Friendship with Israel No Place for Hamas 
The socially, culturally and politically-constructed friendship between the two actors that is 
under investigation is a solid mixture of physical and non-physical visions that has drastically 
overcome a diversity of rigorous historical circumstances through which this relationship has 
collectively seen the light. This was clearly expressed in a remarkable talk delivered in 2008 
to the Israeli Knesset by Angela Merkel, the Federal Chancellor of Germany, to the effect 
that,  
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that Israel and Germany, Israel and 
Europe are such partners – linked by shared values, linked by shared challenges 
and linked by shared interests. For stability, economic prosperity, security and 
peace, both in Europe and in this region, are in our mutual interest.
952 
 
 
According to Merkel, “the power of trust”, inspired by shared values of democracy, freedom 
and respect for human rights, has strengthened the bond between Germany and Israel.
953
 
Therefore, this power that has dominated these incrementally-constructed relations after 
WWII has had significant roots in the rediscovered system of common values and culture to 
which both states perceived themselves as belonging. Based on this reality, it could be 
assumed that a strong and unbreakable friendship has arisen between Israel and the EU in 
general. Essentially this value-based friendship has been the most important factor in 
determining the extent to which the EU might have the intention and the fortitude to escalate 
confrontation with Israel in times of disagreement over specific Israeli policies. Therefore, 
policies and behaviour that would have required immediate action had they come from other 
states, had in Israel’s case been tolerated.  
Thus, for example, the Israeli war against Gaza in 2008/09 with its severe outcomes did not 
provoke a parallel reaction from the EU side, which merely launched some condemnatory 
statements without living up to its commitments to human rights and peace as the supposed 
driving EU principles. Moreover, it is known that the EU has opposed the construction of 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank considering these to be an obstacle that substantially 
hindered the peace process and contradicted negotiations between the Israelis and 
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Palestinians. But despite this position, the EU actually did very little, failing to exert any 
obvious pressure to get Israel back on the peace negotiation track or to stop its policy. This 
lack of reaction from the EU side cannot, in fact, be understood without scrutinizing the high 
appreciation the EU holds for Israel and the depth of the friendly relations between them.                  
Indeed, the description and the interpretation of such a friendship can easily be found in the 
rare speeches by EU leaders and other documents that have mainly been presented in the 
Knesset. These documents are used to setting Israel apart and portraying it as a unique state 
in terms of its democratic system in the ME and its significant cultural identity. Generally 
speaking, the amiable connections between these friends are principally rooted in “our 
common culture and fate”, as stated by Berlusconi,954 or based on historical, cultural and 
religious factors, in addition to material interests, as confirmed by the PEP Baron Crespo in 
1991.955 From Sarkozy’s standpoint, the deep friendship that has prevailed between the 
French people and Israel since its establishment has arisen not only from the Jewish 
community in France and the Francophone Jews in Israel but also from something deeper. 
[it is] due too to the way in which Judaism has influenced, nourished and 
enriched French culture, to the inspiration the founding fathers of Israel drew 
from the values of French universalism. It’s due to the close economic, scientific, 
cultural, technical and intellectual ties, and also quite simply the human ties 
which our two peoples naturally forged so well together.
956  
In the same vein, Laszlo Solyom, President of the Republic of Hungary, confirmed this strong 
history and the significant contribution of the Jews to Hungary’s economy and culture, 
especially in the latter half of the 19th century. This contribution to Hungary’s heritage 
alongside Israel’s own cutural, political and economic achievements had, he claimed, made 
the Hungarian friendship with Israel of such significance.
957
  
This was similarly addressed by Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of 
Poland (2000) who ascribed the strong bonds between the Poles and Israel to the fact that 
“Poland and Israel are heirs to one of the most unusual chapters of human history”.958 
According to Kwasniewski, the ancient links that had brought Jews and Poles together in 
building the bright pages of Polish-Jewish history were very vital because of their outcomes, 
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and represented “outstanding works of culture, a climate of tolerance unprecedented in that 
part of Europe and a great spiritual and religious development”. While standing at the 
Knesset podium he reminded the Israelis of the common socio-cultural issues between the 
two states, pointing out that Poland for eight hundred years had been “an important Jewish 
centre of science, Talmud studies and seminaries, arts, poetry, literature, philosophy and 
theology”, and that Poland and Israel must strengthen their relationship universally and 
cooperate against any evil that tries to ruin their lives.
959
 Similarly, Jerzy Buzek, as a former 
Prime Minister of Poland before later becoming PEP, expressed his pride in the role played 
by the Polish people in building the homeland of the Jews.
960
  
With regard to the UK discourse, the former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, standing on the 
same platform in 2008, in an obvious gesture to the historical role the British had played in 
the region between 1917 and 1948, was also very clear in expressing his feelings of pride that 
British Jews and the British people, in general, had distinguished themselves in helping to 
achieve the Jewish endeavour in Palestine. As Brown commented, this matter had 
established, described, and underpinned facts “based on shared values of liberty, democracy 
and justice”, on which an “unbreakable” friendly partnership with Israel has been 
strengthened.961  
Due to these common normative values between the EU and Israel, the latter, according to 
the PEP Josep Fontelles, has become “a natural partner” to the former.962 By scrutinizing the 
rest of the speeches of other EU leaders, this common ground, presented in relation to the 
EU-Israeli friendship, has been focused on repeatedly, in an attempt to justify the way in 
which Europeans have internalized the Israeli state since WWII.    
Religiously-Affected European Discourse: Historically-Based Narrative     
Not only has the EU discourse internalised Israel within the values system that has dominated 
Europe, but it has also revealed its adoption of the religiously-articulated Israeli narrative 
about the meaning of Israel and its interpretation of historically-perceived Jewish rights in 
Palestine. Significantly, Israel as ‘a homeland’ for the Jews, which had been fragmented more 
than 2000 years ago before being re-established in 1948, is a narrative that the EU leaders 
have openly supported, adopting the Zionist point of view with regard to the historical right 
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of the Jews in Palestine.
963
 Therefore, the “homeland of the Jewish people”,964 the “ancient 
dream”,965 the lost homeland”,966 the “land of Israel”,967 and the “promised land”968 are all 
normal descriptive conceptions of Palestine that are to be found in the speeches of EU 
leaders, in their attempts to show their support for Israel.  
Thus these leaders, based on historical perspective, believe that the Jewish people who were 
displaced from Palestine “after the destruction of the temple”969 and persecuted over time, 
have the right to return to the land of which they have been collectively deprived. According 
to the PEP Enrico Baron Crespo, Israel is “the prime example of a people scattered by force 
and violence and seeking to re-establish itself in the lost homeland”.970 To put it more simply, 
the distressing history of Jews in the world at large is the justification cited for their claimed 
right to rebuild their country in the so-called “lost homeland”.  
These meanings are, in fact, the same as those of Gordon Brown, a former UK Prime Minster 
who celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of “the achievement of 1948” in the Israeli Knesset. 
He considered that, by the re-establishment of Israel, “the centuries of exile (were) ended, the 
age-long dream (was) realised, the ancient promise redeemed”, and declared that the Jewish 
people has returned home, following the steps of their ancestors in the fields and coastlines of 
Israel.
971
 Those ancestors, according to Brown were those who have inspired the new Jewish 
generation who “gorgeously” proved to the world that “the human spirit is, indeed, 
indomitable”, forgetting, that this so-called “achievement” in 1948 had caused displacement 
for millions of Palestinians who have been homeless ever since. Furthermore, Brown 
regarded this so-called achievement as an embodiment of justice after two thousand years of 
struggling and battling against oppression and exile, and cited the testimony of the prophet 
Amos – that “justice would roll down like a river and righteousness like an ever-flowing 
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stream”.972 Thus, given the historical suffering of the Jews over time, Israel, from Brown’s 
standpoint, represents one of the instantiations of the justice which it has deserved; a matter 
that also reflects his ignorance of the Palestinian suffering arising out of this so-called 
‘justice’.        
Regardless of the meanings of such expressions, which consider history and religion rather 
than evidence, and official documents as the bases of international legitimacy, EU leaders 
have constantly persisted in emphasising this perception of Israel. Therefore, it is probably 
not surprising that the structure of the language used by Europeans in this context appears 
historically and religiously-motivated, and that the ideological background of their discourse 
is thus clearly felt – a matter that emphasizes the extent to which the common intellectual 
base for both actors overlaps and intertwines. As is commonly known, approving any claims 
about property anywhere according to international law is based on legal arguments and 
formal documents rather than on historical claims or fabrications. In light of historical logic, 
even if such claims were genuine in their historical context, if legalizing historical Jewish 
claims was right, dozens of other claims around the world would have to be legalized as well; 
a matter which would open the door to endless claims around the world to be seen by all; let 
alone that this would have to be done by enforcing the law, rather than taking place in a 
colonial context as happened exceptionally with the Jews.  
The inconsistency in this unprecedented European policy is represented in the adoption of 
normative agendas as objectives of the EU’s foreign policy, while allowing history and 
religion to reflect their commitment and support for one party rather than the other. This, in 
fact, continues to be the case, even though the other party has all the evidence confirming 
ownership of the land, and even though dozens of international resolutions have been issued 
by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council as well approving and confirming the 
rights of Palestinians in their country, including, for example, Nos. 181, 194, 224, 338 and 
others.   
The politicians in the EU’s decision-making circles, like the major leaders in Europe, have 
clearly expressed the extent to which they have been moved and affected by the literature and 
religion of the Jewish founders. As well as more recent EU officials, one could also cite 
Lloyd George, Prime Minster of the UK during WWI who was driven, inter alia, by religious 
motivation towards the notion of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He is a startling example of 
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an individual who justified Britain’s pro-Jewish policy from 1917 onwards; when lecturing 
on the role that the UK played in favour of Jews, he described himself as a Zionist who had 
absorbed Jewish culture and heritage and become “imbued with the history” of the Jewish 
race.
973
  
By the same token, the former PEP Hans-Gert Pöttering cited the Jewish heritage and thought 
several times in his speech to the Knesset, confirming his belief in the statement attributed to 
Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion (“Anyone who does not believe in miracles is 
not a realist”), and internalizing the reality of Israel as a miracle that should continue the 
ways of its ancestors in manufacturing miracles.
974
 In the same vein, the President of 
Germany, Johannes Rau stated the same conclusion when referring to President Weizman’s 
memorable talk about the Jewish generations who had passed “from the Pillar of Fire of the 
Exodus from Egypt to the pillars of smoke from the Shoah [sic]”, and when recalling 
Weizman’s tribute to the land of Abraham that had again influenced the recent history by 
bringing forth the state of Israel.
975
  
Similarly, Sarkozy perceived the Jewish state as a collective identity consisting of collective 
values stemming from “the universal values” that “the prophets of Israel” had taught all 
mankind. Interestingly, he mentioned Herzl’s statement to the effect that “if you will it, it will 
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be no legend”, as if to say that the reestablishment of Israel is no longer a legend but has 
become a reality based on the teachings of the prophets; a matter that was considered a 
Jewish triumph over the obstacles of history. Sarkozy repeated what he considered as fact, 
i.e., that the Israeli state is an instantiation of the words of the Bible which the world’s Jews 
have not stopped teaching their children. This was to the effect that: “The Lord said to Moses, 
‘Go up into this mountain of Ab’arim, and see the land which I have given to the people of 
Israel [sic]”.976  
In addition to this significant discourse, Sarkozy felt the secret of Israel’s success during the 
past 60 years lay in “the prophetic spirit” of Judaism which he considered as “responsible” 
for the progress and justice that Israel represents. In his view, Judaism is more than just a 
traditional religion; it is a way of life and a way of thinking “moulded by a singular 
relationship to biblical texts”, as well as a religion for the survival and advantages of which 
Israel’s founders had fought.977 He also perceived Israel as a preface for the coming era of 
pleasure and happiness that would predominate in Jerusalem and has been long awaited. As 
he declared, in the words of the Prophet Isaiah: “I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and be glad in my 
people; no more shall be heard in it the sound of weeping and the cry of distress. They shall 
build houses and inhabit them; they shall plant vineyards and eat their fruit. They shall not 
labour in vain, or bear children for calamity.” 978  
This religiously-raised perception of Israel in the eyes of certain important European figures 
shows how deeply Israel has been positioned in the European mentality, and how it has 
become part of the beliefs and thoughts of the decision-makers. It is obvious that politics is 
not the only determinant of such a perception of Israel; it is first and foremost the cultural 
factor, affected by both history and religion. Significantly, when dealing with Hamas, this 
matter forms an understanding that accepts neither the political nor the cultural-religious 
aspects of such a relationship, and that even fights the very core of the logic of the European 
leaders.         
When the Holocaust has Melted Differences towards Jews  
The EU’s FP towards Hamas and other similar entities, which contradict the existence of 
Israel or policies in the ME and elsewhere, has been affected by events that occurred in 
Europe in the first half of the 20th century. According to Phil Bennion, a member of the 
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delegation for relations with the PLC, Israel came about as a result of war in Europe, which is 
why Europe has had a historical responsibility towards Israel.
979
 Indeed, genocide perpetrated 
against Jews during WWII has left a significant imprint on European mentalities, and has 
since affected their decision-making process towards the Jewish community, Israel, and even 
Israel’s enemies thereafter. Evidently, those who usually plan foreign policies towards other 
actors find themselves affected by various factors pertaining to interests, culture, 
environment, religion and psychology. 
In the case of the EU and Israel after the Holocaust, the latter has been sympathetically 
internalized into the mentality of the former after having been culturally, religiously and 
politically adopted, and this has had a significant effect on the EU’s decision-making process, 
not only towards Hamas but also towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in general. In the opinion 
of MEP Jarmo Oikarinen, “there is a common sense in Europe that a truly heroic event 
happened against the Jewish people in World War Two, and this sense has played a 
significant role in emphasizing the idea that the Israeli state should live in peace.”980 
Therefore, it has become extremely difficult to read European policy in this area without 
taking into consideration the way European leaders have become captive to and dependant on 
events that dominated a specific period of time in Europe. In Sarkozy’s view,         
no one can think of Israel without thinking of the history of the Jewish people. 
No one can think of Israel without remembering the pogroms, sealed trains and 
gas chambers. No one can think of Israel without thinking of Captain Dreyfus 
before his judges, of the women who died of typhus in the death camps and all 
the martyred children remembered at Yad Vashem.
981
 
These massacres left Europe experiencing guilt for the fate that befell the Jewish people in 
WWII. Significantly, European leaders over time believe that the perpetrators who took their 
personal guilt at killing Jews to their graves, left consequences to subsequent generations to 
bear the moral responsibility for these crimes; a matter that, as Johannes Rau, a previous 
German President, remarked, lies in the Judaeo-Christian faiths and in common traditions.
982
 
From the perspective of Austrian President Thomas Klestil, in order not to fall again into evil, 
the Austrian people must look at the past or what he called the “historical truth”, i.e., the 
Holocaust, when Austrian Jews were suppressed, humiliated and forced to leave Austria, 
their native land. He expressed his people’s regret at not having done very much for both “the 
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survivors of the Jewish tragedy and the victims’ descendants.” According to Klestil, this 
essential remembrance is so vital for helping Austrians to understand how to behave and to 
build trust with the people of Israel in the present and the future alike, considering that no 
apology could ever “expunge the agony of the Holocaust”.983   
In fact, the Holocaust has become part of the historical awareness of the Europeans which, in 
Brown’s words, “everyone who loves humanity needs to know”. Interestingly, he recalled the 
Israeli Knesset member Tommy Lapid, who proclaimed that his “whole life [was] a response 
to the Holocaust”, to assert the significance of genocide in steering him towards Israel. He 
considered that after a journey of two thousand years of suppression and exile, the suffering 
of the Jews has found its end and a solution in Palestine, in which Jews have reconstructed 
their freedom and their home. Jewish people, in his view, had endured all pogroms and the 
horror of the Holocaust because they had no home and this plight should not be allowed to re-
emerge in contemporary history.
984
 Thus, Brown  perceived Israel not only as a solution for 
the Holocaust in the 20th century but also a solution for the millennium Jewish history of 
banishment and suppression.  
In  the same vein, Sarkozy asserted that as a home of the Jewish people, Israel is “a response 
to the injustice” from which they had suffered over time. Due to these considerations, 
according to the speaker, Israel is now the only place in the world where Jewish people can 
wear whatever they want,  live whereever they want, where “Jews won’t be prohibited from 
taking buses, going to the cinema and theatre, holding certain jobs or going to Jews-only 
restaurants, shops and schools.”985 In these statements Sarkozy referred to history when, 
because of racial considerations, Jews had been obliged to wear, work, study, and live in 
particular places that had been prescribed and/or set aside for them in Europe at that 
particular time.     
For most European leaders the genocide that occurred in Europe against Jews has meant that 
the world after the Holocaust ought not to be the same as it was before. According to the 
President of the Republic of Poland, “the experience of the Holocaust will never disappear 
from our memory”.986 Hence, anti-semitism, in addition to other racial phenomena that have 
accompanied the Jews for a long time, is no longer  allowed to appear in the world due to its 
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fatal results which were seen in the 20th century, or in Merkel’s words “because otherwise all 
of us – German society as a whole, the European community, the democratic foundations of 
our countries – would be placed in jeopardy.”987 Substantially, the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust has thus caused a European leader to believe, for instance, that those who deny and 
doubt the event or underestimate its importance are not from the civilized nations and must 
not be accepted in their framework.  
The tragedy perpetrated against Jews meant, according to Buzek, one of the PEPs, that it was 
not only a European tragedy but was also “a stain on the history of humankind”. Speaking 
sympathetically, he suggested that the personal and collective duty of Europeans and the 
entire world is to make sure that nothing similar to the Holocaust could be perpetrated in the 
future; therefore, the fight against anti-semitism should be launched by the whole world, not 
just by Europeans.
988
 This was also confirmed by Fontaine, another PEP who felt the majority 
of Europeans have acknowledged collective responsibility for the crime that was committed 
against humankind through targeting Jews, and that this fact must be kept alive in the 
memories of generations to come, as a collective European duty. Hence, he believed the 
relations that tend to bring Israel and the EU together are significantly marked by memories 
of WWII and the Holocaust.989 In this regard, however, history means responsibility towards 
victims; this, as Johannes Rau, President of Germany maintained, begins with education in 
schools about the security of the Jewish community and  how it is no longer the object of 
another persecution.
990
  
In addition, responsibility for the Holocaust has become part of the European identity which 
has to be protected against being forgotten or revived.
991
 This responsibility, as the major 
European representatives have repeatedly confirmed over time, must remain part of the 
European present, and must be “passed on from one generation to the next”. According to 
Horst Köhler, when addressing the Israelis “we must understand, all of us, that the victims of 
the Shoah have given us a mandate: never to allow genocide to happen again”, and that this 
responsibility has also to be held by new generations because of their role in shaping the 
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future.
992
 These endeavours have been proved by actions and deeds, rather than talks and 
words. As Merkel put it, “memories must constantly be recalled; thoughts must become 
words, and words deeds”,993 and these deeds are explicitly felt when the Germans stand with 
Israel. For that reason, as Horst mentioned, it is a fundamental principle of EU policy that 
Israel can enjoy an assured status while living within internationally-recognized borders, and 
in a state “free of fear and terror”.994 Anything that might affect this “incontrovertible” 
principle would not be tolerated in the political arena.  
Significantly, the psychological element has constituted a major factor in steering Europe’s 
policies towards Israel. Given collective European guilt about the Holocaust, the inherited 
feelings of shame and responsibility have played a significant role in determining Europe’s 
foreign policy towards Israel and its enemies alike. The following quotations from speeches 
given in the Knesset by various European leaders describe how the Holocaust has affected 
them psychologically.   
The Shoah fills us Germans with shame. I bow my head before the victims. I 
bow before the survivors and before all those who helped them so they could 
survive.
995
  
I am speaking on behalf of that Croatia which bows with respect and reverence 
to the memory of the millions of the victims of the Holocaust….I am using 
every opportunity to ask for forgiveness from all those who were harmed by the 
Croats at any time.
996
  
Neither of our parliaments can forget - nor should we forget - the dark side of 
the history of our respective peoples.
997
  
We in Europe will never forget the terrible, unparalleled suffering inflicted on 
the Jewish people. That this suffering was inflicted in the name of my own 
people, the German people, fills me with shame.
 998 
We Germans, too, will be accompanied for all time to come by the images of the 
murders for which Germans bear responsibility.
999
  
When I bowed my head at Yad Vashem today morning, it was in respect for the 
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victims and with responsibility for the future.
1000
 
It is obvious that the feelings described demonstrate the very strong link between such 
feelings and responsibility for the future of Jews, which the Europeans believe will prevent 
such a crime or any of its potential precursors from ever happening again. In this regard, the 
leaders claim, it is crucial that knowledge of the history of this genocide is “handed down 
from one generation to the next”,1001 in order to protect people’s memories and stop them 
from forgetting the responsibilities left to them by their long-deceased forefathers. In other 
words, it is essential for new generations of European citizens to protect the future of Israel 
(which represents Jews throughout the world), from threats to its existence, as a kind of 
compensation for the guilt incurred by their ancestors.1002 Consequently, Europe “with its 
2000 years of history, bears the burden of the moral debt towards the Jewish people”, whose 
suffering has been caused by Europeans throughout history including the Holocaust 
period.
1003 
This moral debt reflects the quality of support that the Europeans grant to Israel in 
its conflict with Hamas, whose ideology is built on ideas, thoughts and behaviours which 
threaten Israel by endangering its security and the stability of the entire Middle East.      
Admiration of the Jewish People and their State ‘Thanks to their mere Existence’  
Another psychological factor affecting the European leaders in their attitude towards Israel, 
as can be deduced from their speeches, is the admiration for the Israel’s achievements, 
progress, and symbolic status. The major EU leaders believe that the uniqueness of the Israeli 
state is represented in its existence out of nothingness, its people’s capacity to gather there 
from around the world, its ability to build an exceptional example of democracy in the ME, 
and its contribution to the world’s scientific accomplishments. The way it has withstood the 
threat of terrorism, wars and hostility has also attracted the attention of these European 
leaders, who regard Israel’s triumph in the face of such threats as an unprecedented success 
of which the Israelis deserve to be proud. As Gordon Brown said in his speech to the Knesset      
For two thousand years, you lifted the artistic and cultural life and the scientific 
and political development of every continent…. From draining the swamps in 
the 20th Century to pioneering electric cars in the 21st, your history of ingenuity 
is a lesson in the boundless capacity of mind and spirit…. No nation has 
achieved so much in so short a period of time. And to have accomplished all this 
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in the face of the war, the terror, the violence, the threats, the intimidation, and 
the insecurity is truly monumental…. No one people in history has more global 
reach and global connections for good than the Jewish people. You are truly 
global citizens.
1004  
The most important thing in his speech was his talk about the terrorism, violence and wars 
which Israel had faced. His speech implied that Israel has been the victim of others who 
targeted it without any justification. Explicitly he considered that Israel had faced terrorism 
and violence waged by others, without paying any attention to the narratives of the 
Palestinians and Arabs who were the genuine victims of the Jewish state throughout the 
conflict. In addition, Brown’s perception of Israel as the world’s super-national state which 
had scored achievements in all areas, reflected a specific psychological feeling, widespread 
amongst Europeans in general, towards the uniqueness and superiority of Israel. In his 
opinion, the Jewish nation has left significant imprints everywhere, attributing discoveries 
and inventions in the world to the contribution of the creative Jewish mind and spirit.  
With regard to the role of the Jews in “draining the swamps” in the 20th century, he tacitly 
indicated the status of Palestine when the Jews started to emigrate there from Europe at the 
beginning of the 20th century, adopting the Israeli narrative about Palestine as if the latter had 
been nothing but swamps before the Jewish immigration, and as if these swamps had been 
dealt with only by Jews who were able to overcome these challenges. Similarly, Horst 
Köhler, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, perceived Israel as the state which 
“has made deserts fertile”,1005 portraying Palestine as a desert before the Jewish presence on 
its land, and ignoring the fact that Palestine had been populated by hundreds of thousands of 
people before Jews, assisted by the British Mandate, had started to arrive in 1917. 
In addition to Israel’s achievements, European leaders claim that its democratic traditions, 
ideals and sacrifices attract the most admiration among Europeans for the Jewish state. 
According to PEP Lord Plumb of Coleshill, along with its “amazing achievements” Israel is 
regarded as the guardian of the ideals of the West on whose behalf Israel has continued to 
make sacrifices; this matter has won the esteem of the European Community.
1006
 From 
Berlusconi’s standpoint, Israel is “the noblest example of democracy and freedom in the 
Middle East, an exemplar that has its roots deep in the Bible and in the Zionist ideal.” His 
admiration for Israel was even more obvious when he considered that the Israeli Parliament 
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“represents the most miraculous event of the twentieth century” since it included citizens 
from the whole world, with a huge diversity of linguistic and regional backgrounds, 
exercising both democracy and freedom under the same roof.
1007
 Given such advantages, and 
its competitive specificity, Israel had been opposed by the fanatics of the world; nevertheless, 
this must not affect Israel’s march towards progress. Directing his speech to the Israelis, 
Berlusconi declared that,  
Precisely for that – due to that – your country is unbearable in the eyes of world 
fanatics. For these reasons, liberals all across the world look at your country as a 
positive, painful and proud symbol of a great history that tells a story of love, 
freedom, justice and battle against evil. We liberated and liberal people of the 
world – we thank you for your mere existence.1008 
These words reflect the extent to which Israel is placed inside the mentality of those who 
have sustained it in the international society. When Berlusconi states that Israel represents the 
fight against evil and, at the same time, liberal and liberated people owe to its mere existence, 
this means that the deeply sympathetic admiration for Israel has penetrated the minds and 
spirits of western leaders to such an extent that the Europeans perceive Israel as a unique 
state, whose enemies are not allowed to impede, or affect its security and stability. However, 
to Berlusconi’s mind, its enemies are merely evil, while the victims of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, who are armed with well-known international resolutions and clearly contradict this 
categorization, have not been taken into consideration at all in his ideologically-inspired 
speech.  
In light of Berlusconi’s logic, the opinions of Hungary’s President Solyom, in which he stated 
that “Israel had to wage wars to survive”, can be easily understood. As far as Israel’s hostile 
counterpart is a kind of evil, its wars against this evil will become comprehensible even if 
they are initiated by Israel itself, because Israel basically counters the forces which are 
uncivilised.
1009
 According to this perception, and contrary to the way the EU has treated Iran 
over its nuclear programme, Israel has been tolerated over the same issue because it is 
perceived as ‘a rational democratic state’ which does not use such weapons outside the 
context of ‘self-defence’.1010 Hence, based on the way it is perceived as a symbol of idealism 
and uniqueness, Israel has occupied a significant place in the psychology of the European 
decision makers.         
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From Sarkozy’s perspective, Jewish people are not only a subject of suffering over history 
but also “a treasure of knowledge and humanity”. Surprisingly, the world’s wisdom without 
the Prophets of Israel would be unimaginable, while all areas of science, philosophy and 
culture could hardly be conceived of without Jewish scholars, thinkers and entrepreneurial 
contributors. In his opinion, Israel is a prodigious and special state in which Jewish people, 
who are characterized by liveliness, multiplicity and openness of thought, have come together 
from everywhere “to give the best of themselves for the good of all”. Furthermore, the Jewish 
people, under the pressure of the hatred and violence that they have faced, have survived and 
have never relinquished the universal values and teachings that “the Prophets of Israel have 
taught all mankind”.1011  
However, the French President forgot to mention how these remarkable characteristics of the 
Jewish people could be applied to the case of Israel’s injustice against Palestinians and their 
land, and to question whether Israel’s policies are compatible with such universal values.  
Hence, psychologically his admiration for Israel as a state that guarantees political equality 
for all its citizens as well as cultural, religious and educational freedom was deeply 
internalized to the extent that made him forget the other people living on the same land.
1012
  It 
seemed as if Sarkozy had never heard of the suffering of the Palestinians living under Israeli 
authority inside Israel, or under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip whose human 
rights were (and are) systematically violated by this model and supposedly democratic state. 
However, one of the most interesting aspects of Sarkozy’s speech was his description of 
Israel as Guardian of the Holy Places of all religions, whereas it is commonly known how 
aggressively Israel behaves towards these places, and how, under various pretexts, it has 
taken numerous measures that adversely affect their status and the ability of the Palestinians 
to access them. As an example of Israeli attacks and violations against religious places, as 
well as other areas in Palestine, the following chart shows a sample of the abuses that 
occurred in December 2012, from this the extent of the religious and humanitarian situation 
throughout the period of the Occupation can be clearly imagined (Figure 11).   
Generally speaking, without scrutinizing the original problem that is the Israeli Occupation of 
the Palestinian Territories, and regardless of the above-mentioned facts, Israel is perceived as 
a progressive, developed country that defends its people from those representing evil forces 
who want to wipe Israel from the international map. If Israel presented an exemplar of 
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universal ideals and democratic values, whereas, of course, Hamas does not, then the 
continuing Hamas discourse concerning Israel’s existence and the ownership of mandatory 
Palestine would become the opposite view of European perceptions of Israel; a matter that 
has caused the clash of perceptions between the EU and Hamas and has significantly affected 
the EUFP towards the movement.    
   Figure 4: Israeli Attacks on Palestinians in December 2012
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Firmly-Determined Commitment towards Israel’s Safety and Existence 
The inherited deep psychological feelings mentioned above, composed of cultural and 
religious incentives, and fostered by strong interests-based friendship, an intense feeling of 
collective responsibility for the Holocaust, and a profound appreciation of Israel, have 
generated a very robust commitment towards Israel’s security and stability. Significantly, this 
commitment has become embodied in the EU’s stance against organizations like Hamas 
which form an existential contradiction to Israel, and that are considered part of the hostile 
alliance against the West in the ME, especially those that have employed violence against 
Israel and challenged Western strategies in the region. Indeed, the solid Western commitment 
to Israel, regardless of Israeli policies, is very obvious in the differing types of political and 
socio-economic cooperation, as well as the diplomatic cover or protection that the Western 
countries, and the EU in particular, have provided to Israel within international institutions. 
The EU’s commitment towards Israel has thus presented it with a significant shield that 
protects it from being sanctioned or penalized despite its proven track record in human rights 
abuses and its intractability in the peace process, along with its continuing policy of 
fabricating ‘facts on the ground’. This EU immunization of Israel, in addition to all aspects of 
the distinguished cooperation conventions launched with it, is indicative of the fruits and 
instantiations of the West’s commitment to securing Israel within the international society, on 
the basis of “the burden of the moral debt towards the Jewish people” that Europe has borne 
for 2000 years of its history.1014   
It could be argued that the leaders of the European member states have competed with each 
other on the basis of who gives and offers stronger pledges to Israel’s security and status. 
Interestingly, Germany, because of its specific role in the Holocaust, appears the dominant 
player amongst those who take responsibility for the security of the Jewish people and the 
security and safety of Israel. According to Angela Merkel, the uniqueness of the German 
commitment towards Israel is based on its feeling of being responsible for the past and the 
Holocaust, as well as for the common values between both states, in addition to “abiding 
solidarity for one another”. Thus, as Merkel asserted, because of these feelings Germany 
“will never forsake Israel but will remain a true friend and partner” who would defend Israel 
everywhere when deeds are called for, especially if threats came from those who deny 
Israel’s right to exist and who, by targeting it, continue to threaten the values not just of Israel 
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but of the entire world.
1015
 From Horst Köhler’s standpoint, based on its commitments, 
Germany will always stand beside Israel and its people by actions rather than words, until it 
become fully secured within internationally-recognised borders, free of fears and threats.1016  
 
By the same token, Britain confirmed the same obligations by promising to stand beside 
Israel whenever its peace, stability and existence are threatened. This promise, based on 
shared values and interests, would be activated whenever needed. Gordon Brown expressly 
warned those who “mistakenly and outrageously call for the end of Israel” that Britain would 
never allow this to happen, and that Israel would always find the UK beside it as a true and 
trusted friend “in difficult times as well as in good times”. He also put Israel in the line of 
developed and civilized countries, and its opponents in the opposite category, confirming 
Britain’s principled stand with the civilized and developed nations, should conflict erupt 
against the enemies of humanity.  
However, the categorization of Israel and its enemies in such a way points to the extent to 
which Britain is ready to act against those organizations which represent the other side in the 
conflict, for example like Hamas and Iran. In this context, as Brown emphasized, the British 
position on Hamas and even Iran could be understood when he promised, in cooperation with 
the US and the EU partners, to continue British attempts to stop the Iranian nuclear 
programme; it has been doing this over time, sending a clear message to those accustomed to 
threatening Israel’s security and existence.1017 This English commitment has met other 
English perceptions found in a 1965 memorandum, which asserted that the UK and the rest of 
the West should keep close ties with the US since, if necessary, it would be the US that would 
ultimately have to rescue Israel. The memorandum confirmed America’s commitment to 
dedicating its military capabilities and fleets to Israel in the event of it being attacked, a 
familiar situation to both Israel and Arab governments.
1018
 Therefore, the promise from 
Balfour to the Prime Ministers of the 1960s and contemporary figures alike, is the same in its 
solidarity and firmness.  
Significantly, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and other European leaders had 
been very clear in their pledges to Israel, exceeding even some of the traditional European 
positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. From an Italian perspective, in the words of Berlusconi,    
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the safety of Israel within its borders and its right to exist as a Jewish state, for 
us Italians is an ethical choice and a moral order…. Our friendship towards 
Israel is honest, open and mutual. It is not merely verbal closeness, it is not 
merely diplomacy – it is the yearning of the soul, a friendship that comes from 
within.
1019 
Regarding Italy’s commitment to Israel, as Berlusconi claimed, it exceeded diplomacy or 
politics and is related to the soul that links both states, and to the common bonds between 
them; thus the Prime Minister’s pledges were genuine, not just words. Interestingly, 
Berlusconi promised on behalf of his people to struggle alongside Israel to prevent any 
awakening of anti-Semitism in Europe or the world, and not to stand by when Israel’s 
security and safety are threatened, considering that all UN member states must take every 
potential procedure against those who seriously menace Israel.1020 Against this background it 
appears highly significant that the basis of the Italian promise and the pledges of other 
European leaders are built, as could be concluded from their speeches, on the prominence of 
the Holocaust on the one hand, and the fact of legitimizing the Jewish state since 1948 on the 
other.1021  
The French and their leaders are no less enthusiastic towards Israel than others, in terms of 
their commitment to its security and existence, as Sarkozy showed in his speech. He 
explained how France had basically stood beside Israel from the moment of its birth, 
promising to keep this position always alive whenever Israel’s “security and existence are 
threatened”. As a friend of Israel, France has vowed to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the 
Jewish state; a feeling that, on his country’s behalf, had always been felt in his “heart of 
hearts”, nor would he ever “compromise on this”. Similar to other European leaders, he 
warned that “those who call scandalously for Israel’s destruction” would always find France 
countering them and blocking their way. Interestingly, he reassured Israel several times that it 
should know that “she is not alone”, and in his address to the Israeli Knesset members, 
reiterated, “let me tell you, from the bottom of my heart that France won’t abandon you’.1022 
Thus, the French leadership’s commitment to Israel encompasses its determination to stand 
for Israel against those organizations or states that might jeopardize Israeli security; a matter 
which means that Hamas is one of those entities under the spotlight.      
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The same kind of commitment has also come from the PEPs, who have repeatedly shown 
their rigorous stand with Israel. Interestingly, Israel’s ‘security’ and ‘existence’ are also the 
magic words around which most of the European leaders have gathered. In fact, this 
European position is not subject to any compromise when threatened by any entity. Hans-
Gert Pöttering noted, as PEP, that whenever this reality is targetted by enemies of Israel 
either by speeches or actions, the EU “without hesitation”, will be on the Israeli side.1023 In 
the words of PEP Josep Borrell Fontelles, speaking to the Israelis; “I wish to reaffirm 
Europe’s commitment to, and its special responsibility for, the existence of Israel as a Jewish 
state and as a democracy living in security and peace with its neighbours”, as it had done 
throughout the history of Israel.
1024
 According to Johannes Rau, former German President, 
this commitment is to the universal values represented and shared by the EU with Israel,
1025
 
and was a matter which “Europe will not allow to be called into question”.1026 Consequently, 
according to Berlusconi, given what Israel represents, it has to be in the EU as a full member 
state,
1027
 and as Laszlo Solyom asserted in his speech to the Knesset, because it is a European 
country that has values in which the common roots of Europe’s values are also located. 1028   
However, in addition to the foregoing, the EU’s commitment towards Israel stems from the 
reality that Israel has formed a unique solution to the historic Jewish question that had 
imposed substantial pressure on the European states over time. While this matter should have 
been solved by the Europeans, it was done but in a way that failed to exclude the centuries of 
accumulated aversion between the two parties. According to Ilan Pappe, given this truth, 
Israel could undoubtedly be considered a part of the Western world but would have been 
geographically separate from Europe. Therefore, in terms of culture, political system, and 
development, it is “part of the family” but the EU does not wish to admit this because, in the 
eyes of the West, Israel is the ‘thug state’ that can do things the West does not want to do, as 
noted by Pappe.
1029
  
Although this logic has become less important since the Second Gulf War in 2003 and after 
the Arab Spring in 2011, the significance of Israel as a reliable Western military base in the 
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ME and a spearhead in any unexpected confrontation between the West and the volatile 
Islamic East, is still influencing the EUDM process, and thereby the commitment to Israel. In 
Ahmed Yousef’s words, “Israel [is] still, and will remain, serving as an unsinkable aircraft 
carrier and strategic stockpile for the West including the EU that will be found ready when a 
need arises that calls for an action.”1030 Furthermore, the EU’s considerable interest in this 
commitment lies in the fact that any existential threat against Israel which might subsequently 
affect the existence of the state will thrust the Jewish question back into the laps of the West 
after it has been socio-politically and geo-strategically solved. In turn this matter might bring 
the tensions between Christian and Jewish identities back to Europe and threaten the virtues 
of coexistence, especially in light of the rise of parties on the extremist right. In this regard, 
the EU’s commitment reflects the status of the overlap between materially-based self-interest 
and culture. With Hamas practically as well as theoretically challenging this philosophy 
behind the EU’s policy in Palestine, means that the EU will not tolerate it and will pursue its 
strategy with Hamas as far as the latter does not change in accordance with what has been 
discussed above.     
Despite these commitments, Israel has prioritized its relations with the US and has not placed 
its trust in Europe, while the clue for restoring this lost trust, from the Israeli perspective, is 
represented in the EU’s effectiveness in the fight against terrorism.1031 In the eyes of the 
Israelis the EC/EU became suspect in the aftermath of the oil crisis in 1973 because of the 
path it subsequently pursued in solving the problem. Significantly, the EU’s understanding of 
the reality of the existence of the Palestinian people and their suffering as diaspora refugees, 
as well as its recognition of the PLO as a legitimate representative leadership for the 
Palestinians and the subsequent declarations based on the necessity of having a two-state 
solution for both the Palestinians and the Israelis, greatly angered the Israeli state and put EU 
policy under fire for a considerable time.
1032
 Contrary to the US approach to the Palestinian 
cause during the 1970s and 1980s, the EC/EU approach was distinguished by being built on 
profound profits and loss calculations should the conflict persist as a result of neglecting the 
political and humanitarian rights of the Palestinians. Considerably, the EU perceived the 
security and stability of Israel and the whole region as a normal outcome of the resolution 
that is based on the aforementioned rights. Even if this has been proved since the Oslo 
Agreements in 1993 between the PA and Israel, the European approach to solving the conflict 
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did over time affect the trust between the EU and Israel.
1033
   
However, even after its political initiatives regarding the peace process had proved their 
accuracy, the EU has been considered pro-Palestinian by Israel, and its engagement in the 
peace process has not been as politically welcomed as its financial role. To bridge the gap of 
trust between Israel and the EU, some observers called for the EU to launch constructive 
public diplomacy moves towards the Israelis to convince them of its reliable role in the peace 
process,
1034
 while others called on the EU to build physical and material trust by enhancing 
security, economic and defence ties with Israel, including taking a tough position against 
Hamas and other movements in the ME categorized as terrorists.
1035
 Hence, the EU has 
absorbed the lesson which teaches that the more pressure it applies on those who represent a 
threat to Israel and the peace process, the more acceptable will be the role that the EU might 
play in the region.  
Conclusion 
It could be concluded that the perceptions of Israel among individual European leaders have 
come together to channel into the European decision-making machine, building a 
collectively- structured perception of Israel and thereby its adversary, Hamas. After 
reviewing this sample of the discourse of EU leaders in terms of their perception of Israel and 
the extent to which it constitutes a significant driving factor of Europe’s policies in the ME, 
the EU’s policy towards Hamas has become more understandable. That is to say, whilst the 
correlation between the EU member states and Israel are culturally, socio-politically and 
psychologically internalized in the EU’s decision-making process, EU policy towards Hamas 
in this context could be accordingly interpreted.
1036
 
Interestingly, Hamas, which is Israel’s violent enemy and has been considered a real threat to 
its security and stability, in addition to the role this ‘enemy’ has played in affecting the 
European plans for the ME peace process, has been stigmatized as a terrorist organization and 
outlawed by the EU. And even though this ‘enemy’ was democratically elected under the 
EU’s supervision of the Palestinian general elections in 2006, the value of Israel has 
outweighed other normative EU values, mainly democracy and human rights. Accordingly, it 
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is obvious that the EU’s perception of Israel has crystallized as a built-in factor and a self-
determinant of the former’s FP towards Hamas and other similar Palestinian factions.  
In this context the significance of analyzing such speeches by EU leaders lies in the fact that 
they embody a representative sample of those leaders who have had the power to draw up and 
influence overall EU policy. Given that those mentalities, which stand behind the EUDM 
process towards Hamas, have held such convictions as described above, the common 
meanings that can be deduced are a significant illustration of the importance of the interaction 
process amongst these meanings, which can generate specific relations between actors and 
highlight the nature of the contextual structure that surrounds decision makers.  
Indeed, exposing this correlation between the EU and Israel (as collectively and socio-
politically constructed after WWII) in such a way, makes tracking the mechanism of the 
evolution of the relationship and the direction it has taken historically indispensable. 
Proceeding from this understanding, the actor-structure approach used in this analysis has 
highlighted the identity-interest controversy, showing this unique case of pairing between the 
two variables in this context. Significantly, the historical perspective, affected by 
constructivist-neorealist logic, has been partly used to highlight the effectiveness of such 
variables in directing the EUFP towards Hamas and its Palestinian counterparts. 
Consequently, the boycotting policy which is adopted by the EU towards Hamas has 
principally undergone this self-determining process, a factor that has cast its shadow over all 
the EU’s official behaviours related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
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Chapter Eight:  US Influence on the EU regarding Hamas: Analytical Perspective 
 
This chapter aims to illustrate the US influence as an external actor on the EU’s policy 
towards Hamas. The significance of this illustration lies in the necessity of showing the 
realistically-driven security-allied construction built by these actors, as “consumers of 
security”, as Waltz called them,1037 or “security maximizers”, as coined by others,1038 under 
the particular circumstances governing EU-Hamas relations. It also shows the self-interest 
determinant in this policy as represented in the EU’s preference for the US positions 
regarding Hamas at the expense of its inspiring norms and values. Basically, the chapter is 
based on in-depth survey of the relationship between the two actors, and the significant effect 
that the US has had on the EU in the case of Hamas. The goals of both parties, and their 
economic interdependency, in addition to the socio-cultural correlations between them will 
underpin the testimonies of EU officials concerning this inquiry. Hence the contextual 
dimension and the partner-dependant debate in the Middle East as a ‘US domain’ are 
discussed, in order to explain the complementary versus contradictory role that the EU plays 
in such a conflict. The attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 (known popularly as 9/11), 
and their effects on the EU’s security perspective towards Hamas are highlighted. The 
Quartet’s restrictions on the EU’s functionality in the Hamas dossier and the perceptions of 
the EU interviewees of the role that has been played by the US, in this regard, are also 
discussed. In brief, this chapter shows the extent to which the EU is exposed to the influence 
of the US in the Hamas question.    
Introduction 
The US is accused of being the effective factor in the consistency shown by the EU in its 
negative discourse against Hamas.
1039
 However, the perceptions of the EU interviewees who 
were interviewed for this study about the US influence on the EU in terms of its policy 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in particular Hamas, were highly expressive.  Most 
interviewees felt their institution was wrong in the policy it followed with Hamas after the 
2006 elections, and most identified one of the main reasons for the continuation of such an 
unsuitable policy as the influence of the US on the EU. Although they recognized that other 
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considerations were on the table when the decision was taken against the Hamas-led 
government, the effect of the US factor was the one which, to varying degrees was most 
commonly agreed amongst those interviewees.  
In fact, while genuine opportunities were offered on many occasions for the EU to revise its 
boycott-based policy against Hamas, such as the Mecca agreement between Hamas and Fatah 
in 2007, and the National Unity Government thereafter, outcomes have been always counter 
to aspirations. While some observers wished that the EU would prioritize its norms and 
values, others believed that these issues were no longer available once Hamas had leapt to 
power in the PA in 2006. Considerably, the socio-politically constructed perceptions of the 
EU officials are based largely on first-hand experience, gathered through a process of 
observation by which they witnessed the way that the EU manufactured its policies in 
different areas. Indeed, the mechanism by which Hamas has been dealt with reflects the 
extent of the complexities that the EU faces while taking decisions in areas where the 
interests of the US and the EU dramatically overlap; it also shows the degree to which the EU 
is affected by the hegemony of the US in the International Relations field.  
EU and US: Common Ultimate Goals Different Tactics   
With the end of the Cold War and the absence of the bi-polar international system during the 
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, transatlantic relations had to be institutionalized and 
mutually formalized. Although the EU had systemized its relations with the US through 
NATO and the establishment of diplomatic relations since the 1950s,
1040
 it asserted the 
specificity of the US in its perception of its identity and personality in the declaration of the 
identity of the EC in 1971. As mentioned in the declaration  
The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine – we share values 
and aspirations based on a common heritage – are mutually beneficial and must be 
preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish 
themselves as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend to maintain their 
constructive dialogue and to develop their co-operation with the United States on 
the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship.
1041
 
This specificity, which has governed the two actors over time, expressed itself in the 1990s 
by establishing a framework through which relations between them could be organized and 
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developed.
1042
 Through this framework, their differences could be uniformly controlled, and 
ambiguities or misunderstandings could be also removed. The first agreement about this 
framework was in 1990 and was called the Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations. It 
defined the associations between them, categorized the challenges facing both, and agreed on 
the actions for tackling them together. The declaration also suggested biannual summit 
meetings that would include the President of the US, the President of the EU Council, and the 
Head of the Commission. In these meetings, internal and external agendas would be 
addressed, and differences were to be minimised.
1043
 Another push in this direction was made 
in 1995 when a New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was agreed that supported the previous 
declaration, and defined areas of cooperation, responsibilities and internal and external 
goals.
1044
 Thus, by conducting summits annually under the umbrella of the NTA, rather than 
biannually as had initially been agreed, the EU and the US would come together every year to 
reassert their commitments towards the challenges they encountered on both sides of the 
Atlantic and globally.  
This framework dictated the various agendas related to major issues while their more 
nuanced positions were left to specialized committees from the two sides. While following 
the same line, they do not differ strategically; in terms of their challenges, values and ultimate 
goals. In fact, the bilateral interests of the US and the EU internationally, and the common 
values and cultural heritage between them made their relations rise above any marginal 
contradictions even when matters were related to military interventions beyond their borders. 
The common issues between them, on which they could construct the basis for a lasting 
partnership, also enabled the two powers to coordinate their strategic visions, global 
responsibilities, and a wide range of foreign policy issues that included the MEPP, security 
and defence, as well as other global matters.
1045
 From the perspective of Takis Hadjigeorgiou, 
a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the EP, the two powers based on the 
common goals of foreign policies and challenges, coordinate together even on the topic of 
Hamas, and in this regard might normally influence each other, which does not necessarily 
mean that one is dependent on the other.
1046
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In fact, after the demise of the Soviet Union most of the military actions of the US or the 
interventions of the EU internationally did not provoke substantial debate between them 
except, for example, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
1047
 Even in this case, most EU leaders 
seemed quite willing to support the US because of its individualism, the inevitability of the 
situation, and also for the benefits of having the US in the leadership position; a matter that 
most of the European politicians had already acknowledged.
1048
 Under these areas of 
agreement, inter alia, the problem of Hamas,
1049
 all nuances were managed, controlled and 
accordingly treated. Significantly, on some occasions the EU has not agreed on the essence of 
US policies due to differences between the member states, but as agreed in the NTA, almost 
the end goals of the US and the EU are the same.
1050
 Thus, they have accepted four major 
objectives for their cooperation:
1051
 
1. Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world…secure 
peace in the ME; and the advancement of human rights. 
2. Responding to global challenges: fighting international crime, drug-trafficking and 
terrorism; addressing the needs of refugees and displaced persons; protecting the 
environment and combating disease.  
3. Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations. 
4. Building bridges across the Atlantic. 
However the approaches of both parties towards achieving these particular points might be 
different. These assumed differences are possibly due to their dissimilar capabilities, and their 
imbalanced power relations,
1052
 in addition to the bitterly-felt and history-based war 
experience of the Europeans, and the lack of preparedness of the EU to bear the potential 
consequences of any US military action in the world, whatever it might be.
1053
 Given the 
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dysfunctional association between the two actors, the US is accustomed to being more 
realistic than the EU which tends to exhaust all options before resorting to military power, 
and invests in what is called its ‘soft power’ before it resorts to confirming its use of the hard 
power capabilities of NATO or the US. According to Helga Haftendorn, these divergences 
could be attributed to “power position, historical experience, and cultural tradition”.1054 
Whereas politically the EU has never stood harshly against the individuality of the US in 
conflicting areas, and thus has never embarrassed the US, even when they have significantly 
differed, the Hamas dossier is one of those problematic issues for which the EU would 
neither embarrass the US, which holds a clear position regarding the recognition of Hamas, 
nor open any dialogue with it before fulfilling the commonly-known ‘three principles’ of the 
Quartet.
1055
 Hence, this US position which has passed through the Quartet, and has thereby 
been adopted by the EU, has become a sort of moral commitment between the two parties. 
However Russia, which has not adhered to the same position, has opened a political dialogue 
with Hamas. According to the EU, this has now become a matter of principle in which the 
EU is not about to appear as though it has disregarded the US which, if it did happen, could 
be considered a diplomatic triumph for Hamas. A study of Hamas and the peace process by 
Goerzig recorded a testimony from a significant figure in the EU asserting that the EU would 
not anger the US by recognizing Hamas unilaterally, since “we would just not do that to the 
US”.1056 Hence, the shadow cast by the US on the EU remains one of the factors which 
prevent the latter from being consistent with its declared norms and values or from making a 
necessary revision of its policies in specific areas of conflict.  
Interdependent Strategic Partners: Economy as an Instance 
Along with cultural correlations, interdependently constructed economic interests are another 
area of strength that has brought the EU and the US together. These interests cannot be 
compared with other global partnerships, and as a result they remain the most influential 
powers in the world,
1057
 and their economic associations have formed the strongest 
interdependent partnership amongst their international counterparts in the global 
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economy.
1058
 Whereas the top international investors in 44 out of 50 American states are EU 
companies, and their investments in Texas alone exceed all US investment in Japan,
1059
 it is 
asserted that the US investments in the EU zone only are three times higher than in all of 
Asia, while the EU’s investment in the US is around eight times the amount of EU 
investment in China and India combined. Significantly, the US and EU economies “account 
together for about half the entire world GDP and for nearly a third of world trade flows.”1060 
Figure 12 illustrates EU foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (BRICs), compared to the US, as an example of such EU and US economic ties,
1061
 
while another example (Figure 13) illustrates the US flows to the same countries as compared 
with the EU.
1062
  
It is obvious that the above-shown figures indicate the strong economic correlations between 
the two transatlantic powers. Hence, this economic interdependency in addition to the cultural 
and political associations have solidified the EU and the US association and propel for more 
strategically harmonized functioning in the world.
1063
 In spite of differences in the system of 
beliefs, and the perception of the two actors towards the centrality of the individual at both 
sides of the Atlantic, their common heritage and feelings of belonging to the same identity are 
sufficiently wide to contain any contradictions or disagreements might appear between 
them.
1064
 Thus, this partnership between these actors is highly appreciated by both, and 
thereby their international actions have to be based on collective understandings and agreed 
common denominator so as to adjust political rhythms in particular geo-strategic domains 
accordingly. 
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Figure 5: EU Foreign Direct Investments in US Compared to BRIC 2007-9 
 
 
Figure 6: US Foreign Direct Investments in EU Compared to BRIC 2000-10 
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The US as the EU Defence Umbrella: the Contextual Dimension  
The history of the relationship between the US and the EU is not limited to the period of the 
latter’s evolution since the second half of the 20th century, but lies further back than this, 
belonging in fact to the cultural, socio-political and geostrategic correlations that link the two 
sides of the Atlantic. The distinguished association is actually inspired by US sacrifices in 
defending the European democracies in the first half of the 20th century, in addition to the 
long-lasting position provided to Europe by the US during the Cold War.
1065
 According to 
Daud Abdullah, these relations are also believed to have been inspired by the protection 
provided beneath the nuclear umbrella that the US has offered Europe over time;
1066
 a matter 
that has enabled Europe to flourish and develop as an entity, politically, economically and 
strategically.
1067
 Hedley Bull also notes that, in the period of the Cold War,
 “Europe itself 
[could] construct no counter-balance [to Soviet nuclear power] without importing outside 
help”, which was sought by the Europeans themselves from the US, the only state that has 
had the capability to do so.
1068
  
Being protected by the US from being targeted from within or outside,
1069
 has left the 
Europeans with feelings of deep appreciation for the favours that have been done for their 
countries. Significantly, without US intervention in the two world wars, the democratic states 
of Europe might have been defeated since they were on the verge of collapsing under the 
huge and devastating machines of the Fascist and Nazi regimes.
1070
  US intervention in both 
conflicts undoubtedly tipped the balance of power in favour of the democracies, and changed 
the face of history thereafter. Furthermore, the commitment of the US to Europe continued by 
way of its huge contribution to rebuilding Europe after WWII, and the supportive scheme 
known as the Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) through which 
the US invested in the reconstruction of the devastated European infrastructure.
1071
 
Another era of US favours was highlighted with the outbreak of the Cold War, in which the 
Eastern Camp represented by the Soviet Union stood against the Western Camp represented 
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by the US. Under the umbrella and leadership of the US, the Western military defence 
alliance, known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949. 
The challenges which faced the Western Alliance were spearheaded and challenged under the 
NATO initiative by the US, which focused its abilities on keeping the alliance safe and 
protected from outside threats, based not only on the wishes of the US but also on European 
security needs.
1072
 Hence, the US fleets that roam the high seas and oceans are committed not 
only to securing the European and American areas, but also their interests and their allies in 
other parts of the world.
1073
 Therefore, the US launched wars on behalf of the Western 
countries and intervened directly and indirectly on many occasions or clash points. Although 
some of the European countries such as the UK, France, Spain and Italy have contributed to 
the US activities under the umbrella of the NATO or away from it,
1074
 the last word has  
always been with the US due to its renowned capabilities and continuous transatlantic 
commitment. Even when the matter was related to Europe’s ‘backyard’, as in the 
Yugoslavian crisis in the 1990s, the EU was unable to take decisive action until the US did 
so.
1075
 Therefore the paternalistic role of the US towards Europe in terms of the part it plays 
in Europe’s survival, stability and development is undisputable.   
Price in Return: EU-US relations and the Boycott of Hamas  
The US is certainly not a charitable institution, distributing money and services without 
anything in return or a normatively-driven actor. In every outstanding situation involving the 
US and its allies, it has been obvious that the US was defending itself, achieving its interests, 
and strengthening its allies on the one hand, while at the same time stressing its hegemony 
and the meaning of its entitlement in being the only recognized hegemonic Western 
superpower in the world. Accordingly, it was expected from those allies that the US 
defended, protected, and militarily or atomically shielded, to act and behave in accordance 
with the services supplied by it. This ‘payment-in-return’ does not necessarily mean that the 
EU policies must absolutely match the US tactics or that “the EU [has] no regional role 
independent of the United States”;1076 in fact, it shows the necessity of coordinating relevant 
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policies with the US
1077
 so that the US can continue to offer its defence capabilities in the 
service of the EU’s geo-strategic interests in the world.  
However, this equation produces two parties, one of whom constitutes the stronger and the 
hegemonic actor, which is the US, while the other one, which is the EU, is dependent on the 
former. The socio-politically constructed interaction between them has led both to build their 
perceptions about their roles in the ME, particularly in Palestine, and to give these roles 
specific meanings. In light of these meanings, each actor’s operational limitations are drawn, 
from which it is easy to identify who is the hegemonic or chief actor and who is the weak or 
dependant one. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the dependant and marginalized 
power is supposed to adapt itself to the interests and priorities of the hegemonic actor. 
According to Kenneth Waltz “the more powerful enjoy wider margins of safety in dealing 
with the less powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and how.” 
Although it would seem that “dependant parties have some effects on independent ones, [but] 
the latter have more effect on the former”, with the result that the weak actors operate on 
constricted margins.
1078
 The EU’s status in this respect has resulted from its great reluctance 
“to break ranks with the United States”, so that it confines itself to playing on the “margins of 
US-dictated policies”.1079  
Because of this equation, the EU has found itself obliged to pay the price of this 
dysfunctional relationship with the US.
1080
 Therefore, the EU might have held other views 
about the arrangements made by the US, as for example in Palestine, but has not undertaken 
any action that would put the US in the corner politically. Instead, it would remain silent or 
use a faintly disapproving diplomatic voice but without applying its abilities to influence the 
political scene in any dramatic way. Ahmed Yusef, former consultant to the Hamas Prime 
Minster Ismail Haniyah, went a long way in asserting that politically Europe has become an 
American colony since the end of WWII, and that its positions in the international arena are 
not decided without taking US policy and attitude into account.
1081
 From the perspective of    
a high-ranking EU official, commenting on the EU’s status with the US, “the stronger does 
always what he can, whereas the weak suffers the consequences; the EU is fragile and does 
not speak with a unified voice in foreign affairs issues”, a matter which has made the former 
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exposed to the hegemony of the latter, coexisting with the differences that may from time to 
time appear between them.
1082
   
In fact, differences like these are bearable and could be contained depending on the nature of 
the controversial matters. From Christopher Hill’s view, there will, of course, be continued 
tensions and disputes between Europe and the US, especially on non-military issues, because 
of their different interests, perceptions and even their different principles.
1083
 Thus, this kind 
of relationship between the US and the EU, and the EU’s preference for following the US in 
certain debatable cases (such as the situation in the ME, and particularly the Hamas dossier) 
even when it is quite capable of functioning in a different way, simply reflects the EU’s 
fragility, and the extent to which other non-normative calculations are prioritized at the 
expense of its normative discourse.
1084
    
Since it was labelled a terrorist organization by the EU in 2003 and subsequently its 
democratically-elected government was boycotted after 2006 due to the EU’s previous 
decision, Hamas has become a victim of the dysfunctional relationship between the EU and 
the US. While the latter had no problem in welcoming Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein 
(the political arm of the IRA – the Irish Republican Army), in New York in January 1994, 
whereas he had previously been considered the spokesman of terrorists,
1085
 the US has stood 
as an obstacle to any dialogue with Hamas, either as a movement or a governmental body. 
Despite its negotiations initiative with the IRA and the role it played with the UK in reaching 
a reconciliation agreement, the same actor, through the Quartet, has directly or indirectly 
blocked the EU’s path and has prohibited formal political contacts with Hamas. In spite of the 
vast sense of conviction that can be sensed amongst the EU’s political and administrative 
staff in support of revising the EU’s position towards Hamas, the decision makers have not 
changed and prefer to follow the US position in this regard, of course alongside other 
considerations.  
Generally speaking, although the EU has had its own relative margin for manoeuvring away 
from the US on tactical issues, this margin narrows or widens following the sensitivity of the 
subject to hand, as is the case that is under discussion. Nevertheless, since the mechanism for 
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dealing with Hamas in the Middle Eastern context is one of those tactics which does not 
significantly affect its strategic relations with the US, the EU has opted to harmonize its 
policy with that of the US; hence, it continues to boycott any formal political dialogue with 
Hamas. According to the MEP Kyriacos Triantaphyllides, even though the EU is the biggest 
donor and has adopted some significant and advanced positions regarding the Israeli 
settlements and Israel’s policies in Jerusalem, it has also had the capability to function in a 
better way by being more decisive and critical with Israel. However, it has never taken the 
lead in this direction, and has left the initiative to the US.  He attributed this to the fact that 
the EU has never had a single foreign policy or a single voice, but it has had 27 foreign 
policies which have made it weak and dependent on the US in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict.
1086
 Daud Abdullah, director of the ME Monitor in London, also believes that the EU 
has no independent foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. As an expert in this 
field and with strong connections to EU officials, Abdullah noted that in their talks with him 
these officials describe the influence that the US has exerted on the EU positions as horrific, 
adding, “when you talk to the officials in Brussels they tell you about the Americans and how 
they have to cope with them.”1087 Hence, the price that the EU has been paying has a political 
nature and has, of course, reflected on the EU’s operative role in the ME, including its 
position regarding Hamas.      
Given that the US is considered the defender and the protector of the EU’s economic and 
geo-strategic interests in the world, which are also underpinned by socio-cultural and 
economic links, its global hegemonic policies have essentially become, in one way or 
another, more understandable by its allies. This is a matter that holds the EU responsible at 
least for harmonizing its discourse with the global attitudes and policies of the US in sensitive 
areas and clash points in which the US has had a big stake, like the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the Hamas led-government issue. Thus, as far as it is possible these strong correlations have 
been significantly translated into adopting and passing on particular political attitudes in 
specific places in the world.   
ME as a US domain: Complementary EU Role    
Regarding the explanations given above, it could be said that the US, having cast its leverage 
over the political components of the region as an actual outcome of the role that it played in 
WWII, has also replaced Europe in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict that erupted in 1948. 
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From the beginning the US took up a distinctive position, by recognizing the state of Israel 
and by adopting and supporting it in the context of the Cold War. It was noticeable, however, 
that after the 1967 war, in which Israel occupied the rest of Palestine and other Arab 
territories, the US established its leadership in the region more firmly than ever, and that it 
has never since then accepted any other participating parties into the strategic decision-
making circles around the Arab-Israeli conflict, even from the same Western camp. This has 
resulted in a new era of US-led domination and hegemony. Hence, as previously noted, the 
favours that have been granted by the US over time to the EU are used as a way of making 
the EU understand that its self-directed attitude in the ME would affect their mutual relations,  
and that thereby the whole commitment of the US towards the EU might be called into 
question. This has forced the EU leaders on many occasions to emphasize the complementary 
nature of Europe’s role in relation to the role taken by the US in the Arab-Israeli conflict.1088   
This US position, according to Costanza Musu, stems from its refusal of any intrusion into 
what is considered the ‘US domain’, in addition to its distrust of the EU’s ability to achieve a 
satisfying compromise, as well as its lack of a harmoniously-constructed role in this 
regard.
1089
 An anonymous member of the EEAS welcomed this perception and confirmed 
that there is a realistic recognition among EU politicians that since the US is the only power 
that has had leverage in the Arab-Israeli conflict, implicitly the EU is susceptible to being 
influenced by the US (even with regard to Hamas or other similar issues).
1090
 According to 
the MEP Ivo Vajgl,
1091
 and Ioannis Kasoulides, a member of the EP’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee,
1092
 this fact should not have prevented the EU from asking Israel to show a full 
compliance with the IHL. Thus,
 
the US monopoly on the MEPP, and the restrictions it has put 
on the “foreign policy instruments provided by the Framework for Political Cooperation have 
certainly contributed to relegating the (EU/EC) to a secondary role in the region.” 1093  
EU: Partner-Dependent Debate in the Hamas Dossier  
Despite these facts about the way the EUFP is noticeably affected by the US, this does not 
appear to mean that the EU’s policy towards Hamas or the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, is 
fundamentally different from that of the US. However, in terms of their strategic position on 
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Israel, and the commitment of the US and the EU towards its security and stability, 
transatlantic relations are not subject to controversy. On the whole, the EU leaders’ discourse 
about Israel that was discussed in the previous chapter is very similar to the speeches of the 
White House leaders.
1094
 Ideologically, theologically and socio-politically inspired thoughts 
and perceptions about Israel and its Jewish identity within its geography could be easily 
noticed in the way US and EU leaders envision Israel; a matter that reflects the practical 
relations between actors on the ground. Significantly, any views about or with Israel that 
might be open to debate are based on common consensus between them, and are dedicated to 
stabilizing and securitizing the Jewish state in ME. Should any argument arise concerning 
Israel, it would be seen as a dispute between associates of the same family.  
Building on this point, any divergence between the EC/EU and the US towards the Arab-
Israeli cause, either in the past or present, has been a kind of tactical disagreement. Hence, 
some observers are convinced that there is no difference between the US and the EU 
regarding Hamas and other similar areas of concern in the world because both prioritise their 
material interests at the expense of their norms and values; in the words of Thomas Risse 
both “are occasionally partners in hypocrisy since they both do not always practice what they 
preach”.1095  According to an interviewee from the EEAS, the EU and the US “are different 
occasionally on tactics; how to do it and when”, but strategically are on the same line.1096 
Hence, the weaker EU finds itself linked to the stronger US, following in its footsteps and 
protecting their common strategic goals regarding Israel and the whole conflict in general. 
This is because the US holds the keys to the region and its leverage is tangible almost 
everywhere. As noted by Vincent Durac and Francesco Cavatorta, any crack in the 
transatlantic relationship is not deep as might be imagined;   
Despite minor tactical differences over methods, timing and ‘reach’, the US and the 
EU have virtually the same objectives in the region, operate under the same 
ideological assumptions, are bound by the same constraints and fall victim of 
similar contradictions. The level of economic, cultural and military integration 
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between the US and the EU is such that rifts are no more than very short and 
superﬁcial temporary crises.1097 
Thus, the US and the EU positions on Israel have no contradictions strategically, and the 
major policies in this regard are consciously constructed to serve the ultimate goals 
represented in securing the state of Israel in ME.  
However, US-EU coordination on Hamas stems from the feeling of responsibility amongst 
them towards necessities in ME that do not arise essentially or solely from the fact that one 
power is dependent on the other in a classical sense. In light of this fact, Marc Otte, the 
former EUSR to the ME Peace Process was entirely correct in saying that “those who believe 
that the EU follows the US blindly are not correct”,1098 because when it decides on a certain 
policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU does so consciously and based on a 
conviction which, according to Ahmed Yusef, “does not deviate from the determinants of the 
US foreign policy”.1099 Marc Otte confirmed the partnership that brought the EU and the US 
together in the ME, putting more emphasis on the US’s ability to function as one government 
with one foreign policy in this area, unlike the EU which, as noted above, has 27 
governments with 27 different foreign policies. According to the interviewee, the EU policy 
towards Hamas and the whole ME is no different from its policy everywhere; it is a 
combination of values and interests. Therefore, it is coordinated with the US in light of the 
balance of power and the balance of interests. This reveals the extent to which the EU is 
inconsistent when it declared in its treaties that the norms which inspired its composition are 
the same prioritized objectives that it sought to deliver in the world. Marc Otte believes the 
ultimate goals and the thinking mechanism of both the EU and the US regarding the conflict 
in the ME are almost the same, with some marginal differences in their perceptions of 
priorities in the region due to Europe’s geographical proximity to the ME.1100 Thus, in this 
equation the EU cannot be considered simply as a financially capable and politically 
immobilized donor, as in the case of the Gulf States.
1101
 The EU has done what it does in the 
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full awareness of the dimensions of the conflict and the (harm) which Hamas is perceived to 
be causing to the MEPP, a position that is also shared by the US. 
In this context, and for the sake of convenience the EU has handed over the leadership in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to the US. According to Ilan Pappe, it is easy for the EU to follow the 
US in this regard by deciding that Hamas is almost part of Al-Qaeda; “they give you the 
impression that they regard Hamas as a real terrorist organization.”  Had the EU not done so, 
in the Arab-Israeli context, it should have answered to its people about what they were 
observing on the ground, and what it has so far done to solve the political and humanitarian 
dilemma in Palestine. By putting the responsibility on the shoulders of the US and pretending 
that it is unable to challenge the US, most charges of accountability would be directed to the 
US and not to the EU. Hence, contrary to the EU declaring inspiring norms, it is more 
beneficial for it to maintain good relations with the US and Israel than to challenge them by 
recognizing the Hamas movement, even after the latter had been democratically elected in 
free and transparent elections in 2006. Thus, in his view, when the EU decided to boycott 
Hamas, it preferred the self-interested choice based on satisfying the US and Israel, to the 
values behind which it has hidden.  
Pappe also believes that since 1967, Israel has been the only entity determining what happens 
on the ground in Palestine, and, under US protection, is the only party to have drawn up a 
peace process agenda for the past and future. However, from Pappe’s perspective Hamas is 
the major element in Palestine that has to a certain extent been able to challenge this fact; 
therefore, the EU is welcomed into the peace process as long as it adopts the vision of Hamas 
as a challenge and a danger. The EU’s responsive policy, he maintains, is built on another 
factor which suggests that under such circumstances, the EU is in principle less interested in 
an independent role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, than it would be interested, for 
example, in Africa in similar circumstances.
1102
 Accordingly, the EU’s lack of interest in 
taking an independent role in Palestine, in addition to the leading role played by the US, has 
made the EU sacrifice its values in favour of self-interests to be found with the US and Israel.           
In this context, the US was able to achieve some significant breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and to sustain them accordingly. Developments from the Camp David Accords 
between Egypt and Israel in 1979, to the Madrid process in 1991, and the Oslo agreements 
leading to the establishment of the negotiating track between the PLO and Israel would not 
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have happened in the absence of a clear role and supervision by the US.
1103
 Without the 
support given to all these stages none of the regional powers could have played the same role 
as the US. Although the Europeans played a significant supporting part in the whole process, 
it is obvious that this was simply logistical, financial and “complementary to the efforts of the 
US”1104 in this domain. However, at certain stages the Europeans did have political views that 
differed from those of the US, such as in the Venice Declaration in 1980 and in relation to the 
notion of the peace conference versus bilateral negotiations as a mechanism through which 
the crisis could have been solved before the Madrid peace process was established in 1991. 
 Despite the significance of these initiatives in terms of paving the regional political 
environment to later US-led change,
1105
 the EU could not translate its enterprise and its 
enabling financial power into practical steps; instead it simply launched declarations, 
preferring to leave the leadership to the US in this regard.
1106
 Thus, according to John Van 
Oudenaren, “the EU’s imperative to maintain cooperation with the United States on the 
Middle Eastern dossier has meant that the EU has constantly accommodated the line followed 
by Washington.”1107 This was glaringly obvious after the Oslo Agreements, when the EU 
dedicated its efforts to assisting the US to keep the peace process alive in Palestine by 
building the PA institutions according to Washington’s choice. When the democratically-
elected Hamas won the elections in 2006, the EU, according to Oudenaren, preferred to 
follow the US tune, and contrary to all its democratic teachings, refrained from supporting the 
outcomes of democracy by shoring up the Fatah movement, the losers in democracy, 
instead.
1108
 Consequently, even if it has been deliberately marginalized or has intentionally 
put itself aside, it could be claimed that the EU partnership with the US with regard to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is built on an implicit subcontract led by the US, in which the EU is 
mandated to play merely a complementary role.
1109
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The US Lead after 9/11 and the New EU Security Agenda: Victimizing Hamas   
The so-called ‘war on terror’ launched by the US after the events of 11 September 2001, has 
fostered the EU-US relations to levels unprecedented since the end of the Cold War in the 
late 1980s. The attacks on the US, as well as those on London and Madrid by Al-Qaeda in 
2004 and 2005, served to adapt the agenda linking the two powers into one that was focused 
more on security and cooperation against terrorism.
1110
 As a result, they have together 
become the biggest allies in the fight against ‘terrorism’ as described in 2006 at an inter-
parliamentary meeting between EU and US legislators.
1111
 Significantly, the EU had 
responded rapidly to the new challengesadopting, for the first time, a common position on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism in 2001,
1112
 and thereby the EU Security 
Strategy (EUSS) in 2003 which emphasized the depth of the relationships and partnership 
with the US in light of these threats; “the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable; acting 
together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the 
world”.1113 This assertion alongside the whole EU strategy is highly compatible with the US 
Security Strategy (USSS), if not a replica of it. Thus, the EU has echoed the US efforts in 
fighting ‘terrorism’, calling on the countries of the region to be “constructive in the fight 
against terrorism”, and “tackling the direct or indirect financing of terrorism” as its 
priority.
1114
 At the same time, the US affirmed the same meaning in its partnership with the 
EU by focusing on the importance of the EU in the USSS and the entire US performance 
around the world, seeing it as “the cornerstone for U.S. engagement with the world, and a 
catalyst for international action”.1115 Thus the 9/11 events and their global repercussions have 
been translated into a stronger US-EU partnership over security issues and ‘terrorism’, and 
further underpinned the functionality of these powers in the world and particularly against 
Hamas in Palestine.  
However, the perceptions which the EU and the US hold about their duties in the world are of 
equal importance to the identities which they both claim. In addition to the significance of 
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NATO in achieving the strategic goals of the USSS, the US and the EU both perceived each 
other as the power that is indispensable for constructing the security and stability which are 
needed for achieving their ultimate economic and geo-political objectives in the world. Thus, 
motivated by developments after 9/11, they have fostered their partnership alongside their 
other allies in the world, including Israel, to overcome various common challenges identified, 
inter alia, in the EUSS and the USSS, as ‘terrorism’. This matter has left no room for 
excluding Hamas from the fight, since it has been placed in the same basket as organizations 
like Al-Qaeda that are regarded as terrorists. In interpreting this partnership, Herman Van 
Rompuy, President of the European Council, attributed such cooperation to the common 
values of the EU and the US, and the common challenges which necessitate a shoulder to 
shoulder policy for tackling global problems.
1116
 Thus, the EU has found itself a major 
partner and ally, led by the US, against terrorist organizations amongst which Hamas has 
been situated. 
Significantly, the rules of the game in this alliance, and the way it functions were underlined 
by the US due to its momentous plight in the aftermath of 9/11; as a result all partners of the 
US, including the EU, have to adhere to these guidelines or rules. Commenting on this kind 
of association, an anonymous member of the EEAS, sharing his opinion with another 
MEP,
1117
 perceived the US as dominant and unchallenged in the ME while the EU 
simultaneously lacks capability and unanimity, which paved the way for the EU to follow the 
US in the Hamas dossier. In his opinion, if the EU wanted to stand as a counterpart to the US 
it should have a ‘one voice policy’ to be capable of influencing the DMP in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
1118
  
Contrary to this opinion, the MEP Paul Murphy rejected viewpoints that attributed problems 
of the EU in the ME to the lack of unanimity, concluding that “even if the EU is speaking in 
one voice what would this voice say”, in light of establishing powers in the EU that see 
themselves having broadly the same interests in the ME as the US. The European powers on 
the one hand, and the US on the other are driven by their perceptions of their interests in the 
region, with the result that the US “dictates the agenda and the way it allies with the EU and 
how [it] uses [the latter] in the world.”  As a part of these interests, Israel sits at the top of this 
agenda which is used to being drawn by certain powers in the EU, and to a large extent is 
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influenced by the US attitudes. From his perspective, without physical and political changes 
in various countries in Europe, and thereby a change in the performance of the EU, its 
weaknesses will remain as always. Fundamentally, as he stressed, the EU’s policy towards 
Hamas is hugely influenced by the pressure which has been applied by the US and 
coordinated with particular powers within the EU; “the US makes the framework within 
which the EU operates, and the limitations within which the EU adjusts its positions towards 
the events in terms of the condemnation or the support it might show”.1119 Thus, the rules laid 
down by the US still control the way that its allies must follow. 
Ironically, although Hamas has showed a significant tendency towards moderation so that 
many countries have revised their position towards it, the EU has not yet done so. According 
to a MEP, commenting cynically on the EU’s insistence on not correcting its erroneous 
policy towards Hamas, “the West revises its position towards Hamas but the EU not yet… it 
has to wait until the US revises, then [we] will do so”.1120 This reflects the extent of despair 
that some EU officials feel towards the EU FPDM mechanism, in this and other areas of 
discussion alike. Accordingly, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 have had significant repercussions 
globally. In spite of the distinguished relations between the US and the EU in principle, the 
EU’s agenda towards Hamas has been substantially affected by such attacks, and in this 
regard it has been remarkably captive to the ‘magnetic power’ of the US. According to 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, the US is still exploiting the EU in the name of the ‘War on 
Terror’, just as it did in the name of ‘Communist danger’ during the Cold War – a vicious 
circle which should be broken.
1121
 Thus, the absence of the EU’s revision of its policy 
towards Hamas reflects the reality of being externally affected, albeit relatively, by the 
agenda of another actor in the world.      
EU Lost Initiative towards (Democratic) Hamas: the Captivity to the Quartet  
It could be said that the ME constitutes the most significant geographic entity in which the 
EU has had a distinctive voice.
1122
 This could be seen in the Venice Declaration in 1980, the 
first and second Gulf wars in 1991 and 2003, in addition to the EU’s reactions to some of the 
Israeli policies in Palestine. In spite of having a loud voice on occasions, the EU is still at the 
walking stage compared to the capabilities of the US in performing and influencing actors in 
the ME conflict. Therefore, its attempts to affect the road to peace are still trapped by its 
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patterns of action over time. In the wake of Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the EU considered the 
situation as dangerous as it was affecting all its outlays in the peace process between the PA 
and Israel. It was therefore eager to get the negotiations between the two parties back on track 
and to stop them attacking each other. Understandably, and especially after the 9/11 attacks 
on the US, its enthusiasm was not sufficient to contain the violence and restore the initiative 
in the region. With these attacks taking place, a new initiative should have been formulated to 
enable the new “coalition of good” to function against the “ally of evil” in the world without 
being interrupted.
1123
 Hence, the US wanted discretion between the PA and Israel to be able 
to take revenge freely in other places. 
 For this purpose and in cooperation with others, the US institutionalized the international 
efforts exerted in the Arab-Israeli conflict by forming the Middle East Quartet in April 2002. 
The MEQ has been used either to contain EU, Russia and UN efforts or to guide their 
reactions to the escalating violence between Israel and the Palestinians. Thus, the EU’s 
enthusiasm for functioning in the region has been institutionalized through an association 
which in the first place is led by the US.  Since its formation, international interventions in 
the conflict have mainly come through this establishment, extending to the Quartet’s reaction 
to the Hamas electoral victory in the Palestinian elections in 2006. Significantly, 
compromises, propositions and economic and political initiatives in this regard have to be 
organized and approved by the Quartet. This is why the EU found itself captive to the 
Quartet’s decision, taken five days after the appearance of the election results of 25 January 
2006, to make any recognition of Hamas’s electoral victory conditional on its compliance 
with the three stipulations mentioned previously.   
By linking itself to the US policies in the Quartet, which refused any positive change towards 
Hamas unless the international demands were met, the EU has not changed its position. As a 
result, it has become trapped in this “gilded cage”,1124 incapable of acting, and refusing to 
engage diplomatically with a very significant party in the conflict. An anonymous officer 
from the EEAS felt that the EU has tied its hands by agreeing to be part of the Quartet, and 
by following the US, which is hijacked by its internal calculations rather than anything else, 
in adopting the three conditions for recognizing the Hamas government.
1125
 Margrete Auken, 
the EU’s Vice-President of the Delegation for Relations with the PLC, went further than this, 
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pointing out that, in a clear signal to the US representatives, there were Israeli representatives 
in the Quartet who dictated policies towards democracy outcomes in 2006, and that the EU 
followed whatever the Israeli representatives wanted regardless of their demands.
 1126
      
It could be claimed that the EU-US combination under the aegis of the Quartet is a distinctive 
institutionalized initiative in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but at the expense of the political 
personality of the EU. In his interpretation of the policies of the EU and the US towards 
Hamas, the MEP Jarmo Oikarinen thinks that the two powers have followed different 
approaches towards the actors in the ME while the Quartet and the Roadmap are two 
examples of how the powers can together act in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In his interpretation 
of the EU’s position in the Quartet, he claimed that negotiations between the PA and Israel 
are considered the only lasting solution that could be followed by all parties to solve the 
conflict, and that the EU position on Hamas has become a hostage to this consideration. The 
EU certainly did not want to upset Israel by taking any position which might affect the 
process of negotiations, and has therefore opted to follow the guidelines drawn by the 
Quartet.
1127
 While the Quartet had been established to facilitate the effective and influential 
channelling of the efforts of international society, the US, a weighty actor with leverage on 
ME conflict, has imposed its hegemony and directed these efforts towards targeting particular 
directions which it perceived regarding Hamas.  
Michael Docherty from the European Commission also stressed that although there is 
coordination between them, the US should not be allowed to dictate the EU’s geostrategic 
interests in the ME. However,  
The EU made a mistake in allowing the Quartet to dictate its policy regarding [the 
post Hamas electoral victory period]. This is basically putting [ourselves] under US 
control. It’s a problem…it is unfortunate…we need some strong EU leadership 
amongst the member states. The only thing we agree is to continue to pay. 
Unfortunately, the sums of money we pay represent the absence of political 
decision making…it is the price of non-policy.1128 
The level of bitterness can be felt from these interviews, which confirm the fact that being 
merely a shadow of the US in the Arab-Israeli conflict reflects the inability of the EU to 
function appropriately as circumstances demand. Accordingly, under such an institution the 
EU not only suffered from the lack of consensus among its members but has been also caught 
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in a policy formulated in the US rather than being agreed with it.
1129
 Annemie Neyts-
Uyttebroeck, the MEP who accused the EU ministers in 2006 of not thinking twice when they 
decided to boycott and sanction a democratically elected body, is convinced that nothing 
could be done in the ME conflict without the decisive US role under which the EU has 
functioned regarding Hamas;
1130
 a matter which confirms Ahmed Yousef’s claim that the EU 
revolves in the space of US foreign policy.
1131
 Thus, it could be said that as a result of the US 
role in the Quartet, the EU has lost its ability to put together its own independent policy in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.
1132
  
However, the EU’s complementary role to the efforts of the US has had its ups and downs, 
affected by the latter’s attitudes. When the US was busy with the ‘war on terror’ and the peace 
process was badly affected, strategically the EU had nothing to do. Notwithstanding the 
formation of the Quartet in 2002, and despite being a member of this group, the EU has 
functioned as the shadow of the US, and continued to move to the beat of its drum while 
waiting for its practical initiatives. This could be inferred from the remarks made by Herman 
Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, after a summit that brought him and the 
President of the US together in 2010:  “Regarding the Middle East, I expressed the Union’s 
support to President Obama’s efforts to put the direct talks back on track. I also recalled the 
EU’s vital contribution to the process, through our assistance to the Palestinian Authority”.1133 
Van Rompuy placed considerable emphasis on the boundaries of the role that could be played 
by the EU in the MEPP and in all related issues. He asserted the significance of the US role in 
putting the peace process back on track from one side, and recalled the EU’s role through the 
logistical and financial assistance that it could offer in this regard. In effect, he clearly 
highlighted the limitations of all the parties and their roles in this dossier, adopting a marginal 
role while leaving the strategic issues to the US rather than the EU, as it has had always 
leverage on the parties in the MEPP. The EU’s response to the question of Hamas can be 
fully understood in light of its acceptance of the leadership of the US in the region, on the 
basis of which the EU needs to adapt its political steps accordingly. 
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Conclusion 
It is obvious that the EU is a central actor in the Western alliance. At the same time, the other 
actor is the US which holds the reins of leadership in this transatlantic coalition. The strategic 
policies of the two partners regarding the ME are not so much contradictory as they are 
complementary. Whereas the leadership of the US is not openly enshrined in a formal 
document signed with the EU, observation confirms that this is fact. Fundamentally, while 
the perceptions of EU officials and experts in IR broadly confirm the reality of the EU’s 
dependence on the US in the Hamas dossier, and in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, the 
EU’s self-perceived role as a complementary agent to the US in this regard, has led the EU to 
become inconsistent with itself by following a policy formulated by others, and often 
contrary to its inspiring norms and values.  
This dependence has turned out to be the kind of dependency between partners but neither 
foes nor counterparts. Thus, the continuing EU policy towards Hamas stems from within as 
much as it is affected by the US as a dominant actor in the Western alliance. In the same vein, 
it could be concluded that there is a common feeling of inferiority towards the US amongst 
EU officials when focussing on the reality of having 27 foreign policies compared to one US 
policy; a matter which has made it easy for the EU to follow plans drawn up outside its own 
borders.  
This reality has also confirmed the extent to which the EU is ready to prioritize its interests 
with the US and Israel, at the expense of its own norms, values and morals, by giving the lead 
to the fully and commonly-known biased actor represented in the US.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This concluding chapter presents the most important findings, contributions, and 
recommendations of this thesis. The study’s main results and its assessment of the EU’s 
foreign policy towards Hamas (as deduced from the empirical chapters) have been 
accordingly articulated. Building on this aspect, the study’s contributions to the literature in 
this area of discussion are presented, along with recommendations to the EU decision-makers 
as well as to the Hamas leadership to be taken into consideration for their future relations. 
Since various constraints meant that it was not possible to fill all the gaps in the literature in 
this specific area of study, additional topics are identified that other researchers may wish to 
investigate in the future.      
Empirical Chapters’ Review  
Following a descriptive chapter dedicated to the decision-making mechanism in the EU, the 
historical chapter proved that the tension between the EU and Hamas is an extension to the 
implicitly and explicitly-felt historical tension between the West and the Islamic East over 
time, which is based on the conflictual interaction between identities and interests of both. 
The examination of the EU norms and values was made in the next chapter after highlighting 
paradoxes pertaining to the EU discourse towards Hamas; this made it clear, in this respect, 
that the EU is realistically driven rather than being normatively motivated. With regard to the 
dialectic debate concerning resistance and terrorism, as an axis around which both actors 
differ significantly, it has been critically discussed demonstrating the EU double standard 
policy in this regard. In the following chapter, the Israeli factor was discussed as a self-
driving determinant of the EU foreign policy towards Hamas, indicating the significance of 
the socially-constructed mix between identities and self-interests; a matter that created 
specific rules for breaking the EU’s commitments to its previously-declared inspiring norms. 
The influence of the US factor on the EU decision making regarding Hamas was discussed 
and arguably articulated in the final empirical chapter, in which the EU’s foreign policy in 
Palestine is also accused of being to a large extent dependent on the US.  
Contradictions over Identities, Perceptions and Self-Interests   
With regard to Hamas, The EU’s FPDM process was aimed at containing the negative effects 
of the Hamas resistance on the stability and security situations that the EU itself had sought to 
enhance after the 1993 Oslo Agreement between the PLO and Israel. Hence, protection of the 
MEPP, as a channel through which stability could be achieved, was given priority by the 
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EU’s policy which focused on two things; neutralizing the influence of Hamas after taming it 
through democratic means, and assuring its compliance with the Middle East Quartet’s 
demands before legitimizing it internationally as a regional political actor. However, despite 
the initial use of diplomacy to achieve this objective, the most influential mechanisms applied 
by the EU were economic sanctions, political siege, and diplomatic boycott.  
This policy was eventually characterized as imbalanced and inconsistent with the inspiring 
declared principles and norms of the EU construct, and was thereafter announced as the 
driving force of its foreign and security policy in the international arena. Whereas the 
promoting of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law are the most 
fundamental norms on which the EU has concentrated in its rhetoric, in the case of 
Palestinian democracy in 2006, the EU’s practices have confirmed that it is driven by 
principles of self-interest, and considerations of identity, rather than being led by norms and 
values-based rhetoric.  This has undermined the EU’s credibility and its commitment to these 
norms and, contrary to its usual normative appearance, has enhanced its negative image as the 
supporter of autocratic authorities. It is believed that this inconsistent discourse and “double-
standard policy in applying norms abroad does not help Europe’s long-term security”,1134 
which it seeks to further through its political policies.       
Identity can be considered one of the main determinants of EU policy towards Hamas. 
Significantly, the reality of the EU as a stability-seeking and a security-driven actor in 
Palestine, in addition to the self-definition of Hamas as a freedom-fighter and a liberation-
seeking actor for Palestine, are the main interactively-constructed and conflictual socio-
political aspects that make up the contradictory status of the association between the two 
actors. Indeed, the identities of both and the way that each perceives itself and the other are 
profoundly produced and reproduced over time within the geo-strategic and political structure 
in which they actively function and interrelate. Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas inhabits the 
Palestinian land around which the conflict has been taking place, and over which, according 
to the Oslo Agreements between the PLO and Israel, a political compromise between 
Palestinians and Israelis should have been implemented in 1999 by establishing a Palestinian 
state. Significantly, both of the EU and Hamas inspiring cultural considerations about this 
land have intersubjectively conflicted and led to the former’s policy towards the latter. Based 
on historical, ideological and religious dimensions, this land is implicitly and explicitly 
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perceived by the EU and Israel as a Jewish sacred area, a ‘promised land’, while Hamas’s 
perception of the same land is constructed on contradictory ideological, cultural and religious 
elements that regard it as an Islamic land under occupation. This culturally-driven 
contradiction placed each actor in opposition to the other, and as explained in Chapter Seven, 
led the EU to defend Israel as a spearhead of the West in the Middle East, given its 
importance in this corner of the world. Besides, feeling that Israel holds the same set of 
values and norms as the EU and belongs to the same Western Judeo-Christian culture and 
civilizastion, pushed the EU to back this state as part of Europe and thus, in the face of its 
enemies, inter alia, Hamas, to act and react accordingly. In this sense, according to the EU, 
Israel is an identity matter, since it has represented a European ‘Self’ and Western interests in 
which the historical Jewish question has been solved once and for all. Therefore, existential 
threats to this Jewish entity (and to the West’s plans for stabilizing and securing it), by 
Hamas or any similar entities might, if successful, ruin historical Western efforts to foster the 
state of Israel in the ME, and allow the Jewish question, an injury supposedly healed, to 
explode once again in Europe. Hence, the EU member states are noticeably interested in 
finishing a mission, started by their ancestors in 1917, that is represented in stabilizing and 
situating Israel as a Jewish state within peaceful and secure borders through the MEPP; 
however, contradictory actions against this mission committed by Hamas or similar entities, 
are considered by the EU as physical threats which must be encountered rigorously and 
robustly regardless of the outcome of Palestinian democracy in 2006.   
In this respect, Hamas has been perceived as an obstacle to the ME peace process because of 
its perceptions of the conflict and its violent practices which contradicted the EU’s core 
endeavour in this area. It represents a challenge not only to the state of Israel, but also to the 
legitimacy and existence of the official Palestinian side, i.e., the leadership of the PA, in 
which the West in general and the EU in particular, have invested time, effort, and billions of 
euros shaping and reshaping its mind-set and behaviour over time in accordance with the 
MEPP requirements. The coming to power of Hamas in 2006, holding its ideological beliefs 
and political convictions, disturbed this internationally-backed peace process which had been 
planned to disburse its advantages over specific periods of time. Significantly, this created a 
profound problem for the EU, by putting it on a conflicting course with its normatively-
introduced image. On the one hand, the EU wanted a democratic process that would bring to 
power a democratic leadership committed to the MEPP, while the unyielding Hamas was not 
a welcome outcome. On the other hand, the EU wanted the solution to the conflict to be 
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negotiated and agreed peacefully, whereas Hamas does not believe in negotiations or in the 
MEPP as designed by Western countries and their allies. Hamas believes in, and exercises, 
violent resistance against the Israeli occupation, while the EU considers violence-based 
resistance as a kind of international pariah terrorism.  
Contradictions over the perceptions of the two actors regarding other controversial issues are 
of equal importance to the issues noted above. Fundamentally, Hamas identifies the whole of 
Palestine, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, as an exclusive right of the 
Palestinian people, while the EU has recognized Israel within the 1948 boundaries, which 
represent 78 percent of Palestine, and perceives the rest as subject to a negotiated 
compromise between the PA and Israel. Furthermore, Hamas considers that the two-state 
solution, if it happens, ought not to be based on recognition of the Israeli state, whereas the 
EU considers this resolution will only come about as a result of Israel having formally-
recognized borders. In fact, while Israel’s safety and security has over time been a very big 
priority for the EU, Hamas believes that by destroying Israel’s security theory, the 
Palestinians could achieve their goals, as happened, for example, in the Gaza Strip in 
2005.
1135
  
With regard to the problems of Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank, and natural resources, along with other controversial issues, the EU is convinced 
that such matters can be solved only through direct negotiations. In light of the prevailing 
balance of power Hamas believes that neither multilateral negotiations nor bilateral talks can 
solve them in the Palestinians’ favour, and that their political and historical aspirations can be 
achieved only through the resistance. From the EU perspective, however, the PLO-Israel 
agreements, and the historical UN resolutions about Palestine are valid for building on, 
although Hamas considers them as in some way validating the historical injustice inflicted on 
the Palestinians. Thus, the conflictual perceptions of the EU and Hamas towards the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in addition to the definition of ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in this regard 
(as well as the Hamas military resistance) have intersubjectively interrelated, breaking 
significant EU norms and rules, and produced inconsistent policy towards the movement 
under light. In other words, the interaction of the practices and beliefs of Hamas with the 
EU’s perceptions has become a fundamental determinant of the EUFP towards Hamas itself.  
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The FPA methodology used in this study focuses on the DM process towards Hamas, and on 
the internal and external factors affecting the decision-makers as well as the policy 
implementation process. In this regard, many of the variables in the surrounding EU structure 
have, in one way or another, affected the policy adopted by the EU towards Hamas. Such 
variables include history-based culture and the tension which has constituted a collective 
cognitive psychological barrier between the Christian West and the Islamic East over time, as 
well as historical junctures in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the contextual dimension of the 
ME in terms of its historical correlations with the European states. Significantly, these built-
in variables in the mind-sets of the EU decision-makers constitute the cultural and socio-
political background of the EU’s policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and 
particularly Hamas.  
As the sum of its member states and as an institution, the EU has undoubtedly inherited 
certain historical developments from both the 20th and 21st centuries, and has remained 
captive to their impacts thereafter, without being capable of making any significant change. 
However, the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the Mandate that followed in 1922, the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 and 
the consequent decision by the EU to put Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations, as well 
as the decision of the Quartet-EU, following the Palestine Legislative Council elections in 
2006, to boycott the Hamas-led government, are significant historical stages according to 
which the EU has since found itself constrained through the effects of identity and self-
interest. It can therefore be concluded that the EU’s policy towards Hamas has been socio-
politically constructed, historically affected, strategically distinguished and realistically 
inspired; and that the inconsistencies and paradoxes of this policy have clearly resulted from 
conflicting understandings of Palestinian rights, including the right of military resistance, that 
are differently perceived by Hamas and the EU.    
It is expected that the European Union’s foreign policy towards Hamas will remain as it is, 
unless substantial and dramatic changes occur on one or both sides of the equation. As long 
as the Hamas movement continues to function as it has done since 2006, and goes on holding 
the same radical beliefs that it has been preaching amongst the Palestinians regarding the 
conflict, the EU will not change its policy towards Hamas. Therefore, without Hamas (or, of 
course, the EU) changing its self-definition, and abandoning some of its identity components, 
the dominant status between them will remain at an impasse. However, were Hamas to 
redefine itself, practically or theoretically, in terms both of its relationship with the Middle 
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East peace process, and of stability and security as perceived by the EU and the West, the EU 
would alter its position.
1136
 Similarly, if the EU, in principle, redefined itself in the same way, 
either practically or theoretically in terms of its relationship with Israel, the US and the rights 
of the Palestinians, the opportunity for change would become feasible.
1137
 Significantly, the 
material and non-material interests of both the EU and Hamas in maintaining the same policy 
track depends on how they estimate the profits and loss that might accrue as a result of their 
policies. While the identity of both has proved to be changeable, shaped and reproduced over 
time, depending on the context and consequential outcomes of their policies, Europe’s 
interests with Israel seems to have been constant and fixed since the Balfour Declaration in 
1917. In the event of any changes in this regard, the entire association with Israel would be 
affected.           
In addition to the external US factor, significant constraints on the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Hamas can be found in the institutional dimension. The EU’s decision-making 
mechanism is a complicated process. Due to the need to achieve consensus among the EU’s 
27 member states, unanimity is an important procedure when it comes to putting an entity on 
the list of terrorist organizations or removing it from that list. Any single member state, 
whatsoever its size, can theoretically and practically use the veto against any decision that 
might be taken by the majority in favour of Hamas or against Israel. Since Hamas was put on 
this list as a result of EU consensus, it has become almost impossible for its name to be 
removed, unless or until it has fulfilled all the requirements for such an outcome.  
Although many EU officials agree that boycotting Hamas, especially after the 2006 elections, 
was a mistake, none of the EU member states has taken the initiative to ask officially for it to 
be taken off the list of proscribed bodies. Despite the EU’s decision to declare the military 
and political wings of Hamas as ‘terrorists’ in 2001 and 2003 respectively, it turns out that 
the behaviour of the EU institutions and member states has gone beyond the terms of the 
decision. Whereas the decision merely talked about “the freezing of the funds and other 
financial assets or economic resources”1138 of those categorized as terrorists, and did not 
criminalize the act of speaking to them, the EU bodies nevertheless boycotted Hamas, and 
constantly refused to open any official dialogue with the movement. Thus opportunities for 
opening appropriate channels of diplomacy that should have been utilized with the Hamas-led 
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government after 2006, have not been activated or used. In addition to the considerations 
noted above, this is due to other institutional restrictions represented in the Middle East 
Quartet and the dominant influence of the US on it.  
The EU’s apparent differences with the US and Israel over its policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict resemble no more than the varying opinions found among members of the same 
family, and are mostly related to (what fits more appropriately than the other) approach, 
rather than being drastically and substantially divergent. The EU and the US are partners, 
neither counterparts nor foes, in seeking stability and security for Israel, and also subscribe to 
the same norms and values, which implies the EU’s commitment to the existence and 
survival of Israel and, at the same time, its compliance with the US discourse towards Hamas. 
Although cultural and historical heritage is one of the components of the European decision-
makers mind-set, this study has found, contrary to what Ahmed Yusef believes,
1139
 that the 
EU policy towards Hamas is not affected by whether or not Hamas is Islamic as much as it is 
affected by Hamas being militarily effective against the safety and survival of Israel in a 
manner that may threaten it ontologically, and by extension endanger the MEPP. Hence, the 
EU has put other secular militant Palestinian factions on the same list of terrorists, including 
such essentially non-Islamic groups as the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP,) and Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command PFLP-GC).
1140
 However, other Islamic parties whose ideology 
against Israel is the same as that of Hamas have not been put on the EU’s list because they do 
not have a ‘resistance identity’ and have not used violence against Israel (for example Al-
Tahrir Islamic party).
1141
 From the European perspective, “history shows ... that political 
violence has been born from all religions and ideologies”;1142 nor is it exclusive to any one 
group or another; therefore, what matters to the EU in this respect are actions rather than the 
ethnic backgrounds of those who undertake them.  
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Failure of the EU Policy 
Europe and its allies have purposefully sought to thwart Hamas,
1143
 through various means 
but without any convincing success. Given that Hamas did not respond positively to the 
demands of the EU and the Quartet, the only way for Hamas to be brought to its knees, from 
the perspective of its opponents, was to poke sticks in the wheels of its government until 
surrendering. Having noticeably failed, through democratic means, to subdue the Palestinian 
movement to their stipulations politically, each actor among the Western allies, the EU, and 
the US, in addition to Israel and the PA, acted in its own way with the aim of putting an end 
to Hamas in power. But despite their success in toppling Hamas from the leadership of the 
PA, and isolating it in the Gaza Strip after June 2007, the EU’s policy towards the movement 
has failed to achieve any significant breakthrough in the stalemated MEPP. It has been unable 
to break Hamas, and has failed to bring it into this Western circle, or achieve stability and 
security in the region. At the same time, the EU has halted its own diplomacy in the peace 
process, having excluded Hamas from the Israeli-Palestinian equation and adopted instead the 
collective hostile policy directed against this democratically-elected body.   
Similarly, the obvious failure of the EU’s policy towards Hamas can be clearly seen through 
the opposite policy outcomes. In this regard the anti-Hamas EU strategy, supported by the 
positions and practices of other parties, eventually led Hamas to take over the Gaza Strip after 
a fight with its internationally-backed rival Fatah. The consequent deconstruction of the EU’s 
investments in the PA security forces in Gaza, in addition to the polarization of Palestinian 
society between Fatah and Hamas and the resulting split between the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip are significant results of the European Union’s policy, which was based on the notion of 
isolating Hamas. Contrary to the EU objectives, and given the absence of a united Palestinian 
leadership and geography, this split has effectively meant the disappearance of any realistic 
prospect for a two-state solution. Other side-effects that have ensued as a result of this policy 
are represented, most importantly, in the retreat of the EU from its plans for promoting 
democracy in the ME in favour of other agendas pertaining to rational choices rather than 
normative goals. This encourages dictatorships to continue to misrepresent the will of their 
people and confiscate their political and civil rights.   
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Despite being boycotted, besieged and even fought against, the steadfastness of Hamas over 
many years is another revealing confirmation of the outcome described above. Despite its 
considerable diplomatic loss as a result of being isolated and proscribed, the Hamas 
movement has been militarily empowered, and its grip over the Gaza Strip has been 
reinforced, both socio-politically and financially. Additionally, because of their free 
democratic choices (neglected by those who are regarded as Western imperial powers), the 
Palestinians in Gaza, and thus Hamas, have become a symbol of ‘the oppressed’ throughout 
the world. Hence, the international solidarity movement, represented through various 
‘freedom flotillas’ and campaigns, as well as by international demonstrations and public 
marches in support of the people of Gaza, constitutes an important response to the pressures 
on the Hamas-led government, and has led to a widening of the circles supporting Hamas, for 
example, by gaining the support of Turkey as an important regional power.  
Significantly, the image of a defiant Hamas and its counterparts in Gaza was further 
deepened and enhanced following the movement’s involvement in two serious wars with 
Israel in 2008/9 and 2012 that failed to bring it to its knees. Its ability to build up its (army) 
and its military capabilities, in addition to its success in enabling other Palestinian resistance 
factions to construct their own military forces under its protection and without the 
international accountability required in the West Bank under the Fatah leadership, are further 
evidence of the failure of the EU’s foreign policy towards the movement. Thus, while the 
EU-Quartet policy to a certain extent succeeded in isolating Hamas diplomatically and 
internationally, the latter has nevertheless achieved significant gains that have moved the 
two-state solution further away from validation, making the region’s stability rather more 
elusive. In the EU’s sanctions policy, as the EU Council confirmed, 
Sanctions should be targeted in a way that has maximum impact on those whose 
behaviour we want to influence. Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent 
possible any adverse humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for persons 
not targeted or neighbouring countries. Measures such as arms embargoes, visa 
bans and the freezing of funds are a way of achieving this.
1144
 
Thus, by going against these objectives and exceeding the intended outcomes, the EU’s 
sanctions-based policy against Hamas has politically failed to achieve its aims, and at the 
same time caused huge humanitarian suffering amongst the Palestinians. As noted by Peter 
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Seeberg, this proved that the EU, contrary to its preferred image, was “a realist actor in 
normative clothes”.1145    
Recommendations to the EU   
Without ignoring its morally-justified interests in the ME, the EU’s foreign policy, in 
essence, should be consistent with its declared normative objectives. However, balanced 
relations with the populations of the region represent the only guarantee that the EU will be 
able to function as an accepted mediator by all parties. Nor can it hope to achieve stability 
and security in its Middle Eastern backyard by being biased towards one party at the expense 
of others, based on self-interest and identity calculations rather than on justice and 
internationally-supported norms and values that accord with IHL. On the contrary, socio-
political disturbance will continue to be the dominant fact on the ground; a matter that will 
undoubtedly reflect on the EU’s interests if not in the short run, then certainly in the long 
term. Hence, the EU should look at the ME, and at Hamas, through the rights of its peoples, 
not through the eye of the Israeli needle. It is true that some EU countries have been involved 
in building Israel, brick by brick, but by disregarding the Palestinians’ right of resistance 
according to the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, while venerating the Israeli right 
of self-defence, the EU will continue to be accused of inconsistency and bias in its role and 
will be unable to interact appropriately. Significantly, the US and Israel have their own 
ideologically-and strategically-motivated calculations in the ME, whereas the EU, given its 
proximity to the ME and the consequential threats, should take into account that its long-term 
interests might well lie with the Arab and Islamic people rather than with Israel.     
Rebuilding EU-Hamas relations will depend on the former’s ability to overcome its 
customary stance towards the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis. In this respect, 
the EU needs to revisit its positions towards both actors – Hamas and Israel – and to treat 
them similarly and neutrally if it does not want to be beside victims of the conflict.  If, due to 
institutional constraints, the EU cannot do so, the fact that its decision to ban Hamas did not 
negate the possibility of mutual dialogue should be reactivated by those EU members who are 
sufficiently courageous to act by opening up an official dialogue with Hamas. At the same 
time, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) could legitimately lead the initiative with 
their counterparts from Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council by opening a 
constructive dialogue that might lead to more profound actions between the two parties. The 
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preliminary stage should be acknowledgement in EU decision-making circles of the need to 
deal with the Hamas dossier away from the dominance of the US and Israel. This should be 
followed by recognition of Palestinian rights, including their legitimate rights under the 
Israeli occupation. Giving priority to the normative and moral factors rather than ideological 
aspects will underpin the bases for constructing solid relations with Arab and Islamic 
countries in the future. Against this background, the outcomes of any democratic elections in 
the PA should be respected and dealt with accordingly, and winners should take full 
advantage of the opportunity granted to them by their constituencies to show their 
performance on the ground.    
Recommendations to Hamas  
The responsibility of Hamas is no less important than the EU’s duty in fixing EU policy 
towards the movement. After fifteen years of evolution, Hamas was put on the EU’s list of 
terrorist organizations, following the EU’s policy shift from being pragmatic towards the 
movement to becoming more authoritarian. It is true that in this regard many determinants 
affected EU decision-making, but Hamas’s own resistance tactics can be regarded as one of 
the factors that accelerated this dramatic shift. However, excessive reliance on specific 
resistance tactics (mainly attacks that targeted Israeli civilians) played a significant role in the 
context of the post-9/11 attacks in vilifying the movement. The Hamas leadership should 
have studied the context after these attacks and behaved accordingly; especially as there were 
plenty of resistance methods used in the second Intifada that could have hurt the Israeli 
occupation (apart from bombing people who are internationally perceived as civilians, which 
is no longer acceptable to Western public opinion).  
In this sense, Hamas must take some responsibility for having become internationally 
isolated, which means that it should have been keen to keep its diplomatic channels open to 
the world by taking the newly-generated post-9/11 international context into account. The 
widespread claims by the Western media that Hamas was a terrorist organization certainly 
had an effect on the European Union’s decision-making circles, among others, with the result 
that many influential figures in the EU were misled into believing such assertions. As one of 
my interviewees commented, Hamas should know that “it is not enough to be correct, 
[Hamas has] to show others that [it is] correct, and to give the impression that [it is] as so”; 
therefore, to reflect the justice of the Palestinian cause it has to be clearer in its statements 
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and behaviour.
1146
 Given that the EU is internally and strategically dominated by the major 
powers, which are considered allies of Israel, it will not be easy for Hamas to be removed 
from the EU’s list of terrorists. However, changing EU policy in this regard depends, on the 
one hand, on any alterations that could occur in Hamas’s convictions and behaviour, and on 
the other the physical change that might take place towards Israel inside the leading countries 
in the European Union. Thus, if it decided not to change itself, Hamas should instead activate 
its soft power and exert its efforts, through its supporters in the West, towards influencing 
Western public opinion to become more sympathetic towards Palestine, and less towards its 
enemy. However, if not interested in deconstructing the EU-Israeli relationships, Hamas 
should at least exert its efforts to minimize the reflections of these associations on the 
Palestinian cause.        
Contributions to the EU-ME Literature   
Even if much of the literature talks about how international actors have dealt with Hamas, 
until the present study the EU’s foreign policy approach towards Hamas has not been 
thoroughly articulated or conceptualized, or indeed intellectually situated. Therefore, the 
major contribution of this work is represented in the articulation and conceptualization 
processes of this policy, which were followed throughout the thesis, and investigated 
theoretically and empirically. As such, its inconsistencies, paradoxes, restrictions and 
determinants have been epistemologically drawn in this discourse.  
Hence, contrary to those contributions made by others, from the three schools of thought 
discussed in the literature review, tackling the EU policy towards Hamas from different 
corners,
1147
 this study has deeply investigated and exclusively emphasized the identity and 
self-interests-based policy affected by various societal characteristics of the EU decision-
making structure. Significantly, the material presented in the research has examined and 
challenged the role of the identities of the EU and Hamas, their respective perceptions of the 
conflict, and the way these variables have subjectively intertwined and interacted. Thus, the 
European Union’s socio-strategically constructed and realistically implemented approach to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and particularly Hamas, has been critically underscored in the ME 
context. In this respect, the importance of the historical junctures related to the conflict has 
been highlighted in terms of their impact on steering the realistic self-interest-based tendency 
of the EU’s foreign policy towards the movement in question. However, based on this trial 
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and under analogous circumstances, it could be generalized that the EU will pursue with 
other cases similar policies to those followed in the Hamas case.   
The material provided in this thesis may also be of use to policy makers in the EU’s three 
leading institutions: the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council. Significantly, 
it has lighted the way towards a more consistent EU policy by showing the opposite face of 
this policy. For those who are involved in the daily decision-making process and are keen to 
project themselves as the normative power, it is extremely important to observe the 
systematically prejudiced and biased nature of the discourse they have had in a specific area 
of functioning over a period of time, and to adjust their views accordingly. As far as the 
Hamas leadership is concerned, if it is interested in constructive international relations with 
the EU it too can benefit from taking these research findings into account. As far as I am 
aware, this research is probably the first in-depth study in this particular field, and is based on 
a vast spread of primary EU documents and interviews, the content of which has been 
comprehensively and analytically scrutinized.  
Topics to be undertaken by future researchers 
Even after answering the main questions of this study, many other problems still have to be 
tackled, and indeed it is clear that this whole area of discussion still needs further 
investigation. The effect of the Zionist lobby on the EU decision-makers regarding the Arab-
Israeli conflict and its related issues has not been deeply scrutinised, nor has the weight of the 
Arab and Islamic minorities and associations in Europe and thereby ways in which the EU’s 
decision-making process toward Palestine could be made more influential need to be 
explored . Another potential topic to be considered is “the EU’s interests with the Arab and 
Islamic countries versus its interests with Israel”, while researchers could also work on “the 
role of European public opinion as an effective instrument in steering the EU’s decision-
making process towards the rights of the Palestinians”.  
In addition, further areas for research and assessment might include “the construction and 
deconstruction of the Zionist narrative in European mentalities regarding Palestine”, along 
with media psychology and impression-based propaganda towards Palestinian military 
factions and resistance. Examination of these, among other suggested areas of research, is 
therefore extremely important both for the EU and for the Palestinians, particularly Hamas. 
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